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Ans TIlt ACT 
Philosophies of history,, with their wide-ranging speculations on the overall course of the 
historical development, have lost credibility under the existentialist and po st-mo dem attacks 
against totality thinking. An illustrious casualty of the latter's deconstructive practice is the 
idea of progress. Elevated during the Enlightenment to the quasi-idolatric status of symbol 
of the dynamic and future oriented traits of modernity, this idea has increasingly faded away 
from the process of self-understanding of modem consciousness in the face of the moral 
ambiguity taken on by science and technology. 
This thesis challenges the current general mood of disillusionment of belief in 
progress. By confronting the 'nihilistic' - Nietzsche and Heidegger - and the 'utopian' - Ad 
orno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse - critiques of progress, it pursues a revitalization of the 
humanist tradition. It argues that Nietzsche and Heidegger, in spite of their repudiation of 
the concept of totality, remain anchored to an idea of totalized modernity which reproduces 
the theoretical pattern of radical philosophy of history. In this respect, it contends that the 
philosophies of history of these two authors can be generally regarded as 'progressive', 
although the ideals they advocate are of a different mould from those of the Enlightenment. 
However, against Nietzsche and Heidegger, the thesis embraces - after criticizing 
Adorno's and Horkheirner's negative dialectic - Marcuse's materialist-dialectical framework 
accounting for a new technological society based upon the values of freedom, justice, 
equality, happiness, and beauty. It argues also that the accomplishment of this utopian 
project does not require us to abandon science and reason. The thesis does not offer a 
definitive argument to establish the superiority of the utopian account of the historical 
totality as opposed to the nihilistic one, although it rejects the relativist assertion that all 
validity claims are equivalent. But, since philosophies of history iniply the task of passing 
value judgements on the course of historical events, the thesis claims that, ultimately, 
insights into a better way of life transcending 'the bad current state of humanity' can find 
their truth only in historical action and in the struggle of humanity to overcome suffering. 
V 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an attempt to explain the crisis of modernity in the light of the critiques 
raised to the idea of progress from the divergent standpoints of nihilism and Critical 
Theory. The most widespread studies of the relationship between modernity and belief 
in progress regard the latter as a sort of secularized view of history which emerged in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries out of earlier phi losophic-historical 
formulations. What has since then grounded the historians' total reconstructions of the 
historical process, these analyses suggest, is an indubitable faith in progress, i. e. in the 
teleological movement of history towards an end-point. Indeed, throughout its 
unfolding, history has displayed a series of extraordinary accomplishments capable on 
their own of substantiating the underlying faith in the magnificent destiny towards 
which humanity was believed to be heading. The development of knowledge, science, 
and technology has expanded material welfare, thus allowing the improvement of social 
and political institutions, the effectiveness of moral norms, and the refinement of 
aesthetic taste. However, all these analyses agree in recognizing that in recent decades 
the entire framework incorporating the idea of progress has come into question and that 
the doctrine of progress has been widely rejected. Disillusionment with progress is 
related to the fact that breakthroughs in science and technology have become morally 
ambiguous, since man's increasing understanding and control over nature have assumed 
the shape of a manipulative and potentially destructive power. The outcome of this line 
of thought is not uniform: some diagnoses claim that the fading of our confidence in 
the idea of progress is ineluctable, especially considering that religion, upon which faith 
in progress is believed to be ultimately grounded, is inexorably declining; other 
interpretations maintain the validity of the idea of progress, though admitting that it 
cannot be retained without providing a new set of ethical criteria assumed to be 
compelling obligations in the course of history. 
But where does this presumed ethical authority reside whose viewpoint entitles it 
to dictate universal norms of moral action? Here is the point where modernity displays 
its close link with the concept of progress - such a pervasive one, the latter, in the 
history of modernity, that it might be almost identified with modernity itself. The crisis 
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of modernity is precisely the coming into question of the notion of truth as "objective" 
or "scientific" truth which can be proved through some-kind of procedural reasoning. 
Renunciation of objective truth involves the abandonment of the epistemological 
relationship between subject and object. Philosophical literature tends to trace back to 
Descartes's Metaphysical Meditations in order to uncover the original source of 
modernity. There Descartes seeks to give reasons for the subject-object relationship. 
How can, he wonders, a given subject enclosed in itself go out of itself to reach a given 
object? This question is destined to be left unanswered until unshakable grounds of 
logical and empirical evidence are revealed to discursive thought. To this purpose, 
Descartes drew on the ego cogito, Kant on the transcendental deduction of the 
categories, and Husserl on transcendental-phenomenological subjectivity. It was 
Nietzsche, instead, considered along with Heidegger as having opened up the crisis of 
modernity, who, by proclaiming that God is dead, affirmed that there are no longer 
foundations of rational thought and that all claims to truth cannot be justified from 
transcendental or divine standpoints. The task that, according to Nietzsche, is left to 
contemporary philosophy is therefore a nihilistic one, which consists in dissolving truth 
into value and unmasking the normative moral judgements as human beliefs and 
opinions or, in late Nietzsche's terms, as a manifestation of the will to power. In this 
nihilistic perspective even the rationality embodied in the logical structures of 
discursive thought - whether philosophical or scientific - is considered to be an 
expression of the will to power whose systems of explanation should be contemplated 
within the horizon of rhetoric and persuasion. 
Insofar as the concept of progress defines the identity of modernity, the fading of 
our confidence in the idea of progress marks the crisis of modernity. According to 
Loewith, the concept of progress is rooted in the Jewish-Christian idea of salvation. 
This has been subjected to a process of secularization during the Enlightenment, thus 
taking on the features of a movement forward in which things steadily get better. What 
distinguishes the secularized view of history from the previous providential 
formulations is that, whereas the latter located the place of emancipation of humanity 
in a transcendent and historical realm, the former confines the kingdom of heaven to the 
world of history. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger are regarded to have been against the 
idea of progress. Nietzsche is said to have considered progress as just one of the many 
myths included among the ascetic ideals whose roots in the will to power should be 
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unmasked by deconstructive thought. Heidegger, on his behalf, believed that 
technological civilization is the culmination of Western metaphysics., for it embodies 
within its formal and logical structure the objectivizing essence of metaphysical 
thought. In a certain sense, Heidegger contends, the technological era has unfolded in a 
brutal and dismaying way the inner tendencies of rational metaphysics - preliminarily 
identified with humanism - towards a manipulative control of human beings. The 
capacity of science to formulate general laws has made possible rational predictions of 
not only natural events but also of human behaviour, thus revealing the values of 
humanism as potentially de-humanising. Secularization and progress, according to 
Heidegger, have paved the way for the decline of humanism, and this defines precisely 
the crisis of modernity. In other words, the crisis of modernity is, for Heidegger, the 
logical and necessary outcome of rationalistic metaphysics which is at the core of 
humanism. 
The challenge facing this thesis lies in the possibility of reviving the 
Enlightenment idea of progress in a disenchanted world without religion and 
metaphysics. The philosophers of the Frankfurt School -Adomo, Horkheimer, and 
Marcuse - though acknowledging Weber's negative dialectics of progress as long as it 
spells out the actual dynamic of modem industrial society pointing to the affirmation of 
formal and instrumental rationality, are not willing to submit themselves to the 
seemingly ineluctable logic of modernization. Weber's contribution to the analysis of 
modernity is designed to show that the historical process of rationalization of the world, 
as it has been advocated by the philosophers of Enlightenment, far from creating 
autonomous individuals, has imprisoned modem humanity, in Habermas's jargon, 
within depersonalized and bureaucratized subsystems of cultural discourse and social 
interaction. Moreover, there is for Weber an internal logical relationship between 
rationalization - in the sense of the affirmation of formal, purposive, and discursive 
rationality aiming at organizing within a systematic order the chaotic manifold of 
human experience - and Enlightenment. The normative idea of reason grounding the 
process of emancipation of consciousness from the obscurities of religious narrative 
has led, in Weber's view, to the emergence of a disenchanted consciousness 
institutionalized in secularized subsystems which reproduce in a reified form the 
inhibitions and restrictions of the old self-deceived religious consciousness. 
Adomo and Horkheimer contend a more emphatic conception of reason 
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encompassing the ideas of freedom, justice, and happiness. On the assumption that the 
dialectics of progress has taken the negative path of the disenchanted world to be 
surrendered to the desacralized and disillusioned activities of scientific objectivity, they 
believe that the liberated society can no longer be thought of as the immanent result of 
the internal evolution of modem capitalist society. A revolutionary act is needed in 
order to break the destructive dialectics of progress and establish a realm of freedom. 
However, depending upon an act of radical discontinuity rather than on the continuity 
of the historical process, the alternative of liberated society is projected into a utopian 
perspective. From this vantage point, it comes to appear as a negative counter image 
postulated beyond history while history points in the opposite direction towards a 
rationalized system of reified institutions inducing the repression of individual 
consciousness. What makes the perspective of liberated society an abstract ideal 
unlikely to be achieved is the evidence that the modem process of rationalization does 
not merely involve the systematization and bureaucratization of politics, morality, 
universal law, and scientific objectification of the world, but extends its influence also 
to the reffication of consciousness. In such a rationalized world so pervasively 
permeated by discursive thought, Adomo believes that only the work of art, by means 
of its aesthetic synthesis, can prefigure a world of authentic rational order. 
At this stage, the confrontation between the two interpretations of modernity I am 
concerned with - the 'nihilistic' and the 'utopian' ones - seems to face an impasse. This 
is determined by the fact that their respective discourses on human progress cannot be 
reconciled. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger, on the one hand, and Adomo and 
Horkheimer, on the other hand, launch radical and devastating attacks on modemity but 
from different perspectives. To recognize the nihilistic critique leads to an 
individualistic overcoming; to embrace the utopian one leads to a total but abstract 
liberation. In confronting them, I probably pay an excessive tribute to Nietzsche's and 
Heidegger's contributions to contemporary thought. It is my persuasion that, after their 
philosophical reflection, everyone who wants to embark on the task of penetrating the 
most entangled features of modemity can no longer ignore their attacks against Western 
metaphysics and ascetic ideals. Yet, it should be considered that the most immediate 
implications resulting from deconstructing and dismantling modem reason lie in the 
danger of plummeting into an uncontrollable and potentially apocalyptic irrationalism. 
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To be sure, in this thesis I tell a different story of Nietzsche and Heidegger. This 
is mainly a thesis on philosophy of history and I argue that these two champions of 
nihilistic thought possess a dialectical theory of Western history designed to take man 
out of modernity. If the surface of their suggestive and metaphorical language flows 
with the vocabulary of relativism and perspectivism, I demonstrate that the substance of 
their thought speaks of a teleological order in the course of Western history which 
contains all features of those grandiose metanarratives that their postmodern followers 
so eagerly despise. On the basis of this argument, I claim that both Nietzsche and, to a 
certain degree, Heidegger can be regarded as 'progressive thinkers', regardless of 
whether the humanity they envisage as an alternative to the current decadent one is 
desirable or not. 
There is no theory of progress without a philosophy of history. Therefore, in 
order to advocate against Nietzsche and Heidegger the Enlightenment ideals of human 
liberation and emancipation, I suggest to embrace Marcuse's materialist-dialectical 
framework of historical totalization. Many reasons could be adduced for this move and 
I hope that the thesis will bring them to light. However, since a philosophy of history 
necessarily undertakes the task of passing value judgements on the course of historical 
events, I believe that ultimately only moral arguments can establish why one account 
should be preferred to the other. 
The thesis unfolds in the following manner. Chapter I introduces the current state 
of the debate on the idea of progress by offering an account of the controversy between 
Loewith and Blumenberg concerning the issue of the legitimacy of the modem age. I 
argue that Blumenberg's eagerness to contest Loewith's secularization thesis brings him 
to neglect the redeeming pathos implicit in the idea of progress, a pathos which the 
philosophies of history he criticizes carry with them. To what extent this pathos shapes 
the modern effort for self-realization is revealed by the uneasiness with which modem 
man takes on himself his own destiny once he has got rid of God. Emblematic of this 
attitude is Rousseau, and to his incapacity to come to terms with historical time I devote 
chapter II. 
In chapter 111,1 enter the central core of the thesis. Here I begin the confrontation 
of the nihilistic and utopian perspectives on progress by examining Nietzsche's radical 
appropriation of the historical and temporal finitude of human essence. I contend that 
Nietzsche possesses a philosophical system which I claim can be understood within a 
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hermeneutic -ontological framework. This, in turn, can be used to explain his 
philosophy of history and his dialectical account of the history of Western civilization. 
Nietzsche identifies a quasi-teleological pattern in Western history leading from the 
decline of the master type to the overman via the affirmation of the slave type. To the 
figure of the sovereign individual he appeals to in order to overcome the age of nihilism 
chapter IV is devoted. 
In chapter VI turn to the other champion of the anti -Enlightenment thought: 
Heidegger. I argue that he, too, reads Western history in dialectical terms as a sequence 
of logically necessary stages starting with the digression from the path of Being 
occurred in the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle and culminating in the age 
of technology. The understanding of the phenomenon of technology as an all-pervasive 
feature of modernity in which the entire history of metaphysics and of the forgetfulness 
of Being converges represents the major legacy of Heidegger's philosophical 
speculation within Critical Theory. However, more important for the philosophers of 
the Frankfurt School than Heidegger's contribution is Max Weber's analysis of 
Enlightenment, through whose mediation they seek to explain the idea of progress. On 
Max Weber's reading of modernity in terms of progressive rationalization of the 
religious worldviews and of the process of disenchantment of the world I focus in 
chapter VI. 
Chapter VII inaugurates the analysis of the utopian perspective on the idea of 
progress. I examine Adorno's and Horkheimer's dialectic of Enlightenment and present 
their theories of human civilization. Although I acknowledge the validity of the tool of 
negative dialectic in providing a critical stance against the most destructive 
manifestations of progress, I contend that this conceptual instrument does not offer a 
positive insight into the idea of what progress ought to be. In this chapter, I also reject 
Marcuse's utopian vision of man's liberation as it is envisaged in Eros and Civilization 
on the ground that it is based upon a merely biological account of human nature. This 
criticism of Marcuse is however provisional since in chapter VIII I turn to his analysis 
of technological rationality and fully embrace his claims in favour of the liberating and 
emancipatory potential of technology. I arrive at this outcome through a criticism of 
Simpson's quasi -Habermasian theory of technological progress and a defence, via 
Feenberg's theory of technology, of Marcuse's materialist-dialectical framework for 
social theory and historical totalization. 
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I. The Terms of the Debate: Progress and Eschatology or Progress versus 
Eschatology? 
The earthquake of Lisbon in 1755 did not only destroy that beautiful capital city but also 
put abruptly before the consciousness of human finitude the optimism of the 
Enlightenment from which the modem idea of progress can be made to initiate. As a result 
of that catastrophe, derision of the providential design in history became more widespread 
and popular than the irony of Voltaire's Candide. 'What can man do before nature, death, 
the ineluctable, and GodT was the existential question universally raised at that time. 
Progress and reaction, delirium of omnipotence and consciousness of human finitude 
have not only confronted each other but also intertwined in the culture of modernity. 
Voltaire already knew it when he mocked the naivety of the Enlightenment and broke into 
pieces the blessed stupidity of the anti-Enlightenment. 'We must attend to our garden', 
admonishes Candide at the conclusion of Voltaire's brilliant tale when Pangloss explains 
to him how dangerous human ambitions are. 'We must attend to our garden' is repeated 
again by Candide when Pangloss draws the inference that we live in the best possible world 
and that not every evil comes to harm. But, yes, it must be that evil comes to harm; and, 
no, we do not live in the best possible world. Our destiny, Candide means by his elliptical 
sentence, needs to be ploughed and transformed like the earth. 
A little dose of Voltaire's caution is probably necessary against both the modem, 
over-optimistic, rationalist interpretation of Providence, on the one hand, and the post- 
modem, self-complacent decline into the play of chance, on the other. It is not clear, 
however, whether such a moderate attitude is consistent. The problem associated with the 
attempt to cut a middle ground between a conception of human life defined by the buoyant 
belief in progress as the steamroller of history and a 'non-progressive' mode of existence, 
is that it deprives the original concept of certain constitutive features the absence of which 
disassembles its meaning. Does the notion of progress make sense without the messianic 
thrust of the Jewish and Christian eschatology? Can it still be preserved once it has 
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assimilated wid-fin its own semantic lymph a dispassionate ease in the world'? Is the idea 
of progress compatible with a suspension or neutralization of the passions of fear and hope 
which rule human life and constantly hint at the possibility of happiness? 
It is the urgency of these dilemmas lurking behind the chasm overoptimistic 
expectations- sense of human finitude that sets the scene for the contemporary debate on 
the idea of progress. The debate was prompted by Loewith's publication of the book 
Meaning in History in 1949. The aim of this book is to disclose the lineage of the modem 
philosophies of history, with their celebration of progress, in the theological Christian- 
Judaic tradition. Loewith claims that all philosophies of history are dependent - in their 
interpretation of universal history as a succession of historical events leading towards an 
end point - upon 'the theological concept of history as a history of fulfilment and 
salvation. " As R. M. Wallace points out, Loewith relies upon Hegel's substitution for 
divine providence of the 'cunning of reason' as the universal force working behind the 
backs of the historical agents to put forward his own derivationist thesis. ' By seizing upon 
Hegel's positing of an ultimate rational design of the world which drives world-historical 
individuals towards a transcending purpose beyond their own intentions, Loewith 
reproduces the same theoretical pattern to argue that the modem idea of progress carries 
forward the Christian idea of salvation in secularized form. In spite of his Hegelian 
appropriation, however, Loewith restrains himself from suggesting that the transformation 
of the eschatological idea of salvation into the modem idea of progress takes place through 
a sequence of dialectical or necessary stages. His explanatory device is vaguely 
genealogical. He singles out the idea of progress as a complex unit and sets for himself the 
task of analytically reducing the compound into its original elements by tracing both the 
nearest and most remote sources of its formation. The validity of the whole project depends 
upon a fundamental assumption, which is that any interpretation of history is motivated by 
'the basic experience of evil and suffering, and of man's quest for happiness. " Human 
suffering is the real stuff of history, and antiquity, Christianity, and modem philosophies 
of history are confronted with this substantial fact of existence when they engage in the 
question of the meaning of historical action. 
Cf. K. Loewith, Meaning in History, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949. 
Cf. R. M. Wallace, "Progress, Secularization, and Modernity: The Loewith-Blumenberg Debate", in 
New German Critique, 1989, n. 22, pp. 63-79, p. 65. 
'Cf. K. Loewith, Meaning in History, cit., p. 3. 
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Given that suffering is a constant in man's life, there is no progressive development 
leading to its elimination but only different interpretations of the same fact. Actually, the 
idea that evil could be suppressed from the world is for Loewith a modern illusion into 
which neither antiquity nor Christianity ever indulged. The ancients did not conceive of 
historical time as a linear process carrying with it a perspective which sees history as a 
realm of human endeavour and progress pointing towards a future fulfilment within 
historical existence. Such a secular transfon-nation of Christian eschatology' is also a long 
way from the religious faith in an imminent collapse of the world. For the founders of the 
Christian religion, the meaning of history is not fulfilled at the culmination of a process of 
historical happenings but through the absolute event of the appearance of Jesus Christ. In 
their conception, the indifferent passage of time acquires historical significance at a 
particular instant of its course. When the episode of the advent of Jesus Christ occurs, a 
new, qualitatively distinctive, temporal horizon opens in which the past is seen as 
preparation for a future redemption. In the scheme of the history of salvation, the ultimate 
meaning of history is a time of consummation which delivers the human creature from sin 
and death. As such, the eschaton of history is a unique, transcendent event breaking into 
the continuity of the natural course of history and dismantling its hopeless trajectory. 
According to Loewith, modem historical consciousness, while discarding the 
Christian faith in an absolute event of redemption and liberation, has preserved the 
temporal structure of the history of salvation, thus articulating historical time in terms of 
a teleological progression of past preparations and future fulfilment. The outcome of this 
secular transformation is a hybrid situation suspended between Christianity and the 
overcoming of Christianity: 
The modem world is as Christian as it is un-Christian because it is the outcome of an age- 
long process of secularization. Compared with the pagan world before Christ, which was in 
'I use loosely in this context the expression "Christian eschatology" without distinguishing between 
the plurality of meanings which it takes on in the tradition of the Christian community. However, while 
acknowledging Bultmann's qualification that the Old Testament does not contain an understanding of 
eschatology as the doctrine of the end of the world and that the latter appears only in the New Testament 
with different connotations across the books of St. Paul, St. John, and the Acts of the Apostles, I assume 
that there is a general sense in which one can speak of "Christian eschatology". It denotes the thought of 
the destruction of the world combined with imaginative speculations about the succeeding time of 
salvation. Bultmann himself employs the notion of eschatology with a unitary meaning so as to be able to 
interpret idealism, materialism, and belief in progress as secularized versions of its underlying teleological 
view of history. Cf. R. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, The Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
1957. 
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all its aspects religious and superstitious and therefore a suitable object of Christian 
apologetics, our modem world is worldly and irreligious and yet dependent on the Christian 
creed from which it is emancipated. The ambition to be "creative" and the striving for a 
future fulfilment reflect the faith in creation and consummation, even when these are held 
to be irrelevant myths. ' 
In other terms, Loewith describes the condition of modernity as a theoretically inconsistent 
abode suspended between the rationality of the classical view of time as a circular 
movement and the irrationality of the Christian conception of historical time as a linear 
progression. While rejecting the Christian belief in an eschatological outcome of history, 
the modem mind preserves the classical idea of an endless and continuous movement, but 
within a linear, not circular, trajectory. ' In this respect, its standing is contradictory since 
the endless continuity of the historical process implies a circular, not linear, movement, 
with a beginning and an end. 
Loewith claims that, by indulging in the hope of a better world in the future, 
modernity gives itself over to a blind and deceptive feeling of expectation and disregards 
the sober, classic view of human existence as a continuous repetition of the same pattern, 
a view wisely skeptical of any eschatological futurism. 
Blumenberg rejects Loewith's interpretation of the idea of progress as a secularized 
version of the Christian eschatology. In his view, what differentiates the modem from the 
Christian interpretation of history is the principle according to which historical 
transformation originates from witl-iin history and not from outside. He begins his analysis 
by examining the category of secularization. When we say, he argues, that 'the world work 
ethic is a secularized monastic asceticism' or that 'the world revolution is the secularized 
expectation of the end of the world', we apparently mean the retrieval of the worldly 
dimension of our existence which went lost in the theological flight from the world during 
the Middle Ages. ' However, Blumenberg contends that the categorial dichotomy 
worldliness-unwordliness does not capture the significance of the expression. He offers two 
reasons for this: firstly, he argues that there is no evidence that the pre-Christian age was 
an epoch of worldliness in which the world "belonged" to the individuals who inhabited 
it. Secondly, he reminds us that, when the modem man got rid of all theological and 
5 Cf. K. Loewith, ibid., p. 201. 
'Cf. K. Loewith, ibid., p. 207. 
7 Cf. H. Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
1995, p. 4. 
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metaphysical illusions, he did not gain the certainty of the world. On the contrary, he was 
even more alienated from it than before. Mathematical physics exposed the unreliability 
of his senses and showed that the world he experienced was a superficial and deceitful 
manifestation of a more substantial reality. ' 
On the basis of these considerations, it follows for Blumenberg that, when 
C secularization' is given as a category of interpretation of the historical process, it is 
assumed that there is a substance in history undergoing qualitative transformations whose 
dynamic can be understood by relating each moment to what preceded it. But, according 
to him, historical substantialism, that is the thesis that there are substantial constants in 
history, cannot be demonstrated. 
Yet, there is a further implication in the secularization thesis clearly spelled out by 
Loewith. The claim that the modem world is the result of a process of secularization of 
Christianity is made by analogy with the process of expropriation of church properties 
carried out in the age of Enlightenment. The suggestion implicit in this claim is that 
modem rationality is enveloped in the conceptual framework of theology and that its 
alleged discontinuity with the past is merely ideological. As a consequence, modernity's 
claim to deliver man from dependence on external religious attributes and to recognize 
reason as the only source of legitimation of ethical and cognitive claims turns out to be 
illegitimate. 
Blumenberg contends that there is a flaw in this explanation. It does not say whether 
the detachment of ideas and thoughts from the religious universe in which they originally 
arose was spontaneous or was carried out by some external agent. Such an ambiguity is not 
irrelevant, but is a constitutive part of the process through which the concept of 
secularization was conjured up as an explanatory category of history. 
B lumenberg, too, underlines that Loewith relies upon Hegel's category of inversion 
in order to ground the genesis of the linear conception of history in the eschatological. 
teleology. According to Loewith, Hegel interpreted the appearance of modem historical 
consciousness as the dialectical reversal of the idea of Providence. Within his monological 
view of history as the process of self-realization of reason, the modem vindication of 
subjective freedom seems to be the logically necessary outcome of the internalization of 
the idea of God. Now, Blumenberg argues that Loewith employs instrumentally Hegel's 
' Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 8. 
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concept of history in order to disclose the illegitimacy of the linear Mstorical 
consciousness. In his view, Loewith's intent is to bring together the Christian story of 
salvation and the modem idea of progress and, via the secularization theorem, read them 
as two aspects of the same phenomenon. As a consequence, both appear to result from an 
epochal break with the cyclical cosmology of antiquity. 
From the way in which Blumenberg understands it, Loewith's project is to 
reconstitute the pagan doctrine of cosmos and 'its cyclical structure of security" which 
were illegitimately abandoned in favour of the biblical unilinear temporality. In this light, 
progress turns out to be a fate, the inevitable outcome of an original diversion that occurred 
at the end of antiquity. Blumenberg, on the contrary, wants to deny the existence of a 
genetic nexus between the eschatological idea of salvation and the historical idea of 
progress. He argues that, since the idea of salvation refers to a transcendent event breaking 
into history from outside and interrupting its continuity while the idea of progress consists 
of the projection onto an immanent future of a pattern of historical movement constantly 
pushing forward, the former cannot provide a model for the latter. In his view, the idea of 
progress results instead from the generalization of a series of experiences which over a 
long period of time develop into something new. Blumenberg offers the phenomenon of 
science as an example of human enterprise in which novel experiences are historically 
produced. Thanks to their methodological unity, scientific theories evolve across time 
'independently of individuals and generations. ' 11 From their success, hopes of a better 
future arise. Eschatological expectations, instead, do not spring from hope but from fear 
and terror before the sheer insecurity of man in the world. If this is the case, then the idea 
of progress as the belief in the possibility of a constant improvement of man's situation in 
this world must have emerged precisely in opposition to and not in continuity with the 
other-worldly possibilities envisaged by eschatology. 
Blumenberg identifies the origin of the idea of progress in the idea of method. The 
idea of progress borrows from the scientific method the notion of a regulative organization 
of human actions. As the scientific activity proceeds by integrating theoretical 
achievements within a coherent pattern of knowledge, in the historical world the belief 
anses that human events and actions can be similarly ordered within a rational scheme. The 
Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 28. 
Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 31. 
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idea of method requires man to take responsibility for his own destiny and become the only 
maker of history. It assumes that no plan of salvation is involved in the project of 
theoretical domination of nature, but 'the disposition of the subject... to take part in a 
process that generates knowledge in a transsubjective manner. "' 
According to Blumenberg, if the idea of progress has hyperbolized into the idea of 
infinite progress and taken on divine attributes in the context of the philosophy of history, 
it is because of the failure of modem science to fulfil the expectations of theoretical and 
practical completion. When it became clear that methodical research was a never-ending 
enterprise whose results were always incomplete and liable of revision, individuals became 
resigned to the thought of being involved in a practice whose products would be enjoyed 
by future generations and not by themselves. Still, though hyperbolized, Blumenberg 
believes that the idea of progress played an emancipatory function since it rendered the 
notion of the absolute irrelevant and made human history bearable and meaningful. By 
standing as a regulative principle of men's activities, it gave sense and direction to their 
dealings. 
In other words, the argument that Blumenberg puts forward to confute the 
secularization thesis consists in showing that the dimension of future and hope opened up 
by the idea of progress is not comparable to messianic expectations. The latter were never 
attractive but expressed a mere negation of fears and visions of downfall. The idea of 
progress emerges instead when, following eschatological disappointment for the 
postponement of the end of the world, the world is released from the spell of otherworldly 
expectations and, as it were, recreated as the abode of human self-assertion. 
As mentioned above, Blumenberg's narrative separates the fon-nation of the idea of 
progress from the appearance in modernity of abstract speculations about the totality of 
history. In his view, philosophical reflection on the content of the overall future constitutes 
an over-extension of the limited range of functionality of the idea of progress. To the 
extent that the philosophy of history reproduces the pattern of salvation story and attempts 
to answer questions about the totality of history, it takes upon itself the burden of problems 
posed by the Middle Ages and offers new solutions more appropriate to a post-medieval 
age. However, the modem reformulation of medieval questions does not justify for 
Blumenberg the secularization thesis, since it is a characteristic of any historical period to 
" Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 33. 
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inherit questions from the most recent past and give them new answers. Thus, speculation 
of philosophy of history on the historical totality represents a 'reoccupation' of the ground 
of eschatology not by reinterpreting it but by manipulating the 'independently generated 
idea of progress"' and extending its application beyond the limits of what is accessible to 
theoretical methodology. What differentiates the category of secularization from that of 
reoccupation is then for Blumenberg the fact that, while the former presupposes the 
permanence of ideal substances across time - namely, the theological substance of 
eschatology - the latter sees the continuity of history in terms of the inheritance of 
problems whereby successive epochs are obliged 'to know again what was known once 
before. "' 
Related to Blumenberg's criticism of the modem philosophies of history is the thesis 
that theodicy is a form of secularization of theology. " While theology was being caught 
up, the thesis asserts, in the dilemma of reconciling God's omnipotence and goodness with 
the existence of evil, theodicy came to its rescue by attributing to human wickedness the 
responsibility of all that which is bad in the world. Underlying the explanation of theodicy 
is the assumption that man is predisposed both to bad and good actions and endowed with 
freedom of choice. According to this thesis, theodicy represents already a first level of 
secularization of theology because, out of concern for relieving God of responsibility for 
the bad in the world, it turns theology into an anthropology of the instinctual and moral 
life. Now, to the extent that this thesis brings with it the implication that philosophy of 
history, through the mediation of theodicy of which it is a more refined form, is the 
continuation of theology, Blumenberg contends that there is no identity of theodicy and 
philosophy of history. In fact, whereas theodicy begins with the presupposition of man's 
autonomy in order to preserve God's absolute goodness, philosophy of history posits 
human freedom as a goal and an end to be achieved in the course of history. What, 
according to the secularization thesis, is an identity in the historical process of ideas must 
be seen for Blumenberg as a taking over of heterogeneous contents of the same position 
within 'the system of man's interpretation of the world and of himself': " 
Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 49. 
Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 48. 
According to Blumenberg, this thesis is asserted by Leo Strauss in Natural Right and History, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, p. 312. Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 55. 
5Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 64. 
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What mainly occurred in the process that is interpreted as secularization... should be described not as the transposition of authentically theological contents into secularized 
alienation from their origin but rather as the reoccupation of answer positions that had become vacant and whose corresponding questions could not be eliminated. " 
How tl-fis methodological and conceptual tool works in the explanation of the 1-fistory of 
ideas is shown in the next section. 
11. Modernity as the Second Overcoming of Gnosticism 
Blumenberg applies the category of reoccupation to account for the transition from the late 
Middle Ages to modernity. His narrative of this historical evolution begins with an analysis 
of the attack against the legitimacy of the modem age, and therefore of the idea of 
progress, raised by attempts to trace their emergence back to Gnostic doctrine. Not that 
Blumenberg denies a connection between the modem age and Gnosticism, but he sees the 
modem age as the overcoming of Gnosticism rather than a relapse into it. Indeed, in his 
view the modem age represents the second overcoming of Gnosticism. The first 
overcoming occured at the beginning of the Middle Ages and resulted into a failure. The 
story of these overcomings told by Blumenberg is rather compelling and deserves at least 
a brief sketch. 
As it is common place in the philosophical literature, the intellectual and moral 
conflict counterposing Gnosticism and Christian dogmatics is rooted in the question of the 
justification of what is bad in the world. The ancient, platonic tradition attributed the 
presence of bad things in the world to the dualism between Idea and matter. In Plato's 
metaphysics, the demiurge creates the world according to the image of the Ideas but, in the 
face of the resistance of matter to take on ideal forms, he cannot reproduce the perfection 
of the original model. Accordingly, the platonic tradition locates the origin of what is bad 
in the world in the unresolved residue between the blind necessity of matter and the formal 
perfection of the archetype. 
Early Christian theology inherits Plato's metaphysics and explains the imperfection 
of the world in terms of a fall of the soul from an original harmonious order into the prison 
" Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 65. 
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of matter. The lost harmony can be reestablished through an act of redemption of the soul 
and the return to the origin. But there is a problem with thisexplanation which lies in the 
fact that it involves the divine principle in the formation of the world. From this scheme, 
in fact, God turns out to be simultaneously source of salvation and principle of badness. 
Gnosticism re*ects this overlapping of positions between the God of creation and the 
God of redemption. God, the good God, is for it only the bringer of salvation. He lives 
hidden in a foreign, transcendent, and impenetrable place of pure essence and has got 
nothing to do with the world. The world was created by the evil demiurge, the opponent 
of the transcendent God of salvation, and everything he did brings the mark of his 
imperfection. " The final dissolution of the world will be the work of divine justice on 'the 
demiurge's illegitimate creation. "' 
Unfortunately, the eschatological potential implicit in the Gnostic doctrine faded 
away in front of the evidence of the persistence of the world. Rather than plunging into 
perdition, the world of disorder manifested durable resilience. The longer the world failed 
to fall down, the more intolerable the consciousness of the impotence of the God of 
salvation to destroy the faulty achievements of the evil derniurge became. As a 
consequence, a new arrangement of life which demanded acceptance rather than sheer 
contempt of the world arose. In polemic with Manichean Gnosticism, for example, 
Augustine argued that the world was created by God for the sake of man and that care of 
the world within the context of God's precepts was the only vehicle of salvation. In 
Augustine's speculation, the origin of the deficiencies of the world does not lie in the 
malevolent intentions of God at the moment of constructing the world but in the freedom 
of man to choose between moral and immoral actions. 
As responsibility for the bad things in the world is imputed to man, the goodness of 
God is preserved. Yet, in order to deserve life in this valley of tears as a punishment, the 
sins of man had to be all too great. " But no action stemming from human freedom could 
be sinful in such a scale as to justify the horror of the world. Aware of this discrepancy, 
Augustine formulated the dogma of man's universal guilt and the doctrine of absolute 
predestination. However, as a result of this move, Gnosticism, which seemed to have been 
overcome through the revaluation of the world and the justification of its creation, returns 
Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 128. 
Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 129. 
'9 Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 134. 
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again 'in the form of the hidden God 520 whose purposes in separating the elect from the 
rejected are inscrutable. Inthisrespect, Scholasticism and medieval theological speculation 
failed to subdue the Gnostic doctrine and transposed it into the inscrutability of God's 
absolute sovereignty: 
Augustine's momentous turning from Gnosticism to human freedom preserves 'order' for the 
Middle Ages and prepares the way for the return of Aristotle at the height of Scholasticism. 
The price of this preservation of the cosmos was not only the guilt that man was supposed 
to assign himself for the condition in which he found the world but also the resignation that 
his responsibility for that condition imposed upon him: renunciation of any attempt to change 
for his benefit, through action, a reality for the adversity of which he had only himself to 
blame. The senselessness of self-assertion was the heritage of Gnosticism which was not 
overcome but only translated. " 
Doubt whether the world was created for the sake of man remained through the Middle 
Ages. It was only when the absolute transcendence of God was perceived as indifference 
to the fate of man that the order of the world disappeared and 'the alternative of the 
immanent self-assertion of man through the mastery and alteration of reality"' came into 
the horizon of human possibility. The loss of the world as an ordered cosmos governed by 
the inscrutable designs of God results in man taking the world in his hands as afactum at 
his disposal. Man is made responsible again for the condition of the world. Yet, he is 
responsible not, as in Augustine, because of his original guilt placed in the past but by 
virtue of a more fundamental concern about the future. In Blurnenberg's narrative, man 
puts 
forward now a program of self-assertion, 'an existential program according to which [he] 
posits his existence in a historical situation and indicates to himself how he is going to deal 
with the reality surrounding him and what use he will make of the possibilities that are 
open to him. "' 
The concept of self-assertion is introduced by Blumenberg along with the category 
of self-preservation. In his understanding, self-preservation is not a biological category. It 
does not merely say that man sets out to equip himself with expedients and technical skills 
in order to satisfy his most elementary needs; it also says that growth and technological 
implements are motivated by the will to realize a new kind of humanity in the face of the 
Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 135. 
Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 136. 
Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 137. 
23 Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 138. 
17 
disappearance of order in the world and of the deficiency of nature. 
According to Blumenberg, this close link between the loss of world's order and the 
affirmation of man as a creative being has been clearly grasped by Nietzsche. Yet, for 
Nietzsche modem science as the most powerful instrument of self-assertion is an appendix 
of the theological Providence. It has helped man to overcome the Middle Ages and gain 
a new freedom but has not enabled him fully to appropriate that freedom. Science and 
technology have become a world of their own to whose laws man is now ineluctably 
subjected. The new challenge of man is for Nietzsche to overcome science into art and its 
creative power. 
Blumenberg identifies instead in the mechanistic philosophy of nature the tool for 
self-assertion. By tracing a dispute between Leibniz and Clarke on the possibility of 
applying the principle of sufficient reason to the explanation of nature, he discovers an 
equivalence between nominalistic and mechanistic') especially atomistic and epicurean, 
explanations of the world. What these two positions have in common is that they do not 
allow reason any insight into the origin of reality. Epicurus assumed that the world arose 
by accident from the divergence of atoms from their parallel paths, whereas nominalism 
traced the origin of the Creation back to a divine will whose reason and purpose could not 
be grasped. 
Both nominalism and atomism reduced the question of the origin of the world to 
something meaningless in itself, thus opening the way to man's rational manipulation. 
When, in early modernity, matter re-occupied the place that in the Middle Ages was taken 
by God's absolute will, the material substratum of the world came to be considered not as 
a state of affairs given once and for all but as a potentiality available to reason's inquiry. 
But, from the act of positing the divine in a hidden and transcendent place and depicting 
his essence as one of absolute indifference to man and the world, atomism and nominalistic 
voluntarism derived completely heterogeneous consequences. Epicurus's philosophy was 
meant to bring to visibility the human capacity for happiness precisely on account of the 
fact that the gods are concerned only with themselves. If no eternal law and superposed 
Logos guarantee the harmony of the cosmos, man is freed from dependence upon any 
supreme authority or from the obligation to adhere to the teleology of nature. Unburdened 
of responsibility for the world, he can retreat into the idyllic spiritual garden of ataraxia, 
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pursue those natural wants which can be satisfied 'without great exertion and expense', 24 
and ignore all those empty and unnecessary wants which can find no natural satisfaction. 
In Epicurus, practical unconcern goes along with theoretical indifference. The aim 
of his aton-iistic physics was to neutralize the need for theoretical knowledge of nature and 
'argue for the irrelevance of the physical answers to the shaping of life in the world. "' 
After the medieval longing for the beatitude of Heaven accessible to the elect, happiness 
could no longer be defined in purely negative terms as absence of pain and suffering or 
suspension of affects and passions. To a man nurtured on the biblical idea of the God of 
creation and with the theological propositions of redemption and salvation, possession of 
truth had come to be seen as an essential feature of the concept of happiness. Yet, 
theological absolutism and the nominalistic claims about the unbreachable transcendence 
of God meant that man had to relinquish his search for indubitable certainties and adjust 
his methods of knowledge of natural processes to the inadequacy of his own subjective 
faculties. The new theoretical system that Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes conjure up at the 
onset of modernity is therefore based upon the recognition that the statements of science 
are hypothetical and, rather than mirroring a given reality contemplated from outside, 
produce it artificially and then subject the results of the simulation to rigorous procedures 
of verification. In the awareness of nature's heterogeneity to the theoretical subject, theory 
becomes 'the workplace of human exertion' where man's imagination, capacity for 
invention, and artfulness are summoned to their full potential in order to formulate 
conjectures about the unknown mechanisms of the world and discharge man's power for 
self-assertion. In this respect, Descartes's undertaking to find groundless grounds for 
theoretical knowledge is more the vindication of human freedom from God than the 
establishment of the certainty of the Cogito: 
In the Principles of Philosophy of 1644 Descartes... described the capacity to abstain from theory 
as the source of man's independence from his origin - which is to say, from the 'quality' of his God. 
Whatever man's origin might be and whatever power of deception might dominate him, there 
remains this minimum of freedom in the act of withholding assent. A god can prevent man from t) 
knowing a single truth, but he cannot himself bring about error, unless man for his part freely runs 
" Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 165. 
25 Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 182. 
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Cf. 
the risk of being deceived. So man Is not free in that he has grounds for his action but rather in that he can dispense with grounds. 26 
With this definition of the scientific method, Blumenberg's narrative reaches its 
completion. From now on, he assumes, the history of modernity is of a different quality 
from what preceded it, and it is the peculiarity of the demand for self-assertion thatjustifies 
its legitimacy. 
III. Limits of Blumenberg's Narrative: Can It Do Without a Philosophy of 
History? 
Blumenberg's criticism of Loewith's secularization thesis seems to fail to address the real 
question raised by Loewith. In arguing that the modem idea of progress cannot be derived 
from eschatological. notions of history but is the result of a conceptual readjustment of 
man) s position in the world in the face of the evidence of the fallacy of the eschatological 
prophecies, Blumenberg disregards the central core of Loewith's argument. This is not 
designed to establish an identity of content between eschatological and progressive views 
but to claim that the modem idea of progress contains within its own semantic baggage a 
redeeming element which cannot be explained by merely making recourse to the 
breakthroughs achieved by physics and astronomy at the onset of the modem age. In order 
fully to understand the teleological import implicit in the idea of progress, Loewith 
contends that the latter must be traced back to a persistent influence of the Christian 
tradition. 
To be sure, in spite of his explicit antagonism, Blumenberg's narrative largely 
converges with Loewith's when he employs the category of 'reoccupation' to explain the 
way in which modernity takes over the intellectual territory which theology was no longer 
able to cover. In this respect, the real polemical object of Blumenberg's dispute is 
Loewith's assumption that, by disclosing its Christian roots, the idea of progress is 
delegitimated. Blumenberg is instead determined to show that modernity, with all the ideas 
which define its concept, is legitimate because it was the only way out of the intricate 
tangle of contradictions in which the medieval theological tradition was caught up. His 
apparently cryptic claim that modernity represents the second overcoming of Gnosticism 
" Cf. H. Blumenberg, ibid., p. 185. 
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is precisely meant to show that, within the continuity of the historical process, the modem 
point of view introduces an element of rupture. But, to this end, he needs to extend his 
analysis to the intellectual contribution of Epicurus's atomism, thus devising a theoretical 
framework for the development of Western thought which reproduces the essential features 
of philosophy of history. For instance, it is only a wide and total examination of the 
evolution of the ancient philosophy into the Middle Ages theological speculation that 
allows him to argue that, whereas in the context of the Hellenistic worldview an attempt 
to neutralize nature was possible for Epicurus, at the culmination of the Christian 
experience such a resort was precluded by divine absolutism. Therefore, a renewal of 
mechanistic atomism after the historical development of the theological tradition could end 
up only into a scientific project of mastery of nature in order to protect man from the fear 
in the irrationality of the world wWch that tradition had generated. 
Th. is expansion of the span of the analysis commits Blumenberg to the kind of 
historical totalization underlying any philosophy of history. To advocate the thesis that the 
idea of progress is an aspect of the demand for human self-assertion which marked the 
advent of the modem age requires a dilation of the lim its of the historical narrative and, 
as it were, a projection of the meaning of history as a whole. My claim is that Blumenberg 
succeeds in his attempt to legitimate modernity as long as he integrates the scientific 
modem enterprise into the wider context of the history of Western thought. But, as Pippin 
argues, to the extent that he holds on to his commitment to isolate a specific historical 
dialogue and declines to answer questions about the totality of history, his project fails: 
... Someone like Hegel would want to 
know how we can accept the theological tradition as 
a necessary component in our legitimation of modernity if we do not know the full story of 
the motivation of that tradition. The particular story of the relation between modernity and 
any premodern crisis does not legitimate anything unless the premodern tradition is itself, 
somehow, legitimate. Predictably, Blumenberg wants to tell that story by isolating the 
dialogue of questions and answers that defined the relation between the ancient and early 
Christian traditions. But at some point it becomes fruitless to look for the motivation of some 
question in another question. " 
In the context of the debate between Blumenberg and Loewith we are confronting a typical 
interpretive situation. In order to confute the idea that a homogeneous conception of 
history is shared by Christianity and modernity, Blumenberg goes too far in the opposite 
27 Cf. R. B. Pippin, "Blumenberg and the Modernity Problem", in R. B. Pippin, Idealism as Modenfisni, 
cit., pp. 265-285, p. 285. 
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direction. He offers a narrative of the emergence of modernity which leaves behind the 
eschatological component. Yet,, * the latter cannot be removed not only because Luter and 
Melanchthon were obsessed with the thought of the end of the world, but also because, 
whether it be agreeable oT#iot, it is precisely within the eschatological conception that the 
relation between the linearity of historical time and the idea of future obtains. And it is not 
true that the Greeks did not have a linear conception of historical time. On the contrary, 
the idea of the succession of universal empires was handed down from the Greeks to the 
Christian prophetic practice, thus initiating the eschatological tradition. If the complex 
relation between historical time and future is not grasped, it becomes extremely difficult 
to understand and contextualize the critical and intellectual contribution offered to 
modernity by authors like Descartes or Spinoza. After them, the notion of progress has 
represented also the belief in a non-apocalyptic future of transformation, even though, by 
doing so, it has imposed a sense and direction on history and therefore justified massacres 
and misdeeds. 
Since the idea of progress implies a goal transcending the actual historical context, 
no analysis of its content, whether condemnatory or apologetic, can be carried out without 
resorting to historical totalization. To provide a defence of the possibility of progress in 
history involves not only an account of the directionality of the course of history but also 
the formulation of a moraIjudgement on the pattern of the historical transformations which 
the theory has identified. In this thesis, for instance, I will demonstrate that both Nietzsche 
and Heidegger discern a quasi-teleological movement in Western history and that, at least 
Nietzsche, can be regarded as a progressive thinker. Yet, the man he envisages to overcome 
the present conditions of nihilism is not a desirable one and does not meet the criteria of 
human emancipation and liberation I advocate after Marcuse. But we cannot appeal to any 
sort of a priori argument in order to establish the superiority of one model of human 
progress as opposed to the other. As a consequence, passing ethical judgement on the 
course of history remains an inescapable moment of any theory of progress. 
If there is an anti-totalizing intent in the works of Nietzsche and Heidegger, I show 
in the course of this thesis that their anti-totalizing view of history goes along with a 
concept of totality in the form of a nihilistic vision of modernity as a process of decline and 
degeneration. Categories of totalization like progress and self-emancipation constitute an 
essential aspect of modem self-reflection and underpin the inescapability of totality 
thinking. In my view, there is a continuity underlying modem Western civilization which 
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is conducive to an understanding of our historical experience as a project of emancipatory 
totalization. Nietzsche and Heidegger, in spite of their explicit repudiation of the concept 
of totality, remain anchored to an idea of totalised modernity which reproduces the 
theoretical pattern of radical philosophy of history. In this respect, they never abandon the 
conceptual ground that they so bombastically challenge. Nietzsche holds to the 'totality' 
of the ascetic ideals as the mask of modernity while Heidegger maintains the 'totality' of 
the forgetfulness of Being as the unspoken logic of the entire history of Western 
metaphysics. 
Philosophies of history offer a methodological instrument for dealing with the 
question about the sense of our historical experience. They articulate the hopes of a better 
social order by projecting onto a possible future the needs and aspirations of the present. 
Within the context of their sweeping speculations, the idea of historical progress acquires 
a rational and critical content. This idea is not logically entwined with a conception of 
history as a unilinear and necessary development. Totality thinking has generally 
recognized the historical boundedness of its wide-ranging claims. Yet, in its historical self- 
consciousness, it purports to raise the limited particularity of its own standpoint and values 
to the level of universal validity. Progress is not a definite concept which could be derived 
by means of empirical generalization from the continuity of the historical process. On the 
contrary, the elements determining the body of its content are disseminated in the 
alternating vicissitudes of the contingencies of history and must be patched together not 
just by putting each piece in relation to another as isolated fragments of a confusing 
patchwork but by reconstituting their unity from the perspective of a willed future. In this 
respect, the task of giving meaning to the idea of progress involves both a systematic 
analysis of the contradictions underlying the present conditions of life and a selective 
activity of choosing the values and aspirations from whose viewpoint the analysis is 
conducted. Without a relation to a value, the particular historical facts which fall under the 
scrutiny of critical analysis would lose their historical interest and become unessential. 
Philosophies of history provide man's project of self-realization with conceptual 
and critical tools. In particular, the categories of dialectics are able to capture the dynamic 
possibilities implicit in the current historical situation and to anchor transcending images 
of future liberation to the immanent conditions of modernity. The model of philosophy of 
history I suggest here is closely linked to a dynamic historical theory of essence. Since the 
scope of the philosophies of history covers the totality of the historical events, a distinction 
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between actuality and potentiality, between what things are and what they could be 
constitutes a fundamental methodological tool of the analysis. In the conclusion of this 
thesis, I embrace Marcuse's materialist and dialectical theory of essence. Its content is 
expressed by him in these terms: 
To the interest governing the materialist dialectic, its object, the totality of the process of 
social evolution, appears as an inherently multidimensional, organized structure. It is by no 
means the case that all its data are equally relevant or "factual". Some phenomena lie close 
to the surface, others form part of the central mechanism. From this distinction results a first 
and still completely formal concretion of essence as what is essential: in a very general sense, 
essence is the totality of the social process as it is organized in a particular historical epoch. 
In relation to this process every individual factor, considered as an isolated unit, is 
"inessential", insofar as its "essence", i. e. the concept of the real content of an appearance, 
can be grasped only in the light of its relation to the totality of the process. " 
A reading of the overall historical process presupposes the possibility of comprehending 
the essence of a sequence of events in the immanence of their manifestations. So 
understood., the essence is not suspended in the clouds of a platonic realm of ideas but 
resides in form of tendencies and potentialities in the constellation of social relations: 
This definition of essence already implies the whole theory of history that deduces the 
totality of the conditions of life from the mode of social organization and that at the same 
time provides the methodological<and conceptual tools making possible knowledge of the 
historical tendencies effective at a particular time. On the basis of this theory the essence of 
man is understod in connection with those tendencies which have as their goal a new form 
of social life as the "Idea" of that which practice must realize. Considered this way, the 
image of man represents not only what can already be made of man today, what "in itself" 
can already be today, but also the real fulfilment of everything that man desires to be when 
he understands himself in tern-is of his potentialities. " 
If no theory of progress can do without the moral and teleological pathos inherited from 
the Christian tradition, I believe that Marcuse's materialist-dialectical framework of social 
and historical analysis provides the methodological and conceptual instruments to account 
for a radical transformation of the present conditions of the world and avoid the 
abstractness proper of the eschatological visions of the future. Philosophies of history are 
not necessarily theodicies, even though they carry with them a moral import. Sinlilarly, to 
make predictions about the future course of history is not necessarily to prophesyze. But 
21 Cf. H. Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence", in H. Marcuse, Negations, Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 
London, 1968, pp. 43-87, p. 70. 
2Q Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., pp. 72-73. 
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the construction of a theoretical system in which it becomes possible for man to account 
for his own transcendence while remaining faithful to the finitude of his existence has 
never been obvious. This is so not just because of conceptual difficulties inherent to the 
comprehension of history but because of man's existential uneasiness in dealing with his 
own destiny. What characterizes the idea of progress is not as much a blissful faith in 
technology as its roots in modernity meant as the watershed between the tolemaic and the 
copernican man. This dividing line belongs only to Western culture and releases the fate 
of man from any external and eternal commands. It culminates in the 1789 French 
Revolution, declares that God and the King are things of the past, and throws the individual 
back onto itself. But it inaugurates at the same time a happy and an unhappy condition for 
man. Among these men left alone with themselves the social bondage is no longer provided 
by a vertical order - the precepts of the Church, the law of the king and the father - but is 
made to reside in the horizontality of the citizens who look like brothers without 
primogeniture. Everybody is born free, proclaim the terrifying principles of 1789. 
Everybody is equal in the share of power they carry with themselves. It is up to them, the 
sovereign people, to establish an order which has been written nowhere. 
The depth and intensity of the existential struggles it has taken for man to arrive at 
a full appropriation of his own destiny is epitomized by Rousseau's dissatisfaction at 
history and time, a theme to which I devote the next chapter before entering the central 
core of the thesis. 'O 
30 In the following chapters I will offer a highly selective reading of the authors I will be dealing with. The 
number of texts from which I will extrapolate their thought is limited. 
I am aware that, taken within the 
context of their opera omnia, the interpretation of each of them could 
be quite different. Yet, my study is 
focused on the idea of progress and it is the particularity of this subject that constitutes the guiding principle 
L- I rigorous one may 
be, a of my research and determines the process of selection. However philologically 
i- 
certain degree of interpretative violence is inevitable in this 
kind of proceeding. 
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Rousseau's Struggling for a Transcendence of History and Time 
I. Introduction 
In his essay on The Three Waves of Modemity Leo Strauss describes the crisis of 
modernity in terms of a crisis of modem political philosophy. He discerns the signs of 
this crisis in the fact that 'modem Western man no longer knows what he wants - that 
he no longer believes that he can know what is good and bad, what is right and wrong. " 
The horizons of such a sense of bewilderment have been opened up, according to 
Strauss' analysis, by Machiavelli, Rousseau, and Nietzsche, who rejected the values of 
the whole philosophical and theological tradition and called for an overcoming of the 
gulf between the is and the ought, the actual and the ideal. 
In the classical and biblical tradition, Leo Strauss argues, all natural beings were 
conceived of as beings directed towards an end understood as the ultimate completion 
of their nature. As regards the human species, it was believed that nature posited the 
standard of perfection for man in the development of his rational faculty as well as in 
the establishment of political and social institutions aiming at the realization of the 
good. The successful outcome of this course of action was guaranteed by nature itself 
which was meant to be, on account of its inner order, teleologically framed within a 
harmonious whole presided by the goodness of God. The place of the microcosm man 
in the wider cosmic order was assigned to him by nature at the very beginning, and man 
was just required to confonn his behaviour to its dictates. 
However, the emergence of modem natural science destroyed the theoretical basis 
of classical political philosophy. ' Final causes were replaced by the logical deduction of 
theorems out of general laws discovered by means of empirical induction, while nature 
'Cf. Leo Strauss, "The Three Waves of Modernity", in Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo 
Strauss, edited by H. Gildin, Pegasus, New York, 1975, pp. 81-98, p. 81 
Cf. Leo Strauss, "The Three Waves of Modernity", cit., p. 87 
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was perceived as a chaos in need of being reduced to order throughout man's 
intervention. Scientific laws took the place of the laws of nature, and truth and meaning 
lost the transcendence of their ontological status to become objects of fatiguing and 
exhausting human activity. Man held firm sway of nature as it was realized that it is in 
fact human understanding which prescribes nature its laws. Nature does possess no 
purpose on its own. 'Everything good is due to man's labour rather than to nature's 
gift... Accordingly, the political society is in no way natural: the state is simply an 
artifact, due to covenants; man's perfection is not the natural end of man but an ideal 
freely formed by man. " 
Leo Strauss attributes to Machiavelli the authorship of having risen the first wave 
of modernity. Through his reinterpretation of classical virtue, Machiavelli is betokened 
to have lowered the scope of morality from the kingdom of God down to the reign of 
political society. The question of how to realize the good, as stated by Strauss, becomes 
with Mach-iavelli a technical one, a question of how to organize the state in accordance 
with man's capacities and limits. 
The second wave of modernity is instead represented by Rousseau. Leo Strauss 
reads in Rousseau's thought a chasm between his "classic" doctrine of the general will 
which found full development in the works of Kant and Hegel, and his "romantic" 
fluctuation towards a quasi-mystical "sentiment of existence" which seems to evoke, 
though substantial differences, the unrest dissatisfaction of Goethe's Faust "with 
everything finite, finished, complete, classic. "I On the one hand, Rousseau introduces in 
the philosophical tradition the idea that man's humanity "is due not to nature but to 
history"'. The entire network of the categorical concepts that we now summarize by 
such words as "rationality" or "morality" is the result of a long historical process which 
is not teleological but accidental. Only once rationality has been actualized and man has 
become an animal capable of calculating and linking means to ends, the idea of a 
meaning immanent in history gains a significant stand. Man being an unlimitedly 
perfectible and malleable animal endowed with free will, Rousseau comes to reckon 
that it is in principle possible to make the particular wills come together in order to 
Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., p. 88 
Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., p. 90 
Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., p. 94 
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forge social institutions universally acknowledged. Were it the case, the positive law, as 
distinct from the lofty and higher natural law, would end up mirroring the general will, 
thus bringing to sight that historical process which hitherto has denied itself to any sort 
of human prediction. On the other hand, there is for Leo Strauss, certainly vague and 
unclear even though not underground and esoteric, 'another fundamental thought of 
Rousseau". Rousseau was never fully convinced of the possibility of man gaining 
freedom and happiness in civil society. Society as such, not just the bourgeois society 
of the capitalist era based on inequality and exploitation, is a source of distress and 
alienation. Man can find the authentic dimension of life and cultivate the original 
sentiment of existence only by returning from society to nature. Society is the world of 
virtue, reason, moral freedom, and history, but it cannot give man "goodness" and 
"happiness" which belong to nature and natural existence. However man may struggle 
in order to attain unity and harmony in his soul, his efforts will turn out to be vain and 
futile since the gulf between goodness, as predicate of sensibility and compassion, and 
virtue, as predicate of sense of duty and obligation, is unbridgeable. 
Rousseau's conception of the sentiment of existence as a peaceful and harmonious 
experience was questioned by Nietzsche, whom the third wave of modernity is related 
to. Inasmuch as there is something like the sentiment of existence, Nietzsche contends, 
it is a sentiment of "historic" existence, which is necessarily tragic. Nietzsche 
recognizes that Rousseau is right in claiming that the human problem cannot be 
resolved in social or political terms, but at the same time he maintains that 'there is no 
escape from the human to nature: there is no possibility of genuine happiness, or the 
highest of which man is capable has nothing to do with happiness. " 
The synoptic point to which Leo Strauss' essay can be led is the construal of the 
problem of modernity in terms of an ethical relativism that is the consequence of the 
emergence in modem philosophy of the historical consciousness. In discovering the 
historicity of human nature, Leo Strauss underlines, Rousseau paves the way to an 
analysis of rationality no longer bound to be conducted sub specie aetemitatis. But 
here, as Ansell Pearson underlines, Rousseau's thought faces a great paradox: the 
transition of man from a sub-human and pre-human condition to a fully human one is 
Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., p. 92 
Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., pp. 94-95 
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described as a transition from an amoral and ahistorical way of life to a moral and 
historical one. Yet, at the same time, the historical process that is designed to deliver a 
rational and moral humanity, far from fulfilling its promises, is actually held 
responsible for substituting present-day moral degeneration and the soul's disharmony 
for the original, simple, and transparent happiness. Leo Strauss grasps in Rousseau's 
dilemma both the challenge of modem thought to the fixed and eternal norms of 
rationality and the modem despair, brought about precisely by the historicization of 
reason, of a totality wh-ich history cannot give. ' 
By following Leo Strauss' reading of Rousseau, in this chapter I analyse 
Rousseau's understanding of modem civilization. In many respects, a great deal of the 
contradictions of modernity converge in Rousseau's thought. If, on the one hand, with 
his genealogical examination of the process of civilization he leaves behind the pre- 
modem search for metaphysical absolutes, on the other hand, the discovery of historical 
time as the shaping principle of human life discloses to his consciousness the sense of 
human despair in a world with no secure grounds. Rousseau never overcomes this 
existential paralysis and his philosophical wandering is emblematic of the wandering of 
modem consciousness in coming to ten-ns with the appropriation of its own destiny. 
In section 11,1 examine Rousseau's rejection of the classical idea of human 
essence. Though claiming that man is fundamentally good, Rousseau contends that his 
nature is subjected to historical transformation. However, Rousseau's standing on this 
point is considerably ambiguous. In section III, through an analysis of the Second 
Discourse, I show how he comes to see certain principles holding in the state of nature 
as binding moral codes in the course of human civilization. Yet, the contradictions into 
which the idea of natural law is cast lead him to replace it with the concept of 'law of 
reason", that is, with a set of historically acquired rather than naturally given moral 
criteria. This step forward in the evolution of Rousseau's thought marks the attempt of 
the Social Contract to provide philosophical grounds for civil society. But Rousseau 
has never been at ease with this quasi-Kantian solution of his philosophical dilemma. 
He was well aware that the echo of the voice of nature, with its prorrfise of happiness, 
resonates so deep down in the recesses of human consciousness that imposition on man 
Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991, 
p. 5. 
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of a system of moral virtue inevitably ends up denaturalizing him and introducing a 
painful conflict in his soul. Rousseau. suggestively expresses his dissatisfaction at the 
idea of good life in his last work, the Reveries, with which the final section of this 
chapter is concerned. 
11. Rousseau's Abandonment of the Idea of Human Essence 
Rousseau's ambiguity with regard to the antinomy between nature and artifice, his 
wriggling amid transhistorical flights to a transcendent reality and appeals to an 
overcoming of the predicament of modem civilization within history, have been well 
summed up by L. Gossman in his definition of Rousseau as 'the prophet of history who 
despaired of history. 'I Despite the philosophical impasse into which he was plunged, it 
is still an undisputable achievement of Rousseau to have undertaken an understanding 
of the concept of human nature in historical and dialectical terms. In his depiction of 
the evolution of the human species, humanity's actual configuration appears as the 
result of extensive historical transformations. At the same time, the direction towards 
which the historical course proceeds is deeply affected, as Horowitz suggests, by the 
'biological development' of human nature. This constant transfiguration of the ways in 
which human beings are shaped across history encourages Rousseau to abandon the 
idea of the existence of an unchangeable human essence. 
The historical development of society as well as the historical evolution of human 
nature combine together in Rousseau's thought to account for the transformations of 
both external and internal nature. 'By beginning to produce the means of his 
subsistence, the natural man creates culture"', gives new shape to his surrounding 
environment, and embellishes the architectonic of his soul with new passions. The 
historicization of human nature and the naturalization of history make up in Rousseau's 
reflection the key through which to provide a portrayal of the progress of civilization 
dispensed with any sort of divine or immanent order of nature. Rousseau rejects the 
Enlightenment's static and abstract concept of a human nature governed by eternal 
' This quotation is taken from K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau, cit., p. 5. 
10 Cf. A. Horowitz, Rousseau, Nature, and History, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1987, p. 
31. 
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laws. In particular, he rejects a conception of human nature revealed 'in the form of a 
system of deductions derived from axioms grasped by rational intuition. " On the 
contrary, in his view, the content of human nature is to be grasped through an analysis, 
which may be called 'historical anthropology"', capable of going beyond the mere 
inductive generalizations carried out by the modem science of ethnography in order to 
follow the process underlying present-day constitution of human beings. 
But if 'human nature is history and is itself created within the historical process"', 
does Rousseau not face the consequence of seeing the distinction between nature and 
artifice collapse? Is his appeal to a conception of human nature that develops itself via 
interaction with the external world not equivalent to a denial of any aternporal and 
absolute standards of humanity? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to 
undertake an examination of the Second Discourse by focussing both on Rousseau's 
historicization of morality and rationality and on his ambiguous stance on the 
ontological status of natural law. 
What is at issue in this Discourse, as Rousseau himself puts it, is 'to indicate in 
the progress of things the moment when, right taking the place of violence, nature was 
subjected to law; to explain by what sequence of marvels the strong could resolve to 
serve the weak, and the people to buy a repose in ideas at the price of a real felicity. "' 
In this introductory passage Rousseau seems to suggest that it is in the 
meandering of an enigmatic historical transition from the state of nature to civil society 
that lie the foundations of modem civilization. Nevertheless, 'the philosophers who 
have examined the foundations of society have all felt the necessity of going back to the 
state of nature, but none of them has reached it. "' 
The main reason why the philosopliical tradition has failed to attain the true 
essence of the state of nature is that 'it has carried over to the state of nature ideas 
acquired in civil society. "' Rousseau resorts to the state of nature in his attempt to 
" Cf. A. Horowitz, ibid., p. 47. 
12 Cf. A. Horowitz, ibid., p. 49. 
Cf. A. Horowitz, ibid., p. 52. 
14 Cf. JT Rousseau, "Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men", The 
Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 3, University Press of New England, Hannover and 
London, 1992, p. 18. 
Cf. JT Rousseau, ibid., p. 18. 
16 Cf. JT Rousseau, ibid., p. 19. 
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inquire into the philosophical foundations of society in order to gain a vantage 
viewpoint from which to launch his vigorous accusation against the moral degeneration 
and corruption of modem civilization. The analysis of the state of nature is meant to 
supply a picture of natural man which may be used 'as a non-n for judging humanity. "' 
Rousseau believes that it is possible to form a judgement of our present state only 
throughout an understanding and knowledge of natural man. In his Discourse on the 
Arts and Sciences, for instance, he mounts his attack on the miserable condition into 
which modem humanity has been plummeted by mythicizing an earlier, more original 
time when transparency prevailed in human relations and the vices of excessive pride 
and vanity were unknown. " 
In this perspective, Rousseau deals with the themes that are at issue in the Second 
Discourse 'through hypothetical and conditional reasoning', that is by fonning 
6conjectures , drawn solely from the nature of man and the beings surrounding him, 
about what the human race might have become if it had remained abandoned to itself"', 
or if God had not taken man out of the state of nature. Such a fictional representation of 
the state of nature fosters a Kantian interpretation of the pre-historical condition of 
humanity that regards it as a 'regulative Idea' which our minds should imaginatively 
make up to 'in order to understand the nature of social man. "' 
Nevertheless, the investigation of the Second Discourse into the state of nature 
seems to reveal historical truths when that state plays the role of an actual historical 
condition which precedes the emergence of civil society. As Leo Strauss claims, 'the 
Second Discourse is meant to be a history of man. ' And Rousseau's text seems to 
confirm it: 
An immense space separates [the natural state and the civil state]... It is in [the] slow 
succession of things [happening in this space] that [one can] see the solution to an infinite 
number of problems of morality and Politics which the Philosophers cannot resolve... [In 
this space is the explanation of] how the soul and human passions, altering imperceptibly, 
change their Nature so to speak; why our needs and our pleasures change their objects in 
the long run; why, original man vanishing by degrees, Society no longer offers to the eyes 
of the wise man anything except an assemblage of artificial men and factitious passions 
which are the work of all these new relations and have no true foundation in Nature... 
Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau, cit., p. 77. 
Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, ibid., p. 2. 
'9 Cf. JT Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, cit., p. 19. 
" Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau, cit., p. 56. 
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Savage man and Civilized man differ so much in the bottom of their Hearts and 
inclinations that what constitutes the supreme happiness of one would reduce the other to despair. The former breaths only repose and freedom; he wants only to live and remain 
idle... On the contrary, the Citizen, always active, sweats, agitates himself, torments 
himself incessantly in order to seek still more laborious occupations... The genuine cause 
of all these differences [is that] the Savage lives within himself; the sociable man, always 
outside of himself, knows how to live only in the opinion of others; and it is, so to speak, 
from their judgement alone that he draws the sentiment of his own existence. " 
This state in which everything becomes artificial and deceptive, and man has pleasure 
without happiness is not the original state of man. Rousseau feels the necessity of 
looking back to the state of nature because of his persuasion that the problem of 
civilization can be resolved by 'detem-fining what is original and what is artificial in the 
nature of man. "' The hi storic- anthropological analysis that he embarks on in the Second 
Discourse is thereby a sort of genealogy, an attempt to ascertain the real origin of man. 
This tracing back to the state of nature is designed then to provide him with a definition 
of the true nature of man that may serve as a measure of value according to which 
passing judgement on modem civilization. 
Both the Kantian reading of Rousseau's depiction of the state of nature as a 
regulative Idea and the genealogical interpretation of it as a source of actual historical 
truths appear to lead to the conclusion that Rousseau acknowledges the existence of an 
objective standard of morality worthy of pursuit. This view, though, is rejected by 
Horowitz. He contends that no hypostatized abstraction is presupposed by Rousseau to 
account for the origin of human history. The perfectibility of natural man's faculties and 
the malleability of his passions are the sole preconditions of history sufficient on their 
own to explain the evolving of an instinctually structured animal 'to the point where 
cultural and historical development takes the place of organic evolution as the mode of 
response to environmental change. But human history, although it presupposes an 
emergence from nature, does not do away with the necessity embodied in nature. 
Human history as opposed to pre-history will reproduce a blind, quasi-natural necessity 
in its own sphere. "' 
It is precisely this point that, according to Horowitz, marks Rousseau's 
detachment from the philosophers of the Enlightenment. Whereas the latter tried to 
Cf. J. J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, cit., pp. 65- 
66. 
" Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau, cit., p. 55. 
23 Cf. A. Horowitz, Rousseau, Nature, and History, cit., p. 80. 
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submit both the dominion of natural phenomena and that of ethical occurrences to 
abstract universal laws arrived at inductively, Rousseau refused to seal off human 
nature within a static and fixed system of general principles. Prior to being identified 
with the logic of reason and abstract thought, human beings are for Rousseau 
characterized by their sensuous, affective, and desiring dimension. Horowitz 
emphasizes to such an extent Rousseau's featuring of man as a sensuous and suffering 
being, as opposed to an abstract absolute subject, that he regards the emergence of 
history from nature as at the same time the entrance of nature into the history of 
artifice. The two moments are not to be separated insofar as history is not just the 
history of reason, but the development of a more compounded whole. " Through this 
dialectical unfolding of human nature across history, Horowitz takes Rousseau as 
saying that history is not proceeding towards a transcending end. Man is his own 
artificer and creates himself by transforming external nature. The historical activity in 
which men are engaged proceeds in an 'eternal tension between biology and culture, 
between bodily desires and its modes of expression and satisfaction. "' 
In Horowitz's opinion, Rousseau rules out the dominion of reason in history both 
as providence and as progress since reason can never suppress passion once and for all 
and take on the command of the individual's will. An element of unpredictability is 
inextinguishable from history and prevents it from being fixed within a static and 
calculable framework. Paradoxically, what makes history unpredictable is not freedom 
but necessity. Horowitz points out the extent to which the freedom of natural man lies 
in his insensitivity to an exterior will. But his indifference 'coincides with his own 
complete lack of self-consciousness. "' Inasmuch as it unfolds itself instinctually and 
does not involve power of choice, freedom, on the pre-historical and pre-moral level, is 
necessity. Similarly, the animal-man which comes out of nature and inaugurates history 
is subject to a sort of natural necessity, namely to the necessity of producing his means 
of subsistence by undertaking social relations with others. Here social dependence 
appears as a kind of second nature. It presupposes negativity as the capacity of 
In his defence of Rousseau's historical anthropology, Horowitz argues that Rousseau surpasses in 
some respects the histonco-philosophical insights of German idealism. This critique of the 
idealistic absolute subject seems, however, to be misleading insofar as it misses, for instance, 
Hegel's crucial distinction between reason and intellect. 
25 Cf. A. Horowitz, Rousseau, Nature, and History, cit., p. 85. 
26 Cf. A. Horowitz, ibid., p. 129. 
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opposing oneself to the external world, and is engendered by a limitless and 
unsatisfying desire for recognition. Its historical outcome is the establishment of a 
society of masters and slaves in which the contenders are imprisoned either by their 
own ethos as a caste of warriors or by their being reduced to a subhuman condition of 
total submission. Not even the bourgeois society that supersedes the master and slave 
society does display free relations among the by now civilized men. The relations of 
instrumental reciprocity constrain the individuals to subject themselves to a new nature, 
'the pseudo-nature of the market. Freedom here turns out to be the subjection of 
persons to a blind and mechanical economic dynamic. It is at the same time the erection 
in the political sphere of a Hobbesian sovereign out of the appearance of atomized 
conflict in civil society. This Rousseau calls a return to a "new state of nature". "' 
In brief, according to Horowitzs interpretation of Rousseau, the history of 
civilization ends up extending and deepening the sphere of necessity of the state of 
nature. It being impossible to annihilate nature, the internalization of cultural 
requirements through social morality as the condition of self-esteem produces a sort of 
neurotic conflict. Therefore, the dynamic and dialectical unfolding of history across 
time turns out to be nothing but the tale of the manifestations of repression demanded 
by civilized work. On this account, history itself may be defined as the development of 
the 'capacity for neurotic conflict inherent in human cultural existence. "' 
111. Rousseau's Dilemma: Happiness or Virtue? 
Rousseau's standing with regard to the existence of natural law might be better 
understood in the context of his criticism of Pufendorf and Hobbes. Rousseau quotes 
Pufendorf at the beginning of the Second Discourse as representative of a school which, 
against Hobbes's claim that man is naturally inclined to attacking and fighting, asserts 
instead that he is timid and peaceful. In the state of nature, Pufendorf argues, men used 
to practise the natural law which was known to them by reason. The abandonment of 
the state of nature and the establishment of the artificial civil state were made necessary 
in order to enforce the law of nature imperfectly obeyed by natural man. 
" Cf. A. Horowitz, ibid., p. 130. 
28 Cf. A. Horowitz, ibid., p. 134. 
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Hobbes labels this view as moralistic. He contends that natural law does not exist 
in the state of nature since its commands, whenever they are not obeyed, are not 
sanctioned. On the contrary, justice, the rules of right and wrong, does derive from the 
power of the state. What makes the latter work is not natural obedience to or the 
knowledge of the natural law, but two non-moral grounds: ' the passion of fear' and 'the 
agreement to accept the sovereign's will as absolute. "' 
In the face of the conflict between Pufendorf and Hobbes, Rousseau's position is 
ambiguous. In the Second Discourse he seems to be telling the story of man in order to 
account for the existence of the natural law which has been overridden by the 
development of civilization. He apparently presents the description of the state of nature 
as hypothetical, but the unravelling of his exposition makes it obvious that the state of 
nature is an actual historical condition out of which man has been drawn. The main 
reason for Rousseau's claim that his presentation of the state of nature is hypothetical is 
that the account he gives of it contradicts the biblical teaching about the origin of man. 
What remains hypothetical for Rousseau is not as much the concept of the state of 
nature as the narration of the development within the state of nature from the earlier 
simple, idle, and indolent way of life to the later Hobbesian war of all against all which 
demands the establishment of despotism. 
The story that Rousseau sets out to tell begins with a 'physical' and 
'metaphysical' investigation into the animal-man. Man, he claims, is an 'ingenious 
machine' which is distinguished from the other animal machines by virtue of his 
displaying two peculiar characteristics: free agency and the faculty of self-perfection. 
Freedom and perfectibility elevate man above the rank of mechanical necessity, thus 
accounting for the spirituality of his soul: 
[A beast] chooses or rejects by instinct and [a man] by an act of freedom, so that a Beast 
cannot deviate from the Rule that is prescribed to it... and a man deviates from it... 
Physics explains in some way the mechanisms of the senses and the formation of ideas; 
but in the power of willing or rather of choosing, and in the sentiment of this power are 
found only purely spiritual acts about which the Laws of Mechanics explain nothing". " 
As to the element of perfectibility, Rousseau posits in it 'the source of all man's 
'9 Cf. A. M. Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1990, p. 133. 
30 Cf. J. J. Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men, cit., pp. 25-26. 
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misfortunes. ' It is this quality in fact that by progressively enlightening his reason, yet 
absent in the first stages of the state of nature, 'makes him the tyrant of himself and of 
the state of nature. ' The primitive operations of human mind are elementary, confined 
to the capacity of willing and not willing, to desire and fear. Knowledge has its roots in 
passion which in turn derives its origin from our needs. The number of passions which 
natural man feels is though very limited. His desires or fears are aroused by the simple 
impulsion of nature, since his imagination cannot evoke objects of which the intellect is 
still unable to form an idea: 
His desires do not exceed his Physical needs, the only goods he knows in the Universe are 
nourishment, a female, and repose; the only evils he fears are pain and hunger. " 
This depiction of man in the state of nature clashes considerably with the one painted 
by Hobbes. Rousseau charges Hobbes of inconsistency for, though assuming that man 
is by nature social, he improperly carries over natural man a multitude of passions that 
might have been acquired only in society. Among these passions, in particular, Hobbes 
attributes to man, on account of his having no idea of goodness, a natural desire for 
aggression and dominion over others. Rousseau, instead, contends that men in the state 
of nature, ignoring any sort of moral relationship or duty, are neither good nor evil. 
They do not injure each other for its own sake, but only if they believe that it is 
necessary to their own self-preservation. They consider their acts of violence as natural 
occurrences that, far from arousing feelings of resentment or desire of revenge, stir up 
pure sentiments of joy or grief of success or failure. There being in the state of nature 
4no comparative assessments of value between human beings', " they do or suffer from 
violence without actually experiencing a sense of injury. Underlying Rousseau's 
analysis is the belief that the moral value of human actions lies for Rousseau in the 
sphere of intentions that is still concealed to beings whose actions arise out of 
immediate instinct. To feel a sense of injury one must have developed throughout a 
long process of socialization a moral sense by means of which one is able to trace back 
the value of human action to recondite intentions of rightousness or wrongdoing. 
Instead., on the level of a pre-reflective mode of existence man lacks even of the 
knowledge of death. And he lacks of reason. Reason is coextensive with language, 
Cf. J. J. Rousseau, ibid., p. 27. 
Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau, cit., p. 64. 
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which in turn presupposes social intercourse and communication. Thus, natural man 
living on his own, language cannot be natural and human rationality must have been 
acquired historically. 
All this reasoning seems to lead to the result that for Rousseau natural man is 
it good" because he is subhuman: 
Man is by nature good because he is by nature that subhuman being which is capable of 
becoming either good or bad. There is no natural constitution of man to speak of: 
everything specifically human is acquired or ultimately depends on artifice or convention. 
Man is by nature almost infinitely perfectible. There are no natural obstacles to man's 
almost unlimited progress or to his power of liberating himself from evil. For the same 
reason there are no natural obstacles to man's almost unlimited degradation. Man is by 
nature almost infinitely malleable. " 
The obvious inference that one is induced to draw from Rousseau's thesis that natural 
man is subhuman and pre-rational, is that 'he is utterly incapable of any knowledge of 
the law of nature which is the law of reason. "' On this account, the transition from the 
state of nature to civil society cannot be due to a rational decision of beings who are 
actually pre-rational, but to natural accidents whose sequence is not dissimilar from 
mechanical causation. This inference is. ) however, not straightforward as it may appear 
to be. In fact, the assumption of natural man's incapacity to know the natural law does 
not imply the fact that in the state of nature there is no natural law. On the contrary, 
Rousseau claims that there is actually in the state of nature a particular 'principle', that 
he calls compassion, which tempers and moderates the excessive manifestations of self- 
preservation, and prevents natural man from doing evil. In the state of nature this 
principle takes the place of laws, morals, and virtue. It inspires all men with this maxim 
of natural goodness: 'do what is good for you with the least possible hann to others'. 
Thus, as a matter of fact, it is Rousseau's opinion that a natural law does exist, 
even though it is not understood by natural man in linguistic and conceptual terms but 
in form of a natural feeling. Yet, how can there be a law prior to rationality and 
regardless of any sort of linguistic formulation? The dilemma contained in this question 
makes Rousseau's concept of natural law paradoxical insofar as, on the one hand, it is 
conceived to preside over the state of nature and modulate its development, while, on 
33 Cf. Leo Strauss, "The Crisis of Modem Natural Right", in Natural Right and History, The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953, pp. 252-294, p. 27 1. 
34 Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., pp. 270-271. 
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the other hand, the state of nature does not de facto include the conditions, namely 
natural man's capacity of reflection as well as possession of language, which are 
required to implement the effectiveness of natural law. 
It is precisely in the conundrum of the paradox explicated above that the chasm 
identified by Leo Strauss in Rousseau's thought opens up. Indeed, Rousseau does 
acknowledge the existence of natural law but he proves also that in the state of nature 
its moral prescriptions are not enforced, provided that the acts of wrongdoing cannot be 
sanctioned. Therefore, as the existence of an objective standard of morality is utterly 
unable to impose a binding moral code on the individuals, on the other hand, the 
compassionate behaviour of natural man is too weak to prevent him from falling into a 
warlike condition. Rousseau's solution of this conceptual paralysis lies in turning the 
"law of nature" into a "law of reason". In other terms., Rousseau gives up the idea of 
finding a norm for man by going back to the state of nature. This state is sub-human 
and pre-rational, no natural end is perceivable in it. It is governed by a blind necessity. 
At this stage the natural law is not properly a "law", it affects feebly and vaguely the 
feelings of natural man without involving his ethical dimension of free decisions. In 
order to establish a bond of society strong enough to keep it together, morality must be 
grounded on reason. Not on an abstract reason but on a kind of reason which assigns a 
primary role to passion and sentiment. 
Also the progress of human mind across history seems to offer to Rousseau an 
empirical support upon which he can rely in his search for universal standards of 
morality. Humanity is acquired, and human rationality is the result of the historical 
process. Man's struggling to come out of the state of nature was painful and tormented. 
Besides, it was necessary, in the sense that it was determined by accidental natural 
causes. Yet, in the end, man came through this multitude of afflictions and reason 
emerged. From then on, man has no longer been 'moulded by fortuitous circumstances 
but rather by his reason. Man, the product of blind fate, eventually becomes the seeing 
master of his fate. Reason's creativity or mastership over the blind forces of nature is a 
product of those blind forces. "' 
It must be underlined that, in spite of its seemingly triumphal emergence, reason 
does not represent the eschatological meaning of the consummation of the history of the 
" Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., p. 273. 
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world. Rather, Rousseau keeps holding to the position that history is meaningless and 
that the historical process is accidental. He denies that -through civilization man has 
experienced any authentic progress. In his opinion, the transition from the state of 
nature to civil society states a formal ratification and institutionalization of the original 
usurpations perpetrated by the rich to the damage of the poor. Culture, far from 
enlightening reason, hypocritically disguises in its refined dressing-up the fundamental 
injustice upon which society is based. Of course, Rousseau cannot ignore the immense 
technological advancement as well as the significant intellectual and moral 
achievements realized through the process of civilization. But he rejects the belief that 
these "marvellous conquests it make up remarkable pieces of a progressive history. 
Indeed, he points out how the development of human n-dnd has been outpaced by the 
scattering of new desires unleashed by reason. The passions of vanity and pride, for 
instance, have grown in the moral world out of the moral idea of "authority" which 
supplemented the "inoffensive" and "innocuous" physical power of natural man. 
Similarly, the desire for great wealth reproduces on the individual and existential level 
the social demands associated with the institution of property on the political level. As a 
consequence, Rousseau cannot accept the presupposition of a meaningful historical 
process that would make it preferable to the sub-human state of nature: 
To the extent to which the historical process is accidental, it cannot supply man with a 
standard, and ..., if that process 
has a hidden purpose, its purposefulness cannot be 
recognized except if there are trans-historical standards. The historical process cannot be 
recognized as progressive without previous knowledge of the end or purpose of the 
process. To be meaningful, the historical process must culminate in perfect knowledge of 
the true public right; man cannot be, or have become, the seeing master of his fate if he 
does not have such knowledge. It is, then, not knowledge of the historical process but 
knowledge of the true public right which supplies man with the true standard. " 
The expression "true public right" mentioned by Leo Strauss refers to the law of reason 
which Rousseau is meant to have taken on as a substitute for the traditional natural law. 
Such a rational law, though transcending the historical world, is not meant to be 
abstract and ineffectual. What reconciles it with the empirical reality is its being rooted 
in the sphere of passion and desire. Rather than envisaging a metaphysical archetype of 
human perfection, the law of reason represents a formal rule whose fulfilment leads to 
the universalization of the individual will. It is a test of generalization by means of 
36 Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., p. 274. 
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which the instinctual and biological desire is elevated to the rank of a rational one. 
According to this test, human desires are forced to restrain their drive to fulfilment by 
one's recognition in all other wills of the same right to realize their own desires. 
This reading of Rousseau's concept of the general will is heavily influenced by 
Cassirer's neo-Kantian interpretation. " Cassirer contends that Rousseau is primarily 
concerned with the problem of reconciling virtue and happiness. The utilitarian and 
hedonist moralities paint a shapeless portrayal of man as passively subject to nature, 
while the moral systems based on the pure idea of virtue bind the ethical will to obey to 
a universal law experienced by the actual subjectivity as too high an ideal to meet its 
real needs. Rousseau holds, according to the neo-Kantian interpretation, that virtue can 
be identified with "freedom" or "goodness" if the moral law is made to originate in the 
individual itself rather than emanate from a heteronomous source. Self-legislation 
becomes then 'the conventional substitute for natural compassion. "' 
Rousseau believes that the overcoming of the state of nature was made necessary 
by the weakening of compassion. The capacity of natural man to have a sense that there 
exists a fon-n of life which is beyond his own moderates his desire for self-preservation. 
However, accidental necessity introduced within the state of nature radical changes 
which brought about inequality, dependence of human beings on each other, and the 
appearance of the passions of vanity and pride. As a consequence, compassion started to 
fade away, leaving men increasingly threatened in their struggle for self-preservation. 
This condition of constant and frightening uncertainty eventually called for the 
stipulation among the endangered individuals of a social contract designed to guarantee 
common survival. Nevertheless, the new conventional corporation which gathers the 
heirs of natural man within a compact civil society is characterized for Rousseau by an 
intrinsic self-contradiction. Regardless of its illegitimate sanctioning of earlier 
usurpation, it forces individuals who by nature have been made to be on their own to 
come together and form an organic and harmonious whole. The denaturalization of 
man's most fundamental structure produces deep in the individual a painful conflict, 
which demands to be transcended, between his profoundest conscience, still intensely 
sensitive to the pure and untouchable voice of nature, and his moral duty. 
Cf. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlighteninent, Beacon Press, Boston, 1961, pp. 258- 
273; plus The Question of J J. Rousseau, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1963. 
38 Cf. Leo Strauss, The Crisis of Modern Natural Right, cit., p. 285. 
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Since civilized man turns out to be lacerated in his soul and alienated from 
himself, while natural man was happy and in peace with himself, 'civil society must be. 
transcended in the direction not of man's highest end but of his beginning, of his earlier 
past. "' Yet, there is no way to return to the original state of nature. The process of 
civilization has so deeply transformed human nature that man has been expropriated of 
his blessed Paradise once and for all. At this stage, the good life which Rousseau is 
longing for can be founded only 'in the closest approximation to the state of nature 
which is possible on the level of humanity. "' 
A Kantian compliance of the denaturalized individuals with the universal pattern 
of the general will is meant to realize the purpose of fulfilling natural liberty within a 
community based on social interdependence. But an identity between the individual and 
the moral -collective body can be achieved at the sacrifice of the individual's self- 
interest. Rousseau attempts to overcome the conflict between the deep voice of 
consciousness and moral duty by advocating a radical transformation in the nature of 
the individual. However, he cannot escape from constructing a pure and abstract will 
refractory to the vicissitudes of historical life if the way by which the particular will 
gains moral freedom is that of becoming a tyrannical master of its desires. 
Rousseau's concern with the happiness and autonomy of the individual requires 
that morality, far from being subjected to a purely ideal end, be rooted in the domain of 
passion and self-interest. This presupposition seems to be eluded when he describes the 
universalization of the rational will in terms of self-education and political participation 
to the moral -collective body. The process of education that the individual undergoes 
turns out to be nothing but a process of acquisition of a sense of responsibility through 
which the individual learns to control its instincts by compulsion and discipline. But, 
whereas the labour of self-legislation in terms of creation of maxims of action capable 
of being universalized to all rational wills is a condition of morality in Kant's system, it 
cannot work without contradiction when it is conveyed to the ambit of Rousseau's 
formulation of morality. In Kant, the generalization of the individual's proposed course 
of action succeeds in transcending the subjective viewpoint since the motive of duty, 
from which the moral action derives, does not appeal to any sort of heteronomous end. 
39 Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., p. 282. 
" Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., p. 282. 
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By contrast, Rousseau's emphasis on the motive of natural goodness of man, his longing 
for the happiness of the pre-social and pre-political life make "true freedom" 
unattainable on the level of moral virtue. Insofar as the standard of the good life is 
posited in the immediate pleasures of nature, virtue, conceived of as the effort to tame 
and domesticate the mere impulse of appetite, is experienced by the moral agent as a 
burden which demands perennially to be transcended. To the extent that fl-iis is the case, 
it can be said that Rousseau's civilized man who nostalgically looks back to the 
primitive state of nature is doomed to bear the traits of that spiritual figure which Hegel 
called "unhappy consciousness". His unhappiness lies in his incessant unrest and 
dissatisfaction, in his utter incapacity to be constrained by whatever given system of 
rules. Happiness, autonomy, and freedom are always excessive, they always exceed the 
boundaries of the established moral norms. Thus, since either they are total or they are 
notl they are to be sought beyond duty and virtue, beyond any attempt to define their 
essentially indefinite and undefinable horizons. " 
IV. The Sentiment of Existence: Rousseau's Discontent with History and Time 
Rousseau's attempt to transcend the historicity of our present limitations throughout the 
construal of an abstract and pure will stems from his pessimistic view of history. 
History appears to his eyes totally meaningless. No sense and direction is perceivable in 
it. There was indeed a moment in our history, or pre-history, when men were 
independent and free. But that natural independence is irretrievably lost. Any endeavour 
to restore it must come to terms with the continual deepening and expansion of our 
selfish needs. Moreover, whereas', on the one hand, the modem institutions seem to be 
inadequate to provide the individuals with an edifying process of education leading to 
the realization of the good life; on the other hand, the idea of good life is characterized 
by such ahistorical connotations that it takes on the features of a secularized version of 
the other world never susceptible of being actualized through a concrete development in 
time. 
Lost his faith in history, that is in a moral outcome of the historical development, 
Rousseau takes flight from the world by seeking refuge in an extemporaneous 
" Cf. Leo Strauss, ibid., p. 290. 
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annihilation of the will. As discontent with civilization becomes increasingly deeper, he 
comes to realize that the fundamental source of human unhappiness lies in the 
experience of time. The transition from the solitary natural form of existence to society 
brings about first of all an essential change in the way in which humanity perceives the 
flowing of time. Natural man was barely able to extend his projects to the end of the 
day. In the state of nature, no expectation about the future or regret about the past 
agitated his soul entirely given over to his present existence. The idea of the future 
makes its entrance on the stage of history the last phases of the state of nature, when 
the idle and assembled life of the first rudimentary tribal agglomerations give rise in the 
human mind to the sentiment of self-esteem and the need for self-recognition. The 
awareness of the ever-opened possibility of death arouses a sense of transitoriness and 
caducity in human affairs. Nothing appears capable of preserving a permanent form 
beyond its inexorable becoming and fading away, nothing seems to be stable enough 
which human beings may hold on to. The ceaseless sinking of the soul into a succession 
of fleeting moments makes happiness impossible to be experienced: 
Everything is in constant flux on this earth. Nothing keeps the same unchanging shape, 
and our affections, being attached to things outside us, necessarily change and pass away 
as they do. Always out ahead of us or lagging behind, they recall a past which is gone or 
anticipate a future which may never come into being; there is nothing solid there for the 
hearth to attach itself to. Thus our earthly joys are almost without exception the creatures 
of a moment; I doubt whether any of us knows the meaning of lasting happiness... And 
how can we give the name of happiness to a fleeting state which leaves our hearts still 
empty and anxious, either regretting something that is past or desiring something that is 
yet to come? " 
The acknowledgement of the perennial passage of time leads Rousseau to express a 
desire for negation of time by annihilating the temporal self, and to seek alternatively a 
compensation for the happiness denied to the soul throughout its incessant flowing in a 
single and lasting state which is not made up of fleeting moments: 
But if there is a state where the soul can find a resting place secure enough to establish 
itself and concentrate its entire being there, with no need to remember the past or reach 
into the future, where time is nothing to it, where the present runs on indefinitely but this 
duration goes unnoticed, with no sign of the passage of time, and no other feeling of Cý 
deprivation or enjoyment, pleasure or pain, desire or fear than the simple feeling of 
existence, a feeling that fills our soul entirely, as long as this state lasts, we can call 
Cf. JT Rousseau, Reveries of a Solitary Walker, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1979, p. 88. tý 
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ourselves happy... What is the source of our happiness in such a state? Nothing external to 
us, nothing apart from ourselves and our own existence; as long as this state lasts we are 
sel f- sufficient like God. 43 
This desire for the oblivion of the self throughout the raptures of solitary contemplation 
represents Rousseau's last desperate attempt to retrieve that fundamental feeling of 
contentment and joy in mere existence which humanity lost along with its natural 
goodness. By transcending time, Rousseau believes that it is possible to reach the 
ultimate nature of man deep in the profoundest recesses of the soul where the individual 
is harmonious and at once with itself. There one can find a state of peace and repose 
which is the denial of the restless desire for progress and of the irresolute strife for 
possession and power prevailing at the superficial level of life. 
Such an absolute and self-sufficient self is not understood by Rousseau 
teleologically as a perfected nature which needs to be actualized in order to realize the 
final Idea inherent to human essence. The self is rather characterized as a "perceiving 
subject", "a thing that thinks and senses", "a Cartesian ego" existing 'through its 
indubitable presence to itself. "' It is an ego related to no external object, bodily or 
ideal, since it is no object at all. It is 'the deepest thing within one', which manifests 
itself metaphysically as a 'sentiment of pure existence. ' No set of qualities specifies its 
articulation, for, as a pure feeling which is always the same, it is fundamentally one and 
self- consistent. 
By positing the true nature of man in the sentiment of existence, Rousseau 
postulates a priority of feeling and emotion as opposed to reason and knowledge. 
Reason is a calculating faculty which, by operating with objects, projects the self onto 
the external world, thus alienating it from its primary ground. Indeed, an impulse for 
self-extension directed to no purpose but feeling more fully the mere actuality of 
existence is in the nature of the self. But when this goalless expansiveness outspreads to 
the extent of dissolving the unity of the soul, existence can no longer be felt as a whole 
wMIe division and conflict cast the self into an inextricable spiral of contradictions. 
Regardless of any moral and teleological content, Rousseau's discontent with 
civilization seems to be rooted in the belief that the frenzied social activity in which 
modem man is engaged disintegrates the unity of the soul meant as the formal 
Cf. JT Rousseau, ibid., pp. 88-89. 
Cf. A. M. Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man, cit., p. 39. 
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condition for a full and consistent existence. Through social life and worldly 
intercourse, man is plunged into the flux of the external things so as to be prevented 
from becoming truly one. Hence, on the one hand, man has to stretch out his clutches to 
the temporal dimensions of past and future in order to escape from perishing each 
instant in the ceaseless stream of sensations and gain unity over time; yet, on the other 
hand, this same self-expansion leads him to remain caught in the flux of worldly things 
and lose that continuity of shape which makes him recognizable over time. 
Accordingly, the condition of civilized man is like that of alienated beings whose 
overwhelming preoccupations and anxieties about the future have detached themselves 
to such an extent from their own present self that they have lost the main source of 
temporal unity, namely their centre of being, from which plenitude of existence springs. 
In order to feel life fully, one must be master of one's life as a whole, unify one's 
actions under a common denominator, and express the same way of life across changing 
times and aspects. In sum, one must live one's life as a single state where the soul can 
find rest and unity of inclinations, thus allowing affections not to clash with duties and 
inner order and harmony to prevail over chaos. 
The internalization of the contradiction inherent to personal dependence on 
external means underpins Rousseau's indictment of modem civilization. What really 
constitutes the core of his disenchantment in the historical development is the belief that 
striving for growth and advancement has brought about disharmony and disunity of the 
soul. In the course of civilization men have become accustomed to pursuing ends by 
acquisition of means. This has engendered a division in the soul. Men have learned to 
defer the satisfaction of their desires until an indeterminate future time while turning 
their attention to the attainment of means perceived necessary for the acquisition of 
future goods. Thus, while airfdng at ends which are well beyond their present 
capacities, their lives are almost entirely taken by the necessity of controlling these 
external means. Hence, divided from themselves and alienated from their true needs, 
men abandon their natural inclinations and give themselves to things they do not really 
need. By doing so they postpone ad infinitum their existence without ever possessing 
what they truly wish. There is no moment in their life for which it would be worth 
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saying: let this moment last forever. Always drifting "on the way", they never are where 
they ought to be. " 
V. Conclusion 
Through his investigations into the origins of man, Rousseau has disclosed the 
historical character of human nature. But the historicity which accounts for the 
development of reason and consciousness leaves him without any prospects of 
redemption from an involute historical process. History is meaningless and demands to 
be transcended. The sense and direction of this overcoming is given by an objective 
standard of morality meant to be beyond history. Yet, inasmuch as the call for an 
overcoming comes from the pre-historical and pre-moral ground of natural law, its 
voice is destined to remain mute, since it requires a regression of humanity to a kind of 
state for which its present faculties and inclinations are inadequate. On the other hand, 
if the standard is posited in an ideal world rationally achievable, then it turns out to be 
fairly high for a being whose passions and inclinations are still too sensitive to the 
appeal of the voice of nature. In a certain sense, history is for Rousseau a sort of 
twilight zone, impracticable and undesirable on its own, but too far away both from the 
vanishing gleam of its blessed origins and from the dazzling light of the pure Idea. 
Rousseau's checkmate is that of the philosopher who seeks the eternal after discovering 
the historicity and transitoriness of life. As soon as he approaches the thought of the 
constant mutability of human affairs, he is plunged into anxiety and despair. The more 
he tries to do without the eternal, the more he finds himself overwhelmed by the 
expectation of eternal salvation. But man cannot be himself without reckoning time into 
the dimensions of past, present, and future. The single state that Rousseau longs for as 
a resting-place for the modem wandering consciousness is an attempt to find an "instant 
of eternity" in which time and eternity may touch each other. Here language 
relinquishes clear semantic distinctions and enters the blurred region of the oxymoron. 
The words no longer mean what they are supposed to mean. They merely express a 
desire to deny time through the oblivion and annihilation of the self. 
Where Rousseau, in spite of his many failures, sows, his successors reap. A 
" Cf. A. M. Melzer, ibid., pp. 66-67. 
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blatant and insolent challenge to the aspirations of modernity is launched by Nietzsche. 
In his defiance of the achievements of modem civilization, Rousseau never dared to 
question the ultimate foundations of human life. He criticized progress as it has 
unfolded itself through history; he also disclosed the appropriation by man of time and 
history as the source of his unhappiness, but he always conducted his own analysis from 
the vantage point of an original and untainted Paradise which humanity lost at the 
moment of entering civil society. It is this premise of an unquestioned, mythical realm 
of happiness that Nietzsche puts into question. However, he succeeds in his attempt to 
combine time and eternity only as long as he exposes the tragic foundations of human 
life. But to recognize that all human achievements are illusory escapes from the 
terrifying truth of existence was too high a price to pay for a generation triumphantly 
celebrating the impetuous march of history. Is there a middle ground between the 
extremes of the nihilistic emphasis on the tragic side of human life and the romantic 
search for a pure, heavenly origin? My argument in this thesis is that there is or, in 
other terms, that the idea of progress can be justified within a dialectical pattern of 
philosophy of history in which historically determined potentialities of human 
emancipation and liberation are progressively realized. Yet, contrary to the Hegelian 
model, I do not see the culmination of the historical process as resulting in a return to 
the perfect, though further enriched, unity of the beginning. 
However, before posing my claim in favour of an emphatic but rational 
conception of progress, let us confront the two champions of the anti-Enlightenment 
thought: Nietzsche and Heidegger. 
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"Beyond the North, beyond the ice, beyond death - our life, our happiness... " 
or rather 
IM TMEI To 
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1. Introduction 
The quotation placed above in form of a tag marks the outset of Nietzsche's Anti-Christ 
and epitomizes, in its evocative and suggestive phraseology, his constant and 
unsatisfiable yearning for a mythical country of warmth and plenty. Nietzsche claims to 
have discovered there happiness and found the exit out of whole millennia of labyrinth. 
The labyrinth into which he was meandering is that of modernity, an existential age of 
regression and decadence which has internalized human consciousness deep inside into 
the most hidden and obscure spiritual profundities. Emergence, through an act of 
"defiant affirmation" of life in its transitoriness and passing away, to the joyful "second 
innocence" of an "unconscious existence" is the landing-place towards which the 
Hyperboreans are driven by the blustery blowing of the north wind. 
Nietzsche brings to a radical conclusion Spinoza's and Hegel's philosophy of 
immanence. According to his reading of their works, both these philosophers, though 
asserting that man and the world lack of any 'supernatural gift emanating from a 
transcendent domain', ' conceive of the realm of immanence as a humanized being 
endowed with human-like forms. They assume that an internal necessity governs the 
world according to a self-justifying system of rational laws, and that a set of fixed and 
eternal categories captures the essence of reality and makes it intelligible. Nietzsche, 
instead, rejects this pantheistic idea of a cosmic meaningfulness as a legacy of the old 
religions. It reflects, he contends, the anthropomorphic conception of a subject-like 
Cf. Y. Yovel, "Nietzsche and Spinoza: amorfat, and amor del", in Y. Yovel (ed. ), Nietzsche as 
Affirmative Thinker, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, pp. 183-203, p. 186. 
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universe which projects chimerically upon the incessant stream of immanence the 
human-made rational forms of regularity and duration. But, in Nietzsche's mind, no 
flight from the finitude of his being is available to man in order to raise himself above 
the boundaries of his temporal existence and realize the spell of eternity. Rather, tile 
rational categories which man attaches to the world of immanence to confer upon it a 
sense of order and pen-nanence are illusory. The necessity into which the ever-transient 
flux of the cosmic will to power is inscribed is in fact an 'opaque and unintelligible 
fatum" absolutely unjustified in its indeterminate unfolding. 
Assent to the inexorable transience of life and internalization of this truth open 
the way, Nietzsche believes, to true knowledge. In this perspective, knowledge retains a 
liberating effect on life. It 'purifies the individual from decadent images and false 
metaphysical consolations" and provides him with the torch of a disenchanted and 
critical enlightenment by means with which to illuminate the path leading to the self- 
overcoming of morality. Yet, the disillusionment descending from the knowledge that 
man is inescapably constrained within the confines of the immanent universe 'is a 
source of suffering and a temptation to despair. " The task of the overman is then that of 
bearing the burden of as much truth as possible and transforming, via artistic creativity, 
the existential quahn for the meaninglessness of human existence into Dionysian joy. 
In spite of cultivating a tragic sense of life, Nietzsche designates, however, a 
f perspective of human ascendance and perfectibility. " His challenge to the 'divine part' 
of man that makes up to 'complacent self-images and comforting illusions', ' though 
cutting within his soul a dark side of shock and horror, looks forward to a kind of joyful 
knowledge delivering the gift of existential liberation. Nevertheless, since in the ambit 
of a radical philosophy of immanence the prospects of self-overcoming cannot spring 
from some supra-natural norm or latent structure of the universe embodying the moral 
world-order, they must reside in a natural principle capable of re-shaping life merely by 
drawing upon its own immanent resources. Therefore, Nietzsche resorts to the doctrine 
of the will to power as the theoretical postulate grounding the man's inherent inner 
'Cf. Y. Yovel, ibid., p. 186. 
' Cf. Y. Yovel, ibid., p. 185. 
'Cf. Y. Yovel, ibid. 
' Cf. Y. Yovel, ibid., p. 188. 
6 Cf. y. Yovel, ibid. 
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drive to enhance his vital and creative powers. The spontaneous and self-productive 
activity of the will to power moulds life from within and-sublimates it above its raw 
original givenness. From its mechanical - but not mechanistic - play universal moral 
obligations do not descend for humanity. The will to power is not an external and 
transcendent substrate dictating self-denying ascetic rules. Any sort of superior and 
extra-natural principle, when imposed upon life from without, has the effect, in 
Nietzsche's view. ) of. frustrating its invigorating manifestations and constraining the 
fundamental striving for power. 
Life as will to power is essentially a drive towards self-transcendence. This 
dynamic thrust to augment the power of existence, far from suggesting a purposive 
organization of the universe, seems to operate accidentally. Yet, absolute contingency 
involves simply the world of immanence considered as a whole. Within this world, 
however, the primordial drive inherent to human beings 'to go beyond their boundaries 
and become more" is not blind and meaningless, even though it is not guided by a 
priori norms deriving from a transcendent realm. The aim of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that, since in projecting their own constitution and self- transcendence 
within the universe of immanence human beings need a meta-perspectival criterion of 
interpretation mediating the ongoing one-sided standpoints, we can more consistently 
understand the history of humanity offered by Nietzsche in his most disparate writings 
within a hermeneutic-ontological framework. Although Nietzsche agrees that there is 
no final perspective of life dazzling in some better future to give meaning to the world 
of immanence, he still acknowledges, I seek to show, that the task of undoing and 
shaping again and again the finite and transitory forms cannot be carried out without 
relying upon some kind of conceptual and logical order. To substantiate this hypothesis 
that Nietzsche has of his philosophy of history, I will also show that he sets up a 
paradigm of human evolution designed to account for the emergence of the sovereign 
individual. The recourse to a historically founded rational pattern of interpretation does 
not undermine, however, his claim that nothing durable and permanent is available for 
man to hold on to. Immanence remains inescapable. But, insofar as we have to make 
sense of it in order 'to will' it, the hermeneutical process of understanding the past and 
projecting the future, though bound not to evade the instantaneous character of life, 
' Cf. Y. Yovel, ibid., p. 192. 
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cannot help but draw on the logos, half translucent and half opaque, of history and its 
categories. 
Nietzsche develops an ontologico-henneneutical theory of the world in order to 
account for the historical self- transcendence of man within immanence. His re ection of 
religion, morality and utopia as illusory escaping towards a comfortable metaphysical 
'Beyond' marks at the same time the utmost affirmation of the transience of life. He 
denies time any qualitative character. The idea that there is a real temporal process 
called history and that this process delivers novelty, advancement and progress is a 
residual semi-mystical attempt to combine time and eternity so as to nullify the 
ineluctable finitude of existence into an indeterminate infinite. Indeedl each moment is 
doomed to pass away and die. Man's hope for an eschatological 'next world' or 'after- 
life' ignores the burdensome truth that nothing will replace our present life. 
Accordingly, Nietzsche recognizes 'the horizon of immanence as the totality of 
existence" and craves for a joyful acceptance of time's transitoriness and flowing away. 
But as this acknowledgement, rather than being pursued by means of intellectual 
abstraction, has to proceed from the affective and instinctual part of life, it demands a 
cultural transformation. A revaluation of moral values designed to overcome 
Christianity and to make of man his own creator is the instrument that he devises in 
order to accomplish his project of amorfati. He points out how life, though stemnling 
in the totality of its passions from an encompassing natural first principle, has taken on 
in the course of history various and often opposite configurations. The morality of 
resentment underlying Christian culture has brought about a decadent and degenerate 
form of life apparently in contradiction with the urge of the will to power for a healthy, 
flourishing, and positive affirmation of life. Consequently, what Nietzsche calls for is 
an act of liberation whereby the destructively regressive tendencies of Christian 
morality, which have so indelibly shaped modem man, are assimilated and overcome 
into a higher type of human being. With his indictment against the world-weary and 
decadent values of modem civilization, he is not advocating, however, a radical break 
in the continuous course of events which would result in a total negation of the outcome 
of history and in the establishment of an indistinct supra-human being. On the contrary, 
by submitting the concept of reason to an immanent critique, Nietzsche embarks on the 
' Cf. Y. Yovel, ibid., p. 198. 
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task of carrying out a genealogical analysis of the origin of our moral values - deemed 
to be the foundation of modem civilization - in order to determine what can yet be done 
with man as he is now. 
Since modem consciousness has been deformed by the historicist pursuit of an 
overabundant historical knowledge, he 'doubts that modernity can still fashion its 
criteria out of itself. " Nevertheless, aware that 'the modem time-consciousness 
prohibits any thoughts of regression, of an unmediated return to mythical origins', " he 
assumes a 'utopian attitude' which looks at the future as the horizon within which 
modernity is reconciled with the archaic. Thus, a movement of reaction introduced into 
history by the slave revolt in morals is turned into a movement of progress. When the 
world is divested of all God's shadows and man takes upon his own shoulders the task 
of creating himself, 'the plastic power of life' cannot be exercised in a manner different 
from interpreting the past from the standpoint of the present and trying to heighten it to 
the level of a superior synthesis. This interpretive act, however, does not make for a 
dialectic of enlightenment. To Nietzsche's mind, personal perfection as conditioned by 
reasoning and dialectics is a kind of self-contradiction. " His alternative is the 
acknowledgement that our creative power is not unlimited, his philological sensibility 
having shown that, insofar as history sets the scenario upon which the works of art are 
performed, 'it is difficult to escape the whirlpool once it has spun us around for a few 
thousand years'. This amounts to saying that, whilst it is true that a degree of 
consciousness makes perfection impossible, it is equally true that the pursuit of 
perfection beyond the boundaries of historical consciousness is an empty, ineffectual 
and vainglorious effort. 
The chapter unfolds as follows: in section 11,1 argue that Nietzsche's 
understanding of the role of history in human life must be explained within a 
hermeneutical framework as it is developed by Gadamer. To any reader of Nietzsche 
who sees him as the supreme advocate of the demolition of the past as a condition of 
historical innovation, this interpretation of his thought might appear paradoxical. Yet, 
Cf. J. Habermas, "The Entry into Postmodernity: Nietzsche as a Turning Point", in J. Habermas, 
The Philosophical Discourse of Moderniry, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1991, 
pp. 83-105, p. 86. 
Cf. J. Habermas, ibid., p. 87. 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Random Horse, New York, 1967, Aph. 289. 
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by revisiting the Second Untimely Meditation, I contend that Nietzsche, while denying 
the possibility of objectifying history, never claims that history is something we can do 
without. Rather, he believes that, as historical beings, we are always involved in history 
and that, in the process of understanding ourselves, we are bound to make an object of 
interpretation. In this respect, Nietzsche argues that our interpretive activity of 
understanding ourselves is not arbitrary but is conditioned by our own historical 
achievements. 
In Truth and Method, Gadamer explains that the possibility of understanding the 
past is ontologically grounded upon the existence of a universal element mediating 
between the different historical epochs. In section 111,1 show that within Nietzsche's 
philosophical system the dyonisian glimpse into the absurdity of human existence can 
be seen to represent the principle of universal mediation for the hermeneutical 
experience of understanding the past. 
The hermeneutical framework within which I read Nietzsche's thought plays in 
this chapter the role of a methodological device whereby I set out to disentangle the 
riddle of his genealogical analysis of our moral values. My aim is to offer a dialectical 
interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy of history accounting for his progressive 
conception of overcoming in terms of a synthesis of Christian and pagan morality. 
Therefore, in sections IV and VI embark on the examination of On the Genealogy of 
Morals and show that Nietzsche's inquiries into the origin of our moral values are 
designed to provide an insight into the origin of our humanity and to prefigure the 
historical possibilities opened to our future advancement. 
This interpretive line implies the claim that genealogy is an exercise not just in 
monumentalistic but also in critical history, an issue which I address in section VI. 
Finally, in section VII I sketch an outline of Nietzsche's philosophy of history 
accounting for the appearance in modernity of a mature and enlightened individual 
endowed with the capacity of autonomy and self-legislation. This story serves to show 
that for Nietzsche the act of overcoming man as he is now must be carried out on the 
basis of what he has happened to become up to now. 
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11. Nietzsche's Early Hermeneutics: Historical Consciousness and Interpretive 
Activity 
Despite the current interpretations which regard Nietzsche's pl-iilosophical thought as 
unsuitable to any sort of historiographical collocation, there is sufficient exegetic 
evidence to include it within the tradition of hermeneutic ontology. The expression 
"hermeneutic ontology" refers to a specific philosopl-lical orientation which traces back 
to Schleiermacher's and Dilthey's attempts to determine critical foundations for 
historical reason and which, throughout Heidegger's pursuit of an existential analysis of 
Dasein, develops up to Gadamer's elaboration of effective historical consciousness, 
Ricouer's reflections on metaphor, and Derrida's philosophical practice of 
deconstruction. 11 
Nietzsche's accreditation within the tradition of hermeneutic ontology is better 
highlighted by confronting his revaluation of historicism with the objectivist ideal of 
historical knowledge aiming at reconstructing methodologically the details of antiquity 
in terms of the categories contemporaneous with their epoch. In the Second Untimely 
Meditation, On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life, Nietzsche embarks on 
the task of assessing the value of history and showing that we need history 'for the sake 
of life and action, not so as to turn comfortably away from life and action. "' Any form 
of historical knowledge, which is 'not attended by action' but is cultivated as 'a costly 
superfluity and luxury' 14 , affects life to such a 
degree that this becomes 'stunted and 
degenerate. "' 
Modem man, according to Nietzsche, suffers from his historical sense. Unable to 
forget and deprived of 'the capacity to feel unhistorically during [his] duration', " he is 
denied happiness: 
He who cannot sink down on the threshold of the moment and forget all the past... will 
never know what happiness is. ... Imagine the extremist possible example of a man who 
did not possess the power of forgetting at all and who was condemned to see everywhere 
a state of becoming: such a man would no longer believe in his own being, would no 
12 Cf. G. Vattimo, "Nietzsche and Contemporary Hermeneutics", in Y. Yovel (ed. ), Nietzsche as 
Affirmative Thinker, cit., pp. 58-68, p. 58. 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983, p. 59. 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 59. 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid. 
16 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 62. 
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longer believe in himself, would see everything flowing asunder in moving points and 
would lose hirnself in this stream of becoming: like a true pupil of Heraclitus, he would in 
the end hardly dare to raise his finger. 
Cratylus' claim according to which we cannot even once plunge into the same river is 
revealed to us by the simple sight of a grazing cow who passes us by thoroughly 
unaware of the flux of time. Man cannot help but staring at it as if he was facing the 
vision of lost paradise whose inhabitants go on living 'in blissful blindness between the 
hedges of past and future': " 
Consider the cattle, grazing as they pass you by: they do not know what is meant by 
yesterday or today, they leap about, eat, rest, digest, leap about again, and so from mom 
till night and from day to day, fettered to the moment and its pleasure or displeasure, and 
thus neither melancholy nor bored. This is a hard sight for man to see; for, though he 
thinks himself better than the animals because he is human, he cannot help envying them 
their happiness - what they have, a life neither bored nor painful, is precisely what he 
wants, yet he cannot have it because he refuses to be like an animal. A human being may 
well ask an animal: "why do you not speak to me of your happiness but only stand and 
gaze at me? " The animal would like to answer and say: "The reason is I always forget 
what I was going to say" -but then he forgot this answer too, and stayed silent: so that the 
human being was left wondering. " 
It is altogether impossible, for Nietzsche, to live without forgetting. Not without that 
kind of forgetting brought about by the oblivion of death which 'sets the seal on the 
knowledge that being is only an interrupted has-been, a thing that lives by negating, 
consuming and contradicting itself'; ` but without that sort of active forgetfulness which 
draws a horizon around society and individuals and traces 'a line dividing the bright 
and discernible from the unilluminable and dark'. " When a human being lets itself be 
overwhelmingly submerged under the burden of the past, it fatefully exposes itself to a 
degenerative process of decadence: 
He also wonders at himself, that he cannot learn to forget but clings relentlessly to the 
past: however far and fast he may run, this chain runs with him. And it is a matter for 
wonder: a moment, now here and then gone, nothing before it came, again nothing after it 
has gone, nonetheless returns as a ghost and disturbs the peace of a later moment. A leaf 
flutters from the scroll of time, floats away - and suddenly floats back again and floats 
into the man's lap. Then the man says I remember" and envies the animal, who at once 
forgets and for whom every moment really dies, sinks back into night and fog and is 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid. 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 61. 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 6 1. 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 61. 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 63. 
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extinguished for ever. Thus the animal lives unhistorically: for it is contained in the 
present, like a number, without any awkward fraction left over: it does not know how to 
dissimulate, it conceals nothing and at every instant appears wholly as what it is; it can 
therefore never be anything but honest. " 
Both the historical and the unhistorical, Nietzsche emphasizes, are necessary for the 
health of an individual, a people and a culture. The criterion of 'stylistic unity', which 
informs his idea of historical knowledge, demands that the past be interpreted from a 
viewpoint capable of creating historical innovation rather than simply mirroring the 
bygone events. Man would not be man if he dwelled, like an animal, within a horizon 
reduced to an extensionless point. Yet, he does not grow vital and truly human unless 
he preserves 'the capacity to feel to a certain degree unhistorically'. 1' The 'envelope of 
the unhistorical' enables him to interrupt his excessive and relentless practice of 
thinking, reflecting, comparing, and drawing conclusions, and begin to exist life- 
minded. By breaking the circle of his memory through an act of injustice towards what 
lies behind him, he gains a little vortex of life. No matter he may appear ungrateful to 
the past: it is a condition of life that, in order to do one thing, one must forget most 
things. 
Nietzsche's vindication of the power of forgetting, combined with his urge to man 
to enclose himself within a bounded horizon, is meant to remove the influence of 
Hegelianism on the study of history. No end and no telos attend man at the cuh-nination 
of the historical process. Man would be deceiving himself if he assumed that, with the 
procession of the course of history, the meaning of existence is gradually disclosed. On 
the contrary, the character of history as a process is merely apparent, since 'the world 
is complete and reaches its finality at each and every moment. ') 24 
The thought of being epigones drifts into our minds when we believe that the 
historical phenomena, once occurred, lose their vital and energetic predicates to become 
dead phenomena of knowledge. But history, pursued as a pure and sovereign science, 
has a paralysing effect on man's creativity. Far from preparing a salutary and fruitful 
future for the present evolving culture, it cuts off the new current of life and turns the 
interest of its devotees to the quiescent recollection and objective reconstruction of what 
22 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., pp. 60-61. 
23 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 63. 
24 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 66. 
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has already existed. In opposition to the historical and unhistorical ways of regarding 
the past, Nietzsche seems to be appealing in this meditation to a supra historical man 
who does not take history too seriously and is capable of recognizing the vital life- 
instincts as the constitutive traits of human action. From this supra historical vantage 
point an eye is cast over the entire trajectory of time so that the past and the present are 
perceived to be one. In spite of belonging to the endless stream of Heraclitus' river, the 
past and the present reveal a typical and permanent structure of value recalcitrant to any 
change. It is life, that is the impulse to act among the alternating moments of suffering 
and search for deliverance, that in this context plays the role of a metaphysical 
description of the ontological configuration of the universe. Nevertheless, though lying 
behind the historical forms taken on by the variegated sublimations of the systems of 
values, life does not function as a principle of internal order and necessity. Nietzsche 
keeps the grip firmly on his anti-historicist standing by refusing 'to accept the idea that 
history is a providential and necessary series of events, whose result and culmination 
would be our civilization. We are not the telos of history, but its casual production, 
which means that in order to know ourselves we have to plunge into the past, but 
without strong criteria of order or choice. "' 
There are, for Nietzsche, three predominant forms of considering the past: the 
monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical. The monumental consideration of the past 
goes over the remote epochs of human history in order to single out those classic and 
rare items worthy of everlasting existence. The great and heroic deeds performed by 
noble human beings constitute, in Nietzsche's view, a chain which 'unites mankind 
across the nfillennia like a range of human mountain peaks. "' The man of the present 
must explore the monogram, cherished in the shrine of history, of the most singular and 
enlightened creations whose appreciation teaches him how to overcome the 
transitoriness inherent to the nature of all things. 
If a great work of art or a great deed once existed, they were possible and then 
may be possible once again. In truth, what the future has in store for us is concealed in 
the dice-box of chance and nothing of what has been achieved in the past can ever again 
be produced in similar features. Yet, the greatness occurred in earlier times, once 
25 Cf. G. Vattimo, "Nietzsche and Contemporary Hermeneutics", cit., p. 64. 
26 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Unthnely Meditations, cit., p. 68. 
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purified of its most idiosyncratic aspects and reduced to approximate generalities, is 
suitable to be exhibited monumentally as something exemplary and worthy of irrutation. 
In tl-ýs process of monumentalising the past a danger, however, is contained: as long as 
the past is embellished and beautified through free poetic invention in order to appear 
appealing, it is distorted. Monumental history, then, has to be balanced with the two 
other ways of regarding the past, the antiquarian and critical, to prevent the forgetting 
and neglect of whole segments of it. Indeed, each of these three modes of history serves 
different purposes: monumental history is designed to be considered by those who want 
to do something great; those who like to preserve and revere the past, instead, turn to it 
with the attitude of antiquarian historians; finally, critical history is embraced by those 
who want to throw off the burden of the past and set off on unexplored and unknown 
horizons. 
The antiquarian sense of veneration of the past makes the individual feel that 
what he is, his customs and his beliefs, his tastes and his values, are not wholly 
accidental and arbitrary, but have grown out of a descent. Nevertheless, this uncritical 
reverence of antiquity, confined to a restricted field of vision, lacks a discriminatory 
power capable of distinguishing between all the things bequeathed by the past. It 
honours all that which is past simply for their being past, while that which is becoming 
and appears new is undervalued or rejected. Hence, antiquarian history, if unrestrained 
in its self-complacent penchant for collecting, munuTfifies and stultifies life. In order for 
man to live and attempt something new, he has to seize the bar of critical judgement 
and be "unjust". 
Not the whole past is worthy being cherished. Critical history brings it before the 
tribunal of the present to be scrupulously examined. The final verdict is not issued by 
justice itself. To live and to be unjust is, for Nietzsche, one and the same thing. In 
breaking up part of the past, the tribunal of critical history condemns it to perish and be 
forgotten. All that exists is doomed to be dissolved sooner or later in order for new life 
to be allowed to enter onto the stage of history. Yet, this process of critical judgement is 
always dangerous: 
For since we are the outcome of earlier generations, we are also the outcome of their 
aberrations, passions, and errors, and indeed of their crimes; it is not possible wholly to 
free oneself of this chain. If we condemn these aberrations and regard ourselves as free of 
them, this does not alter the fact that we originate in them. The best we can do is to 
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confront our inherited and hereditary nature without knowledge of it, and through a new, 
stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and II it, a new implant in ourselves a new habi 
instinct, a'second nature, so that our first nature withers away. It is an attempt to give 
ourselves, as it were a posteriori, a past in which one would like to originate in opposition 
to that in which one did originate: - always a dangerous attempt because it is hard to know the limit to denial of the past and because second natures are usually weaker than 27 f1 rs t. 
Nietzsche is careful to mitigate his scepticism about the feasibility of altogether denying 
our inheritance just a few lines below where, nearly in the form of a law of human 
nature, he claims that 'the first nature was once a second nature and every victorious 
second nature will become a first). 29 The ambiguity of this passage raises a few 
questions: primarily, if, in coming to terms with our past, we have to see ourselves as 
necessary links in a chain, how is it possible to break up the uninterrupted progression 
of this chain and replace our first nature with a second one? Furthermore, assuming the 
possibility of neutralizing our first nature, does the provisional distinction between first 
and second nature not undermine the hypothesis of including Nietzsche's thought within 
the trend of hermeneutic ontology based exactly upon the idea of continuity of 
traditions? 
To summarize, in the Second Untimely Meditation Nietzsche sets out to denounce 
the paralysing effect brought about on life by overemphasis of history. The polemic 
objective of his accusation is fundamentally Hegel's dialectical account of 
consciousness' itinerary from the earlier stage of sensible consciousness to the later 
stage of absolute self-consciousness in terms of a necessary rational process directed 
towards self- transparency and self-knowledge. According to Nietzsche, in Hegel's view, 
when reason finally becomes fully comprehensible to itself, history is effectively over. 
At that point, one recognizes oneself as an epigone or a latecomer of the ages, the 
supreme product of a past whose particular episodes lead, by virtue of logic-dialectical 
implication, to the zenith of absolute self-revelation. Since the past has already 
unfolded the most meaningful and significative circumstances of the total narrative of 
the world, we epigones can do nothing but taking on the semblances of Minerva's owl 
which spreads its wings with the falling of dusk to record the events already occurred 
and give them conceptual systernisation. Rearrangement is the only option left to 
individuals who have nothing of their own to introduce into history. All the genuine 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 76. 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 77. 
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new possibilities have been exhausted so that the latecomers, reduced merely to 
understand what made them-what they are, are deprived of their status as sovereign 
agents. " 
Nietzsche rebels against this Hegelian fashion of conceiving history. He contends 
that history has no meaning whatsoever; above all, it has no meaning unravelling 
diachronically in the form of a moral drama made up of an intricate plot of threads 
whose final disentanglement exhibits the triumph of history and the accomplishment of 
human freedom. Tracing the course of history, we can undoubtedly find out one 
meaning in it. Yet, this meaning is not embodied in the shell of history as such, but has 
been 'bestowed upon it by the activities of particular individuals. "' These individuals, 
far from carrying forward some kind of process inherent in history, 'live 
contemporaneously with one another'. History merely offers them the scenario upon 
which to perform their 'heroic deeds'. In this sense, if any purpose is to be attributed to 
history, it cannot but be the production of the highest exemplars. However, the task in 
which they are engaged is not supposed to change the 'fundamental structure of 
history', which is no structure at all. Although current retrospective interpretations 
describe the course of history according to logically ordered patterns, each of these 
patterns as a whole is meaningless. Their systematic and methodological forms simply 
mirror the causal sequences of events, whose occurrences, however, have no reason and 
essentially lack any internal ontological order. " 
Yet, to deny that the process of history is marching, by reason of internal logical 
necessity, towards final and conclusive ends, or to deprive history of a fundamental - 
that is, ontologically founded on essential grounds - meaning does not amount to ruling 
that the achievements accomplished by the great individuals are illusory and that there 
can be no 'historical innovation. ' Similarly, when Nietzsche refuses to recognize in the 
subjective identity of an individual 'the being of an unchanging spiritual substance"', 
he is not suggesting that the perennial succession of first and second natures is a trivial 
and innocuous game of masks. On the contrary, what men have become across history 
Cf. A. Nehemas, "The Genealogy of Genealogy", in R. Schacht (ed. ), Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
Morality, University of California Press, 1994, pp. 269-28 3, pp. 270-7 1. 
'0 Cf. A. Nehamas, ib., p. 272. 
" Cf. A. Nehamas, The Genealogy of Genealogy, cit., pp. 272-73. 
12 Cf. R. Schacht, "Of Morals and Menschen", in R. Schacht (ed. ), Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, 
cit., pp. 427-448, p. 444. 
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is a 'genuine attainment' so that, in the interplay of conflicting perspectives, 'a strong 
center of the interpretative activity is needed in order to give sense to the world of the 
will to power. "' 
111. A Medium for the Hermeneutic Experience: The Dionysian Glimpse into the 
Absurdity of Human Existence 
A brief analysis of Nietzsche's conception of the role played by myth in offering an 
insight into mankind's existential predicament provides the background against which to 
address the foundations of his early hermeneutics as well as his "appeal to a 
Lebenshorizont capable of delimiting the value and meaning of human activity"". 
In The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche attacks the scientific rationalism of Sach- 
Philologie for pursuing the reconstruction of the relics of the ancient world as 'a myriad 
of isolated facts apart from a unifying horizon"' which endows them with a 
comprehensive significance. He rejects the Kantian idea that throughout the categories 
of intuition and understanding the phenomenal world is made intelligible. As 
Schopenhauer claims, causal explanations simply 'describe the order in which events 
take place, [but] nothing of their why and wherefore. "I When the veil of Maya is torn 
aside and the synthesis between reason and sense falls apart, the perceived world turns 
out to be utterly different than the phenomenally intelligible world represented by pre- 
reflective consciousness. The knowing subject realizes, on his behalf, that he physically 
belongs to a phenomenal world whose incessant becoming can never be grasped a 
posteriori through the fixed concepts of understanding. But, on the other hand, he feels 
also that the truly essence of the world of becoming, though intelligible, eludes the 
concrete apprehension given by perception. Thus, while actually belonging to a world 
that he knows does not exist, he cannot flee to the nournenal world which does de facto 
not exist - that is, is not susceptible of being schernatized by the principium 
individuationis: 
Cf. G. Vattimo, Nietzsche and Conteinporary Hermeneutics, cit., p. 65. 
Cf. N. Davey, "Hermeneutics and Nietzsche's Early Thought", In K. Ansell-Pearson (ed. ), 
Nietzsche and Modem Gernian Thought, Routledge, London, 199 1, pp. 88-118, p. 97. 
" Cf. N. Davey, ibid., p. 95. 
16 Cf. A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Dover Publications, New York, 
1966, par. 15. This quotation is taken from N. Davey, cit., p. 103. 
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The tension between what a subject conceives of as an intelligible existence and what he 
perceives as his actual unintelligible existence constitutes the existential horror which is 
at the root of reflective consciousness. 37 
According to Nietzsche, the reception of Olympian mythology through the mediation of 
Greek tragedy expresses exactly this 'nauseous insight into the horrific nature of 
existence. "' The existential anxiety suffocating human beings stems from the 
realization of the illusory nature of pre-reflective consciousness, that is from the 
awareness that the fixed categories of reason can never seize the flux of becoming. The 
Dionysian glimpse into the mysterious primordial unity has made the Greeks feel the 
terror and absurdity of existence. But this truth, which they apprehended in 
mythological form, is in fact a transhistorical and absolute truth of human existence. 
Although Nietzsche believes that our epistemological and interpretative categories are 
historically fluctuating, the existential predicament is still common to both the antique 
and contemporary worlds. It is this shared insight into the horrible truth of human 
existence that provides a medium for the hermeneutic experience. 
The historical distance between the Greek sense of absurdity of existence and the 
modem European experience of "epistemological fracture" or "sense of nil-fility" is not 
unbridgeable, provided that both are understood as different cognitive frameworks of a 
universally shared existential predicament. Therefore, the questions with which 
contemporary philologists interrogate Greek tragedy can be answered insofar as the text 
of the Greek tragedy is itself an answer to the same question which informs the interest 
of modem interpreters of Greek civilization. For Nietzsche, the existential glimpse into 
the senselessness and meaninglessness of life constitutes precisely the common 
hermeneutical horizon within which the process of understanding and interpretation 
takes place. The contemporary world and its past are not incommensurable realms. 
Sach-Philologie's objectivist pretensions to understand the past according to its own 
canons of interpretation ignores the hermeneutic-ontological fact that the present is an 
extension and emanation of the past and cannot stand outside its own tradition. 
Therefore, an examination and understanding of the past is not only necessary in order 
to understand the present, but also has to be employed in order to transform the cultural 
37 Cf. N. Davey, ibid., p. 104. 
38 Cf. N. Davey, ibid. p. 100. 
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problems of the contemporary world and 'mediate the nature of an envisaged historical 
future. 
In this perspective, the study of the Greek experience of art offers us an aesthetic 
analogy whereby modem humanity can overcome the experience of nihilism and 
cultivate an affirmation of the tragic character of existence. As the Apollonian 
production of works of art provides the Greeks with an aesthetic appreciation of the 
spectacle of life in all its abysmal and terrifying features, in the same way in the epoch 
of nihilism individuals should resort to analogous fon-ns of artistic transfiguration in 
order to withstand the flux of time and affirm the eternal self-creation and self- 
destruction of life. The extent to which Nietzsche is unwilling to give up the historical 
consideration of the past is expressed by Davey in these terms: 
The hermeneutic components within Nietzsche's thought and the academic and cultural 
context in which they are deployed show how questionable it is to regard his thinking as 
either revolutionary in the sense of breaking with tradition or eccentric in the sense of 
standing outside. It is a reform of Sach-Philologie that Nietzsche was looking for and not 
its destruction, for the latter would entail the loss of the only cultural exemplar capable of 
overturning nihilism. The problems which Nietzsche addresses in his discipline and 
cultural epoch are not placed on the agenda by him. It is he who responds to their 
emergence. " 
Nietzsche's hen-neneutical procedure seems to anticipate, though in an implicit and not 
yet articulate way, Gadamer's reflections on the aesthetic experience of a work of art 
and effective historical consciousness. As a primary element in the process of 
understanding, effective historical consciousness embodies the "ontological 
incompleteness" of our historical being. It designates the consciousness of the 
hermeneutical situation in which we find ourselves when we are engaged in the task of 
understanding a text handed down by tradition. Since we can-not but exist historically 
and 'our self-knowledge proceeds from what is historically pre-given, the illumination 
of this situation can never be achieved completely. "' The act of interpretation 
involves 
a fusion of horizons: of the horizon in which the interpreter lives and the particular 
historical horizon within which he places himself. Neither of these horizons are static, 
but constantly in motion. The horizon of the present and the horizon of the past 
Cf. N. Davey, ibid., p. 110. 
Cf. N. Davey, ibid., p. 100. 
Cf. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, Sheed and Ward, London, 1975, p. 269. 
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constitute one great horizon which embraces 'the historical depths of our self- 
consciousness. ' TI-iis single horizon moves from within so that 'the dialectic of 
experience can never end with the overcoming of all experience. "' Experience points 
always to some more experience, and this ceaseless reference to other new experiences 
accounts for its irreducibility to science, that is to the fulfilment of the dialectic of 
experience in definitive knowledge. 
IV. How Men Have Come To Be Those Which They Are: Nietzsche's Genealogy 
A further and decisive step ahead to the development of his view of interpretation and 
of our relationship to the past is made by Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morals. 
Richard Schacht draws a parallelism between the Genealogy and what he regards as its 
companion book, the fifth book of the Gay Science, " a piece of work added by 
Nietzsche in 1886 to the four books which composed the original edition of the text. ' 
In this fifth book of The Gay Science Nietzsche had announced a new task for humanity 
to perform. After underlining once more the danger of dwelling excessively upon 
dragging out the past, he had called for human beings to become those which they are. 
To this end, that is to the end of producing individuals capable of giving themselves 
laws and creating themselves, he had urged us to become physicists. Lurking behind his 
appeal to metamorphose ourselves into 'learners and discoverers of everything that is 
lawful and necessary in the world', lay a particular interpretation of morality. In 
opposition to the commonplace belief that morality is something absolutely basic and 
foundational, he had tried to demonstrate that it is in fact an interpretation of the 
physiological phenomenon of human suffering. The cause of this 'intentional feeling', 
far from being traced back to a divine origin or to obscure occurrences in the 
profoundest recesses of consciousness, is to be attributed to the brute and crude fact of 
some kind of physiological deficiency. As such, suffering is meaningless; it has no 
Cf. H. G. Gadamer, ibid., p. 329. 
Cf. R. Schacht, "Of Morals and Menschen", in R. Schacht ed., Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality, 
cit., pp. 427-8. 
Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche 'God is Dead"', in A Heidegger, The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, 1977, p. 
60. 
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reason, no agent, no purpose. Morality, by interpreting our impulses and desires 
according to a metaphysical categorical apparatus of free will, responsibility, and guilt, 
and by prescribing sets of norms for human actions', both offers suffering a meaning 
and makes it tolerable. 
Viewed in this light, the task of making physicists of ourselves turns out to be a 
sort of semiotic activity. Under the inspecting scrutiny of 'physics' objectivist method', 
judgements of value are reinterpreted as symptoms of an underlying physiological 
condition. In particular, Nietzsche's pursuit of a naturalistic reduction of morality to 
drives and affects leads him to interpret 'moral prejudices as symptomatic of varying 
degrees of health and decadence. ' 11 
Since moralities are merely a sign-language of affects, Nietzsche invites us not to 
take moral judgements literally. However, by undertaking genealogical inquiries into 
the origin of moral values, he seems to realize that the project of becoming those we are 
requires a kind of understanding that natural sciences cannot provide. Given that our 
present humanity is not the unfolding of a fixed and immutable nature but the result of 
a historical transformation from an initial natural existence, we must come to know the 
conditions and circumstances under which we grew, evolved, and changed in order to 
understand who we are. Indeed, the comprehension of the process through which we 
have become those we are goes beyond the mere goal of offering us a knowledge of 
what we are to enable us also 'to discern what we might yet become. "' Nietzsche's call 
for us to become 'genealogists' adds then to the call to become 'physicists' via a 
'symptomatological turn' in order 'to account of the historical as well as natural 
character of our humanity - "' 
With the aim of reconstructing the historical vicissitudes of how we have come to 
be what we are, Nietzsche sets about to focus upon morals. The reason is twofold: on 
the one hand, he wants to emphasize the fundamental role exercised by morality in 
shaping humanity during its historical development; on the other hand, morality offers 
a 6case history' which enables him to interpret a system of truths that we have hitherto 
taken for granted - 'as given', or 'as factual', or 'as beyond all qualities5 - as 
in fact 
45 Cf. D. W. Conway, "Genealogy and Critical Method", in R. Schacht (ed. ), Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
Morality, cit., pp. 318-333. p. 321. 
Cf. R. Schacht, "Of Morals and Menschen", cit., p. 427. 
47 Cf. R. Schacht, ibid., p. 428. 
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something very 'human, all too human'. Therefore, the genealogical inquiries into the 
origin of moral values are tightly intertwined with a concern about the origin of our 
humanity, namely of the type Mensch into which we have developed, and the historical 
possibilities and perspectives opened to our further advancement. 
The h-i storic- genealogical question of how the value-judgements "good" and 
it evil" arose is presented in the preface to On the Genealogy Qf Morals as inseparable 
from the anthropologic-philosophical question of whether these value-judgements are a 
sign of distress, impoverishment, and degeneration of life, or, on the contrary, of 
abundance, prosperity, and plenitude of life. Insight into the origin of our moral 
prejudices is designed to shed light on the emergence and attainment of our human 
nature, and vice versa. Thus, the analysis of the unegoistic instinct-values of self- 
sacrifice and self-abnegation involves an assessment of the value of these values. Have 
they, Nietzsche wonders, hindered or furthered human prosperity? The morality of pity 
is,, to his mind, the sign of an ultimate illness in European culture. It is a bypass to 
nihilism. There is no evidence that present humanity represents a development of the 
better or the higher; onward development is not the same thing as elevation, 
advancement, and strengthening. Progress is a modem, false idea. False, too, is Ree's 
social Darwinian hypothesis that the most recent product of human evolution is the 
highest through the 'survival of the fittest' argument. " 
Both the question of the origin of our moral values and of the origin of our 
humanity are genealogically dealt with. Nietzsche proceeds in his inquiries by 
formulating hypotheses about the psychological or historical causes underlying the 
manifestations of our morality as well as of our being in general. This method of 
genealogic-experimental reasoning consists in tracing ideas back to psychological 
impressions or historical circumstances under which conflicting forces clash with each 
other to impose their dominion. The networks of interrelations, uncovered by genealogy 
across the historical itinerary through which we have become what we are to account 
for the transition from an earlier cultural system to a later one, though claiming 
'empirical plausibility, does not establish logical or dialectical necessity. Genealogy is 
not dialectical, and does not assert a general teleology. "' Internal teleologies can 
48 Cf. D. C. Hoy, "Nietzsche, Hume, and the Genealogical Method", in Y. Yovel (ed. ), Nietzsche as 
Affirmative Thinker, cit., pp. 20-38, p. 20. 
49 Cf. D. C. Hoy, ibid., p. 34. 
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certainly be drawn up in order to devise a posteriori an explanatory framework of 
human evolution, but these teleologies do not belong to the historical pattern as a 
whole, nor do they lead to a final truthful revelation. 
In submitting the values of Christianity, around which Western metaphysics at 
one with modem civilization revolves, to critical scrutiny, Nietzsche relies, however, 
upon the will to power as a principle of universal validity. The morality of pity 
epitomizes in fact humanity's propensity to decadence provided that life itself is instinct 
for growth, for power, and for accumulation of forces. Since in the supreme values of 
Christianity, in which mankind expresses its higher desideraturn and which govern its 
existence, the will to power is lacking, humanity is strolling along a path of inexorable 
decline. Nor is philosophy capable of suggesting a way out of this existential 
catastrophe. Kant's categorical imperative, for example, by imposing upon man an 
impersonal duty, sacrifices him to the 'Moloch of abstraction'. Man cannot act if 
motivated by an abstract concept of duty in general, without being compelled by the 
instinct of life, by a feeling of inner necessity growing out of a deep, personal choice. 
An entire fictional world, made up of imaginary causes and imaginary effects, of an 
imaginary anthropocentric natural science and an imaginary teleology, has been devised 
by Christian morality with the intent of devaluing and denying actuality. Such a 
fictitious apparatus of moral and religious concepts betrays a profound discontent of 
man with the natural. As a reaction to his suffering from it, man strays from his 
instincts and boasts flauntingly a divine or spiritual origin. Nevertheless, becoming 
conscious or 'spirit' is merely 'a symptom of a relative imperfection of the organism. "' 
The decline of the will to power mirrors a physiological regression, a decadence. Even 
the concept of God is reversed by the nihilistic relapse: it is stripped of the attributes 
which constitute signs of ascending life and reduced to the symbol of the weary and the 
weak. God itself sanctions thus the declaration of hostility towards life and nature and 
becomes the contradiction of life. 
In this perspective, Buddhism, though being a religion of decadence, is for 
Nietzsche more advanced than Christianity. It is a "positivistic" religion whose 
phenomenalistic epistemology aims at struggling against suffering rather than against 
imaginary moral concepts - sin, for instance. Its main concern is to devise procedures or 
50 Cf. F. Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1990, P: 14. 
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ideas which produce repose, cheerfulness, and absence of desire. Buddhism is a religion 
for late human beings, for individuals excessively sensitive and over-intellectual: 
It leads them back to peace and cheerfulness, to an ordered diet in intellectual things, to a 
certain philosophical hardening. Christianity desires to dominate "beasts of prey"; its 
means for doing so is to make them sick - weakening is the Christian recipe for tarning, 
for "civilization". Buddhism is a religion for the end and fatigue of a civilization, 
Christianity does not even find civilization in existence - it establishes civilization if need 
be. " 
The tendency to denaturalize natural values is inscribed in the origins of Christianity. 
Christianity is the logical consequence of the 'Jewish priestly instinct' to falsify all 
reality. Nietzsche hypothesizes that Jewish- Christian morality has originated as a 
countermovement to an oppressive prior moral order. A slave revolt in morals 
subverted an historically prior 'noble morality' and established a new system of moral 
codes based upon resentment. In other terms, the Christian regime of life arose out of 
the spirit of resentment become creative. Its artistic genius was capable of inventing an 
abstract moral world-order from whose viewpoint all that which represented the 
ascending movement of life was rejected. 
According to such a reading, the whole conceptual structure of Christian morality 
and religion embodies a kind of symbolism in relation to which only inner realities are 
taken as true realities, while everything inherent to nature, tii[ne, and history is taken as 
sign or occasion for metaphor. Thus, the 'kingdom of God', for instance, is not a 
concrete world belonging to history. Since it transcends any conceivable measure in 
space and time, it can be understood only as an innen-nost experience which, in a certain 
sense, is everywhere and nowhere. " 
By reducing morality to a phenomenon of consciousness, Christianity shifts the 
centre of gravity of life out of life into the 'Beyond'. Furthermore, the will to deny 
reality and denigrate life is not simply posited as a postulate. Christianity is a practice 
of life: it lays out a set of procedures whose rationale lies in the intention of making the 
life-denying way of life unconscious. This purpose has been successfully accomplished. 
Christianity has introduced in the world an art of living by means of which asceticism, 
51 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., P: 22. 
52 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., P: 34. 
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that is the pursuit of the ascetic ideal, has been reduced to a complete automatism of 
instinct. " 
V. A True Historical Accomplishment: The Entrenchement of Christian Morality 
into "the Type Mensch " 
Once he has provided an understanding of 'the type Mensch' we have come to be, 
Nietzsche, by means of an investigation into the origin of our moral prejudices - which 
discloses at the same time a perspective upon the origins of our humanity - goes on to 
discern what might yet be done with man. His rejection of the idea of man as a definite 
entity endowed with a timeless and ahistorical essence does not imply the assumption 
that the "contingencies" which influence our development leave our identities 
constantly fluctuating. On the contrary, history, and especially the history of the ascetic 
ideal, is for Nietzsche overloaded with meaning. Epochal events have undoubtedly 
imposed upon us forrns of life that have radically transformed the structure of our 
being. Yet, throughout his existential wanderings, man has preserved to some extent the 
shape in which he was carved. The forms that have forged his coarse nature cannot be 
annihilated at once. For this reason, no transformation is ever experienced 
lightheartedly. The change which occurred when man found himself enclosed within 
the walls of society and of peace is portrayed by Nietzsche in dramatic terms: 
The situation that faced sea animals when they were compelled to become land animals 
or perish was the same as that which faced these serni-animals [Primordial human 
creatures], well adapted to the wilderness, to war, to prowling, to adventure: suddenly all 
their instincts were disvalued and "suspended". From now on they had to walk on their 
feet and "bear themselves" whereas hitherto they had been borne by the water: a dreadful 
heaviness lay upon them. They felt unable to cope with the simplest undertakings; in this 
new world they no longer possessed their former guides, their regulating, unconscious and 
infallible drives: they were reduced to thinking, inferring, reckoning, co-ordinating cause 
and effect, those unfortunate creatures; they were reduced to their "consciousness", their 
weakest and most fallible organ! I believe there has never been such a feeling of misery 
on earth, such a leaden ýriisconfort - and at the same time the old instincts had not 
suddenly ceased to make their usual demands! Only it was hardly or rarely possible to 
humour them: as a rule they had to seek new and, as it were, subterranean gratifications. 54 
Nietzsche depicts the metamorphosis process which man underwent at this decisive 
53 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., P: 57. 
5' Cf. F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, Vintage Books, New York, 1962, Second Essay, 
section 16. 
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turning point of his history as a 'serious illness' bringing about the breaking down of 
his former instinct- structure. Nevertheless, the apparatus of imaginary concepts devised 
in order to branch man off his instinctive fonner guides did not find their way smoothly 
into human nature. The old instincts have not vanished altogether in favour of 
conscious processes of drive-reduction. Strong residues of them survived the course of 
"de-naturalization" and "deification" of man and profoundly affected 'the specific 
direction taken in the development of major portions of [his] spiritual life. "' Instincts, 
desires, and impulses, inhibited from discharging themselves outwardly, have turned 
inward, digging within the internality of man 'the blind spot' of the soul. Out of this 
process of internalization emerged 'the bad conscience' and the phenomenon of the 
'ascetic ideals' as sublimated forms of an undisrupted fundamental instinct- structure. 
Hence, human suffering has not been curtailed; it has simply been deepened. Its 
perpetuation, caused by a surreptitious functioning of unsettled instincts, tends to 
exercise a negative and self-destructive impact upon human life: 
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward - this is what I call 
the internalization of man: thus it was that man first developed what was later called his 
"soul". The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two 
membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height, in the 
same measure as outward discharge was inhibited. Those fearful bulwarks with which the 
political organization protected itself against the old instincts of freedom... brought about 
that all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man turned backward against man himself. 
Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, in destruction - all this 
turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the "bad conscience"... 
But thus began the gravest and uncanniest illness, from which humanity has not yet 
recovered, man's suffering of man, of himself - the result of a forcible sundering from his 
animal past, as it were a leap and plunge into new surroundings and conditions of 
existence, a declaration of war against the old instincts upon which his strength, joy, and 
terribleness had rested hitherto... On the other hand, the existence on earth of an animal 
soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, was something so new, profound, 
unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and pregnant with a future that the aspect of the 
earth was essentially altered. 56 
Although modem humanity has been forged according to the instructions of a morality 
grown out of the spirit of resentment, Nietzsche is far from supposing that 'the warrior- 
aristocratic culture", based upon the unrestrained discharge of the most immediate 
instincts, is preferable to the triumphant 'priestly- aristocratic culture' in which the 
fundamental instinct- structure of human nature is sublimated into the lofty heights of a 
" Cf. R. Schacht, Of Morals and Menschen, cit., p. 44 1. 
56 Cf. F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, cit., Second Essay, section 16. 
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spiritual life: 
It was on the soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly form, 
that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did the human soul in a higher 
sense acquire depth and became evil - and these are the two basic respects in which man has hitherto been superior to other beasts! " 
If it is true that the phenomenon of resentment has marked deeply the main features of 
human civilization, it must be acknowledged, however, that with the moralization of 
man's existence everything in life - human suffering, above all - has been given a 
metaphysical meaning. " And man, it should be remembered, cannot endure the 
meaninglessness of suffering. He does not repudiate suffering as such, though; he needs 
rather to be shown a purpose of his suffering. Christian morality, by placing all 
suffering under the perspective of guilt, has just filled the existential void into which 
man has been plunged. No matter that its interpretation of human suffering has brought 
about other suffering, deeper, more inward, and more life- destructive. Even in the most 
grudging aversion to life, in the most obstinate will to nothingness is still the will to 
power at work. 
Human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spiritual 
dimension that Christianity has introduced into it. The priestly moral order has reared 
individuals who, being denied the true reaction of deeds against their enemies, have 
compensated themselves with an imaginary revenge. " At the roots of Christian morality 
lies a slave revolt in morals. Unlike the master morality, which develops from a positive 
affin-nation of itself, the slave morality arises out of a "No" to a hostile external world. 
The reactive character of the slave morality seems to swing Nietzsche's balance in 
favour of the master morality. In fact, a positive and affirmatory, though instinctive and 
pre-reflective, drive to happiness and pleasure underlines the latter's way of life, 
whereas the existence of the weak rests artificially upon the self-deceptive 
pronouncement of their being happy and good by fleeing from life. Yet, in constructing 
a typology of morals on genealogical foundations, Nietzsche is not arguing for a 
restoration of a pre-Christian morality. To advocate a return to the pagan aristocracy of 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., Second Essay, section 6. 
Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau, cit., p. 132. 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, cit., First Essay, section 10. 
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the blond beast would in fact mean to ignore the recognition that humanity as a moral 
species is the result of a historical evolution. The slave revolt in morals has deepened 
the human soul. This is a historical achievement,, a genuine attainment in human 
development, not a mere illusion. 
What the human type has built up and accumulated in the course of his evolution 
cannot dissipate altogether. All the qualitative changes in human nature take place on 
the basis of an existential platform handed down from history. The inherited form 
according to which the human type has been historically shaped prefigures 'logically' 
the direction and circumscribes 'a priori' the horizons within which further changes in 
human nature are bound to occur in the future . 
60 Therefore, no inexplicable and 
inscrutable gap lies on the path of history. If sometimes epochal events appear to break 
up unbridgeable discontinuities along its way, it is merely because the circumstances 
and conditions under which these events take place are absolutely contingent. Nietzsche 
does not envisage a new type of being that would take over mankind in the succession 
of species for the simple reason that the human being is itself a conclusion. Rather, his 
problem is 'what type of human being one ought to breed, ought to will, as more 
valuable, more worthy of life, more certain of the future. 161 
This more valuable type, he underlines, has indeed already existed, but as an 
accident, as an exception, never as willed. As Ansell-Pearson demonstrates, 'what 
Nietzsche demands is that humanity overcome itself once again by incorporating and 
transfiguring all that has been necessary and educative in human development so far in 
order to reach a higher state of nobility founded on a conscious "second innocence" of 
joy and self- affirmation. Such a synthesis of master morality and slave morality into 
something higher is no easy task, but then Nietzsche does not pretend otherwise. In 
60 In accounting for Nietzsche's philosophy of history, I employ the categories of dialectic and teleology 
in order to explain the historical transition from the master type to the oven-nan via the slave type. Against 
the postmodern reading of Genealogy, I assume that Nietzsche sees the historical content not as a 
miscellany of accidental facts but as a coherent whole within which the genealogical method detects 
tendencies to which facts point. This hypothesis does not imply that history has a definite end. The 
teleological character of history is not assumed a priori but emerges at the conclusion of a hermeneutical 
study in which possibilities sedimented in the past are resurfaced and projected into the future. In this 
perspective, dialectic is the only method capable of capturing the course of history as a process in which 
man actualizes his potentialities and shapes his life according to the notion of reason. That Nietzsche's 
project of overcoming does not go so far as to place itself outside the horizon of reason is implied by the 
argument I develop in this chapter and the next 
61 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Anti-Cl7rist, cit., P: 3. 
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order to carry out this task adequately man must learn to know what it means to be 
beyond good and evil, which does not mean beyond good and bad. 
VI. Genealogical Critique versus Hermeneutical Circle 
In the Genealogy, Nietzsche tells us the story of how man became a calculable and 
regular being by the employment of cruel and tyrannical methods of punishment and 
social discipline. The development of the faculty of memory enables him to think 
causally, to operate in terms of means and ends, and to ordain the future in advance. 
The original impetus to develop inside man a 'reason' and a 'conscience' provided with 
the capacity to recollect the past and to anticipate the future resides in the social 
necessity of rendering him reliable. With the aid of the morality of mores and the social 
straitjacket, man was made uniform and calculable. The result of this process is 'the 
sovereign individual', an autonomous and supra moral creature endowed with the 
mastery over himself and over circumstances and nature. This subject's power over its 
passions has penetrated to such an extent the profoundest depths of the human soul that 
it has become the dominant instinct. The emergence of conscience has thus broken 
man's immersion into the passing moment and brought about the phenomenon of 
responsibility, of a 'long chain of will' among the continuous alteration of 
circumstances. The sovereign individual, with his own independent protracted will, is 
both the 'ripest fruit' that emerges at the end of this tremendous process and the 'root', 
the starting point of a self-overcoming of morality in the epoch of nihilism. The 
direction which man's re-shaping and sublimation is designed to take is indicated by the 
teleological pattern that Nietzsche draws throughout his genealogical investigation into 
the origins of moral values. In this perspective, genealogy diverges from its task of 
reconstructing how we have become what we are to act as an immanent critique of what 
we are. The will to power plays the role of principle in the critique by informing 
surreptitiously the acts of judgement that serve to rationalize the past. The will to power 
functions in fact as a discriminatory criterion for evaluating the previous moral values 
so that these are put into an order of rank according to whether they are signs of 
" Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau, cit., p. 133. 
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ascending life or signs that life is exhausted and degenerating. " 
The task of the critique based on the principle of the will to power, however, 
seems to be in contradiction with Nietzsche's acknowledgement that Christian morality, 
deemed to have promoted impoverishment and degeneration of life, has actually 
deepened and spiritualised human existence to the point of cultivating a disciplined and 
autonomous type Mensch with the power to control his affects. As long as the 
revaluation of values and the self-overcoming of morality are performed from a 
standpoint which is beyond good and evil, they are bound to pass judgement on the past 
not without taking into account the wider historical context of culture so as to affin-n 
life in its totality, that is both in its ascending and descending phases. ' 
This incoherence at the heart of Nietzsche's thought reflects neither more nor less 
the contradictions in which contemporary hermeneutics wriggles. It is an appendage of 
the wider problematic of the circular structure of understanding with which the 
hermeneutics of the human sciences has to come to terms. Heidegger traces the 
hermeneutic circle to the temporality of Dasein. Given the historicity of our being, he 
states, all understanding inevitably involves some prejudices. The movement of 
understanding and interpretation always proceeds by projecting anticipations and 
expectations about the meaning of the text. It begins with fore-conceptions that are 
gradually reflected by more suitable ones. The meaning projected for the text as a 
whole can be confirmed or dismissed only through the working out of the text itself. 
Notwithstanding this difficulty, the hermeneutical circle, according to Heidegger, is not 
to be seen as a vicious circle. Rather, it possesses an ontologically positive significance 
provided that the fore-meanings used in the process of understanding are not utterly 
arbitrary. " 
In the light of Heidegger's clarification of the circularity of understanding, it can 
be said that Nietzsche's conflict outlined above exposes his thinking to the same risk of 
conceptual collapse as that lurking behind hermeneutic ontology. As the latter oscillates 
between the phi lo sophico- theoretical claim of the relative validity of all interpretations, 
functional to the practical exercise of deconstructionism, and the logical necessity of 
Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, ibid., p. 106. 
Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, ibid., p. 107. 
65 Cf. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, cit., pp. 235-240. 
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discovering a universal medium - language, for instance - of hermeneutical experience, 
in the same way Nietzsche's genealogical reading of modernity in nihilistic terins 
cannot elude the dilemma of either being unmasking and ironic, and thus anti- 
metaphysical, or evaluative and critical, and thus metaphysical. On the one hand, 
inasmuch as it is confined within the boundaries of hermeneutics, Nietzsche's critique 
does not involve the ideal of a complete self-transparency of the subject. On the other 
hand, however, as long as genealogy is to be preserved from declining into a futile and 
irrelevant exercise of monumental and antiquarian history, it must find a connection 
between origins and outcome in history, remaining thus a 'variant of teleological 
history. ' 11 
VII. From the Jewish Noble to the Ascetic Scientist: History of the Emergence of 
the Sovereign Individual 
In order to account for the emergence in modernity of a mature and enlightened 
individual with the capacity for autonomy and self-legislation, Nietzsche sets out to 
delineate a teleological pattern comprehensive of the whole history up to now of the 
type Mensch. The narrative told in this explanatory framework begins with humanity's 
exit from a prehistorical condition characterized by a pre-reflective and instinctive 
mode of behaviour and, through the description of the succession of cultural formations 
and forms of life, reaches the historical point at which the necessity of obedience to law 
has become the dominating instinct. The culmination of this process is exactly the 
sovereign individual, a particular creature endowed with the capacity to creatively posit 
goals. 
The slave revolt in morals, with the correlative denaturalization of the natural 
values, was initiated for Nietzsche by Jewish culture. ' Originally Yahweh, the God of 
Israel and God of justice, represented the central explanatory metaphor accounting for 
the Jewish forrn of life. It protected its people and decided about their destiny. 
Cf. K. Ansell-Pearson, Nietzsche contra Rousseau, cit., p. 123. There is no room here to develop 
further this analysis as well as it is beyond my capacities to resolve this dilemma within the 
bulk of Nietzsche's opera omnia. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to claim for the purposes of 
this thesis that I tend to presume that Nietzsche possesses a metaphysical system. On this 
point, cf. J. Richardson, Nietzsche's Systent, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996. 
For this genealogical reconstruction of the emergence of the sovereign individual, I am totally in 
debt to D. Owen, Maturity and Modernity, Routledge, London, 1994, pp. 40-41 
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Nevertheless, a combination of internal and external circumstances brought about the 
collapse of Jewish culture. The Jewish nobility and their consciousness of power based 
upon the superiority of their natural qualities was then supplanted by the creative genius 
of resentment exhibited by the Jewish priests. These weak creatures subverted the order 
of rank in Jewish culture by denying the realm of experience and nature and by positing 
imaginatively a supra natural realm of being. The reification of consciousness along 
with the inhibition of the instincts to discharge themselves outwardly gave rise to the 
phenomenon of 'bad conscience'. In a similar way bad conscience emerged in Greek 
culture. There it was myth, with its deification of the animal in man, that played the 
role of explanatory metaphor. The noble and the aristocrat had no idea of the 
consciousness of guilt. They acted pre-reflectivelY, while their gods, portrayed in 
anthropomorphic form, took upon themselves the responsibility for their rnisdeeds. 
Following the Athenian victory in the Persian wars, Greek myth, in which the 
exaltation of the instinctive and natural qualities of nobility was embodied, collapsed. 
The noble, enclosed within the walls of peace and society, could no longer fashion their 
natural aggressiveness either externally or internally. 
The displacement of myth by dialectics, the new explanatory metaphor of Greek 
culture, is mirrored by the displacement of Aeschylus by Euripides. The actions 
performed by the characters in Euripides's plays are no longer heroic and tragic. These 
characters make choices on the basis of accurate knowledge of the consequences of 
their actions. Therefore, in a context in which the outcome of human actions is made 
predictable, there can be no kind of tragedy. Euripides' characters act in fact reflectively 
according to noble principles: 
The significance of Euripides is that his tragedies represent the movement of Greek myth 
from the realm of the unquestioned to the realm of the questionable and, thereby, set the 
scene for the displacement of myth by reason. 68 
Euripidean drama is, for Nietzsche, the poetic translation of the Socratic dialogue, and 
Socrates's 'philosophical-dialectic of truth' is the Greek counterpart of the Jewish 
'theological dialectic of sin'. In a world in which the nobility's creative affirmation of 
instincts has been undermined, Socrates's creative genius of resentment offers them a 
new redirection and sublimation. Moral judgements are therefore denaturalized while 
68 Cf. D. Owen, ibid., p. 50. 
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the concepts of "good" and "just" are severed from the social and material context to 
which they belong to become objects of dialectic. " 
Christianity represents a further and more emphatic development of 'bad 
conscience'. It raises the theological idea of God and the philosophical idea of Good to 
a higher level of abstraction by universalizing the culturally specific categories of 
'Jewish noble' and 'Greek noble'. In other terms, Christianity displaces the source of 
guilt from the particularity of the noble's instincts structure and redirects it onto the 
universal category of 'Man' or 'Self'. As a result, within the perspective of Christian 
morality, the cause of human suffering is no longer attributed to a specific entity which 
may be ostensively pointed to, but instead is made to reside in a highly abstract 
consciousness called 'spirit' and in its failure to dominate a similarly abstract sphere of 
instincts called 'flesh'. 
The main achievement of Christian morality is, on Nietzsche's conclusions, that 
of inscribing the individual within a regime of reflection, interrogation and confession. 
Yet, the dialogue of the soul with the authority of the divine is not straightforward and 
direct, but has to be mediated by the figure of the priest. In this sense, the Christian 
believer is not autonomous; 'he cannot out of himself posit ends at all. "' In the 
articulation of his values he depends upon a priestly judgement. 
Renaissance embodies the first attempt in history to overcome Christian morality 
and perform a revaluation of its values. It is marked by a high sense of scientific 
consciousness. Disrespectful of authorities, its main concern is with loyalty to truth and 
unfettering of the individual. But contemporary to the Renaissance is the Refon-nation, 
whose prevalent interest is turned to moral practices. The Reformation aims to abolish 
the authority of the priest and constitute the individual as the judge of himself: 
The reflexivity instituted by the shift in direction of resentment from the noble to the self is 
hereby deepened insofar as the judgement of the self is displaced from the realm of a priestly 
judgement to an ongoing regime of self-judgement and is thereby reconstituted as a 
hermeneutics of self-suspicion. " 
In the confrontation between Renaissance and Reformation it is the latter that triumphs. 
The consequence of the affirmation of Protestant asceticism is that bad conscience 
" Cf. D. Owen, ibid. 
70 Cf. D. Owen, ibid., p. 55. 
71 Cf. D. Owen, ibid., p. 56. 
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comes to be further heightened so that the psychological need to overcome both inner 
and external nature attains a conspicuous drive. 
The history of the most recent modernity is therefore a history of translation and 
sublimation of the Christian morality of truthfulness into a scientific conscience. 
Whereas the advent of history was inaugurated with the invention of a supra natural 
realm of being, the latest development of this process in the epoch of nihilism 
culminates instead in the displacement of God by scientific forms of explanation. 
Nevertheless, insofar as the scientific will to truth does not transcend the dichotomy of 
real and apparent worlds, it does still represent for Nietzsche the ascetic ideal in its 
most spiritual formulation. Faith in the metaphysical and absolute value of truth ties 
modem science indissolubly to the phenomenon of asceticism. But what happens if we 
overcome the opposition of real and apparent world and abolish the real world as the 
universal ground of the will to power? 
Nil-iilism is what emerges when the will to truth is subjected to critical scrutiny 
and the value of science put into question. According to Nietzsche, we are living in the 
epoch of nihilism. This condition is not ineluctable, however, and humanity, at least 
potentially, does indeed possess the cultural instruments to transcend it. The possibility 
of overcoming nihilism rests upon a positive affirmation of the realm of becoming. The 
results of the genealogical analysis suggest the sense and direction of the exit on the 
basis of the accomplishments bequeathed by the past. According to Nietzsche, in the 
master morality the nobility developed their capacity to posit goals for themselves 
throughout the internalization of the social pathos of distance. It was the unreflective 
recognition of their power to command goals and tasks for the slaves that grounded 
their ability to conu-nand goals and tasks for themselves. Thus, within the culture of 
pagan aristocracy, the pathos of inner distance was founded on the pathos of social 
distance. This internalization of the social order of ranks led the noble to predicate an 
affirmation of the relationship between self and world. 
The slave revolt in morals repudiates the pathos of social distance. By 
proclaiming that all souls are equal before God, it overthrows the social order of ranks; 
and, by postulating a metaphysical beyond along with devaluing the world to the status 
of an "apparent" being, it negates the relationship between self and world. The pathos 
of inner distance is then predicated upon a pathos of metaphysical distance. What 
constitutes the pathos of metaphysical distance is reflective adherence to the set of 
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values defined by slave morality. Christianity deepens the inner pathos of distance as 
the individual's ability to command itself in relation to a goal, while Reformation 
heightens it to the level of an immediate relationship between God and the soul. With 
the death of God and the advent of nihilism the pathos of metaphysical distance also 
collapses. Therefore, in order to overcome nihilism, a new pathos of inner distance 
other than social or metaphysical has to be constituted. Nietzsche foresees that this new 
pathos is dwelling in the soul of the sovereign individual, an individual endowed not 
only with the capacity to command himself in accordance with an heteronomous set of 
values, but also with the creative power to determine the values for himself. Here is the 
artistic pathos of distance. 
VIII. Conclusion 
The philosophy of immanence, as implicit in Nietzsche's work, seems to develop as a 
sort of counter-Enlightenment project designed to overcome the false Kantian 
distinctions between the nournenal and phenomenal realms and to constrain man within 
the boundaries of his empirical existence. Nietzsche believes neither that there is an end 
at the culmination of history which human beings teleologically pursue by giving 
rationally founded assent to the command of the categorical imperative, nor that moral 
action can ever be effective in transforming the world. 
Yet, though rejecting the notion of moral law along with the coercive implications 
involved in it., he still retains as valid Kant's idea of Enlightenment both as "man's 
emergence from his self-imposed immaturity" and as capacity for autonomy and self- 
legislation. Accordingly, he undertakes a critique of reason not in order to circumscribe 
the theoretical and practical limits of its law-making activity, but to the purpose of 
assessing the value of the same ideals of knowledge and morality. The task he sets 
himself is then to articulate a genealogical analysis of the synthetic a priori judgements 
of reason, both in their theoretical and moral application, as well as to deconstruct 
modem belief in the existence of a transcendental and a-historical ego governing the 
course of events in the world. 
What Nietzsche pnmarily points to, indeed, is 'a reconceptualization of the notion 
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of autonomy' by disconnecting it from 'the idea of a universalisable moral law. "' Thus, 
he discovers that at the end of modernity a new type of mature individual is emerging 
endowed with unity of style, that is with the capacity to organize, by virtue of a set of 
goals, the chaotic multiplicity of competing drives under a leading one. However, in 
order to become truly sovereign, this individual lacks the capacity to take on the 
responsibility of positing a goal for himself. Through a process of displacement of 
responsibility, he thereby postulates fictional authorities as transcendent sources of 
legislation. Hence, to the rules emanated from their divine domain, he devotedly gives 
his obedience. 
The further and ultimate step that Nietzsche sets about to take is therefore to 
sublimate and heighten the moral agent into an a-moral and creative artist gifted with 
the ability to determine his own goals. No irrational and a-logical leap seems to be 
involved in such proceeding. On the contrary, though the activity of this autonomous 
and self-legi slating individual is bound to respond exclusively to the demands of the 
will to power, the perspectives disclosed by his interpretive work are not arbitrary, but 
materialize out of the hermeneutical interplay of historical consciousness. 
Nietzsche's unmasking critique of reason appears not to go so far as to place itself 
outside the horizon of reason. Reason is still the ground upon which rest both the 
foundations of its critical exercise - namely, the 'philosophical theory' of the will to 
power - and the inner structure of its genealogical inquiries. Thus, at the conclusion of 
their itinerary, the Hyperboreans do not give up philosophy. Their declaration of 
proximity to an indeterminate 'beyond', far from amounting to a flight from reality, is 
in fact the proclamation of a deeper immersion into it. Nevertheless, insofar as such a 
penetration is designed to enhance the creative power of the modem deconstructed 
subjectivity, Nietzsche's philosophy faces anew dilemina: is the existence of the artist 
still possible in a disenchanted world from which myth has been banned? Or, having 
overcome the age of nihilism, is there still enough room for history? Do not the 
aesthetics of production, which celebrate the transitory and dynamic, the spontaneity of 
the moment and the suspension of the present, take over historical consciousness to the 
extent of making it explode into an infinity of meaningless fragments to be managed 
merely by judgements of taste? 
72 Cf. David Owen, cit., p. 3 1. 
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I will argue in chapter VII that the incapacity to escape these dilenunas 
undermines Adomo's method of negative dialectics. Meanwhile, let us analyse in depth 
the essential traits of the special individual to whom Nietzsche appeals in order to take 
man out of the age of nihilism. 
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The Vision of the Overman and the Riddle of Eternal Return 
1. Introduction 
The image of the sovereign individual as the autonomous subject of the modem age 
endowed with the creative capacity to reevaluate moral values begins to take shape in a 
comprehensive way in the character of Zarathustra. Zarathustra is a complex and 
contradictory figure: he is a wanderer and a hermit, a philosopher and a prophet, a 
visionary and an analyst. He has a double will: one will clings to man, the other drives him 
high towards the overman. He teaches the doctrine of the overman and the eternal return. 
The oven-nan, with his demand for continuous self-overcoming, implies a linear conception 
of time, while eternal return of the same implies circularity. How these two opposite 
teachings can be reconciled has always been a puzzling dilemma among Nietzsche's 
scholars. 
In this chapter, I argue that the teaching of the overman and the doctrine of eternal 
return are strictly entwined. I will demonstrate this by following the tortuous existential 
itinerary of their herald, Zarathustra, whose primary concern is to offer to man the ideal 
of something higher beyond himself susceptible of conferring a meaning upon his shattered 
and fragmented existence. 
Despite, or maybe by virtue of, the elusive nature of his identity, Zarathustra 
emerges as a philosopher of the future. What he announces, however, does not unfold as 
a further expansion of the modem teaching of progress. The future he longs for exhibits 
a model of human perfectibility which does not meet the egalitarian and democratic criteria 
of humanist Enlightenment. Indeed, the actual content of the post-nihilistic era Zarathustra 
points to is not disclosed in any of his innumerable discourses. Still, I assume that the 
'post-modem age' he envisages will promote values which are in conflict with the 
predominant values of the modem age. On the other hand, one has to recognize that, in 
order for the Socratic-Platonic-Christian-Modem tradition to be deconstructed, Zarathustra 
83 
must offer, somehow, an account of the opposing values on the basis of which modem 
consciousness is supposed to undertake the labour of internal self-destruction and transcend 
nihilism. Therefore, by highlighting the opposition between the last man and the ovennan, 
I will draw a few outlines of what a post-nihilistic era might look like. The whole scenario, 
however, will remain nebulous. What, instead, will appear distinctly clear is that, for 
Zarathustra, there is only one world, the one in which we live, and within it there is no 
possibility of a definitive break with the history that modem culture has unfolded so far. 
The chapter is structured as follows: section 11 offers an analysis of the project of 
the overman as it is presented by Nietzsche in Zarathustra Prologue and Part 1.1 argue that 
in this segment of the book Zarathustra sets out to announce the ideal of the overman as 
the only counterforce available in the epoch of nihilism to neutralize the process of 
decadence of modem man and prevent the debasement of the human species. I also contend 
that the coming of the overman is seen by Nietzsche not as an imi-ninent event and that 
Zarathustra is a mere prophet who denounces the failure of our civilization and poses the 
demand for a greater elevation of man. 
The process of overcoming nihilism and giving new meaning to the earth is 
achieved by re-interpreting the historical situation in which modem man is placed and by 
developing the potentialities present in it. For Zarathustra, redemption must be free of the 
spirit of revenge towards the past. Accordingly, the ideal of the overman does not point to 
some novel future reminiscent of the religious longing for an eschatological outcome of 
history. In this respect, I argue in section III that the doctrine of eternal return, if 
understood in voluntaristic and not ontological terms, enforces the ideal of the overman by 
inviting man to pursue empowerment of life within his own historical existence, that is 
through an act of affinnation of the becoming of time. 
Finally, in the last section, I criticize Lampert's dualistic interpretation of 
Zarathustra's teachings of the overman and eternal return. Against his reading of 
Nietzsche's text, I contend that in the course of his spiritual itinerary Zarathustra does not 
give up the ideal of the overman but vindicates a perspective of overcorning devoid of the 
mystifications of eschatology. To abandon the idea of a transcendent exit of history does 
not mean to renounce to a possibility of fulfilment beyond the present historical conditions. 
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11. Zarathustra -s Prologue: The Project of the Overman 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra's incipit features the forty-year-old* hem-lit and philosopher 
addressing the rising sun from outside his cave high in the mountain. There in the 
wilderness Zarathustra has been in solitude for ten years, but now he has grown weary of 
the wisdom accumulated. 'Like a bee that has gathered too much honey', ' an internal 
impelling necessity spurs him to descend to mankind to distribute the fruits of his 
overflowing knowledge. 
Zarathustra's desire to go down to his fellow men reflects the development in his 
spirit of a transfiguration which has metamorphosed the traditional ascetic figure of Persian 
religion into a sort of profane sacerdotalist who celebrates the intrinsic value of the earth 
and body. On his way down the mountain, Zarathustra comes across another hem-lit, an old 
saint who warns him against mankind's readiness to receive a superior teaching. This 
encounter is instructive, for it highlights a fundamental difference between the two 
divergent ways of experiencing the adventure of solitude. Both the old saint and 
Zarathustra have turned away from men out of a disgust with their imperfections, but, 
whereas the solitary saint has replaced his love of mankind with the love of God, 
Zarathustra, well aware of the death of God as an epochal event, has not abandoned men 
for good but is returning to them to bring the supreme gift of a new ideal. 
Ten years of solitude are experienced by Zarathustra as a retreat from the world 
designed to discover a new meaning for the earth following mankind's loss of the belief 
in God. In Zarathustra's hope, the higher ideal of the overman, that is a type of man which 
emerges from a will to complete modem man's imperfections, should instill a burning 
enthusiasm into the latter's uninspired soul under the ashes of which the fire of life has 
been extinguished. 
Zarathustra's teaching of the overman as the meaning of the earth represents the 
project of a future redemption of mankind, considered as a species, from its general 
demise. Zarathustra believes that man is something that should be overcome. ' The 
transition from a lower species to a higher one spells in his view the evolutionary pattern 
of life. All creatures hitherto have created something beyond themselves. Once man was 
a won-n and then, through the evolutionary chain of the species, he has made the way to 
1 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Penguin Books, Nbddlesex, 1961, Prologue 1. 
2 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., Prologue 3. 
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his present configuration by advancing along a progressive series of intermediary stages. 
Therefore, it would be shameful as well as a source of embarrassment if man now, 
disregardful of the linear sequence of evolution, deemed himself as the terminus of this 
process. There is still too much in man of the won-n and ape to be superseded, Zarathustra 
proclaims. Even the wisest among men are only a discord and hybrid of brutal nature and 
lofty spirituality. The overman, in Zarathustra's envision, represents the step forward of 
man towards something higher, the vision of a future achievement of man beyond his 
current standards and determinations. In this respect, the overman is the postulation of an 
ethical, though not 'moral' imperative, that is the deontic positing of an exceeding 
augmentation of man's qualities and characteristics which man can, and should, become. 
In a world deprived of any otherworldly dreams, the ideal of the overman, if taken up and 
willed by humanity as the goal towards which the evolutionary process tends, unfolds its 
liberating capacity to bestow upon the otherwise meaningless earth a new meaning. I 
Zarathustra's urge for man to create something above and beyond himself, 
however, does not appeal to artificial experiments of biological evolution. As Whitlock 
points out, 'it is Zarathustra's message in the Prologue and throughout that man has not 
yet become all he can within his present biological constitution. Nor would there be any 
guarantee that physiological evolution would mean spiritual evolution (- indeed, this is the 
very problem with man). Thus evolution is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for the Uebermensch. Modem man must will the overman in this body and on this earth: 
there is still much to be done with man outside of genetic considerations. " 
On the basis of anthropological considerations supposedly combined with 
genealogical analyses of the evolution of human beings from their origin up to the 
emergence of the sovereign individual, Zarathustra has come to acquire the conclusion that 
man is still the minimal man. Incapable of coping with his suffering, man has diverted his 
vital energies away from earthly and bodily things in order to cherish imaginary worlds 
inhabited by God and angelic creatures. Cultivation of reason and virtue, the search for 
happiness and justice, and nourishment of pity have contaminated human nature to such 
an extent that modem men esteem 'the bowels of the Inscrutable more highly than the 
Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1986, p. 19. 
Cf. G. Whitlock, Returning to Sils-Maria, Peter Lang, New York, 1990, p. 104. 
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meaning of the earth. " No sooner man becomes aware of his shortcomings and feels 
disgust at the mediocrity imposed on -his life by the postulates of moral experience, than 
he rediscovers the imperative of remaining loyal to the earth so as to prepare the conditions 
to arrest his downfall. Were this occur, it would be the hour when man has interiorized the 
ideal of the overman and determined himself to will to become this higher being. 
Nevertheless, despite the demand for the overman's coming, he is still a long way 
off and his actual appearance is left by Zarathustra to an indeterniinate future belonging 
to a sort of humanity yet to come. The task which Zarathustra sets out to accomplish in the 
Prologue is simply that of preparing the way to the overman by initiating a historical 
project which will culminate in the advent of the overman. That this is Zarathustra's 
project is however controversial. Lampert, for instance, denies that Zarathustra heralds the 
coming of the overman on exegetic grounds concerning a dramatic shift in Nietzsche's 
thought between the writing up of Zarathustra Part I and the elaboration of Part 111. He 
claims that, despite the fact that Zarathustra presents the overman as an evolutionary 
phenomenon in Part 1, this image is subsequently abandoned in Part III. On Lampert's 
reading, the beginning of Zarathustra's course should be measured by its end, 'for he 
begins as the teacher of the superman but ends as the teacher of eternal return. The first 
teaching requires a linear concept of time, with the meaning of time passage dependent on 
the future achievement of those who have contempt for the past. But the final teaching 
seems to contradict the notion that time is linear, that the past is worthy only of contempt, 
and that the future alone can be the ground of meaning. Interpretation of the superman 
teaching requires that it be reconciled with the teaching of eternal return. "I will return 
to this point later on when Lampert's interpretation is disclosed to a full extent and 
becomes the central motif of my analysis. At the present stage, I want to focus further on 
Zarathustra's presentation of the overman in the Prologue. 
Insofar as the teaching of self-overcoming is concerned, Zarathustra does not place 
the site of the overman in a platonic transcendent world, but depicts his traits along the 
lines of a creature living on this earth: 
Man is a rope, fastened between animal and Superman -a rope over an abyss. A dangerous 
, going-across, a 
dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking back, a dangerous shuddering and rý ri tý 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., Prologue 3. 
Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, cit., p. 21. 
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staying still. What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in 
man is that he is a going-across and a down-going. ' 
The abyss over which man is suspended represents the ever-present possibility of man 
failing in the traverse from his animal past to his superhuman future destiny. Only if he 
holds fim-dy to the ideal of the oven-nan as the purpose giving value to his life, will he 
manage successfully to preserve a balance across the dangerous path towards his end. Man 
is not an end in himself, but a means to a higher being the accomplishment of which makes 
his present imperfect condition justifiable. As he is still now, all-too-human, he is 
worthless. But in his will to achieve more and overcome the comforts and stasis of modem 
bourgeois philistinism, man has to cease targeting otherworldly goals and constrain his 
telos within the horizon of the earthly world. 
The overman is a kind of man who one day may live. His existence, if de facto 
actualized, would constitute a further advancement in the progress of the species. To this 
end, the men who for the sake of surpassing the minimally human seek to pave the way to 
the coming of the overman must will to perish. By striving for the overman to come into 
existence, they must will their own downfall. This going-down, as Zarathustra puts it, 
manifests itself in the shape of a sacrifice to the earth, so that 'the earth may one day 
belong to the overman. " 
In accordance with the aims of his project, Zarathustra reverses the classical 
conception of virtue. He writes off values such as moderation, resolution of conflict, or 
rational agreement 11 from the shibboleth of the moral register and delivers a tablet of 
beatitudes treasuring the hyper-sensitive strife to surmount the barriers still dividing man 
from his longed-for ideal. Therefore, virtue becomes, on Zarathustra's transvaluation, the 
passionate search to complete and improve oneself. This demands, on the part of the 
subject who possesses it, a spirit of sacrifice centred more in the heart than in reason: 
I love him who is of a free spirit and a free heart: thus his head is only the bowels of his 
7 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., Prologue 4. 
' The expression "bourgeois philistinism" was widely used in nineteenth century German literature. It 
appears often, for instance, in the early narrative of Thomas Mann. It denotes a way of life which, 
while being incapable of conceiving higher ideals, dwells upon the comforts of everyday life. tý 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., Prologue 4. 
10 Cf. G. Whitlock, Returning to Sils-Maria, cit., p. 41. 
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heart, but his heart drives him to his downfall. " 
Zarathustra summarizes the condition of the minimal man 'under the locution last man. 
This expression denotes the prototype of nihilism, that is the present epoch in which man 
indulges in self- contentment at the comforts provided by an existence led within the limits 
of moderation and composure and keeps himself away from the strenuous extremes of 
virulence and overexertion. The last man is the undifferentiated member of the herd who 
has given up the struggle to excel and has pledged himself to the paltriness of petty 
pleasures and unburdening suffering. He seeks only entertainments that do not exhaust him 
or make the string of his vital tension twang. Incapable of conceiving anything higher than 
the satisfaction of his most urgent needs, Whitlock explains, 'the ego of the last man 
becomes the endpoint and meaning of history in his own mind, for all knowledge and value 
is already contained in his immediate monadic consciousness. "' 
On Whitlock's reading, Zarathustra prefigures the advent of nihilism as the logical 
conclusion of Christianity. Wars and apocalyptic catastrophes will lead to a post-Christian 
era characterized by a general loss of belief in God and by a progressive secularization of 
religions. In this era, the human species will dirempt into two sub-species: the last man and 
the overman. The choice between these two 'values' or 'ways of life' articulates the fate 
facing man in a proximate future. The prevalence of the last man will built a kind of 
humanity drifting aimlessly through the historical process, while the affirmation of the 
overman will give to humanity a meaningful goal over and beyond itself. " 
Both the spiritual nihilism of the last man into which humanity may degenerate and 
the ideal of the overman which humanity should strife after represent for Zarathustra two 
different 'fon-ns of atheism' 11 surviving the death of God. They finish up the spectrum of 
possible shapes available in the future into which man can still be forged by the 
malleability of his nature. In rejecting any gods with the power to manage human destiny, 
the last man reaches for a technological mastery of nature and shakes off the fear at the 
unpredictable and obscure forces of chance. The atheism of the last man manifests itself 
Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., Prologue 4. On the theme of Zarathustra's suspicion 
of logical arguments, see G. Whitlock, Returning to Sils Maria, cit., p. 44. 
12 Cf. G. Whitlock, ibid., p. 46. 
Cf. G. Whitlock, ibid., Preface. 
Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teachnig, cit., p. 24. 
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in a sort of humanism which pursues the extinction of scarcity and inequality throughout 
the findings achieved by the science of nature. 
By counterposing the teaching on the overman to the spiritual decadence of the last 
man, Zarathustra intends to denounce the dangers looming over the enlightenment brought 
about by this modem figure of human progress. Zarathustra fears that, under the universal 
sway of the last man, intellectual unifom-lity and cultural homogenization might replace 
the vital tension for struggle and self-overcoming. These would produce a debasement of 
the human species which would result in frustrating those creative qualities within the 
spirit which constantly push man further towards something higher. Since the last man sees 
himself as the most perfect accomplishment arisen out of the line of historical progress and 
evolution, his affirmation announces the appearance of a generation of herd men without 
ideals and aspirations, but comfortably settled down in the enjoyment of material well- 
being. From the vantage point of its achievements, the modem age surveys all that has 
gone before to come to proclaim the technological domination of nature ensured by the last 
man as the endpoint towards which the whole history of humanity has been directed. 
On the basis of this overview, history is perceived to tend towards the last man. 
The global spread of his technological products are seen to be already, and ineluctably, 
under way. Within such a context, Zarathustra's appeal to modem man to turn away from 
his pragmatic and scientific culture based on control of nature and reach for the overman 
proves to be vain. It aims in fact to deflect the course of history from its spontaneous path 
and give back to man the promise of a wonderland of abundance and plentifulness. But 
why and how should man experience uneasiness at present-day civilization if he feels at 
home in it? Lampert's answer is that also 'the project of the superman implies a praise of 
progress. But the critique of the last man separates that praise from much of what has 
counted as progress in the modem world and raises the question of where Zarathustra 
stands with respect to the characteristic modem teaching of progress. An adequate answer 
to this question cannot be puzzled out of the oracular utterances of the prologue, nor does 
it need to be, for Zarathustra will later unfold a comprehensive view of human history that 
makes clear the ways in which he embraces progress - the progress of inquiry, for instance, 
while refusing as madness unrestrained progress in the alteration of nature. "' 
" Cf. L. Lampert, ibid., p. 26. 
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Yet, the Prologue contains a few indications of the way in which Zarathustra 
conceives the route to progress. This route is described as a gradual advancement to the 
overman. After Zarathustra delivers the speech on the last man in the market place, a 
tightrope walker emerges from a little door and proceeds across the rope stretched over the 
square where the people addressed by Zarathustra are gathered. But as the tightrope is 
halfway through his course, ajester dressed in motley clothes appears out of the same door 
and follows him. Thejester's steps are fast and within a short while he catches up with the 
tightrope walker, lets out a devilish cry and springs over him. His insolent action baffles 
the walker who, exposed to public shame, loses his balance and falls, crashing at 
Zarathustra's feet. To the shattered man near to death Zarathustra whispers a few words 
of consolation. Then the tightrope walker confides his terror of being dragged to hell, but 
Zarathustra tells him that such an afterlife does not exist. There is no devil and no hell, the 
soul dies even before the body. The walker replies that, if Zarathustra speaks the truth, then 
life itself is worthless because the man who dies leaves nothing in leaving life. Zarathustra 
replies that life is worthy anyhow, even in absence of an eschatological sense of history. 
He also shows his appreciation of the walker's courage, for, by behaving dangerously, he 
has raised himself above the undifferentiated mass in the crowd , thus emerging as a model 
of loyalty to an ideal alternative to that of undisturbed contentment. Out of respect for the 
example the walker represents, Zarathustra will bury him with his own hands. 
On the other hand, Zarathustra's contempt at the jester's reckless performance 
derives from his disgust at the purposeless deeds of modem man whose patchwork nature - 
exemplified by the jester's bright clothing - has deprived life of any principle of unity - The 
jester aims only to entertain the crowd and win its favour. Insofar as he wishes to cross 
over symbolically to the overman, his attempt is naive and foolishly audacious. He is one 
who believes that man can be skipped over and overcome by a single leap. " On the 
contrary, the transition to the overman is to be undertaken and practised by Zarathustra as 
a going through a series of metamorphoses each stage of which is a source of tribulation 
and suffering. Unlike the philologist-gravediggers who are concerned only with dead 
history, " Zarathustra seeks wisdom out of spiritual poverty but combined with vitality. In 
16 Cf. G. Whitlock, Returning to Sils-Maria, cit., p. 48. 
17 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., Prologue 8. 
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his effort to break the old table of values and go beyond the average man, he leaves behind 
destruction. His undertaking is not painless: 
I make for my goal, I go my way; I shall leap over the hesitating and the indolent. Thus may 
my goinc-forward be their going-clown. " t-ý 11 
Going down implies perishing, dissolution of former structures of life and establishment 
of new, enhancing ones. The words quoted above are spoken by Zarathustra as the sun 
stands at noon and an eagle sweeps through the sky in wide circles letting a snake coiled 
around its neck hang under it. " This image, borrowed from Greek mythology where the 
eagle is the animal of Zeus and symbolizes pride, light, and elevation, while the snake is 
the animal of Apollo and symbolizes cleverness, adherence to the earth, and darkness, 
condenses Zarathustra's desire to overcome the old dualism of light and darkness, heaven 
and earth, good and evil. " In the new figurative cosmology envisaged by Zarathustra, the 
sun is kept low within the horizon of perceptible things. Rather than being lifted to the 
zenith of a permanent source of light and being, it is depicted as a mere star harmoniously 
integrated into the system of celestial spheres. It rises and sets, comes up and goes down, 
brings light and disappears to give way to darkness. The ascension and decline of the sun's 
trajectory reproduces the parabola of life itself which comes into being and passes away 
in a perennial succession of forms and modes. 
The very essence of Zarathustra's universe contains in peaceful unity dimensions 
of existence which the philosophical tradition has separated into an irreconcilable dualism. 
Overcoming means bringing together these opposites. Man will transform himself into a 
being beyond good and evil only by going through his animal nature. In order to become 
a complete human, that is to embody within his present constitution the eagle and the 
snake') he has to rediscover and re-evaluate the instinctual part of his "body" so as to make 
it match with the most refined and spiritualised features of his 'soul'. " 
The act of going across the bridge to the overman cannot override the civilizing and 
humanizing process through which man has undergone while advancing to his actual 
configuration. Endowed with a sense of the historical past, the spirit of man has to follow 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., Prologue 9. 
'9 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., Prologue, 10. 
20 Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, cit., p. 29. 
21 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., 1,4, pp. 61-63. 
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a developmental path leading by dialectical necessity to the over human act of creating new 
-values. This will to overcome, stemming from a spiritual tension, is described by Nietzsche 
as a kind of cruelty which refuses the comforts of any traditional knowledge and takes 
upon itself the burden of pursuing an hitherto unexplored wisdom. Spirit, strung by high 
tension between conflicting poles, is driven to transfigure itself into a sequence of figures 
whose ultimate exit will release it from the condition of radical nihilism into which it is 
currently writhing. Since the spirit recognizes the present system of the highest values as 
no longer tenable and feels to be unable to posit another system of values marked by the 
same brand of "beyondness" and "in-it selfhess", it submits itself to a process of 
transformation designed to restore self-fulfilment 'free of rage against the past... and 
therefore not in need of a future to redeem it. ' 22 
The first metamorphosis features the spirit taking on the semblances of a camel who 
carries the heaviest things and hurries into the desert. What is hard to bear and overwhelms 
the fatigue of the camel is the morality of custom that he bears on his back with joyful 
attitude as well as sense of responsibility. In the isolation and loneliness of the desert the 
second metamorphosis occurs: the spirit here becomes a lion and wants to be a master over 
his own surroundingS. 23 The transfiguration of the spirit from camel to lion is required by 
the reverent nature of the camel. Though the latter is a heroic spirit capable of bearing 
much weight, he does not possess the pride and audacity of the lion to challenge traditional 
values and conventional standards of morality. To be lifted from the consciousness of his 
unbearable weight, the camel has to metamorphose himself into a lion and destroy all pre- 
formed and pre-existing values. The desert into which the camel has fled is in fact checked 
by a string of 'Thou Shalt' imposed on its territory by the law-giving dragon called Moses. 
The camel, feeling that this moral constraint has to be fought, becomes lion. The spirit of 
the lion destroys everything. No respect for tradition or sense of sacrilege contain his fury 
against what repulses him. The lion says 'I will' where God, Moses, or any other moral 
authority has decreed 'Thou Shalt'. The lion does not let himself be bound by any master. 
He seeks pure annihilation. His freedom is negative. Yet, the lion is against everything. He 
destroys all boundaries and fixed categories, but is unable to provide himself with the 
positive freedom to perform some affirmative action. Thereby, the spirit of the lion has to 
" Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, cit., p. 35. 
23 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., 1,1, p. 54. 
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be transfigured into the spirit of a child. The destructive act of the lion has left the spirit 
homeless, floating around in search of a resort. Once the spirit has overthrown all masters 
and gods and has nothing more to bring down, it cannot remain indefinitely in its own 
blessed self-isolation. In order to nourish its feeling of power, it has to create something 
new upon which to wield its power. The child, in the innocence and forgetfulness of its 
nature, creates a new world. It is 'a new beginning', 'a first motion', 'a sacred Yes. " The 
child draws 'a new geography of the spirit"', a map of spiritual territories where hope for 
the height and light is rooted down in the deep and dark. " 
Zarathustra's striving for self-overcoming is distinguished from the aspirations of 
the teachers of Christian virtue for what is higher. The sages and hermits of the modem age 
seek the good-in-itself not for its own sake, but as a means to escape from the sorrows of 
life and attain repose of the spirit and peace. Virtue, for Zarathustra, is instead possession 
of one great passion for an ideal to the service of which one commits one's entire being. 
Zarathustra does not scatter his personality into a myriad of fragmented entities each 
devoted to a different small virtue, but strives to bring the multiplicity of his inner 
discordant forces under the ruling of one commanding passion. No eternal reward will 
compensate his suffering. Passion is not grounded in rationality, nor in any other universal 
imperative. Rather, passion springs out of a natural drive. Nevertheless, in spite of the 
irrationality of its origin, one passion is autonomously chosen by the individual so as it acts 
as a principle of moral law. 
On the other hand, the spiritual life of man is nothing but the projection of animal 
drives into a realm of the imagination which is dehumanized and regarded as existing in 
its own right. The body and its senses, nature and the earth make up the soil upon which 
all supernatural things grow. They are the underlying principle of all reality. Zarathustra 
attributes the emergence of the religious consciousness to weariness of the body and 
weakness of the will. On his account, when men are not sufficiently strong and naturally 
well-disposed to life, they escape from it by taking flight into an afterworld cleared of the 
sorrows and pains of this world. 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 55. 
25 Cf. G. Whitlock, Returning to Sils-Maria, cit., p. 62. 
26 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., 1,8, pp. 69-7 1. 
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The demise of God, however, does not extinguish Zarathustra's love for mankind, 
since he recreates his love by. striving after the ideal of the oven-nan. As the religious 
consciousness is uiu-nasked in its deceptive devices and afterworldness is disguised in its 
physical and all-too-human foundations, Zarathustra's bringing to humanity the gift of the 
overman has the therapeutical effect of curing disillusionment. Out of this anthropological 
perspective, man comes in fact to know that he himself is the creator of God as well as the 
measure of value and that through a Dionysian metamorphosis of spirit he can still exercise 
his 'divine power' of creating the world. 
To preside over the physical universe is the body itself, a creative force endowed 
with intelligence and purposiveness. Matter as such is, in Zarathustra's view, a sort of 
teleological activity which organizes clashing drives within the organism under a coherent 
system of 'laws' and 'reasons'. Zarathustra calls the body 'the Self', a 'mighty command' 
and 'unknown sage'. The self lives in the body, he is the body. The fundamental motive 
of his activity is the wish to enhance the power of life. The body wants to create beyond 
itself". Also the spirit is an ectoplasm of the body. It is a tool in the service of more life, 
'one more level in the progressive creativity of life. "I And even the despisers of the body, 
who turn away from life and desire their own destruction, want to create beyond 
themselves. But they have lost the strength for that and, as a result, have grown envious 
of the success and superiority of others: 
And therefore you [despisers of the body] are now angry with life and with the earth. An 
unconscious envy lies in the sidelong glance of your contempt. I do not go your way, you 
despisers of the body! You are not bridges to the Supermen ! 29 
Despite the fact that he is a hermit and is moved by a religious sensibility, Zarathustra 
rejects the teaching of those religious moralists who see the body as a source of moral 
corruption and a cause of inhibition for spiritual elevation. He reverses the spiritualist 
position of the metaphysical tradition and places the body, both in its all-encompassing 
expansion and in the more specific condensed form in the individual, at the centre of the 
universe. As Whitlock puts it, 'the body, with its stages of self-overcoming, is the principle 
for understanding life, and its highest creation is the basis for the highest values of man. 
27 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 1,4, p. 63. 
28 Cf. G Whitlock, Retunfing to Sils-Maria, cit., p. 70. 
29 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., 1,4, p. 63. 
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The highest creation of the human organism, though, is the individual in which every level, 
every process of the organism is in its healthiest state - and that individual is the 
ovennan. ' 30 
Zarathustra exhorts man to depart from what is nearest , that is the average man, 
and pursue that which is most distant, the overman. Hitherto humanity has been chasing 
a thousand goals, for there have been a thousand peoples. The one goal which may weld 
humanity into a unity is still lacking. " Zarathustra reports that on his travels all over the 
world he has found that there is no greater power on earth than good and evil. A table of 
values hangs over every people. Every people estimates and evaluates, and the result of 
their evaluations is codified in a system of norms which defines the line between good and 
evil, what is praiseworthy and what is not. No people can do without evaluating, for 
valuation is the act through which each people differentiates itself from the others and 
acquires its own identity. Moreover, the sense of good and evil represents the ethical 
standard according to which meaning and value are bestowed upon the world. Without a 
table of values that each people places above itself as an archetype of the highest good, life 
would be meaningless and purposeless. To trace back the succession of tablets of value 
alternating across history means therefore to map the progress of the peoples over the 
hindrances of their natural or biological constitution. 
A table of good and evil expresses the history of a people's spirit. It is 'the voice 
of its will to power"' and of its driving force of life. The history of a people is littered by 
a chain of overcomings whose achievements mark its triumph over the other peoples. And 
the crystallization of the process of revaluation into a code of laws sums up the essential 
features shared by the members of this people that allow it to excel in wealth and strength. 
However, the emergence of the individual in the modem age has fundamentally changed 
the way in which new tablets of value are to be created: 
A change in values - that means a change in the creators of values. He who has to be a 
creator always has to destroy. Peoples were the creators at first; only later were individuals 
creators. Indeed, the individual himself is still the latest creation. 33 
30 Cf. G. Whitlock, Returning to Sils-Maria, cit., p. 71. 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., 1,16, p. 86. 
32 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., p. 84. 
31 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 1,15, p. 85. 
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So far all the peoples have grounded their notions of good and evil on a metaphysical 
principle of natural or divine sort. But now, - given that what transcends human 
understanding has been recognized as untenable, loyalty to the ancestral absolutes is 
withering away. And, with it, the same notion of 'people' as a compact unity is shattered. 
As a consequence, in order to overcome present-day fragmentation and rescue mankind 
from the triumph of the last man, a new people must be created. But, for this people to be 
generated, a creator is needed. Yet, under conditions of modernity, only the individual can 
be creator, that is a special being which has emerged out of the development of bad 
conscience and grown clever and calculating under the pressure of the utilitarian demands 
of contemporary civilization. The task facing this special individual is to bring together all 
the peoples that have existed so far into one harmonious whole. This unity will turn their 
random appearances into the meaningful enterprise of being engaged in a universal destiny. 
Thus, the overcoming that the to-be overman will carry out is supposed to be different 
from all previous overcomings, for "it will incorporate the historic achievement of the 
individual that was the death of peoples... The effect of this supreme act will be to 
overcome both the uncontrolled particularity of the thousand peoples hitherto and the 
ignobility of the modem state, whose march towards global dominance appeals only to the 
sword and the appetites and brings about only the universality of the last men. The 
preconditions of the superman include the whole history of the human race so far, a history 
now seen as the long preparation for his coming. That most powerful man who will weld 
mankind into a whole must possess "an unprecedented knowledge of the preconditions of 
culture 11 . 134 
Man is an experiment, Zarathustra claims, an open-ended possibility of assuming 
ever new and different shapes. This does not mean that he is an agglomerate of raw 
material upon which to perform the creative play of invention. Millennia of history have 
forged the shape which man has come to acquire. Although the experiments that he has 
undergone in the past were accidental, their inheritance is not accidental, but necessary. 
Once an experiment has been made, it imprints upon man some characteristic marks which 
can no longer be cancelled. Modem man's physiological configuration is therefore a record 
of the history of mankind's interactions with nature and itself. The reason, and madness, 
of millennia, Zarathustra maintains, now breaks out in him. However, since this 
34 Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, cit., pp. 63-64. 
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experimental past was governed by chance, much ignorance and error has become body. " 
The reason and madness that have ruled over mankind hitherto are in fact 'the giant 
Chance', senseless and meaningless. What Zarathustra calls for, therefore, is that humanity 
struggle for a creator who, by means of a better knowledge of the body, will open the way 
both to a maxirriization of its unexploited potentialities and to a greater elevation of the 
soul. 
There are, according to Zarathustra, a thousand paths which have not yet been 
taken. Hence, the historical responsibility of man is to pursue, for the sake of humanity, 
the multitude of directions still open with full awareness of where they lead to. In a world 
dominated so far by chance and nonsense, the overman will bring the light of knowledge 
and free choice. The knowledge of the body he is provided with will make of him a sort 
of physician who, first, heals himself, and then his fellow men. The conditions of 
supervitality that the physician turned ovennan is designed to achieve show that his 
investigation into man's experimental past is not merely archaeological, but looks forward 
to opening a new future. By enacting a physiological and spiritual recovery of man from 
the weaknesses of his will, the overman for the first time will intervene in the random 
course of history to try to divert its direction. This act of interference, inspired by love 
nourished with Promethean humanism, will finally give to the earth a freely chosen 
meaning, thus introducing into history a 'rational sense' though of a different sort both 
with respect to the eschatological constructions of the religious doctrines and to the 
spiritual or material immanent dialectics of the Hegelian and Marxian theories. 
111. Zarathustra Parts 11 and III: The Doctrine of Eternal Return 
Zarathustra invites modem man to cultivate the virtue of self-sacrifice for the benefit of 
the future generations. He seems to promise in Part I that self-denying devotion to the 
cause of the overman will be rewarded in an indefinite future by a remarkable development 
of mankind as a whole. It is this enlightened ethics of 'service to posterity' underlying 
Zarathustra's appeal to perish for the coming of a higher man that makes his call appear 
as an invocation to 'the spirited men' to take up the ideal of progress. Nevertheless, 
Zarathustra's teaching of progress is miles away from the modem doctrine of progress. He 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., 1,22, p. 102. 
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spurns the progressive schemes of the last man. He does not pursue wealth, accumulation 
of material goods, alleviation of suffering, relaxation of the chains imposed upon man by 
natural necessity. He also shows contempt for democratic politics as well as the universal 
moral edification of man through enlightenment. He is not even accompanied, along his 
path to the overman, by either of the two mainstream philosophical dogmas of progress - 
namely, the providential and the secularized ones. 
Zarathustra rejects in fact both the idea of history as relentless progression towards 
the highest good presided by Providence and the Kantian conception of the historical 
process as exhausting but constant emancipation achieved by man through a progressive 
rational dominion of his lowest and most intractable instincts. The kind of progress 
Zarathustra envisages is instead located in a future still a long way off and will be enacted 
only when men are willing to undo present-day civilization and turn themselves to the 
passionate search for a superhuman goal. Lampert contends, however, that Zarathustra's 
teaching of progress is only provisional. 11 The unfolding of Zarathustra's itinerary from 
hermit to teacher and then again to solitary wanderer betrays, he claims, a fundamental 
change in his understanding of life. Whereas in Part I of Nietzsche's book Zarathustra 
limits himself to announcing the advent of the overman and teaches that redemption of 
humanity lies in a future achievernent, in Part 11 and Part III he metamorphoses himself 
into the overman and reveals the thought of eternal return. By the time Part III begins, 
Lampert states, Zarathustra is no longer a herald, but incarnates the actualization of the 
overman. He does not teach any more that an overman yet to come will fulfil the meaning 
of the earth, but discloses reluctantly that life is an infinite recurrence of the same events 
and must be acknowledged as such, without attempting to escape from it by dreaming of 
a future kingdom of God. In the following pages, I will address this question, seeking to 
demonstrate that, along with the progression of his wanderings, Zarathustra does not 
abandon the teaching of the overman in favour of the doctrine of eternal return, but that 
his speeches on the eternal return of the same represent a further deepening of the notions 
of will to power and self-overcoming. To put it differently, I will point out that the 
doctrine of eternal return is taken up by Zarathustra in order to describe the act of self- 
overcoming in such a way that, by performing it, the will is liberated by the spirit of 
revenge, that is the desire to punish the past. As a matter of fact, the challenge facing 
36 Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, cit., p. 81. 
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Zarathustra is to provide modem man, dizzily floating around in search of a substitute for 
his waning belief in God, with -some kind of teaching that might conceptualize a future of 
redemption without inducing him to fall into the error, committed, according to 
Zarathustra, by all the doctrines of salvation, of willing to impose guilt and punishment on 
what has been. Whether Zarathustra's endeavour is successful or not can be judged, I 
believe, only once his wisdom has been assessed by taking into account the close 
entwinement run-ning between the concepts of will to power and overman, on the one hand, 
and the idea of etemal return, on the other. 
Zarathustra Part I ends by showing Zarathustra leaving the market place and 
returning to isolation. He is escorted by his disciples who, at a crossroad, give him as a 
parting gift a staff with a handle featuring a serpent coiled around the sun. Part 11 begins 
with Zarathustra described as back again in his cave, withdrawn from humanity. In the 
solitude of his cave, he is portrayed to be waiting like a sower who has scattered his seed. 
The first discourse of Part 11 is delivered to his heart, to which he reveals to be moved by 
an unrestrained desire to communicate his wisdorn. Then he reassembles his disciples and 
pleads them once more to gaze upon distant seas for the overman. 
The discourse 'On the Blissful Island' is a restatement of the project of the 
overman, a reaffirmation of the need to create a complete and extraordinary man. God is 
only a supposition, Zarathustra asserts. He is a conjectural hypothesis that has been raised 
to the status of truth by men's wish to project their shortcomings into the perfect, the 
unmovable, and the intransitory. In letting out their phantasies, Zarathustra goes on, the 
poets, the very creators of the world, should now celebrate the human experience of time 
as becoming and transitoriness. Creation is a peculiarly human activity by means of which 
man is redeemed from suffering and lifted from life's heaviness. But, for the product of 
creation to come into existence, Zarathustra states again, the creator has to undergo a 
process of transformation which involves struggle and pain. No matter for the afflictions 
and tribulations that the creator goes through: when the feeling of suffering is backed up 
by a will to create something beyond the standards of present man, this will comes to him 
as a liberator and bringer of joy. " 
In the next discourses., Zarathustra continues to define the main lineaments of the 
act of overcoming. Overcoming is., first of all, overcoming of pity, bad conscience, and 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., 11,2, pp. 109-112. 
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resentment. These feelings are to be overcome because they prevent man from cultivating 
a sentiment of joy about himself and developing, through self-discipline, a condition of 
physical and psychological health conducive to affirmation of existence. Overcoming 
means also to transcend the religious type of man, the death-oriented priest who drives his 
herd over the bridge to a future Redeemer consisting of holes into which he puts illusions. " 
By contrast, the virtue man should be endowed with in his way to the overman is 
not a kind of faculty to calculate the rewards and retributions that might follow the 
accomplishment of some good action. Virtue is the innermost drive of the self to create, 
it is the internal compulsion to discharge the potential lying within the self itself. 
Utilitarianism, eudemonism, and hedonism are the pleasures of the rabble, of the spiritually 
poor. Fortunately, Zarathustra proclaims, in the future this type of the lowest man will not 
exist. It is precisely here, at this point, that lurks a great danger for Zarathustra: in feeling 
disgust with the rabble, in wishing to abolish the last man, Zarathustra proves to be 
affected by the poisonous passion of revenge. Should not overcoming, according to his 
own recornmendations, be free of that sly and insidious spirit eager to punish what is 
aberrant in life? 
Conscious of the contradiction in which he is slipping, Zarathustra assures his 
disciples that it is not revenge what sits within his soul. He emphasizes again that his 
highest hope is to deliver men from the bonds of revenge. Accordingly, he condemns the 
preachers of equality who, moved by a democratic feeling to correct the faults of nature, 
want to restorejustice in the world and make all men equal. He proceeds then to demystify 
this will to justice, claiming that aggrieved self-conceit and repressed envy lie behind 
egalitarianism. In truth, the good and just men are motivated in their enterprise to emend 
natural injustice and social inequality by a fanatical drive for revenge against the superior 
individuals. In fact, once they have carried out their dreadful acts of vengefulness, they 
become tyrants over the same masses they had previously instigated to arise. 
Indeed, men are not equal, Zarathustra declares. Recognition of the hierarchical 
structure of natural order and advocacy of the system of commanding and obeying that 
modulates mutual intercourse among the members of human species represent 
Zarathustra's antidote to the poisonous bite of the vindictive tarantula triumphant in 
modem democracy. As a consequence, the extent to which Zarathustra himself succeeds 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 11,4, pp. 114-117. 
101 
to transcend his nausea with the lowest man and accept the necessity of his existence will 
measure the value of the wisdom that teaches to strive relentlessly for something higher 
without harbouring in the soul the slightest desire for revenge. As much this judgement 
becomes a priority as it appears evident that the struggle not to succumb to the spirit of 
revenge while keeping firm the objective of self-overcoming will constitute the essential 
task to which Zarathustra will devote from now on all his efforts. 
In 'The Dance Song' Zarathustra begins to cast doubts on what he calls his 'wild 
wisdom'. This is a form of wisdom held by the spirit of gravity which gives meaning to 
life but makes man grow gloomy and melancholy. During a figurative dialogue with Life, 
Zarathustra is mocked for considering her - Life, which appears dressed as a woman - as 
'the unfathomable'. As it is the case with all the virtuous men, Life blames Zarathustra for 
imposing on her a set of categories that do not belong to her. These categories reflect 
simply his own idea of virtue. Such adjectives attached to life as 'profound', 'eternal', 
'mysterious' or 'unfathomable' represent in fact conceptual instruments of interpretation 
designed to make all things thinkable. Since they have a lifting effect on man, the wisdom 
inscribed in these expressions serves the task of seducing man and rendering existence 
tolerable. However, while being changeable and untamed and not virtuous, life is in fact 
fathomable, Life reveals to Zarathustra. Then Life proceeds to suggest to Zarathustra what 
she really is. The knowledge that Life communicates to Zarathustra transpires as a new 
form of wisdom alternative to the wild wisdom Zarathustra is said to possess. It is not one 
of the many interpretations of life, all to be maintained equally valid. The secret wisdom 
Zarathustra is conveyed is spoken by Life herself so that it carries with it the 
inextinguishable proof of truth. 
The content of the revelations made by Life to Zarathustra is unleashed in the 
discourse 'On Self-Overcoming', the speech in which the whole narrative of Part Il comes 
to a clii[nax. Here Zarathustra sets out to unmask the will to truth as a form of the will to 
power. He sees the will to truth as a passion to make all things thinkable. And he explains, 
confronted with the doubt whether things are in fact thinkable in themselves, that the will 
to truth wants to bend reality to its generalizations and projections in order to make things 
appear in accord with the conceptualizations of human mind. Also in the metaphysics of 
good and evil is the will to power to speak. The moral values predicated by the wisest men 
and the language framework which embodies their assessments reflect an obstinate will to 
impose permanent structures of objectification upon 'the river of becoming'. 
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Wherever there is a living creature, there is will to power. Even in the will of the 
slave, Zarathustra claims, is operating the will to be master. All living creatures are 
obeying creatures and, if they cannot obey themselves, they are commanded. Commanding 
is more difficult than obeying. In commanding one takes the risk of experimenting 
something unknown; one has to bear the burden of legislating without being able to 
ground his laws upon some external authority. As the will of the weaker persuades him to 
surrender to the stronger only in order to be master over those who are weaker, in the same 
way the stronger yields to the will to power for the sake of power, thus complying with the 
demands of the essence of life. 
'Life is that which must overcome itself again and again': here is the secret that 
Zarathustra wrested from Life. There is a variety of crooked paths that life takes along its 
route to overcome itself and enhance its feeling of power, but the goal is always the same: 
to create something higher beyond itself. The task facing modem man is therefore to 
overcome the values of good and evil and set a new tablet of values. 
Zarathustra's seizure of the essence of life, however, does not wipe out a further 
need for philosophy. The truth that all beings are will to power has not made them more 
intelligible. That Zarathustra has succeeded in creeping into the castle of Life and stealing 
her secret says simply that life, though changeable and elusive, cannot obstruct the attempts 
made by the wisest men to catch the flux of becoming that it is. Still, its secret remains 
enigmatic. The highest spirits who have grasped the essence of life do not find themselves 
contemplating peacefully an eternal truth, but are left wondering about how to make reality 
more worthy. At the end of the speech, Zarathustra urges for new value-givers to come, 
break up the old system of values by means of which life was made calculable and steer 
the course of history into a different direction. 
But for new value-creators to appear, the sublime men - that is, figures of a penitent 
spirit of knowledge who, having penetrated the most profound and terrifying truths of 
human existence, have grown nauseated with it - are the first to be overcome. Confronted 
with the sublime results of their own inquiries, these men of knowledge cannot transform 
them into beautiful achievements. Consequently, they tum the horror of life inwardly, thus 
letting their souls become gloomy and their bodies ugly. Zarathustra asks for man to 
overcome this dark nihilism born out of sublimity throughout the refinement of the 
aesthetic judgement of taste. Whereas sublimity produces merely negative world views 
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along with body's ugliness, transcendence of sublimity into beauty elevates the 
fundamental will to power to the heights of gracefulness. 
The horrific truth discovered by the sublime men is formulated by a soothsayer as 
follows: 'everything is empty, everything is one, everything is pastI. 39 Zarathustra believes 
that th. is prophecy, hanging over the earth, contains the potential to sink humanity into 
despair, overwhelmed by a sense of weariness with life. He himself is actually 
overwhelmed by it. For three days he goes about grieving, incapable of taking any food or 
drink until he falls into a deep sleep. As he awakes up, he tells Ms disciples a nightmare 
he had while sleeping. He dreamed of being a grave-watchman in the castle of death. He 
was there as a guardian of death's coffins in which all the eternities of the past were sealed. 
But a terrible event occurred and made him awake in a state of doze. He heard three strokes 
on the door. He went to the door and tried to open it. But he couldn't. The keys didn't 
work. Suddenly, a raging wind tore the door open. In its whistling fury, it threw a black 
coffin at him. Thousands of masks of angels, owls, fools, and butterflies spilled out 
laughing at him. Terrified, Zarathustra shrieked and woke up. 
Lampert reads this nightmare as the key-event that opens Zarathustra's eyes to the 
insufficiency of the promise of the overman and makes him understand that redemption 
from the past cannot lie in the future. According to Lampert, what lies in the glass-coffins 
filled with the dusty eternities that Zarathustra holds in custody is the whole of the past, 
while Zarathustra's seclusion in the castle of death symbolizes the waiting of the herald for 
redemption to be delivered in the future by the overman. However, what the future brings 
is a mocking laughter which dashes Zarathustra's hopes for redemption and shows 'the 
bondage of every future to its past. ' 11 
Lampert's interpretation of this section on the soothsayer seems to be overdone. 
Although the dream shows Zarathustra still unable to overcome himself, his eventual cry 
is not emitted out of dismay at the realization that his hope for the overman is extinguished. 
Rather, Zarathustra's bewilderment derives, as Whitlock points out, from the recognition 
that a great distance still separates him from the overman. In order to fill the gap, he has 
to submit himself to a new test: the test of the eternal return. This will make the difference 
between the overman and the last man and only the result of the test will prove whether or 
39 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 11,19, p. 155. 
40 Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, cit., p. 138. 
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not the goal of the overman is set to fail. 
Zarathustra prepares the ground for the revelation of the thought of eternal return 
in an astonishingly profound and narratively brilliant discourse entitled 'Of Redemption'. 
The speech is concerned mainly with the question of giving a content to and defining in 
more detailed terms the sense of redemption: 
To redeem the past and to transform every "It was" into an "I wanted it thus! that alone do 
I call redemption! " 
What man must be redeemed from is the past, the entire dimension of the bygone events 
that so far have been unfolding accidentally as something over which he had no control. 
Man has to reflect on his past not just in order to know and accept it fatalistically, but to 
enact a movement of overcoming which will lead him eventually to will all that from 
which he has been formed. Willing retains a liberating power. Its redeeming force is so 
unrestrained that it might drive man to break up even what appears unalterable and in front 
of which he feels frustrated and impotent. But the will is still a prisoner, Zarathustra states: 
Willing liberates: but what in that fastens to fetters even the liberator? "It was": that is what 
the will's teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called. Powerless against that which 
has been done, the will is angry spectator of all things past. The will cannot will backwards: 
that it cannot break time and time's desire - that is the will's most lonely affliction. " 
It is time, that is the passage of time, that imprisons the will. While the creative activity of 
the will is projected into future possibilities, the becoming of time inexorably forces time 
backwards into past necessity. The horizon of possibilities opened up to the manipulative 
operations of the creative will is therefore not unlimited. Past achievements shape the 
present and circumscribe the range of possible scenarios into which the future might be 
moulded. What we can expect out of the future is already determined to a certain extent 
by what is and has been. There is no chance for a new beginning totally extrapolated from 
the past and the present to come into existence. Thwarted in its creative potentialities, the 
will plunges into dismay. It feels to be encompassed within a spiral of immutability: 
Willing liberates: what does willing itself device to free itself from its affliction and to mock 
at its dungeon? Alas, every prisoner becomes a fool! The imprisoned will, too, releases itself 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., 11,20, p. 16 1. 
12 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 11,20, p. 161. 
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in a foolish way. Itsullenly wrathful that time does not run back; "That which was" - that is what the stone which it cannot roll away is called. And so, out of wrath and ill-temper, the 
will rolls stones about and takes revenge upon him who does not, like it, feel wrath and ill- temper. Thus the will, the liberator, becomes a malefactor: and upon all that can suffer it 
takes revenge for its inability to go backwards. " 
The will cannot will backwards, nor it can break time's inexorable flowing. Thus, by 
understanding that the past is not redeemable, the will draws the conclusion that life is no 
good. So, madness begins to take possession of it. Out of the realization that the past 
cannot be recaptured to be worked out again, the will begins to take revenge on it and 
punish life: 
This, yes, this alone is revenge itself: the will's antipathy towards time and time's "It was". 
Truly, a great foolishness dwells in our will; and that this foolishness acquired spirit has 
become a curse to all human kind. The spirit of revenge: my friends, that up to now has been 
mankind chief concern; and where there was suffering, there was always supposed to be 
punishment. 'Punishment' is what revenge calls itself: it feigns a good conscience for itself 
with a lie. And because there is suffering in the willer himself, since he cannot will 
backwards - therefore willing itself and all life was supposed to be - punishment! " 
As the will to power, raged by desire for revenge, sublimates itself into the creative art of 
producing metaphorical and conceptual language, it begins to enact a self-deceitful play 
of reconciliation with time. Thus philosophy, the most spiritualised form of life, puts itself 
in the service of revenge. It sets out to devise moral views of the world which, though 
designed to deliver redemption from the unreachable and unalterable past, turn out to cast 
the will into a new, tragic vortex of self-annihilation. 
Each of these views is a 'preaching of madness'. They teach that things in the world 
are morally ordered according to general laws ofjustice and punishment; or they teach that, 
since the past cannot be rolled away and punishment, as a consequence, proves to be 
eternal, the only escape from the endless cycle of reincarnations and punishments is 
individual annihilation; or, finally, they teach the Schopenhauerean doctrine according to 
which, since the past cannot be undone through punishment, the will can be redeemed only 
by not willing. All these teachings share the curse, Zarathustra assumes, of designating a 
universal moral order in which to enslave the will and through which to devalue the earth. 
It is at this point that Zarathustra, in order to offer an alternative teaching suitable 
to liberate the will from the vicious circle of revenge and punishment and redeem the self 
Cf F. Nietzsche, ibid., 11,20, pp. 161-62. 
Cf F. Nietzsche, ibid., 11,20, p. 162. 
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from the facticity of the past, Zarathustra hints, though vaguely and in an allusive way, at 
the doctrine of -eternal return: 
All 'It was' is a fragment, a riddle, a dreadful chance - until the creative will says to it: 'But 
I willed it thus! Thus shall I will It! 545 
To attain deliverance from the spirit of revenge the will must will the past as it was. But 
to will the past as it was means that the creative will to power must will the eternal return 
of the past. Zarathustra's formulation of the problem of redemption shows, on Lampert's 
reading, that redemption cannot be secured by annihilating the will or breaking up the 
passage of time, for both the will and time's becoming cannot be suspended by man. 
Redemption requires that the will come to recognize that, since the accidental chance 
which has forged the world has impressed upon it the seal of necessity, things are to a large 
extent unalterable. Redemption from revenge comes when the creative will learns to will 
the world not to be other than what its accidental history has made it. It comes when the 
creative will learns to let beings be as they are to such an extent that it wills their eternal 
return. 
The connection between will to power and eternal return, Lampert concludes, is the 
connection between fact and value. The will to power, disguised as will to knowledge, 
comes to discover the fundamental fact about the world, namely that the world has been 
made by chance and accident and cannot be changed. Hence, put on its more appropriate 
flying garments of creative and artistic will, the will sets out to posit a new ark of values 
in accordance with the fundamental fact just discovered. As a consequence, the teaching 
of eternal return makes it possible, both on the practical and evaluative level, a form of 
human life in consonance with what life de facto is as a whole. " 
Lampert's reading of Zarathustra's enigma of redemption, highly reminiscent of 
the Kantian dichotomy between phenomenon and nournenon, ends up constructing an 
image of Zarathustra as an apologistof aresigned, though apparently joyful, fatalism. But, 
despite the fact that Zarathustra lets himself be caught by a flash of doubt as he wonders 
about his own identity whether he is a creator, or a prorniser, or a fulfiller, the ideal of the 
overman has not been relinquished. He still laments for the fragmentation of modem man 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 11,20, p. 163. 
46 Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, cit., pp. 148-49. 
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as a result of having over-developed and hyper specialized one or a few faculties. He 
claims that man has grown deformed and incomplete: 
The temble thing to my eye to find men s t-) I hattered in pieces and scattered as if over a battle-field of slaughter. And when my eye flies from the present to the past, it always discovers the same thing: fragments and limbs and dreadful chances - but no men! The 
present and the past upon the earth - alas! my friends, that is my most intolerable burden; and I should not know how to live, if I were not a seer of that which must come. " 
Zarathustra still envisages in Part 11 the enactment of a complete and harmonious 
individual in whom all faculties are developed to the greatest extent. The actualization of 
such an individual can be found only in the future and will fulfil Zarathustra's aspiration 
to achieve the goal of redeeming history from its imperfection and accidental making: 
I walk among men as among fragments of the future: of that future which I scan. And it is 
all my art and aim, to compose into one and bring together what is fragment and riddle and 
dreadful chance. 48 
The theme of eternal return is taken up allegorically again later in the section 'Of the 
Vision and the Riddle', a fundamental stage in Zarathustra's itinerary towards the overman 
since there is unveiled, to an audience of sailors, the abysmal thought of eternal recurrence 
of the same. On board of a ship, Zarathustra tells of having undergone an enigmatic and 
surrealistic experience. He presents to the sailors a riddle that occurred to him in a vision. 
The riddle speaks of Zarathustra climbing a mountain path. He forces himself upward 
despite the spirit of gravity, his archenemy, pulls him downward. Zarathustra is called by 
the spirit of gravity 'the stone of wisdom'. But, like every stone, the spirit of gravity warns, 
the stone upon which Zarathustra soars himself high must fall too. The text indicates that 
in the figure of the spirit of gravity is objectified that modem inclination to nihilism which 
threatens to thwart Zarathustra's spiritual progress and cause his downfall across the bridge 
to the overman. But Zarathustra, though oppressed and tormented by the tortures imposed 
upon him by the spirit of gravity, keeps on climbing. Suddenly, he summons his courage - 
a fundamental qualityl according to Zarathustra, that has allowed man to raise above all 
animals - and challenges the spirit of gravity. The challenge Zarathustra launches to the 
spirit of gravity consists in a 'battle of wits' in which he discloses his abysmal thought in 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, cit., 11,20, p. 160. 
48 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 11,20, p. 161. 
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the persuasion that the spirit of gravity, unable to endure it, will be crushed. 
The spirit of gravity, by now transfigured into a dwarf, takes up the challenge. He 
jumps away from Zarathustra's shoulder, squats down upon a stone posed in front of him, 
and sets off to listen to Zarathustra's riddle. A gateway stands before them. The scene is 
now set for Zarathustra to reveal his abysmal thought of eternal return: 
Behold this gateway, dwarf! It has two aspects. Two paths come together: no one has ever 
reached their end. This long lane behind us: it goes for an eternity. And that long lane ahead 
of us: that is another eternity. They are in opposition to one another, these paths: they abut 
on one another: and it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name of the 
gateway is written above it: 'Moment'. But if one were to follow them further and ever 
further and further: do you think, dwarf, that these paths would be in eternal oppositionT - 
'Everything straight lies', murmured the dwarf disdainfully. 'All truth is crooked, time itself 
is a circle. " 
The dwarf's answer seems to admit the circularity of time, but only apparently, as if he 
were performing a bit of dialectical or sophistic game. In fact, as Zarathustra goes on, he 
cannot stand his more articulate version of the thought: 
Behold this moment! From this gateway Moment a long, eternal lane runs back: an eternity 
lies behind us. Must not all things that can run have already run along this lane? Must not all 
things that can happen have already happened, been done, run past? And if all things have 
been here before: what do you think of this moment, dwarf? Must not this gateway, too, have 
been here before? And are not all things bound fast together in such a way that this moment 
draws after it all future things? Therefore - draws itself too? For all things that can run must 
also run once again forward along this long lane. " 
Having unveiled the riddle of the eternal return, Zarathustra is caught by a feeling of fright. 
In the moonlight, he hears a dog howling. And then he has another vision. He sees a young 
shepherd writhing and choking, while a black snake is hanging out of his mouth. With 
disgust the shepherd bites the snake's head off and spits it out. Thus, the shepherd is 
transformed: 
No longer a shepherd, no longer a man -a transformed being surrounded with light, laughing! 
Never yet on earth has any man laughed as he laughed. " 
Lampert understands the spirit of gravity as a Socratic spirit of rational optimism who has 
49 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 111,2, p. 178. 
'o Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 111,2, pp. 178-79. 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 111,2, p. 180. 
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mastered the world in several forms of Platonism. " The latest form that Platonism has 
taken on, however, is Schopenhauerean pessimism. This no longer believes in a 
redeeming, eschatological outcome of mortal life. That life is no good and has to be 
annihilated, this is the latest decadent version of Platonic metaphysics. In order to defeat 
the spirit of gravity and gain the mastery of the world, Zarathustra has to come to terms 
with tffis my stic- sceptical world view, Lampert claims. As they are portrayed in the 
opening scene of the section while climbing a mountain path, Zarathustra and the spirit of 
gravity look as irreconcilable enemies. In the fight they undertake, the survival of the one 
will lead to the destruction of the other. Hence, if Zarathustra prevails, the whole Socratic, 
rational tradition culminated in Schopenhauer's negation of life is doomed to be slain. 
At Zarathustra's spelling out of the doctrine of eternal return, Lampert continues, 
the spirit of gravity is devastated. He cannot bear it because Zarathustra radicalizes the 
thought of eternal return to the extent of claiming that it is not just similar things that come 
and go in an endless cycle of recurrence, but it is exactly the same things that return, and 
precisely as they were and are. The spirit of gravity yields to this version of eternal return 
because he realizes that this moment will eternally return and, hence, cannot be annihilated. 
Also, Lampert reads the spirit of gravity turned into a dwarf as an allegorical figure 
of the small man, the man of the modem age shattered into pieces and fragments. He 
maintains that the vision of the shepherd and the act of biting off the snake's head mark 
a great transformation in Zarathustra's teaching. Zarathustra comes to realize, by working 
out the meaning of his vision, that man's redemption does not lie in some novel future 
whose actualization in the figure of the overman will redeem the whole historical past as 
an imperfect stage developing into a distant perfect fulfilment. He sees instead that the 
outcome of the history of Socratic rationalism is the enactment of a will which, in willing 
the eternal return of the same, wills the repetition of all things, hence also of the 
contemptible small man. 
It is at this climatic point that Lampert's reading is flawed. He understands the 
laughing shepherd raising up after biting the head's snake off as the symbolic moment 
in 
which Zarathustra becomes the overman. What occurs in this visionary scene, 
he contends, 
is the transformation of Zarathustra through redemption. Having replaced the ideal of the 
oven-nan with the less vertiginous idea of the eternal return, Zarathustra 
has now to 
52 Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, cit., pp. 160-180. 
110 
swallow, in order to be redeemed, the nauseating consequence of the eternal existence of 
the small man. And that is the epilogue of Zarathustra's itinerary. - 
TNs reading defies the evidence that, in the last passage quoted above, the 
shepherd, that is Zarathustra, is a "transformed being", no longer a shepherd, no longer a 
man. Or, better, Lampert claims that Zarathustra has metamorphosed into the overman, but 
refuses to assign to him the characteristics of a true overman, something beyond the actual 
man. Zarathustra, as depicted by him, is merely the teacher of eternal return in a peaceful 
universe without struggle and tension. 
Whatever side one may take on the issue, it must be pointed out that Zarathustra's 
transformation has so far occurred only imaginarily in his vision. Lampert holds that the 
image is actualized in the section entitled 'The Convalescent' where the deeds of the vision 
are performed. I will argue that the narrative of this section shows that Zarathustra does 
not identify himself with the overman, who remains at a long distance from him. 
The section unfolds as follows: Back into the solitude of his cave, one morning 
Zarathustra springs up from his bed like a madman and cries out in a terrible voice. Drawn 
by the shriek, his animals come to the cave and find him trying to articulate his most 
abysmal thought. But, having failed to give expression to his abyss, he falls down into 
death-like trance from which he emerges pale and trembling. His convalescence lasts seven 
days during which he is looked after by his animals, the eagle and the snake. Eventually, 
on the seventh day, the animals bid him to step out of the cave and go to the garden-like 
world. They ask Zarathustra whether a new, oppressive knowledge has come to him, but 
Zarathustra, rather than answering the question, tells them to go on talking and let him 
listen, since their words are refreshing and allow man 'to dance over all things'. The 
animals, then, take the opportunity offered to them by Zarathustra to launch themselves 
into a grateful hymn to time and becoming: 
Everything goes, everything returns; the will of existence rolls for ever. Everything dies, 
everything blossoms anew; the year of existence runs for ever... Existence begins in every 
instant; the ball there rolls around every there. The middle is everywhere. The path of 
eternity is crooked. " 
The animals' fon-nulation of the theory of eternal return is clearly cosmological. They 
speak, in a metaphorical language, of a non-teleological universe where things come and 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 111,13, p. 234. 
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go endlessly without any purpose. Time is circular: past, present, and future are not definite 
moments in the linear trajectory of time, but each instant is simultaneously beginning, 
middle, and end in the circle of time. Zarathustra confirms that the animals have spoken 
out his own thought, thus committing himself , at least apparently, to the content of what 
they said. Then he proceeds to express his great disgust with the small man, as the snake 
bitten by the shepherd symbolizes. However, he learns throughout the test of eternal return 
that the multitudinous man of the market place cannot be eradicated. This recognition of 
the necessity of an order of rank among men enables him to pass the test of the overman 
and teach a doctrine of self-overcoming exempted from the spirit of resentment. Yet, 
finally redeemed, Zarathustra can-not restrain himself from lamenting that the greatest men 
are still all too similar to the small man. He does not want to turn himself into an accuser 
of man, but he cannot help calling forth a new world that should be enacted according to 
his learning that 'the wickedest in man is necessary for the best in him and that all that is 
most wicked in him is his best strength and his hardest stone for the creator. "' Here is an 
explicit allusion to the overman whose spiritual ascent has to pass through a process of 
naturalization of man, that is throughout the rediscovery of the most immediate and 
instinctual aspects of life. 
The animals interrupt Zarathustra's speech and bid him once more to go out to the 
garden-like world and learn from the song-birds to sing. Then they proclaim Zarathustra 
teacher of the eternal return and give a further version of the doctrine: 
For your animals well know, 0 Zarathustra, who you are and should become: behold, you are 
the teacher of the eternal recurrence, that is now your destiny... Behold, we know what you 
teach: that all things recur eternally and we ourselves with them, and that we have already 
existed an infinite number of times before and all things with us. You teach that there is a 
great year of becoming, a colossus of a year: this year must, like an hour-glass, turn itself 
over again and again, so that it may run down and run out anew: so that all these years 
resemble one another, in the greatest things and in the smallest, so that we ourselves 
resemble ourselves in each great year, in the greatest things and in the smallest. " 
The crucial point in the new formulation of eternal return is that it is not only what is 
smallest that recurs eternally, but also what is greatest. Then the animals enact a scene in 
which they represent what Zarathustra would say were he at the point of death: 
54 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 111,13, p. 235. 
55 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 111,13, p. 237. 
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And if you should die now, 0 Zarathustra-, you would say... 'Now I die and decay, and in 
an instant I shall be nothingness. Souls are as mortal as bodies. But the complex of causes 
in which I am entangled will *recur - it will create me again! I myself am part of those causes 
of the eternal recurrence. I shall return with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this 
serpent - not to a new life or a better life or a similar life: I shall return eternally to this 
identical and self-same life, in the greatest things and in the smallest, to teach once more the 
eternal recurrence of all things, to speak once more the teaching of the great noontide of 
earth and man, to tell man of the Superman once more. I spoke my teaching, I broke upon 
my teaching: thus my eternal fate will have it - as a prophet do I perish! Now the hour has 
come when he who is going down shall bless himself. Thus - ends Zarathustra's down- 
going'. 56 
Death is the individual annihilation, both bodily and spiritual. There is no after-world, no 
permanent eternal life after this life on the earth. There is no escape from the wheels of 
existence, either in the form of resurrection in a heavenly universe or in the form of a 
denial of the attributes that constitute the essence of the individual - will, for instance. 
There is only one world, this one in which we live, and the eternal recurrence, within it, 
of life and death. This is Zarathustra's teaching, and with the announcement of eternal 
return his destiny is fulfilled. 
Yet, Zarathustra does not hear the last formulation of the doctrine and lies still 
conversing with his soul. His absence betrays a certain distance from the wordsjust spoken 
by the animals. The cosmological and metaphysical interpretation of the notion of eternal 
return is the business of the animals and Zarathustra, rather ostentatiously, does not want 
to be involved with it. Their proofs are not his own, and are at odds with his suspicions of 
scientific truth. Therefore, his down-going is not yet over and his destiny as the teacher of 
eternal return is truly accomplished only in Part IV where he addresses the highest men on 
the earth on the notion he has been seeking to spell out for so long. 
The sense of eternal return, however, is fully disclosed in the last songs of Part III 
where Zarathustra invokes eternal return by naming it Etemily. 11 There, eternal recurrence 
emerges as a strategy of the will to power to will the present moment in a certain way 
rather than as an ontological category. " It expresses the will to power and articulates a 
particular attitude of the will towards temporality. In saying to the present moment 'Go but 
return', the will to recurrence lets this moment pass away without holding on to it. Yet, it 
does not simply let this moment disappear. On the contrary, the will to recurrence asks to 
" Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 111,13, pp. 237-38. 
57 Cf. F. Nietzsche, ibid., 111,15, pp. 244-47. 
58 Cf. R. Small, "Eternal Recurrence", in Canadiaii Journal of Philosophy, 13: 4, (December 1983), 
pp. 585-605. 
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the present moment to come again and again, for an infinite number of times. So 
understood, recurrence affirms the moment-both as changing and as necessary, and 
combines the idea of being with that of becoming. On the one hand, recurrence implies that 
everytl-iing comes and goes in an uninterrupted process of change. On the other hand, the 
moment does not consume itself in just one occurrence, but is bound to return exactly in 
the same way as it is now. What emerges from this account on eternal recurrence is that 
Zarathustra's opposition to Platonism, considered as a conception of reality which 
recognizes true being only to the unchanging and eternal and dismisses the passage of time 
as mere appearance, is not absolute. When eternal return is conceived of in voluntaristic 
terms, to will eternal recurrence means to will both the becoming of being and the being 
of becoming. " 
There is a further implication involved in the idea of eternal return. If one wills 
eternal recurrence, one has to will the present moment infinitely many times. But, in order 
to will the repetition of this moment, one has to will the repetition of all moments that have 
led to this moment. Hence., to will eternal recurrence means to will backwards as well as 
forwards. In other terms, when one affirms the past to the extent of claiming 'Yes, I willed 
it) , one wills all that which 
has led to the present moment without exposing oneself to the 
futility of taking revenge on it. Moreover, since the past events are related in such a way 
that they generate the present moment, any creative act of evaluation is an act performed 
sub specie aetemitatis. To will eternal recurrence of the present moment is to experience 
the unity of all things and to be so well disposed towards life as a whole that we desire its 
eternal recurrence. 
On this account, eternal recurrence represents a thought-experiment more than an 
ontological hypothesis about the world. Applied to the normative sphere, it encourages the 
individuals to act in such a way that they must will the eternal repetition of their actions. 
It is a voluntaristic criterion of the will to power functioning as a selective test to separate 
those who are strong from those who are weak. The strong are driven by it to affirm 
themselves even more while the weak are frustrated to the point that they want to negate 
themselves even more. If existence has no meaning or goal whatsoever but is bound to 
59 Cf. G. Whitlock, Retuming to Sils-Maria, cit., pp. 23-26. 
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return as it is for an infinite number of times, who else than the strong would like to start 
their lives all over again under the same actual circumstances? 11 
IV. The Ideal of the Overman and the Teaching of Eternal Return: An Argument 
in Favour of Their Reconciliation 
The thought of eternal return is, as M. Haar emphasizes, a sort of religion that releases life 
from its heaviness. Although opposed to those religions which promise a better life in an 
after-world provided that the individuals go through this world enlightened by a certain 
tablet of values, the religion of Zarathustra offers happiness 11 on earth , that is 
empowerment of life to those who are strong enough to seize the fleeting moments of life 
in their absolute contingency. It does not demand, on the part of the individual, any duty 
or moral obligation, it does not condemn anything as sinful or wrong, it considers 
everything, simply because it is, innocent. 
The discrepancy between the animals' formulation of the idea of eternal return and 
Zarathustra's version is acknowledged also by Lampert. But he holds that it is not a 
question that the animals are mistaken and Zarathustra is right. The difference between the 
two positions is merely a reflection of the different vantage points from which the aniiinals' 
speeches and Zarathustra's hymn to eternity are made. According to Lampert, the animals' 
speeches represent the point of view of things redeemed, Zarathustra's aloofness represents 
the point of view of the redeemer. 11 The animals express gratitude to Zarathustra for 
letting them be what they are. Their celebration of eternal return is a song of beatitude for 
the harmony of the universe where each being is given the freedom to come and go in the 
stream of becoming without being threatened by any external authority. The animals 
understand the eternal return as ajoyful conceptualization of the natural cycles of birth and 
death, and desire to be again exactly as they are now because they love life. However, 
Lampert recognizes that Zarathustra's image of the garden-like world sung by the animals 
is not so idyllic. He is well aware of the tragic side of existence underneath the reality of 
60 Cf. M. Haar, "Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language", in D. B. Allison (ed. ), The New Nietzsche, The 
MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985, pp. 5-37. 
61 On the consistency of applying to Nietzsche's main themes such concepts as "happiness" or 
"beatitude" see H. Birault, "Beatitude in Nietzsche", in D. B. Allison, ibid., pp. 209-231. 
62 Cf. L. Lampert, Nietzsche's Teaching, cit., p. 213. 
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the garden. His idea of eternal return is the culmination of a long ascent designed to 
retranslate man into nature. But his goal is not reconciliation. Having defeated the Socratic 
optimist rationalism and modern nihilism in the form of the soothsayer's teaching, 
Zarathustra's aim is to transfigure himself into Dionysus, the god of tragedy. In spite of 
staging Silenus' truth that life is not worth living, tragedy does not endorse pessimism and 
nihilism. Tragedy is the artistic affirmation of existence which sublimates the abysmal 
truth about the world into a creative act of evaluation. Zarathustra embraces Dionysus, the 
God of tragedy, in order to desacralize the earth from the hypostatization of any 
cosmological or rational necessity and to bestow upon it new weights and measures. What 
will dawn as a consequence of the teaching of eternal return, Lampert concludes echoing 
Zarathustra's 'Yes and Amen Song', is a new ordering of all things where a) passions are 
elevated into something higher and more spiritual; b) scientific inquiry is not abused for 
a technological mastery of nature but secures nature its eternal return as it is; c) and the 
spirit of gravity which makes things heavy and grave is replaced by a dancing spirit that 
makes them light and easy. 11 
Lampert's reasoning is wide-ranging and it is enlightening to follow his 
argumentative path. He claims that Nietzsche considers Stoicism as the paradigm of 
philosophy. He attributes to Nietzsche the belief that the attempt of Stoicism to master 
human nature represents the emblem of a more general tendency of philosophy to tyrannize 
nature as a whole. Because the Stoic philosopher is able to master the piece of nature that 
he himself is., it seems to follow, Nietzsche argues according to Lampert's reconstruction, 
that nature as a whole lets itself be tyrannized. From this insight, Nietzsche concludes that 
there is no philosophy which is not influenced by the drive to rule and don iinate. He 
unmasks the will to truth as the highest and most spiritual form of the will to power. The 
text of nature filled by modem physicists with mathematical formulas and laws of nature 
is only interpretation. The idea of a conformity of nature to law, as though there were a 
commanding law-giver to whom nature gives obedience, is an anthropomorphic description 
of natural events which betrays a more fundamental inclination to control the spontaneous 
course of nature. Nietzsche denies however, Lampert emphasizes, that nature defies the 
interference of the most spiritualised will to power. In his reading, Nietzsche calls for a 
new act of interpretation which will give to 'the highest beings' a new responsibility for 
61 Cf. L. Lampert, ibid., pp. 242-243. 
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ending the attempt to make nature malleable at their commands and establishing 'an order 
that is true to the earth. '64 
Finally, Lampert asserts that, in spite of the will to power being the name for the 
ontological essence of all beings, this requires the affirmation of eternal return in order to 
make sure that beings are let be what they are. The new evaluation of beings aims to defeat 
Platonism in the form of both Christianity and modernity . It confers measure on things 
without drawing upon a transcendent or rational or future order, but by rejoicing at the way 
things are. Opposition to any teaching on the linearity of time underlines Nietzsche's idea 
of eternal return. Both the Christian belief in a future eschatological fulfilment of time and 
the modem teaching of progress represent Nietzsche's targets of attack. Therefore, 
Zarathustra's abandonment of his own early promise of a future redeeming achievement 
of the overman is implied by his new teaching of eternal return which poses the highest 
good in earthly life as it is. Lampert refuses to consider Zarathustra as the latest extension 
of modernity. His teaching does not exhibit parallels, he argues, with B acon's and 
Descartes' fables of human mastery of nature or with godlike dreams of a society where 
men are provided with an infinity of devices that enable them to enjoy life. Rather, 
Zarathustra calls for a new beginning that makes possible the recovery from the modem 
findings of progress which, in a secularized form, carries forward Christianity's slave 
revolt in morality. Progress, to be more comprehensive, descends directly from the Socratic 
rational optimism which inaugurated the endeavour in philosophy to know and subdue 
being through the principle of causality combined with logical reasoning. It is this kind of 
decayed Platonism, which at the end of a long historical process has assumed the 
theoretical and practical form of the last man, that must be opposed by pointing to an 
alternative ideal. It is in this respect, Lambert contends, that Zarathustra is adamant to 
make sure that the ideal of the overman he longs for is preserved from the 'curse' of 
utopianism. The future he promises will not deliver redemption out of the spirit of revenge 
nor time will stop running by collapsing into a state of permanent present. Zarathustra puts 
forward a teaching that acknowledges the perennial flux of time, does not purport to 
remove suffering from life, and invites to love life as it is to the extent of willing its eternal 
return. 
' Cf. L. Lampert, ibid., p. 254. 
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In sum, Lambert rejects Heidegger's accusation that Nietzsche's idea of eternal 
return conceals the modem desire for a vengeful conquest of nature. Nietzsche's 
philosophy represents, he argues, an untiring effort to bring man back to nature, the 
exhortation not to be intended as a restatement of Rousseau's state of nature, since there 
has never been for Nietzsche a natural humanity as envisaged by Rousseau. Nietzsche sees 
instead modem man as the latest outcome of the philosophical will to the mastery of nature 
by technological means. This kind of hubris towards nature unfolds in the form of a 
democratic and humanistic instinct to emend it in order to eliminate the order of rank 
established by natural and social inequality. The result of technological and democratic 
hubris as applied to nature is global homogeneity and machined uniformity. 
Against the sheer hubris of modem science springing out of the passion of fear and 
sentiment of revenge, in Lampert's interpretation Nietzsche looks for a science grounded 
in the passion of adventure. " He aims at releasing science from the will to alter by 
confining it within the limits of a mere contemplation of the secrets of nature. A 
philosophy ruled by the imperative of eternal return should in his view dictate to science 
its scope of application. The redundant circularity of eternal return is in fact radically at 
odds with the progressive trajectory of linear time underlying modem scientific belief in 
the perfectibility of corrupted bodies. To impose the imperative of eternal return on science 
means, therefore, to eradicate at once the modem technological project to achieve a state 
of permanence of time by making global society predictable and individual bodies 
immortal via technological manipulation. In ultimate analysis, if there is a point where 
Lampert's account can be pinned down to, this is the claim that eternal return emerges 
as a teaching concerned with the temporality of beings and with affiniiing mortality as the 
essence of life in a world still surrounded by a halo of mystery. 
To think of beings as creatures who return infinitely in time opens the way to the 
transcendence of technology into justice. Science, under the sway of the imperative of 
eternal return, ) far from serving the purposes of modem civilization 
to enhance human 
power over nature, could offer a sober vision of the universe where a measure is assigned 
to the possibility to alter what is given by nature. In such a universe, human beings would 
regard themselves as beings among others who love each other and will that they will 
always be in the same way as they are now. A joyful 'Yes' to everything that was and is 
65 Cf. L. Lampert, ibid., p. 275. 
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must underpin justice, that is the standpoint of a flowing eternity which conu-nands to let 
beings be as they are and to affirm the eternal return of temporal life as the highest ideal. 
66 
In conclusion, Lampert asserts, Nietzsche recognizes that Platonism and 
Christianity have shaped modem thought and marked indelibly the history of European 
humanity. Yet, he believes that the nihilistic fate towards which modem man is directed 
is not ineluctable, since European civilization, wl-i=ich has become by now a global fate, has 
created a tension of the spirit leading either to the reality of the last man or to the goal 
expressed by Zarathustra himself in whom nature as a whole and human nature in 
particular are eventually made complementary. " 
Lampert's interpretation of the doctrine of eternal return is highly conditioned by 
his determination to dissociate Nietzsche's philosophy from what he considers Heidegger's 
misunderstanding. Heidegger reads Zarathustra as a seeker of mastery for whom the world 
is a standing reserve at his disposal. He regards the thought of eternal return as the most 
refined and spiritualised attempt to impose being on becoming. In willing to eternalize the 
passage of time, eternal return 'expresses the modem technological desire for perpetual 
mastery. ' 11 As a consequence, Heidegger counts Nietzsche among the metaphysical 
thinkers of modernity who pursued the modem task of discovering a permanent grounding 
for the impermanent flowing of time. 
In order to support his claim, Heidegger argues that Zarathustra is both the herald 
of the overman and the teacher of eternal return. The two teachings belong together. A new 
type of man is needed, he explains, because humanity has reached the historical moment 
when it has to assume dominion over the whole earth. But, since man as he is up to now 
is not prepared to fulfil this task, another individual surpassing the actual man must come 
to replace him. However, as long as man is called upon to cross the bridge to the overman, 
he must be delivered from the spirit of revenge. Nietzsche discloses the essence of revenge, 
Heidegger maintains, as the will's aversion to the transience of time. Given that the 
passage of time makes the will suffer, Nietzsche perceives that the will takes revenge on 
time by positing absolute Ideals compared to which the temporal, that is the earthly, is 
devalued to the status of non-being. Therefore, according to Heidegger's reading, 
" Cf. L. Lampert, ibid., p. 28 1. 
67 Cf. L. Lampert, ibid., p. 283. 
68 Cf. L. Lampert, ibid., p. 262. 
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Nietzsche concludes that man, in order to take control over nature, needs to be released 
from the spirit of revenge. This means, in other words, that redemption cannot come out 
of negation of the will, but by affirming time and its transience in the eternal return of the 
same. 69 
There is no doubt, I believe, that the overman is the central figure of Zarathustra's 
teaching, and Heidegger is unconfutable when he says that the doctrine of the overman is 
strictly entwined with the doctrine of eternal return. To remove from Zarathustra the 
aspiration for the overman, as Lampert seems to be doing when he reads Zarathustra 
redeemed from revenge as the actualization of the overman, makes of him a sort of 
unhappy consciousness incompatible with his spiritual tension. The overman is the 
philosopher of the future who is concerned about the future of man. He is the goal which 
humanity should long for, though his philosophy unfolds more as a philosophy of the 
future than as a philosophy of progress. 11 The project of the overman does not meet 
completely the canons of the modem conception of progress, since it is not the culmination 
of the 'humanism of progress' which brings to all human beings release from social 
inequality and natural constraint. The future that Zarathustra envisages does not exhibit 
democratic and universalist concerns. The overman, in his imagination, will live side by 
side with the last man and will compensate for the lack of energy of his rival type. The 
power he will try to affirm is not political but artistic. He lives detached from the world, 
sober and austere, full of disdain for everything may level down human beings. 
The oven-nan is the possibility in the future of something more than human that 
fulfils the essence of life as will to power. The overinan actualizes to the highest degree 
the artistic capacity of man to overcome himself by converting the chaos he and the world 
are into anthropomorphic form. His work of revaluation will aim to retrieve 'cultural 
health' by enacting non-native models derived from methodic experiments. " 
But if the overman is the ideal of an augmentation of man as he is now, how can 
he be reconciled with the teaching of eternal return? Magnus seems to hold a solution to 
this dilemma. He claims that in the reign of the overman 'eternal recurrence functions as 
69 Cf. M. Heidegger, "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra", in D. B. Allison (ed. ), The New Nietzsche, cit., Z: ) 
pp. 64-79. 
70 Cf. M. Haar, "Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language", in D. B. Allison, The New Nietzsche, ibid., 
p. 24. 
71 Cf. M. E. Windham, "Nietzsche's Philosopher of the Future as an Ethicist: Experimentalism in 
Ethics", in Intematimial Studies hi Philosophy, XXIV/2,1992, pp. 115-124. 
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a postulate eternalizing life. ' 11 According to him, eternal recurrence is a sort of romantic 
imperative that recommends to live as if our lives recurred eternally. Although it does not 
posit fixed goals external to the eternal circularity of all things, it does not leave man 
crippled in a state of unconditioned relativism. It drives man to intensify his life by 
imposing the quality of eternity upon the moment. But, again, how can man choose what 
to be and how to live his life if he has already lived infinite lives all of them in the same 
way? 
Magnus argues that eternal return, conceived of as an ethical imperative, poses an 
existential paradox: because we have no memory of our previous lives, we know what we 
were only once we have actually chosen what to become. This absence of memory, 
however, rather than plunging the will into a fatalistic paralysis, 'intensifies the dynamics 
of choice, because whatever I choose to be that I shall be for infinite recurrences... Thus 
through the interpenetration of an infinite future and infinite past within the finite moment, 
the present too is eternalized. Paradoxically, I am free to create my determinate fate. "' 
Magnus claims also that to be committed to a normative rather than cosmological 
interpretation of eternal recurrence does not allow one to consider the overman as a sort 
of ideal-type of human perfectibility, but imposes one to see him as a mere representation 
of a particular attitude towards life. He holds that, if the overman is regarded to be the type 
of man who celebrates strength and health against decadence and stagnation, then the set 
of characteristics he is attributed make him precisely the sort of heroic ideal which the 
thought of eternal return was meant to do away with. Eternal return is instead a kind of 
Kantian imperative, purely formal without any content. It does not articulate any specific 
form of life. 11 
The conclusion Magnus draws about the overman from the normative principle of 
eternal recurrence echoes that held by Lampert and, in effect, seems to have inspired 
Lampert's extensive study on Zarathustra. Both seem to deny the urge of the overman to 
overcome man as he is now. This inference, however, is not necessary if the image of the 
overman is seen as a contingent rather than absolute ideal. This view could reconcile the 
Cf. B. Magnus, "Nietzsche's Eternalistic Counter-Myth", in Review of Metaphysics 26: 4, (1973), pp. 
604-16. 
73 Cf. B. Magnus, ibid., p. 612. 
74 Cf. B. Magnus, "Perfectibility and Attitude in Nietzsche's Uebennensch", in Review of Metaphysics, 
36, (March 1983), pp. 633-659. 
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ideal of the overman and the teaching of eternal return, and at the same time maintain that 
the oven-nan is an ideal type of man to be achieved in the future. Robert Pippin offers an 
argument which seems to meet all these theoretical demands. 
Pippin agrees with Lampert in recognizing a dramatic break occurring halfway 
through Zarathustra's itinerary determined by Zarathustra's realization that the doctrine of 
eternal return is poised to shatter his hopes for a new kind of human being to come into 
existence and redeem present-day declining humanity. He claims that the image of eternal 
return is received by Zarathustra as a shock. Its significance undermines the possibility 
that a conscious process of self- transformation may lead to the establishment of a 
permanent state beyond the condition of the last man. The revelation of eternal recurrence, 
Pippin goes on, exposes the overman as a radically temporal, contingent ideal whose range 
of validity cannot transcend 'what we might want to be, given what we see we have 
become. '" 
Insofar as eternal return, even in its non-cosmological version, asserts that all things 
return, the last man cannot be historically overcome. At the same time, however, if the last 
man is bound to return eternally, his eternal appearance will reproduce the conditions of 
decadence that actually make possible the overman. The last man and the overman, thus, 
turn out to form an indissoluble link which rules out the possibility of an ultimate historical 
redemption. Nevertheless, Zarathustra's realization of the self-deceiving mystification 
lying beneath every sort of eschatological goal does not lead him to abandon the ideal of 
the overman. Rather, Pippin holds, he sets out in Part III and IV to reconstruct that ideal. 
Zarathustra comes to understand that, like all the utopian ideals inhabiting the history of 
philosophy, also his own hope for a higher type of man is motivated by a sentiment of 
revenge aiming at transforming the future into a permanent present. Hence, in order to 
avoid to the ovennan the same fate, he has to overcome in himself the spirit of resentment. 
This meansl in other terms, that the culture of the last man cannot be suppressed, while the 
overman can still offer an exit out of modernity but only as a historical ideal, valid under 
the specific historical conditions of present time. The overman cannot claim any 
transcendent legitimacy beyond the particular historical contradictions which made its 
emergence possible. 
Cf. R. Pippin, "Irony and Affirmation in Nietzsche's 777us Spoke Zarathustra", in M. A. Gillespie and 
T. B. Strong (ed. ), Nietzsche's New Seas, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988, pp. 
45-71, p. 52. 
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Further details on the actual lineaments of the overman than those I have described 
so far are not given by Zarathustra. Other descriptions are highly influenced by the 
approximately coherent patchwork of fragments that Nietzsche's scholars - including 
Heidegger - have tried to reconstruct out of his later notes published in the volume Will to 
Power. Whether Heidegger or Lampert are right in attributing to Zarathustra a will to alter 
or not to alter nature has not been discussed in this chapter, though I have rejected 
Lampert's interpretation. What I have tried to demonstrate, however, is that, whatever 
features the overman is going to take on, were he to be actualized, he cannot do away with 
modem culture altogether. In this respect, Zarathustra's precipice " is the precipice of 
modem consciousness regardless of the repugnance or delight one may experience at his 
dream-like, surrealistic, sometimes delirious visions. Though aware of the inescapability 
of this world, our will cannot help but reaching, 'from the abysses of its depths', for what 
is high while being kept firm to the ground by the fetters of history. 
V. Conclusion 
At the conclusion of my revisitation of Rousseau and Nietzsche, a few points must be 
highlighted. I began my study with an analysis of Rousseau as the most remote 
philosophical source to have carried out the transformation of the concept of human nature 
into a historical and dialectical notion. It is Rousseau's merit to have demonstrated 1) that 
the inauguration of history occurred when important evolutionary changes took place in 
human nature; and 2) that it is in the clutches of the dialectical relationship between 
humanity's biological evolution and its own historical activity that the dilemma. of progress 
and modem civilization must be disentangled. 
Yet, Rousseau is also aware that Mstory is not capable of its own to account for the 
historical process, thus needing the aid of philosophical abstraction. Consequently, he 
admits that the question whether history displays humanity progressively moving towards 
the better must be confronted within the context of a philosophy of history. However, as 
soon as Rousseau discovers the historicity of human life, he escapes from it. The transience 
of human affairs appears to him as too an unstable ground to sustain the high demands of 
morality and happiness. 
76 Cf. F. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 11,21, p. 164. 
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It is Nietzsche, instead, that embraces in its most radical implications the inexorable 
fact-of the becoming of life. He acknowledges the illusory nature of man's attempts to 
escape time's passing away through metaphysical flights in a transcendent 'Beyond' and 
sets for himself the task of affirn-fing life as it is. The thought of eternal return articulates 
the rejection of a perfect world of being beyond all becoming while the oven-nan embodies 
the ideal of a more advanced but still historical type of man. But, who is the overman? And 
how can this ideal be reconciled with the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same? 
A more precise answer to these questions can now be given: the overman is the self- 
transparency of the superior synthesis who, by virtue of knowing all the moments - master 
and slave types - in the past which produced his own complex unity as outcome, wills the 
eternal return both of them and of himself so as to manifest his gratitude for the 
contribution that these diverse parts have given to his life as a whole. He wills eternal 
return because he sees how all the one-sided, previous human types that are now 
entrenched in his own complex constitution in form of drives and practices play a positive 
role in himself. Therefore, he transports this lesson to the world as a whole. To say 'Yes' 
to his own flourishing implies that he has to proclaim a wider and more binding 'yes' to 
the world as it is and has been, thus embracing in one fleeting retrospective glimpse the 
goodness intrinsic in all its parts. 
But if the thought of eternal return is the metaphor for the overman's temporal 
stretch, 'Nietzsche's historical story suggests a dialectical progression from master to slave 
to the overman'. 1' As Richardson claims, Nietzsche thinks the movement from the 
disappearance of the master type to the degeneration and sickness of the last man 
dialectically, 'as a retreat that could allow a great advance, as this sickness is taken up into 
a "higher health". "' 
The focus of the overman embracing becoming and willing eternal return is the 
future, the constant effort of incorporating sickness into health. The overman, to follow 
Richardson's prose, 'acts in the view that his practice has come from and will go back into 
ways of life ambiguously other than this one that defines him. He makes his new self as 
out of something other and as on the way to becoming something other again. He shapes 
an organized viewpoint (and practice) out of the disparate forces he finds at hand, giving 
Cf. J. Richardson, Nietzsche's System, cit., p. 68. 
Cf. J. Richardson, ibid., p. 133. 
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these parts a richer expression and sense. But he shapes this viewpoint not as an end or 
culmination but as one to be given a richer sense in turn, by being itself destroyed and 
replaced. "' 
There is a quasi-utopian dimension in Nietzsche's project of overcoming nihilism 
which, in spite of its anti-humanist connotations, is fully compatible with the idea of 
progress. Nietzsche envisages an ideal of human type which should result from a historical 
and dialectical process. Although he rejects the modem idea of progress as it has unfolded 
itself in the history of the last man, he embraces the deeper essence lying at the core of that 
idea: dialectical progression and synthetic structure. At this point, I turn the same question 
to the other great critic of progress: Heidegger. In his reading of the history of the Western 
world, does he share with Nietzsche the same hidden dialectical structure? 
I will deal with this question in the next chapter. 
" Cf. J. Richardson, ibid., p. 139. 
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5 
THE PROPHET OF NOTHINIU- 
Heidegger's Dangerous Path of Thinking 
1. Introduction 
In accounting for the history of nihilism, Nietzsche understood himself as a prophet who, 
on the basis of a profound knowledge of what happened in the past, traced the outlines of 
what would happen in the future. Nietzsche died without witnessing much of what he had 
foreseen, but his prophesies cast a far-reaching light on the meditations of entire 
generations of philosophers. Later, when Heidegger took on himself the task of disclosing 
the recondite meaning of Nietzsche's deep thought, he assumed that he would also inherit 
from his predecessor the gift of prophecy so as he would be allowed to predict the 
impending destiny of modem civilization. 
Heidegger conceived of his oracular role as a hermeneutical activity of 
deconstruction of fixed and rigid interpretations of an original revelation. There is no true 
prophet, however, without a divinity who dispatches his messages to the conunon mortals 
through the sacerdotal interpretative mediation of decoding and deciphering. Heidegger 
believed that the historical epochs that humanity inhabited across the centuries were 
epiphenomenal manifestations of an underlying revelation of Being. He thought that Being 
had first appeared in an abysmal form to the early Greeks and that those people, struck by 
wonder and awe at the terrifying spectacle featuring before their eyes, reacted by setting 
up myths, inventing gods and creating great works of art, thus initiating the world of what 
would later become known as Western civilization. 
Yet. ) Heidegger believed also that at a relatively advanced stage of the 
Greek world, 
namely at the time of Plato, a digression from the primordial interpretation of Being 
occurred. A onesided, constricted interpretation of Being in the form of metaphysics came 
to prevail and covered up the disclosing event of Being as such. This deviation from the 
original path of Being, he argued, gave impulse to a series of m isconceptions and 
misunderstandings from which the true essence of Being has never been retrieved again. 
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Heidegger read therefore the history of Western civilization as the history of nihilism, that 
is as the W story of obliviousness to Being. He derived from his hen-neneutical enquiries the 
conviction that this history of decline was culminating in the world of global technology 
in which all the logical possibilities contemplated in the fatal, initial metaphysical 
digression were being played out. Eventually, he thought, at the end of modernity the 
realignment of history with the path of Being was made possible again. 
It was at that turning point in history, when signs announcing the imniinent new 
beginning were allegedly appearing everywhere, that Heidegger could throw his prophetic 
power into the political arena. He set out then to attune himself to the revelation of Being 
by embarking on the hermeneutical task of rediscovering what had been left unthought in 
the past history of humanity and projecting that which he could still work out as alive 
possibility into the future. Nevertheless, history was to prove a severe judger for his 
prophetic ambitions. His predictions turned out to be disastrous. Later, when he was asked 
to give reasons for his commitment to National Socialism, he retreated conspicuosly from 
his sacerdotal postures. Still, he maintained that what he called 'the inner truth of National 
Socialism' was valid, even though he confessed that he could not help to effect any direct 
transformation of the present state of the world. 'Philosophy is over', he asserted 
(prophesied again? ), and 'only a god can save us'. 
In this chapter, I abstain from considering the political dimension of Heidegger's 
thought and focus instead on the ontological side of his philosophy. I demonstrate how his 
political downfall is the reflection of a more fundamental logical and theoretical failure. 
My aim is to delineate a sketch of the history of what I call, following Zimmerman, 
'productionist metaphysics', and account for the emergence, in the Heideggerean longed- 
for post-metaphysical era, of a new type of mail, homo humanus, out of the overcoming 
of the animale rationale who has been nurtured by the humanistic tradition. I also 
demonstrate that, despite the dialectical framework Heidegger devises in order to 
'rationalize' the process leading to the appearance of the type homo humanus, this process 
is not to be regarded as a kind of progressive development toward an ultimate mature 
individual but as a negative fulfillment of an original, vital possibility that has been lost 
in the course of history. 
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11. Metaphysics as the History of Nihilism 
In his attempt to explain the course of Western history, Heidegger focuses on the essential 
movement which defines the entire development of modem civilization and which he 
captures under the Nietzschean expression nihilism. 
Nihilism, as Nietzsche described it, is the historical process of the devaluing of the 
highest values. For Heidegger, who set out to interpret Nietzsche's thought in depth, as 
long as the source from which these supreme values draw their worth and meaning is God - 
a name that in Nietzsche's vocabulary, Heidegger clarifies, stands for the transcendent in 
general, that is for ideals and norms, principles and rules which are set above the sphere 
of the worldly beings in order to confer upon them an order and a purpose - nihilism can 
be also defined as the historical process whereby the dominance of God becomes null and 
void. Besides, Heidegger thinks that, since the philosophical investigations into the truth 
of beings have been prerogative across the centuries of the discipline of metaphysics, the 
event of the death of God is at the same time the event of the end of metaphysics. 
However, he claims that the fact that former values now are devalued and the 
dominance of the transcendent becomes superfluous does not bring about a purely nihilistic 
conception which sees the world as something to be denied and annihilated and human 
history a futile process. Heidegger is adamant to point out that for Nietzsche 'the end of 
metaphysics does not mean the end of history". When Nietzsche declares that God is dead, 
Heidegger expounds, he calls for humanity to free itself from all its metaphysical 
constraints and perform the task of a new valuation. The collapse of the realm of the 
transcendent is therefore both experienced as an event of liberation and perceived as a 
prelude to a new fulfilment. In this respect, however, Nietzsche's project of revaluation 
of values should not be regarded as a mere operation of replacement of old values with new 
ones. Rather, the act of revaluing all previous values goes far beyond the repudiation of the 
values themselves. It implies that the very place for previous values, that is the place in the 
transcendent, is eradicated and the nature and direction of valuation is transformed. 
According to Heidegger, Nietzsche wants to make the new valuation proceed from 
the realm of beings themselves, whose basic character he defines as will to power. In his 
view, the interpretation of beings in tenns of power and enhancement of power serves as 
ca principle for the inscription of a new table of values and as a standard of measure for 
' Cf. M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, Harper & Row Publishers, San Francisco, 1982, p. 5. 
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suitably ranking such values 112 . However, Heidegger argues, 4will to power as a principle 
for the new valuation tolerates no end outside of being as a whole. ' Hence, 'because all 
being as will to power - that is as incessant self-overpowering - must be a continual 
becoming, and because such becoming cannot move "toward an end" outside its own 
"farther and farther", but is ceaselessly caught up in the cyclical increase of power to which 
it reverts, then being as a whole too, as this power-conforniing becoming, must always 
itself recur again and bring back the same'. ' 
In brief, Heidegger explains that Nietzsche's definition of life as becoming does not 
purport to posit a final goal towards which life points in its continual and endless 
progression. Becoming, as overpowering of power, is for him the eternal recurrence of the 
same. In its apparent incessant flowing, he says, becoming constantly returns to itself. As 
a consequence, given that the transcendent has been abolished and only the earth has been 
left as the horizon within which the new standards of order and measure are to be raised, 
nihilism faces the task of devising new immanent criteria to take man as he has been until 
now out of and over himself. To this purpose, Nietzsche fashions the figure of the 
Overman as the prototype man should confonn to in overcoming himself. The Overman 
is 'the most singular form of human existence who leaves the man of traditional values 
behind, overtakes him, and transfers the justification for all laws and the positing of all 
values to the will to power. ' ' 
Nietzsche having defined nihilism as the process of the devaluing of the highest 
values, Heidegger wonders how and in what aspect nihilism is connected to valuative 
thought. After all, he points out, nihilism is concerned with the nothing which, in a logical 
sense, is merely the negation of beings. Yet, there is another sense of Being, Heidegger 
emphasizes, which no logical and methodical thought has ever considered. The fact that 
the nothing is not a being or an object does not imply that this non-objective matter is 
simply a nullity. The confusion on this point in the metaphysical tradition suggests, 
according to Heidegger, that the essence of metaphysics has not yet been adequately 
fonnulated. No one, he complains, has ever conceived of the possibility that the nothing 
is neither a being nor simply null, and this ornission explains why Western metaphysics has 
given the way to the triumph of nihilism. 
2 Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 6. 
'Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 7. 
'Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 9. 
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Nietzsche's philosophical parabola is in itself emblematic, for Heidegger, of the 
extent to which logical thought failed to think about the essence of the nothing. Although 
Nietzsche recognized nihilism as the ultimate movement of modem Western history, he 
was unable to grasp the notion of the nothing as something different from the mere 
counteressence to all beings. Consequently, Heidegger claims, he apprehended nihilism on 
the basis of valuative thought as the process of the devaluing of the highest values. Seen 
in this light, Nietzsche appears to Heidegger's eyes 'to have thought metaphysically, 
remained on the path of the history of metaphysics, and brought metaphysics to its 
conclusion. ' 
Evaluative thought is, in Heidegger's analysis of Western philosophy, at the core 
of metaphysics and contains in its essence a particular interpretation of Being. The 
dominance of valuative thought in metaphysics is made evident, according to him, by the 
inner coherence of valuation and the will to power. All metaphysics is, at least potentially, 
Heidegger claims Nietzsche as saying, metaphysics of the will to power. It is value 
positing: it thinks in terms of values and reckons with values. Metaphysics postulates, for 
instance, the categories of unity, totality, truth, and purpose as the highest values. These 
deterrninations of the beings are regarded as cosmological values in Greek philosophy and 
become in the modem metaphysical interpretation of the Being of beings 'categories of 
reason). 
Now, in order to show how the essence of nihilism lies in valuative thought and 
how valuation has its principle in the will to power, Heidegger undertakes a tortuous path. 
He begins with the Nietzschean insight that nihilism is history. Then, he sets out to inquire 
into the history of metaphysics and discerns a transition in it from an initial revelation to 
a later forgetfulness, and eventually comes to the conclusion that nihilism is the inner logic 
of the history of Western metaphysics. A deeper examination of Heidegger's line of 
reasoning will cast light on the consistency of his argument. 
Heidegger understands Western history as the history of man's attempts to answer 
the question 'What is being? '. This question puzzled the early Greeks, he says, provided 
a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, and became after the philosophical 
investigations of the latter theme of a specific discipline named 'metaphysics'. He reads 
therefore in the Greeks' articulation of their experience of Being into metaphysics the 
'Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid. 
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starting point of the history of the West. Being appeared first to them as something 
abysmal and totally incomprehensible, he claims, an aporia whose un-resolvability evoked 
mysteriousness and ineffability. However, struck by the wonder of Being, the Greeks were 
led to think and speak in a fundamental sense of their enigmatic encounter with it. Thus, 
they invented the Olympic gods, set up the polis, created the tragedies and philosophy; in 
other terms, founded a world whose structure and character has become known as 'Greek 
civilization'. 
Therefore, it was confrontation with the question of Being the primordial fact, 
Heidegger believes, from which descended the struggle of the most creative minds among 
the Greeks to determine a new ontological horizon for themselves, thus giving birth to the 
Greek world and through the Greeks to the West itSelf. 6 
In the Books IV and VII of the Metaphysics, Aristotle raised the question of 
metaphysics as a question of essence. By moving from the assumption that there was an 
equivalence between the question of Being and the question of essence, he demanded that 
philosophy focused primarily on a particular being and only later, on a second level of 
analysis, paid attention to its Being and essence. In Heidegger's view, when Aristotle posed 
the question 'What is Being? ' he meant 'What is the Being of a being? ', that is 'What is 
the essence of a particular thing? '. The direction of his question was then toward the 
particular being as such'. This Aristotelian attitude toward Being is what Heidegger regards 
as 'metaphysical', for 'in order to apprehend the particular being as a being, it strides over 
and beyond the particular being - meta taphysica - toward Being. " 
In founding metaphysics as a science, Aristotle demarcated also the scope of its 
inquiries. Although Being appears to be undefinable, he demonstrated that it does not resist 
every attempt at formulation. We speak of a being in many and different ways, for 
example, as regard to its being a magnitude i. e. according to the category of quantity, or 
as regard to its being heavy i. e. according to the category of quality. But all these varying 
ways of being are related to one cardinal principle of unity, that is the ousia, the essence. 
In order to make the relationship between Being and the various ways to be of a being 
more intelligible, Aristotle draws in the Book IV of Metaphysics an analogy between Being 
6 Cf. M. A. Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of History, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1984, pp. 135-36. 
7 Cf. W. Marx, Heidegger and the Tradition, Evanston, 197 1, p. 17. 
'Cf. W. Marx, ibid. 
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and health. The multiform occurrences of being, he claims, refer to one single meaning of 
being in the same way that a healthy complexion or a healthy medicine or a healthy march 
refer to the one signification health, which determines them all as its modes. No polysemy 
takes place in these disparate uses of health and being, since these words are penneated by 
a univocal reference to the ousia. The task of the philosopher, Aristotle states, is therefore 
to concentrate his attention on the ultimate grounds of ousia and raise the question about 
essence whenever the sense of Being is involved. 
The account Aristotle gives about the ambit of metaphysics proves, for Heidegger, 
that he was concerned only with the constitution of the Being of the cosmological and 
earthly beings, and not at all with the sense of Being as such. Aristotle asked about the 
'what' of the particular being, the 'what' of that which, according to Heidegger, is brought 
into presence by Being, but not about the phenomenon of presenting itself. Yet, Aristotle 
is not the only objective of Heidegger's attack. The essential aim of his analysis of 
Aristotle's Metaphysics is to demonstrate that Aristotle's interpretation of Being as ousia 
and substance strongly influenced the development of the whole history of Western 
thought. Heidegger claims that even modernity, the historical age which begins with 
Descartes and culminates in Nietzsche, belongs to the metaphysical tradition, since it 
embodies the Platonic and Aristotelian ontological doctrines that forget any authentic and 
genuine interrogation of Being. 
Heidegger distinguishes between two different ways of questioning Being: the 
Leitfrage, or 'guiding question', and the Grundfrage, or 'grounding question'. Whereas the 
guiding question raises issues about a delimited domain of beings or even all the beings 
considered as a whole, the grounding question asks only about the meaning of Being as 
such, without taking for granted 'the standard ways in which our understanding of Being 
has been thernatized by philosophy and science. "' The forgetfulness to which modem 
thought has fallen prey consists precisely, according to Heidegger, in not having developed 
the grounding question and having instead inherited in an uncritical way the metaphysical 
pre-deteni-iinations of Being. 
In pursuing the grounding question, Heidegger purports to encourage a form of 
Cf. W. Marx, ibid. For an understanding of Aristotle's point, Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, The 
University of Michigan Press, 1960, IV, 1003a3l-1003bl9; plus J. Barnes, Aristotle, Oxford 
University Press, 1982, pp. 39-46. 
'0 Cf. R. B. Pippin, "Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Metaphysics of Modernity", in K. Ansell-Pearson 
(ed. ), Nietzsche and Modern German Thought, Routledge, London, 199 1, pp. 282-3 10, p. 291. 
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thinking that acknowledges the ontological difference between Being and the beings as 
well as thernatizes an understanding of Being which is more proximate to the 
phenomenology of our experience of it. In his view, all our dealings with the beings 
presuppose an implicit, pre- ontological, and non-thematic familiarity with the meaning of 
Being. He states that Dasein, as Being-in the-world, prior to its making of the world an 
object of its representing, is always already involved in the world. It does not first 
encounter the beings out there in the world from the isolated monad of its own 
consciousness and then determines their Being by reckoning which representations match 
up with the way beings are. Rather, the mode of being of Dasein is to be always already 
provided with fore-knowledge, though vague and indistinct, of Being and to exist in a 
condition of permanent familiarity with it. 
Given the occurrence of such an original phenomenological experience of Being, 
what remains unthought in the metaphysical tradition, according to Heidegger, is, as Pippin 
puts it, 'what is pre-predicative in our experience, what allows beings to be originally 
present, always already "illuminated" in some way or other, such that we can subsequently 
make assertions about beings so already "lit up". Being itself should be interrogated as this 
illumination itself, even though when so interrogated, because all such illumination always 
already seems to presuppose such an orientation, we end up formulating the meaning of 
being ontically, as if again we were formulating an Aussage, an assertion about it... It is 
as if Heidegger means to somehow address such "non-objects" [the elusive, non- 
representable, concealed character of Being] as the eternal sourceless light in a Cezanne 
landscape, a light that isn't in the painting, or isn't an object painted, but is that by means 
of which the "world of Cezanne" can possess its disturbing qualities of great stillness and 
great tension, as if at once supremely objective and weighty, and chaotic, threatening to 
come apart. ' 1' 
Metaphysics' failure to raise the grounding question and think Being is for Heidegger 
at the basis of the disaster of modernity. In his view, modernity is the latest unfolding of 
the history of metaphysics initiated by Plato and Aristotle. It begins by proclaiming the 
values of freedom, emancipation from the constraints of religion, and scientific progress 
and ends up in world technology and totalitarianism. Modernity is nothing but the grab of 
reason and enlightenment in which metaphysics wraps itself. It is nihilistic because 
" Cf. R. B. Pippin, ibid., p. 291. 
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metaphysics as metaphysics is in its essence nihilistic". The difference between the 
nihilism of modem metaphysics and the nihilism of the early stages of development of it 
is simply that modem nihilism brings to light peremptorily the nihilistic content remained 
concealed in the metaphysical doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. 
This formulation of the question of modernity amounts to the assertion that 
metaphysics is fundamentally nihilistic because it leaves Being unthought. It also marks 
an important dividing line between Nietzsche's and Heidegger's philosophies of history. 
For Nietzsche, nihilism is the history of the devaluing of the highest values; for Heidegger, 
it is the history of the forgetfulness of Being. Nevertheless, if Being has remained 
unthought through the unfolding of Western metaphysics, it is not the fault of metaphysics, 
but of Being itself. Metaphysics fails to think Being because Being withdraws and denies 
itself to the apprehending structures of our thought. Following Heidegger's reconstruction 
of the origins of our civilization, we discover that only the pre-Socratics caught a full 
glimpse of Being, thus starting off the history of the of the West out of their experience of 
revelation of Being. Afterwards came Plato and Aristotle whose philosophical doctrines 
cast the first veil of obscurity upon the ontological difference between Being and the 
beings. This process of concealment was further deepened by medieval Christianity and 
finally brought to completion in and through the subjectivistic turn of modernity. 
In its historical course from the original revelation to utter progressive withdrawal, 
Being does not merely disappear. It is always thought, but only in terms of beings, as the 
'what' of the beings. While the effect of the primordial glimpse into the essence of Being 
increasingly fades away, Being is experienced as hypokeimenon orfundamentum, that is 
as what lies beneath or behind the beings. Though apprehended in a vague way, it is 
regarded to be self-evident and tautological. Thus, left unquestioned, it is neglected and 
forgotten, enjoying a status of obviousness beyond the clutches of the categories of 
thought. 
Nietzsche, despite his claims that enlightened and rationalized modernity is a self- 
serving delusion, does not escape from the history of forgetfulness of Being, either. In 
maintaining that everything is will to power, Heidegger argues, he propounds a 
metaphysical thesis in the shape of an all-embracing teaching on the beings as a whole. He 
asserts that all beings are beings as will to power, and that they struggle relentlessly for 
12 Cf. M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, cit., p. 205. 
134 
ever more power. Hence, 'since Being is determined as a value and is consequently 
explained in terms of being-s as a condition posited by the will to power... Being is not 
acknowledged as Being. "' 
Nietzsche's failure to think of Being as such represents the completion of the 
Western metaphysical tradition. The Platonic account of Being as eidos and the 
Nietzschean account of Being as value constitute, for Heidegger, the antipodes of a unique 
and comprehensive historical process which has systematically covered up the true essence 
of Being. What is peculiar about Nietzsche's thought, however, is that it is especially 
representative of the metaphysics of subjectivity which was inaugurated by Descartes's 
subjectivistic turn and further developed by Leibnitz's, Schelling's and Hegel's attempts 
to determine the will as the self-grounding ground of the beings. 
From this account of Nietzsche's effort to unmask modernity and recreate a new 
sense of history and the future Heidegger draws the conclusion that Nietzsche is erroneous 
to believe that his transvaluation of modem values could overcome nihilism. On the 
contrary, he argues, 'to think as Nietzsche does of the will to power in terms of the eternal 
recurrence of the same and to think of Becoming as the Being of the totality of beings 
corresponds to the supreme form of nihilism. "' In fact, in positing new values according 
to the principle of the will to power, Nietzsche transforms Being into a value -a thing, a 
being, something that can be defined - thus proclaiming that 'there is nothing to Being 
itself'. Consequently, 'Nietzsche's metaphysics... is the ultimate entanglement in nihilism. 
Through value thinking in terms of will to power, it of course continues to acknowledge 
beings as such. But, by tying itself to an interpretation of Being as value, it simultaneously 
binds itself to the impossibility of ever casting an inquiring glance at Being as Being. By 
means of the entanglement of nihilism in itself, nihilism first becomes thoroughly complete 
in what it is. Such utterly completed perfect nihilism is the fulfilment of nihilism proper. "' 
Nietzsche fails to overcome nihilism because he fails to grasp the essence of it. He 
understands the element of negativity implicit in nihilism metaphysically, that is in terms 
of devaluation and decline, even though his idea of will to power is not to be identified 
with a substance that manifests itself in an enervated and weakened manner. Heidegger 
is well aware of Nietzsche's reluctance to make de re assertions about the essence of 
Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 201. 
Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 201 
15 Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 203. 
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beings. He knows that Nietzsche, with his claim that the world is will to power, does not 
mean to point to the ultimate essence of reality but to affirm in the most radical way the - 
fleeting constitution of the world. On Nietzsche's account., what the world is is the result 
of competing interpretations of the world and these interpretations are constantly changing. 
Yet, Heidegger maintains that there is a continuity between the modem metaphysical 
attempts to ground the Being of beings in subjectivity and Nietzsche's explanation of the 
origin of any possible determination of the world in terms of the interpretative human 
activity, and this continuity he sets out to address. 
As compared to the achievements of Kant and the German post-Kantian idealists, 
Nietzsche's philosophical advancement consists, for Heidegger, in denying the existence 
of any logical or conceptual constraints capable of limiting the subject's representing 
activity. Once the immediate and the positive have been denied 'existence in itself' and 
referred back to the subject for grounding, no transcendental necessity is left to govern the 
way in which the subject constructs and determines its own object. A priori categories turn 
out to be ineffectual, as the ground of subjectivity refuses to recognize that principles and 
rules may restrain its 'human, all too human' drive for manipulation and self- affirmation. 
Therefore, Nietzsche is 'the "truth" of modem philosophy, the revelation that there is no 
way to moderate or qualify the subjectivistic turn, the turn to the subject as source or 
ground. Such a source grounds by itself standing on "nothing". "' 
To surnmarize: the metaphysical nature of Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power 
lies, for Heidegger, in its inclination to value thinking. Alike the whole modem 
metaphysical tradition, Nietzsche thinks of Being in terms of values, so that Being as such 
remains unthought. But, since metaphysics as metaphysics is nihilistic, Nietzsche's 
teaching of the will to power is nihilistic too. Metaphysics is nihilistic in two different 
senses: in a deeper sense, it is nihilistic because, by claiming that Being is eidos or the soul 
or the subject or a value, it implies that 'there is nothing to Being'. In a more superficial 
sense, metaphysics is nihilistic because it is the historical movement that culminates in the 
16 Cf. R. B. Pippin, "Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Metaphysics of Modernity", art. cit., p. 300. 
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death of God and man's abysmal realization that the world has no foundations". Heidegger 
takes for granted this second version of nihilism in which it is seen as the history of 
Western civilization, but he regards its narrative of the decline of the West as an 
epiphenomenal manifestation of more fundamental facts taking place on the ontological 
level of Being itself. Hence, he sets out to trace the history of the forgetfulness of Being 
which leads him to discover that nothing constitutes the essence of Being. Thus, he devises 
an ontological framework on the order of the realm of Being from whose vantage point he 
embarks on an attack against Nietzsche's doctrine of the will to power as the fulfilment of 
the modern metaphysics of subjectivity. 
Although Nietzsche considered his thought to be a countermovement to metaphysics, 
Heidegger contends that he remained deeply entangled in it. From his own vantage point, 
he discovers that Descartes's subjectivistic turn introduces in the history of metaphysics 
the hubristic principle of man's self-determination. Beings are no longer considered as 
independent entities standing in the world on their own right, but their constitution depends 
on what an essentially self-defining and representing free subject decides to take them to 
be. Heidegger continues his analysis claiming that the modem subjectivistic tendency to 
self-affirmation is actually true of the whole metaphysical tradition since Plato, and that 
it comes to an end in Nietzsche's account of Being as will to power. Consequently, 
Nietzsche fails to overcome nihilism and his position is then to be understood as an 
extreme attempt to establish dorninion over the earth through a project of totalitarian world 
technology. 
A more detailed examination of the relationship between nihilism and the 
metaphysics of subjectivity, along with a clarification of the deeper sense of nihilism 
outlined above, will be given in the next section. 
111. Early Modernity and Emergence of Subjectivity 
Heidegger's claim that Nietzsche, by transfonning the question of Being into a question 
17 A synthetic passage from Heidegger's comi-nent on Nietzsche reads thus: 'Metaphysics is history's 
open space wherein it becomes a destining that the suprasensory world, the Ideas, God, the moral 
law, the authority of reason, progress, the happiness of the greatest number, culture, civilization 
suffer the loss of their constrictive force and become void. ' Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Word of 
Nietzsche: God Is Dead", in M. Heidegger (ed. ), The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, New York, 1979, pp. 53-112,65. 
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of values posited by a subject, brings to a completion the modem metaphysical tradition 
is a part of a more comprehensive understanding of modernity as the unfolding of the 
subjectivistic drive for self- affirmation. To be sure, Heidegger holds that the dominance 
of the subjective does not permeate merely the age inaugurated by Descartes, but also 
embraces, though in a latent form, the larger extension of the Western metaphysical 
history, which includes the Platonic postulating of a realm of eternal forms above the 
sensible and changeable beings as well as the Christian search for salvation in the self- 
creating substance of God. 
However, before embarking on the task of tracing Heidegger's analysis of the 
emergence of subjectivity in modernity, a digression is needed in order to account for his 
ontological speculation on the essence of Being. 
Underlying Heidegger's diagram of his philosophy of history is the assumption that 
Being has always secretly guided the course of metaphysics and Western history. The 
inauguration of the history of Western civilization in the shape of a metaphysical 
detachment of man from the ground of Being traces back, in Heidegger's reconstruction, 
to the Greek world whose inhabitants first caught a glimpse of Being in its abysmal and 
aporetic nature. The mysteriousness that the ineffability of Being evoked led them to think 
in the manner of mythos and logos, so that the combination of the epiphany of Being and 
man" s wonder at receiving its appeal gave birth to the Greek civilization, from whose 
impulse the subsequent epochs in Western history followed. 
The emergence in Western history of different ages depends therefore upon the 
multifon-n ways in which man experiences the question of Being. However, although man 
has given across the centuries many different answers to this question, all those answers, 
by way of belonging to the metaphysical tradition, share a common fundamental 
understanding of it. Thus, given that Being is thought metaphysically in terms of whatness 
or essence, all metaphysical answers to the question it poses are metaphysical 
interpretation of the "essence", which asks about the "what" of beings as such. As a 
consequence, Heidegger derives that Being remains unthought in metaphysics and that any 
reflection on it is prevented from discovering the extent to which it enters into relation to 
beings. 
Yet, Heidegger contends that if Being is unthought in metaphysics, that is not the 
fault of metaphysical thinking. After all, in it Being is not thoroughly overlooked. On the 
contrary, in order to recognize beings as such, metaphysics needs to know Being as the 
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Being of beings. Hence, Heidegger states that the main lapse for the omission of Being in 
metaphysics resides in- Being itself: 
Even when it does not express itself as ontotheology [metaphysics is inherently ontology and 
theology, for Heidegger, because it speaks of the theion in the sense of the highest existing 
ground], metaphysics asserts and knows itself as a thinking that always and everywhere 
thinks "Being", although only in the sense of the being as such. Of course, metaphysics does 
not recognize this "although only". And it does not recognize it, not because it repudiates 
Being itself as to-be-thought, but because Being itself stays away. But if that is so, then the 
"unthought" does not stem from a thinking that neglects something. " 
Being stays away, Heidegger claims. Being occurs as the unconcealment in which the 
beings come to presence, but the unconcealment itself, in order to allow the beings to stand 
in view, remains concealed. Being, as unconcealment, keeps away, holds to itself, while 
the beings, insofar they are beings, stand in the withdrawal of Being. In other terms, Being 
exists in its being absent, as the obscure source of the cleared horizon within which beings 
emerge in the fullness of their practical significance. 
The distinctive nature of metaphysics consists however in forgetting not just the 
unconcealment of Being, but also the further concealment that itself perpetrates with regard 
to the forgetfulness of Being. While in metaphysical thought the withdrawal of Being is 
omitted, metaphysics omits even the omission as such' '. Therefore, the essence of 
metaphysics rests upon a double concealment: on the one hand, metaphysics conceals 
Being because, by giving answers to the question of Being, it takes Being away from the 
realm of the question itself, that is from the realm of the unconcealment of Being. On the 
other hand, insofar as it answers the question "what is Being? " by focusing onesidedly 
upon the essence or whatness of Being as the Being of beings, it closes off all other 
interpretations and covers up its own hermeneutic status of being just one interpretation, 
among many possible others, of the unconcealment of Being. 
Given that Being, by revealing itself, opens up in each epoch a particular 
configuration of the world, that is a particular horizon in which Being and the beings are 
related to one another, the sequence of epochs across history is detennined by the different 
ways in which Being both withdraws and concedes itself. Besides, since each epoch is 
characterized by the particular answer it gives to the question of Being and since each 
answer reflects a unilateral interpretation of it, the succession of epochs in the history of 
Cf. M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, cit., p. 213. tnt: ) 
Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid. p. 219. 
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the West describes a sequence of particular forms of misrepresantation of Being. In fact, 
while each epoch provides- an answer to the question of Being, the question itself, that is 
Being, is forgotten. Therefore, as each epoch reveals the truth about beings but disguises 
the truth about the unconcealment of Being, a progressively increasing degree of 
misrepresentation is attached to the sequence of epochs that compose the history of 
Western metaphysics. 
Whether the transformation of the relationship between Being and the beings 
underpinning the transition in the history of metaphysics from one epoch to the successive 
follows logical and dialectical necessity or is determined by an arbitrary and inscrutable 
change in the way Being appears and withdraws, is an issue to be tackled later in this 
chapter. What I intend to point out at the present time is instead the unitary and coherent 
character of metaphysics as the history of the obliviousness to Being. Thus Heidegger 
emphasizes this aspect: 
Being itself withdraws. The withdrawal happens. The abandonment by Being of the beings 
as such takes place. When does it happen? Now? Only yesterday? Or a long time ago? How 
long has it been? Since when? Since the being came into the unconcealed as the being itself. 
Metaphysics has prevailed ever since this unconcealment occurred; for metaphysics is the 
history of the unconcealment of the being as such. Since that history came to be, there has 
historically been a withdrawal of Being itself; there has been an abandonment by Being of 
beings as such; there has been a history in which there is nothing to Being itself. 
Consequently, and from that time on, Being itself has remained unthought. " 
I now return to the question I earlier left suspended of Heidegger's analysis of the 
emergence of subjectivity in modernity. However, let me first scrutinize the progression 
of the stages in the history of the unconcealment of Being whose unfolding leads, 
according to Heidegger, to the advent of modernity. 
As mentioned above, Heidegger believes that the early Greeks were the first 
individuals in Western history to experience the question of Being as an aporetic question 
and to live in the proximity of its mysteriousness. Parmenides, Heracliteus and 
Anaximander initiated the tragic age of Greek civilization, an age in which men, struck by 
the wonder of Being, continually reasserted the question it posed without indulging in one 
or another realm of answers that were contingently offered. The withdrawal of Being as 
a question begins with the Sophists who, by ceasing to ask about the truth of Being, let the 
Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 215. 
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question of Being become submerged in the answers it evoked, so that Being was impeded 
to resurface as a question. Socrates, with his. dialectical examination of opinions, attempted 
to turn the Sophistic tide once again toward the aporetic ground of Being, but he was taken 
over by Plato whose doctrine of real and apparent beings provided a fatal answer to the 
question of Being. Plato reversed the common sense belief that what is bodily, touchable 
and mutable truly exists and recognized full reality only to the unchanging fon-ns that 
constitute the essence of beings. Being, in his ontology, does not disappear though, but 
appears constantly in conjunction with the Being of beings. Nevertheless, this kind of 
appearing of Being as the universal essence lying behind the sensuous presence of beings 
is conducive to a more thorough concealment of it. In fact, 'insofar as Being appears at all, 
it is not missed and thus not called into question but always and everywhere overlooked, 
recognized but recognized only as something self-evident and tautological and thus as 
something unworthy of investigation. In disappearing as a question, Being thus reappears 
as the highest answer, as the ultimate or final ground of beings. Henceforth, the question 
of the ground becomes the central question of metaphysics and the West. "' 
Accordingly, a shift in the understanding of truth occurs in the transition from 
Socrates and the pre-Socratics to Plato. Whereas the fon-ners located truth in the realm of 
the aporetic and drew a tragic relish from dwelling in the proximity of Being where they 
could be struck by its mysteriousness, the latter aims at overcoming the revelation of truth 
as aporia by recognizing Being as constant presence. In contradistinction to the 
ephemerality of the attributes of becoming, pen-nanence and invariability compose the 
distinctive traits of the supreme Being in the new ontological hierarchy that Plato sets out 
to articulate. 
The forgetfulness of the unconcealment of Being that occurs in Plato is, for 
Heidegger, the deten-ninative ground of metaphysics and ontology. Following him, in fact, 
Aristotle develops his ontological orientation into a productionist metaphysics, given that 
he conceives of all things as formed matter, that is as products of a labouring process of 
giving form to a raw material. Aristotle transforms also the notion of Being once more. 
When he asks 'what is the Being of this thing? ", he means 'what is the cause of iff. For 
Aristotle, to be means to be effected, caused and produced. In addition, he turns this sense 
of making into a conscious planning, i. e. a theoria based upon the observation of eternal 
21 Cf. M. A. Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and 7he Ground of History, op. cit., p. 142. 
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models or endS22 , that is constantly present entities that make possible the appearance of 
their evanescent and sensuous counterparts. 
A further withdrawal of Being occurs in the translation of Greek into Latin, followed 
by the transformation of the whole categorial apparatus of metaphysics into the Christian 
theological system. In the Latin assimilation, the metaphysical dualism of Being and 
appearance, which by now has been institutionalized in the discipline of philosophy and 
hence embedded in language, takes on the connotation of a dualism between "idea" and 
"actualitas" or "essentia" and existentia". Sim- ilarly, the expression physis, "the shining 
forth it , that in Greek denotes Being and carries with it the semantic nuance of "coming into 
presence" is replaced by natura, which implies birth and growth. Therefore, as Gillespie 
explains in his account of Heidegger's philosophy of history, 'the sense of Being as a 
sudden and inexplicable revelation is concealed, and it appears instead as a natural process 
of action and reaction, as a chain of causes and effects. "' 
Furthermore, the Romans introduce the first wave of humanism in history. They 
understand man as animal rationale. This definition, Heidegger emphasizes, 'is not simply 
the Latin translation of the Greek zoon logon echon but rather a metaphysical interpretation 
of it. "' While the expression zoon incorporates an interpretation of life as the coming into 
presence of the living being within the realm of physis, the term animal suggests a 
biological interpretation of man as a purely 'organic thing'. The fact that the adjective 
rational accompanies the noun animal to determine and qualify its meaning, thus 
indicating that the being we are dealing with is not just one living creature among others 
but is endowed with a ratio, that is with a 'faculty of categories' and a 'faculty of 
principles', does not change in a fundamental sense the biologism implicit in the Roman 
metaphysical interpretation of man. Ratio remains in any case grounded in animal and 
animal constitutes the essence of humanitas. 
In the chasm opened up by the Romans between Being as the realm of essentia and 
beings as the realm of existentia, Christianity finds a space into which to wedge itself. It 
introduces a new revelation of Being that discloses each being as the ens creatum, that is 
22 Cf. M. A. Gillespie, ibid., p. 144. 
23 Cf. M. A. Gillespie, ibid., p. 145. 
24 Cf. M. Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", In M. Heldegger (ed. ), Basic Writings, Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, London, pp. 193-242, p. 202. 
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as that which is created by the personal Creator God 25 . To be means, in the Christian 
vocabulary, to belong to a specific rank of the order of the universe created by God. Within 
that order, man and the world fall to a lower level than in the previous ontological 
hierarchies, the grade of being of both being now established by their relationship to God. 
As a consequence of the Christian revelation which removes Being out of nature into 
transcendence where it becomes the highest cause of all beings, a further withdrawal of 
Being occurs. Nevertheless, out of this deepened absence of Being, a new vitality emerges. 
The further withdrawal of Being brings in fact the ontological question back to the context 
in which the early Greeks posed it, deprived of the metaphysical distinction of Being and 
appearance. Being, which has now retreated into nothing, is experienced again as 
something mysterious and aporetic. Yet, as Gillespie remarks, 'this experience of Being 
is the experience not of its presence but of its even greater absence and thus leads not to 
a creative rebirth of the tragic age but to a further radicalization of metaphysics. "' 
The original Christian experience of Being as enigma and aporia dissolves when a 
neo-Platonist form of theology which combines metaphysical categories with an over 
abstract conceptualism derived by the interpretation of the Scriptural revelation arises. In 
the new ontology established by this form of Christian dogmatics, the centre of gravity is 
no longer the question of Being as truth, but 'a transcendent God who has created both man 
and nature and who has revealed himself in and as Christ. "' 
However, despite the large use of philosophical concepts made by theology, 
Heidegger does not regard it as true knowledge. In his view, there is no Christian 
philosophy. The knowledge of God is not the result of a logical or dialectical argument, 
but rests upon the interpretation of the Scripture. Hence, God remains by definition 
incomprehensible and only the certainty of faith sustains the validity of the syncretism 
between Scriptural revelation and neo-Platonist theology. 
The historical perspective has now been sufficiently clarified to allow me to 
introduce the long deferred question of the emergence of modernity. 
Heidegger identifies the essential feature of modernity in the phenomenon of 
subjectivity. From his numerous works on this topic, modernity transpires as an age opened 
25 Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Age of The World Picture", in M. Heidegger (ed. ), The Question Concerning t) 
Technology and Other Essays, cit., pp. 115-154, p. 130. 
26 Cf. M. A. Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and The Ground of History, cit., p. 146. 
27 Cf. M. A. Gillespie, ibid. 
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up by Descartes's Philosophical Meditations in which a distanced subjectivity arises as an 
independent entity 'standing over against' objects andjudging and manipulating them for 
its own purposes. Here is an example: 
The traditional guiding, question of metaphysics - 'What is the Being? ' - is transformed at the beginning of modem metaphysics into a question about method, about the path along which 
the absolutely certain and secure is sought by man himself for man himself, the path by 
which the essence of truth is circumscribed. The question 'what is the being? ' is transformed 
into a question about the fundamentuin absolutum inconcussum veritatis, the absolute, 
unshakable ground of truth. This transformation is the beginning of a new thinking, whereby 
the old order passes into the new and the ensuing age becomes the modem. " 
Heidegger propounds also a 'secularization thesis' in order to account for the origins of the 
modem notion of subjectivity. He claims that the positing of the subject develops out of 
the decline of religious certainty. When the fading of the salvation motive widens a gap 
between man's earthly existence and his afterlife expectations, that gap is filled with an 
emphatic affirmation of self-certitude: 
Man's claim to a ground of truth found and secured by man himself arises from that 
"liberation" in which he disengages himself from the constraints of biblical Christian 
revealed truth and church doctrine. Every authentic liberation, however, is not only a 
breaking of chains and a casting off of bonds, it is also and above all a new determination of 
the essence of freedom. To be free now means that, in place of the certitude of salvation, 
which was the standard for all truth, man posits the kind of certitude by virtue of which and 
in which he becomes certain of himself as the being that thus founds itself on itself. 29 
Nevertheless, in spite of turning against faith and Christian ontology, modernity remains 
deeply entangled in the metaphysical essence of Christianity. The renunciation of God, 
Heidegger emphasizes, is far from excluding religiosity. Rather, a pure religious 
experience replaces the loss of God, while historiographical study of myth compensates 
for the resultant void". Heidegger discovers thus a twofold nature in the essence of 
modernity: on the one hand, he claims, the modem perception of the world remains 
fundamentally Christianized inasmuch as subjectivity is posited as the infinite, 
unconditional and absolute ground of the world. On the other hand, the Christian doctrine 
is transformed into a world view - the Christian world view, precisely - and therefore is 
updated and "modernized"". 
28 Cf. M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, p., 97. 
29 Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid. 
'0 Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Age of The World Picture", cit., p. 117. 
" Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., pp. 116-117. 
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Hence, a deep parallelism runs, for Heidegger, through the Christian Middle Ages 
and the secularized age of modernityý the certainty of faith is equalled by the certainty of 
self in introspection, divine creativity is matched by world technology, and God is 
superseded by man as the highest Being. 
Yet, subjectivity as such is not, strictly speaking, a characteristic of modernity. In 
The Age of The World Picture, Heidegger enumerates among the essential marks of 
modernity the mathematical science of nature, machine technology, the loss of gods, the 
universal process of massification and standardization of culture, and the progressive 
assimilation of the event of art into the scope of aesthetics. The phenomenon of 
subjectivity does not appear among them. The reason of this omission is that Heidegger 
sees subjectivity or, more precisely, the subject-object dichotomy more as the common 
hidden thread that runs across all the distinctive traits of modernity than as a mark of 
modernity itself. Subjectivity is what lies behind all the phenomena of modernity, the 
metaphysical ground that provides foundation for their essence. It names the way in which 
Being manifests (and conceals) itself in the modem age, the defining horizon within which 
all beings come to light and count as beings. Let us see, for instance, how the subject- 
object split is present and pervades the phenomenon of modem science. 
The word science today, Heidegger says, means something fundamentally different 
from the Greek episteme". Science has become a rigorous method of investigation into 
nature. It is based upon a preliminary stipulation of what is to be meant by nature. Nature 
is described as the realm of the material bodies which possess the property of motion. An 
event, in order to be considered as a natural event at all, must be defined in ýadvance as a 
spatiotemporal magnitude of motion, so that it can be made available for the measuring 
exact procedures of the mathematized science of nature. Experiment is the cornerstone of 
modem science, especially of the physical science of nature. It provides the latter with a 
rigorous means of verification of the validity of its theories. In setting up an experiment, 
in fact, the mathematical science of nature reproduces circumstances through and in which 
it comes to control in advance, by means of calculation, a specific series of events as well 
as to subsume them under a universal law: 
Experiment is that methodology which, in its planning and execution, is supported and tý 
" Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 117. 
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guided on the basis of the fundamental law laid down, in order to adduce the facts that either 
verify and confirm the law or deny it confirmation. " 
Confirmation of the validity of the law amounts to a provision of explanation of the events 
under investigation, which is precisely the fundamental objective modem science seeks to 
accomplish. All this, of course, is a far cry from what Aristotle meant by episteme. For 
him, episteme was based upon empeiria, a kind of observation of the qualities and 
modifications of fl-iings under changing circumstances airning at 'the knowledge of the way 
in wl-iich things as a rule behave. "' Compared to the Aristotelian empeiria, the modem 
experiment, Heidegger argues, 'is not only an observation more precise in degree and 
scope, but is a methodology essentially different in kind, related to the verification of law 
in the framework, and at the service., of an exact plan of nature. "' 
What makes possible the transformation of episteme into modern science, Heidegger 
suggests, is a new understanding of beings at the disposal of representation. Modem 
science would not have progressed into the sort of mathematical study of nature that it is 
today if there had not been preliminarily a development of truth into the certainty of 
representation. The essential movement behind the whole range of changes introduced by 
modernity, of which science is the eponymous example, is to be identified in the self's 
quest to secure its own reality from doubt by bringing all the external beings before the 
scrutinizing operations of the eye of the mind. In the course of this process, the role of 
subjectivity is to certify, through the methodical treatment of its cogitationes, the effective 
reality of what it is presented to. A thing gains the ontological status of "reality" only if it 
is liable of being represented in a rigorous way by the inner thinking activity of the self. 
What is decisive in the turning of modernity, however, is not so much the 
unrestrained affirmation of subjectivity as the mutual interplay that initiates between 
subject and object. Heidegger emphasizes how, as a matter of fact, modernity, along with 
liberating man from an unreflective condition of subordination to external authorities of 
human or divine origin, has produced a kind of objectivism that was never seen in any age 
before. The subject is simply one tenaiinus of a dual relation which involves also the world. 
It can become in modernity the being upon which the truth of the world must be grounded 
only because the understanding of the world has changed. The world is now conceived of 
Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., pp. 121-122. 
Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 121. 
Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 122. 
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and grasped as a picture, that is it has become something that man wants to bring before 
himself and represent. 
This conception of subjectivity as the terrninus of a dual relation including also the 
world as picture has been, for Heidegger, at the root of the Western interpretation of the 
reality of things almost from the very beginning. Plato's notion of eidos as the invisible 
essence of things that can be grasped only intellectually by the eye of the mind is an 
ancestral account of the process of knowledge that is vastly echoed in the Cartesian 
narration of the activity of representation. Underlying the two is a common understanding 
of temporality in terms of constantly available presence, which develops from the Greek 
belief in the appearing of the thing's being into intellectual visibility up to the modem 
guaranteeing of all things before the judgement of the self-present subject". 
Insofar as Plato's notion of eidos is the presupposition for the world having to 
become picture, there must be some connection or necessity, though not accountable in 
terms of Hegel's dialectical development, in the history that unfolds from the Greeks to 
modernity. At the beginning was the Greek emergence of a thing's being out of hiddeness 
into open sensible and intellectual visibility. With the transition from the classical era to 
the Middle Ages, the intellectual and invisible eye of the mind flees from the fallible space 
of the empirical world to take refuge in God. The decline of religious faith at the end of 
the Middle Ages forces the self to turn inward in search of self-certainty. This turning 
allows the self to discover in its inner cogitationes, that is its inner thinking activity, a 
constantly present entity that guarantees the presence of other things. With the affirmation 
of the subject as representing activity that-brings the world before itself as a collection of 
objects, we arrive at the modem age. Still, Heidegger identifies a further development 
within the ambit of modernity itself. The representing activity of the subject unfolds in fact 
as will to form an orderly picture of the world. 
Heidegger contends that modem subjectivity exists only by imposing a self- 
originated order on other things. The primal source of this shaping labour that is performed 
by the subject upon the world in order to gain sufficient power to control the conditions 
of representation is nothing but an act of will". The coming into play of will, a crucial 
element in the metaphysics of modernity, accounts therefore for the transition within 
" Cf. D. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, University of Chicago Press, 1986, p. 13 1. 
37 Cf. D. Kolb, ibid., p. 141. 
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modernity itself from Descartes's search for self-certainty to Nietzsche's notion of the will 
to power via the mediation of Leibnitz's doctrine of the monad as the unity of perception 
and appetite. Let us see how this movement proceeds. 
IV. Late Modernity and Dominion of Technology 
As mentioned in the previous section, another essential feature of modernity which is 
uncovered by Heidegger and is strictly related to subjectivity is technology. In expounding 
his interpretation and evaluation of modem technology, Heidegger gives preliminary notice 
of being concerned not with the instrumentalist and anthropologic definition which 
represents technology as a kind of human activity serving ends established by man, but 
with the more fundamental task of discovering the transcendental conditions that make 
possible the experience of beings as raw material available for manipulation, exploitation 
and consumption". In his view, the essence of modem technology neither is to be 
identified with the arrangement of techniques, devises, and production systems that make 
up the most tangible mark of contemporary industrial society, nor is to be associated to the 
rationalist and scientific world view that embraces the historical epoch of modernity. Both 
these elements, industrialism and modernist world view, are in fact epiphenomenal 
manifestations of a deeper movement that takes place on the ontological level of Being's 
epoch shaping play. Modem technology is to be understood instead as a mode of disclosing 
things, an original revelation that exposes things as entities liable of not only being 
scientifically investigated and brought together under a unique system of laws, but also 
engineered and utilized. 
Heidegger explains that the expression technology stems from the Greek word techne 
which originally means "the act of bringing forth". It refers to both the activity of the 
craftsman and the fine arts whose essence lies not in the process of making, manipulating 
or using means, but in revealing. As denoting an act of revealing, the word techne is 
associated to other similar words like aletheia, poiesis or physis, all expressions that mean 
"bringing forth", "bringing into appearance". Now, according to Heidegger, the revealing 
"' On Heidegger's transcendentalism see M. E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, 
Indiana University Press, 1990, Introduction; plus D. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, cit., pp. 172- 
177. The latter argues that Heidegger's philosophical enterprise can be legitimately called transcendental, 
even though the methods he employs for establishing his claims are more phenomenological than those 
attainable in a traditional transcendental deduction. 
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that rules in modem technology is a sort of one-dimensional disclosure of things as 
standing reserve: 
The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, thesoll as a mineral deposit. The field 
that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears differently than it did when to 
set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not 
challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of 
the forces of growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the 
field has come under the grip of another kind of setting- in -order, which sets upon nature. It 
sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. 
Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for 
example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be released either for 
destruction or peaceful use. " 
The phenomenon of setting upon is, Heidegger continues, a challenging forth and 'happens 
in that the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what 
is transformed is stored up, what is stored up is, in turn, distributed, and what is distributed 
is switched about ever anew. Unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching 
about are ways of revealing. "' 
The expression Heidegger uses to name the content of the original revelation that 
constitutes the essence of modem technology is Gestell. Ethimologically, the German word 
Gestell is made up of the root stell, which means to put or to set, and the prefix ge, which 
generally serves to confer upon the expression in which it appears the semantic nuance of 
collectivity". Hence, Gestell, as the call on man to encounter beings as standing reserve, 
can be translated into English by the expression "universal imposition"". 
According to Heidegger, the world of universal imposition has taken over in late 
modernity Descartes's world based upon the dominance of subjectivity and established a 
regime of competition among men for the conquest and exploitation of the earth: 
Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand 
there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this 
way has its own standing. We call it the standing reserve... Whatever stands by in the sense 
of standing -reserve no longer stands over against us as object". 
., 
Technoloo, ", in M. Heidegger (ed. ), The Question Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Z-, Y I 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, cit., pp. 14-15. 
Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid. p. 16. 
41 Cf. D. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, cit., p. 145. 
42 The expression "Imposition" emphasizes that beings are under the sway of 
the call of Being while 
"universal" tries to capture the semantic nuance of the prefix ge, indicating that all 
beings, man 
included, are involved in the call and are under the threat of 
being objectified. 
43 Cf. M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology", cit., p. 17. 
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The point made here by Heidegger needs clarification. To summarize: Heidegger describes 
technology as a mode of revealing of beings as standing reserve. He identifies revelation 
with the opening up of Being which manifests itself in the form of a call sent out to man 
to order beings as raw material available for use and manipulation. This call assumes the 
character of a "universal imposition" whose commands cannot be eluded. Under its 
dominion every object in the world is made available for the subject, but the subject itself 
has now lost the central role that it played when it emerged in the early modernity as the 
ground of beings and has instead been reduced to open availability. 
The weakening of the role of subjectivity in modem technology implies that there 
is a transition within modernity from an earlier stage characterized by the domination of 
subjectivity to a later one dominated by universal imposition. In the latter, the central 
subject has been removed from the privileged position in the ontological order and brought 
to the same level as the other worldly things as an objectified entity. 
Yet', Heidegger maintains that the development of modernity in the sense of the 
dominion of universal imposition represents a fulfilment of its intrinsic nature. The 
replacement of the centrality of subjectivity with the generalized will to power of universal 
imposition goes in fact along with the unfolding of modem technology. At the culmination 
of modemitY everything is ordered to stand by and be immediately ready for manipulation. 
Things are no longer experienced simply as objects that stand over against the subject in 
order to be certified as to what their ontological status is, but have been transformed into 
mere standing reserve available for human engineering. 
Now, if man is no longer the projecting centre of a methodical and rigorous 
procedure that stamps the mark of reality upon those things that conform to his 
predelineated patterns, what kind of role has he been relegated to? Heidegger claims that 
in the world of universal imposition every entity, man included, is made object of a call 
or an "attack" that urges them to stand ready for use and exploitation. The source of this 
attack placed upon beings lies nowhere because there is no primordial font out of which 
a calling force could radiate". Heidegger says therefore that this attack which is waged 
upon man in the form of a call ordering indiscriminate exploitation of the energies of 
nature takes on the feature of a "challenging revealing" that opens up a field of possibilities 
' Cf. D. Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, cit., p. 147. 
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in which things and man are made available to one another. However, despite there is no 
centre from which the call for availability and ordering is en-fitted because man himself has 
been claimed by the same call to come to presence as standing reserve, man still plays a 
special role as the receptive abode that makes the world of universal imposition possible: 
Who accomplishes the challenging setting-upon through which what we call the real Is 
revealed as standing reserve? Obviously, man. To what extent is man capable of such a 
revealing? Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or 
other. But man does not have control over unconcealment itself... [However], because man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature, i. e., into the process of 
ordering, he never is transformed into mere standing reserve. Since man drives technology 
forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing. But the unconcealment within which 
ordering unfolds is never a human handwork. " 
Man occupies a halfway position between the call of unconcealment and the process of 
ordering, but he has no say in the work of modem technology. Or, at least, modem 
technology as an ordering revealing is no merely human doing. Thus, rather than an 
instrument in the hands of self-determining man designed to serve his purposes, it turns out 
to be a world of its own whose logic and necessity surpasses the limits of human control. 
As a consequence man, in accomplishing the attack on things by ordering them as standing 
reserve, simply responds to the call of unconcealment without having any control over 
unconcealment itself. It is universal imposition, which as the essence of technology is 
nothing technological but a mode of revealing, that in ultimate analysis holds sway of the 
modem world. 
Heidegger asserts also that the order for universal imposition is sent to man by 
destining. As such, it holds complete sway over him, even though it happens in and 
through him. Yet, the destining of universal imposition does not compel. It is not a fate that 
manifests itself in the form of a command directed to the human will. On the contrary, 
man, as being-in-the-world, always already belongs to the realm of destining by listening 
to it without being involved in any sort of constriction: 
When we consider the essence of technology, we experience Gestell as a destining of 
revealing. In this way we are already sojourning within the open space of destining, a 
destining that in no way confines us to a stultified compulsion to push on blindly with 
technology or, what comes to the same thing, to rebel helplessly against it and curse it as the 
work of the devil. Quite to the contrary, when we once open ourselves expressly to the 
Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Question Conceming Technoloc, ", cit., p. 18. t, Y I 
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essence of technology, we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing claim. " 
How is it possible that man, who is caught up in the frame of destining, becomes free? 
How can he achieve complete freedom if he is always claimed by the destining of 
revealing? In order to reconcile freedom and destining Heidegger resorts to the paradox 
of identifying both. 
The conundrum implicit in this seemingly ethical paradox, however, can be 
disentangled on the ontological level if we bring into the discussion Heidegger's theoretical 
issue of what it means for man to be in the world. I have already mentioned that, according 
to Heidegger, the subject-object dichotomy is not the primary way in which human 
understanding of reality occurs. He claims that the encounter with things happens first on 
a more fundamental level than that which is described by the modem oppositions between 
subject and object or thing and qualities. Human being, he contends, is first of all Dasein, 
the "being there of", whose essential ontological constitution is to be a "being-in-the- 
world"". As being-in-the-world, Dasein is always already involved in the world and 
dealing with some being or other, before concepts and propositions structure the meaning 
of its encounter with it. In other terms, the encounter with the world happens first on the 
primordial level of our dwelling in the world. It is out of this pre-conceptual understanding 
that we erect our conceptual frameworks and form explicit propositions that articulate and 
make explicit the meaning that has already been experienced on the pre-linguistic level. 
On the other hand, as one terminus of a dual ontological structure named "being-in- 
the-world". ) world is not a mere collection of ob ects 
detached from the subject and at j 
disposal of its manipulative operations. On the contrary, world is a texture of things and 
lived possibilities that are not present as such, but emanate from present objects as the 
horizon within which we comprehend practically the things we are confronted with by 
relating them to projected purposes. Therefore, while significance emerges out of the play 
of presence, absence and possibilities taking place within the texture of the world, the 
world exists only as the presupposed context that makes possible the occurrence of 
meaning. Consequently, it can never be articulated in a definite set of propositions. 
46 Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., pp. 25-26. 
The hyphens in the expression "being- in-the-world" are designed to point out the unitary structure of 
the kind of being that Dasein is and to remove any misleading suggestion that the entity referred to 
by the grammatical term "subject" is something that is "opposed to" or "stands against" the entity 
referred to by the grammatical term "complement". 
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However, despite the indeterminacy of its boundaries, the openness of the world is not 
unlimited. The closure of death, as the possibility that ends possibilities, determines -an 
existential and qualitative limitation that constrains the world to a certain definite temporal 
structures. 
Heidegger believes that, inasmuch as we postulate pure openness to things, we 
delude ourselves. The ideal of unlimited access to the world is the legacy of a metaphysical 
way of thinking that emphasizes presence over the temporal dimensions of past and future. 
The world, instead, is irretrievably finite. Thrown into it, we find ourselves confronted 
with a series of possibilities that have been passed on to us from past experiences and 
uncompleted achievements. Then, on the basis of what has been revealed and granted us, 
we project actual possibilities into the future. Ultimately, it is in this interstice between 
what we have been granted to be and the activity of uncovering from the past unthought 
possibilities that can be projected into the future that the creation of human freedom is 
played. 
I now return to the question of the essence of technology. Heidegger claims that the 
world of universal imposition is the latest manifestation of Being in the history of 
productionist metaphysics that began with the Greeks. As a further development of 
modernity characterized by the dominance of subjectivity, the technological era was 
prefigured at the very beginning when "to be" came to mean "to be produced"". Yet, 
productionist metaphysics is the history of one specific meaning of Being, that is Being as 
energeia, that stands alongside other meanings like aletheia and hypokeimenon but exhibits 
a development of its own. Therefore, while subjectivity is the logical outcome of the 
transformations of hypokeimenon into subiectum and aletheia into certainty, the world of 
universal imposition results from the history of the transformation of energeia into the 
world of the will to power. 
It is Plato., according to Heidegger, the proto technological thinker par excellence, 
given that he first gave impulse to the history of productionist metaphysics with his 
doctrine of the eida as the eternal forms of which sensible things are imperfect copies. 
Heidegger contends that Plato drew the notion of eidos from the sphere of human 
manufacturing where models and blueprints were used as prototypical images for the 
making of the work. Like the shape of an accomplished product of a craftsman was 
48 Cf. M. E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Coiifrontation with Modernity, cit., Introduction. 
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founded upon the structure of a model, thus Plato thought that the aspect of the changeable 
things in the temporal -empirical world was founded upon the structure of the eternal forms 
in the ideal and temporal world. Hence, by interpreting Being in the sense of the permanent 
presence of eternal forins rather than as the event of presencing itself, Plato initiated the 
history of metaphysics. 
Aristotle, Heidegger continues, turned further away from the understanding of Being 
in terms of disclosure and revelation, thus deepening the process of metaphysics, with his 
interpretation of the Being of a being in terms of energeia, that is the event by which an 
entity endures in presence. 
The Roman translation of energela into actualitas introduces another shift in the 
meaning of Being. Now, the Being of an entity is understood as that which "causes" the 
existence of the entity, so that the entity ends up to be the effect of a cause. Afterwards, in 
the ontotheological Christian thought, God becomes the supreme causal agent, a planning 
and calculating Creator who makes things come into and last in presence. 
With the inauguration of modernity announced by Descartes, subjectivity takes over 
God as the producer of all things. Then, the transformation of the meaning of the Being of 
a being from objectivity - to stand over against - into value accounts for the transition from 
Descartes to Nietzsche. It is Leibnitz, however, that paves the way for Nietzsche's doctrine 
of the will to power. In his doctrine of the individual monads, he understands beings as 
products of human will more than objects of a mere representing subject. Also Hegel 
describes will as the inner force of history through which reason attains absolute self- 
knowledge. Nietzsche, however, performs the last extreme act of the history of 
productionist metaphysics by making reason an instrument in the hands of the will to 
power. In his theory, reason comes to serve the purposes of the will, which are nothing but 
its self-perpetuating striving for ever more power. The culmination of subjectivism into the 
will to power marks the triumph of modem technology. The Overman emerges as "the 
technological worker-solder" who uncovers the "value" of all entities in their availability 
to stand as material reservoir 'necessary to enhance the ultimately aimless quest for power 
for its own sake"'. 
49 Cf. M. E. Zimmerman, ibid., p. 173.1 also owe to Zimmerman this account of the history of 
productionist metaphysics. Cf. ibid., pp. 168-173. 
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Nietzsche's theory of the will to power brings to a conclusion the history of 
productionist metaphysics. Since his nihilism has exhausted all the possibilities of the 
destiny that was sent out to humanity in the age of the Greeks, whatever follows will be 
from a new beginning. Will it be man the agent who carries out the task of taking himself 
out of the history of metaphysics and initiating a new era? No, "only a God can save us" 
from the world of universal imposition, Heidegger states in his Spiegel interview. Any sort 
of human effort, philosophy included, 'will not be able to effect any direct transformation 
of the present state of the world. "' 
Two reasons are to be adduced in order to account for man's impotence: first, 
according to Heidegger, the age of universal imposition has reached a point of 
completeness that makes it impossible the emergence of further possibilities from within 
its own resources. Secondly, the levelling out of all subjects in the general availability of 
things to be ordered - this being an accomplishment of the world of universal imposition - 
has neutralized the existence of any ultimate ground from which the appeal to impose a 
new order on the world could proceed. 
Nevertheless, in spite of being totally dependent upon the uncontrollable power of 
technology, Heidegger foresees a limited role for man in preparing the conditions for a new 
manifestation of God, that is for the coming into presence of a new mode of revelation 
alternative to that of universal imposition. He believes that the essence of technology is 
ambiguous. On the one hand, it might have affected the essence of man to such an extent 
to deny him the possibility of entering a new revelation. On the other hand, it harbours in 
itself a "granting" which 'lets man endure that he may be the one who is needed and used 
for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of truth. ' Quoting Hoelderlin, Heidegger 
emphasizes that where the danger is, grows the saving power too. Should the saving power 
actually be arising somewhere, man's keeping awake the readiness for the expectation 
would turn out not to be futile. 
But, how does the saving power materialize within the world dominated by universal 
imposition? Heidegger says that the saving power comes into being in letting man 'see and 
enter the dignity of his essence', a dignity that lies in 'keeping watch over the 
unconcealment of all coming to presence on this earth. ' In other terms, the age of universal 
Cf. the article "Only A God Can Save Us: An Interview with Martin Heidegger", in Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal, vol. VI, No. 1,1977, p. 18. 
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imposition opens a way for us to get out as it offers us a chance to take a "step back" from 
the one-dimensional experience of beings as standing reserve and encounter the event of 
disclosure in its own right. This retreat from the world of universal imposition will 
therefore enable us to catch a glimpse of the original phenomenon of presencing where the 
transcendental conditions for the possibility of the occurrence of the succession of epochs 
in history are contained. 
To have the destiny of universal imposition as such before us, without being screened 
by the mediation of any metaphysical scheme, is for Heidegger an experience liberating 
in itself', since we come to realize that we inhabit the world on a level other than that of the 
things made simply present. Moreover, by realizing that the destiny of universal imposition 
holds sway of the technological world, we come also to grasp the untenability of the 
categories of modern thought. The concepts of ground and foundation, cause and effect, 
all will turn out to be inadequate to describe the relation of mutual dependence between 
the essence of technology and the concrete phenomenon of technology, a relation which 
is not that of an Idea that hovers over its existential occurrences, but is to be understood 
in terms of granting and destiny, absence and presence, possibilities and obliviousness. As 
a consequence, all the metaphysical categories will be aufgehoben in the Hegelian sense, 
'that is they will remain but lose their unconditioned power. "I 
What we truly experience in taking the step back from the world of universal 
imposition is a prelude to what Heidegger calls Ereignis, that is the event of the belonging 
together of man and the world. We can become aware of the appropriation of man and 
things because we already have a pre-conceptual understanding of it. We always already 
know the way things are revealed and how they take on meaning within the texture of the 
world. We know all this because we do not first stand in the world by devising concepts 
and theories in our isolated monads and projecting them outside into the external reality, 
but by being involved practically in its significant unfolding based upon the interplay of 
presence, absence, and time. 
The belonging together of man and the phenomenon of unconcealment of beings has 
been forgotten throughout the Western tradition because it is appropriate to the nature of 
the latter to withdraw and refuse itself. Metaphysics, we have seen above, covers up both 
Cf. the article "Only a God Can Save Us: An Interview with Martin Heidegger", ibid.; plus D. Kolb, 
The Critique of pure Modernity, cit., pp. 156-57. 
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the unconcealment of Being and its own concealment of this unconcealment. Now, at the 
end of modernity characterized by the dominance of universal imposition, this double 
hiddeness for the first tin-ie since the early stages of the Greek thought can become visible 
again. As the technological world is disclosed in its overall meaninglessness, we come to 
realize that it is driven aiii-dessly forward by the call to universal imposition, and that this 
call is nothing but the condition of our historical world that withdraws perennially and can 
never be brought into luminous transparency. 
Insofar as we grasp the appropriation of man and things within the space opened up 
by the revelation of Being, we gain access to an experience of finitude that speaks of the 
intrinsic limitations of our historical situation. We come to understand, in other words, that 
we exist as mortal beings thrown into the world who are not engaged in the task of 
knowing and manipulating alien objects by means of scientific discoveries and technical 
progress, but are involved in finite projects of carrying out possibilities that we retrieve 
from what in the past has been left unthought. Within the destiny that we receive and are 
called to bear forward, we discover that we and the objects surrounding us belong together, 
that there is no harshness in the objects which needs to be overcome, and that this 
reciprocal appropriation urges us to embrace the facticity of our historical situation in 
which we do not possess unlimited possibilities. By doing so, we give up envisaging final 
and ultimate landing-places that are attained at the end of ceaseless j ourney s across history 
and come to accept the inescapable necessity of sojourning within limited horizons. In 
there, time is not reckoned in a linear sequence by the pointers of our watches, but flows 
in accordance with the phenomenological movement of our inner consciousness. 
However, the fulfilment of the step back from the world of universal imposition and 
the decision to embark on the task of thinking as a preparation for the advent of a new 
revelation do not make by themselves the new era arrive. In Der Spiegel interview, 
Heidegger seems to deny that there is any logical necessity or causal connection between 
our dwelling away from the world of universal imposition and the actual event of its 
overcoming. The making of the succession of epochs in history is exclusive prerogative 
of the inscrutable play of Being, and man has no say in it. Thinking can only bring him to 
this awareness. 
Compared to the previous epochs in the Western history of metaphysics, there is 
something special about our age, and it is that we are at the end of a long path. The destiny 
of the metaphysical history of Being is about to be played out. Within the cleared 
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'Western' space allowed by the concealment of its self-withdrawing, all possibilities have 
been exhausted. There will be no further turning into a new metaphysical era. What comes 
next, if it comes, will be of a different quality. 
Instead of blindly attacking technology and attempting to neutralize the donUnion 
that it has imposed on the world by devising rational patterns of historical development 
leading to the advent of the new era, Heidegger invites us to become aware of the 
inescapable truth that there is no exit from the technological world. Technology cannot be 
mastered or overcome because it is the destiny that was sent to humanity by the play of 
Being. Yet, man can prepare the way beyond the technological era through a reflective 
thinking on a different kind of making and producing that discloses things in a non- 
domineering fashion. This meditative activity involves the undertaking of an act of 
deconstructing the history of productionist metaphysics designed to unearth what has 
remained unthought throughout its unfolding. Following the traces left behind by the 
metaphysical manifestations of Being, Heidegger discovers the primordial and authentic 
meaning of technology in what the ancient Greeks meant by techne: to disclose things and 
let them be. Of course, this uncovering does not by itself initiate a new mode of producing, 
but can help to restore an understanding of technology that has been forgotten by humanity 
and give an insight into the way in which a future possible advent of Being prefigures the 
encounter of man with things. 
At the conclusion of his essay The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger says 
that reflection on technology must take place in the realm of art because, on the one hand, 
art is akin to the essence of technology, while, on the other hand, is fundamentally different 
from it. The privileged position that art occupies in the technological order makes it the 
object of a special attention on the put of the philosopher who is eager to discover an 
abode harbouring adequate resources to foster the growth of the saving power. 
The inner connection between art and technology resides, for Heidegger, in the fact 
that both are forms of techne, that is modes of disclosing and knowing. However, 
Heidegger recognizes that this definition is at odds with the common interpretation which 
identifies in the form-matter structure the essential constitution of every entity, from mere 
things such as stones to pieces of equipment like a pair of shoes or useless objects like a 
van Gogh's painting. It is generally assumed as an incontestable truism, he emphasizes, 
that things consist fundamentally of formed matter, in the sense that they are produced by 
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adding a particular forrn to a prior shapeless material". Yet, he intends to reverse this 
constricted interpretation by uncovering an authentic understanding of the process of 
making and producing which abstains from instrumental and anthropologic 
misconceptions. 
With his doctrine of the four causes, Aristotle introduced in the metaphysical 
tradition what has now become the ordinary conception of making as a causal activity. He 
stated that every entity is the resultant of the concurrence of 1) the material cause, that is 
the matter out of which, for example, a silver chalice is made; 2) the formal cause, that is 
the shape into which the material is carved; the final cause, that is the end, for example, 
the sacrificial rite in relation to which the chalice is produced; 4) the efficient cause, that 
is, for example, the silversmith who makes the chalice by moulding the material according 
to the formal cause. 
Heidegger denies, however, that Aristotle conceived of "causality" in a productive 
sense, a sense that it assumes when it is taken to signify "bringing about" or "effecting". 
He contends that the Greek expression for "causa" is "aition", which means "that to which 
something else is indebted". Thus, the chalice is indebted both to the silver, for the material 
of which it is made, and to the eidos, for that which gives it shape. Furthermore, it is 
indebted to the telos, for that which defines the boundaries within which it is used, for 
example, the sacrificial ceremonies in the Olympic temple. Finally, the chalice is indebted 
to the silversmith, for the "how" of the coming into appearance of the matter, the telos and 
the eidos. The substantial change in this version of Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes 
concerns the role of the silversmith. He no longer comes out as the efficient cause, that is 
the agent who brings about the finished chalice as if it were the effect of a making, but as 
the one who is responsible of "gathering together" the other three ways of "being 
indebted". The matter, the eidos, the telos, and the silversmith now turn out to be 
"occasioning s" more than "causes", all co-responsible of "bringing forward" the chalice 
into appearance. Among them, however, the silversmith shares the highest proportion of 
co-responsibility, for, thanks to his special attunernent to logos, gathers together the other 
moments into the unity or synthesis of the finished chalice. 
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Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", in M. Heidegger (ed. ), The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, cit., pp. 149-187, p. 157. 
53 For this understanding of the way in which Heidegger reads Aristotle's notion of causality, cf. 
E. 
Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confraontation with Modernity, cit., pp- 232-233. 
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In this light, if understood in terms of techne, authentic producing does not involve 
the causal intervention of an agent who, by means of his manufacturing and intellectual 
skills, forces the material together into a specific form, thus effecting the finished product. 
Rather, it is the event of bringing something into the open for its own sake, so that it can 
be released from hiddeness and allowed to come forth as something accessible in its own 
right. Of course, the know-how required to gather the thing into a stable presence 
presupposes the capacity of the silversmith to disclose in advance what the envisioned 
product is. 
Nevertheless, according to Heidegger, handcrafts and equipments possess the 
ontological power of disclosing entities only in a derivative sense. In fact, they arise from 
artl which is the highest form of techne, and bring things forth exclusively within the world 
opened up by the work of art. Heidegger explains the world-founding power of art by 
analysing the event of truth occurring in a well-known van Gogh's painting featuring the 
shoes of a peasant woman. As long as we imagine a pair of shoes in general, he argues, we 
do not need any special knowledge any special knowledge to figure them out. Nor we 
acquire more infon-nation than we already have once we have produced a description of 
the content of our imagination. We all know what a pair of shoes is. A pair of shoes is a 
pair of shoes. They consist of leather soles and uppers, joined together by thread and nails. 
They serve to clothe the feet and protect them while walking, working in the field or 
dancing. A pair of peasant shoes, too, is a pair of peasant shoes and nothing more. And yet, 
Heidegger claims referring to the peasant shoes appearing in van Gogh's painting: 
from the dark openings of the wom insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker 
stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of 
her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a 
raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the 
loneliness of the fieldpath as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, 
its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of 
the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplained worry as to the certainty of 
bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the 
impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment 
belongs to the earth, and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this 
protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting- wi thin-itself. 
54 
It is only in a work of art, like van Gogh's painting, that we discern the very essence of a 
54 Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art", in M. Heidegger (ed. ), Basic Writings, cit., p. 
163. 
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pair of shoes. The real peasant woman, instead, simply wears them. She is well aware of 
the world which her painted shoes speak of, but in a pre-conceptual and unreflective way. 
Indeed, the more the world evoked by the shoes in the picture keeps quiet unnoticed in the 
background and refrains from intruding into her everyday life, the better the (real) shoes 
do their job. The peasant woman walks in them and goes to work with them, but she never 
looks at or thinks about them. The shoes speak of themselves exclusively in the painting. 
There they emerge into the unconcealment of their Being. They do so because the painting, 
as a work of art, is the event revealing what they are "in truth". Art succeeds to bring the 
shoes forth as they are because it possesses the ontologically disclosing power of carrying 
us away from the affairs of the world in which we are constantly engaged into the event 
of the opening up of the world as such. 
This revealing, t1iis truth of beings happens only in the work of art. Therefore, 
although the activity of creating art and that of producing equipmental things are 
manifestations of the same essence, techne, they are fundamentally different, given that the 
artist opens up the world while the artisan reveals the things within and in accordance with 
the structure of the world already opened up and founded by the artist. Yet, both are modes 
of disclosing, a trait that exposes, in Heidegger's view, the inadequacy of the dominant 
metaphysical concepts to grasp the essence of things. To be sure, this disclosing 
characteristic is shared also by natural things. Indeed, physis (nature) is revealing in the 
highest sense, for it accomplishes its power of "bringing forth" without the need of any sort 
of mediation. Physis is the arising of something from out of itself, like, for example, the 
bursting of a blossom into bloom. Whereas the revelations happening in the case of a 
painted pair of shoes in van Gogh's painting or of the silver chalice in Aristotle's 
description of the notion of causality occur only by virtue of the artist and the silversmith, 
a blossom emerges from out of itself as if it produced itself. It combines both the disclosing 
and generative capacity. 
Nonetheless, although physis is self-generating, it does not come into light outside 
of the historical world opened up by the work of art. For example, it is only the temple 
standing on the rocky ground of a valley in Greece that makes its surroundings significant. 
A storm raging above it would be meaningless if the temple did not enable it to manifest 
itself in its violence. Similarly, only the temple, not the sun, brings to radiance the 
splendour and gleam of the stone of which it is made. And it is the temple firm towering 
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that makes visible the invisible space of air". Heidegger calls the 'where' of the 
provenance from which everything arises, included the stones of the temple, earth and 
claims that art is the locus where the eternal opposition between earth and historical world 
is played: 
World and earth are essentially different from one another and yet are never separated. The 
world arounds itself on the earth and earthjuts through world. But the relation between world t: ) 
and earth does not wither away into the empty unity of opposites unconcerned with one 
another. The world, in resting upon the earth, strives to surmount it. As self-open it cannot 
endure anything closed. The earth, however, as sheltering and concealing, tends always to 
draw the world into itself and keep it there. " 
Only a work of art lets the earth be earth. In it, for the first time, metals come to glitter and 
shimmer, ) colours to glow, tones to sing, the word to say. By virtue of a work of art, the 
stone and the blossom, originally worldless, come to have a world. Yet, on the other hand, 
the earth struggles to resist against art's attempts to bring into the open its own elements. 
Thus, as long as it does not utterly succeed in its concealing and sheltering action, we have 
a plurality of works of art being produced as well as sequences of historical worlds being 
brought into appearance. Therefore, the coming into light of a work of art indicates that 
a breaking through earth's defences has occurred, but it suggests at the same time that more 
and more is yet to be gained from its inexhaustible source. 
In conclusion, the point that Heidegger is trying to make with his examination of the 
phenomena of art's creating, equipment's producing and physis' self-emergence can be 
summarized in the following way: all these phenomena are modes of disclosing, but truth, 
as the revealing of beings in the highest sense, occurs essentially in a work of art where the 
ontological play of lighting and concealing takes on the features of a strife between earth 
and world. In the equipment, instead, the disclosing property does not become prominent 
because it disappears in usefulness. In this respect, equipment is radically different from 
works of art and natural things". It is a commodity that serves human purposes. It appears 
within the world already opened up by a work of art and fulfils practical needs which are 
defined by the system of significant references constituting the horizon of the world. By 
way of contrast, works of art, as world-founding, stand on the edge of the world, not within 
55Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 169. 
56 Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid., p. 172. 
57 M. E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, cit., p. 234. 
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it. In this sense, they make no "practical contribution" to the world"'. They are useless. And 
useless are natural things, too. They fulfill no purpose, neither in the world nor outside, in 
the service of a supposed transcendent principle. There is no reason for their being: they 
are because they are. A rose blooms because it blooms. That is all". 
Now, also a piece of equipment, by virtue of its essence as techne, an essence which 
it shares with works of art and natural things, is without reason and essentially useless. It 
has no function but to disclose and reveal the world. Yet, it cannot do properly "its job" - 
that is, to disclose the world - because it is too busy "in" the world. A long history of 
misunderstandings and misconceptions has covered up and even distorted its essence, so 
that it can no longer be fully expressed. The history of productionist metaphysics tells 
precisely the story of how man in Western civilization has filled the fundamental 
meaninglessness of things with an abstract apparatus of concepts, categories and purposes. 
On the other hand, man could not escape from setting up this story. The unspeakable and 
ineffable purposelessness of the sheer presencing of things was too a terrifying spectacle 
to be endured. The history of productionist metaphysics has therefore given a "reason" and 
a "purpose" to an otherwise a-rational and purposeless world, thus enabling man to be 
released from his anxiety. 
The modem technological system is merely the latest and final development of this 
history. Grounded in the essence of techne as disclosure for the sake of disclosure, it is 
utterly purposeless, despite the apparent purposiveness that governs its unfolding. The 
purposelessness of technology is visible both in its content, which reveals the aimless 
striving of an unrelenting will to power for ever more power, and in its form, in which it 
is exhibited as just another world among many others . In this perspective, talk of 
technology as an instrument in the hands of man serving his purposes is pure nonsense. 
Technology exists in a world of its own, indeed it is the world that is available for us and 
is beyond our control. 
Ultimately, the step back from the world of universal imposition that Heidegger 
urges us to take does not aim to establish by itself a new post-technological and thus post- 
modem era, as if man were in charge of the destiny of the world and could 
"produce " such 
The fact that in the current global market works of art are traded and made travelling 
from one 
exhibition to another does not affect, according to Heidegger, their essence, which is 
to open up a 
world and reveal its truth. Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Origin of the 
Work of Art", cit., p. 150. 
Cf., M. E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modemity, cit., p. 135. 
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an era. Rather, to retreat from the world of modem technology means to give up the 
con-stant purposiveness it demands and, by engaging ourselves in a meditative thinking in 
the vicinity of Being, enter the realm of what is purposeless. There we could discover, 
Heidegger envisages, the artistic character of modem technology, that is 'we could 
discover that the technological world is analogous to a work of art in the sense of being a 
disclosure of entities simply for the sake of that disclosure, not for any "higher" or 
"ulterior" purpose'O. ' 
Once modem technology has been unmasked in its absolute contingency and 
unveiled as having no rational or theological justification for its existence, we come to 
realize that 'things could be otherwise. ' 61 This prompts us to attune ourselves to the 
possible arrival of a new revelation of Being so as to be prepared to take on ourselves the 
new destiny it may send us. While thinking and meditating, Heidegger foresees however 
that we will continue to produce and consume, to manipulate things and to pursue objects, 
but all these activities will lose their unconditional power upon our will. We will no longer 
let ourselves be overwhelmed by the frenziness of technology. Awaken and illuminated, 
we will be waiting patiently for the advent of the new "God" who alone can save us. 
V. Animal Rationale versus Homo Humanus: A Dialectical Reversal? 
Before moving on to the next question I intend to raise in this chapter, a recapitulation of 
the main line of the argument that I have developed so far is needed. I began with the claim 
that, in Heidegger's view, the advent of modernity marks the triumph of subjectivity as the 
ground of all beings. However, as Heidegger's "secularization thesis" about the emergence 
of modernity seemed to suggest, whereas the discovery of the universe of self- 
consciousness frees man from the theocentric structure of the Christian thought, 
simultaneously the affirmation of subjectivity above nature opens up a gap between man 
and the world. The world appears as something opposed to the subject who, in turn, feels 
insecure and not at home. Nevertheless, man overcomes his alienation by carrying out a 
project of objectification and mastery of the world. The world is transformed into a world 
picture, that is a scientific model whose formal structure reflects the corresponding 
structure in the representing activity of the subject. This process of objectification and 
60 Cf. M. E. Zimmerman, ibid., p. 235. 
61 Cf. M. E. Zimmerman, ibid., p. 236. 
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control of nature evolves into modem technology whose essence is identified by Heidegger 
in the call of Being to universal imposition. In other terms, modem technology emerges 
in Heidegger's analysis as the call of a destiny that was sent out by the inscrutable play of 
Being to urge man and things to appear as standing reserve for ordering and disposition. 
Heidegger argues also that the history of the West as a whole is a destiny and that, within 
the sequence of its epochs characterized by the dominion of productionist metaphysics, 
modem technology is simply the logical outcome. There is therefore a kind of necessity 
in its appearance which makes impossible for it to be overcome by mere human doing. Yet, 
Heidegger believes that man, by meditating on the essence of universal imposition, can 
uncover a different meaning of technology liable to suggest a picture of the new beginning. 
At this point, however, Heidegger's "quasi-eschatological" vision of a humanity 
liberated from the grips of technology raises the question of the etl-fical import lurking 
behind his ontological speculation. The inescapable question is: in what sense and to what 
extent is the type of post-technological man Heidegger envisages essentially superior to the 
present man shaped by metaphysics and humanism? Besides, what implications will 
Heidegger's thinking in the proximity of Being have on the values which have been 
cherished by humanity up to now? 
Heidegger's hope for the advent of a new kind of humanity is motivated by his deep 
unsatisfaction with the man who has emerged at the end of modernity, namely the clever 
animal who pretends to be in control of the world but is in fact the unaware recipient of a 
call of destiny that urges him to strive unrelentlessly for more and more power for its own 
sake. Although the man whom Heidegger depicts as the prevailing type under the dominion 
of industrial technology carries many traits of Nietzsche's last man, he believes that it is 
the Overman, that is the type of man envisioned by Nietzsche as the radical alternative to 
the feeble and decadent last man, that represents the grandest and most advanced 
sublimation of the ideal of man demanded by technology. If the last man embodies in fact 
the bourgeois standards of happiness and security and indulges on the comforts of life 
which are offered by technological progress, Heidegger contends that the Overman 
reinforces this tendency as long as he represents the fulfilment of the hubristic aspiration 
of modernity for the mastery of the earth. Therefore, despite Nietzsche's proclamation that 
the Overman will overcome nihilism by devising a new table of values in accordance with 
the principles of the will to power, the actual result of his com ing about is a further 
deepening of it. Having been nurtured within the history of productionist metaphysics, the 
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Overman becomes the "half-steel, half-organic human machine"" which exploits to the last 
remnants the resources of the earth in order to expand its will to power beyond itself. 
Following the death of God, he takes on himself the divine power of creating and 
destroying and, by means of his calculating intelligence, brings the future under the domain 
of his own will. Hence, Heidegger argues that, if the essence of modem technology 
requires from man unconditioned submission to the goal of production, then the Oven-nan 
meets entirely this demand. He is the God-like producer who commits himself fully to the 
task of arranging domination over the earth on a scale unknown to any previous epoch in 
the history of humanity. 
Of course, behind this highly controversial reading of Nietzsche's idea of the 
Overman lie two different interpretations of nihilism. While Nietzsche sees nihilism as the 
history of the devaluing of the highest values, Heidegger conceives of it as the history of 
the forgetfulness of Being. Accordingly, Nietzsche identifies in the revaluation of the 
moral values the decisive step which needs to be taken in order to overcome nihilism, 
while Heidegger envisages that only a new revelation of Being can bring to a conclusion 
the history of nihilism and initiate a new era. Thus, Nietzsche assigns to the Overman the 
task of revaluing and determining the new values necessary to open up the post-nihilistic 
age, Heidegger declares instead to be unable even to anticipate whether there will be a new 
advent of Being or not, and therefore invites men 'to prepare to be prepared for the 
manifestation of God., or for the absence of God as things go downhill all the way. ' 
To put it differently, Nietzsche believes that history, in spite of the innumerable 
contingencies and dreadful chances disseminated on its way, proceeds in a linear fashion 
towards the accomplishment of ever more composite human types within ever more 
complex historical worlds. On his account, the Overman is a superior synthesis, within the 
evolution of the type Mensch, which amalgamates in itself characters and attitudes of both 
the pre-Christian and the Christian type. Besides, he assumes that the historical epoch the 
Overman initiates contains both the immediacy of the instinctual behaviour of the blond 
beast and the complexity of the rational conduct of the mature and disciplined moral man. 
By contrast, Heidegger considers history as a process of decadence and decline from an 
original revelation - the primordial appearance of Being to the early 
Greeks which was 
experienced by them with wonder and awe - to a subsequent Fall occurring with the fateful 
62 -Mis quotation from Ernst Juenger is reported by M. E. Zimmerman, ibid., p. 187. 
166 
first concealment of Being in the metaphysical doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, down to 
its utter neglect in the conclusive stage of the technological era. In this perspective, the 
Overman cannot appear to Heidegger's eyes other than as a kind of individual as much 
entangled in the logic of the productionist metaphysics as the last man. Both are consurning 
and producing animals blind to Being as such and, therefore, incapable of attuning 
themselves to the disclosing event from whose play alone the pose-metaphysical era can 
ari s e. 
Heidegger's interpretation of the Overman would not be affected by the fact that in 
many of his discourses Zarathustra calls for man to remain faithful to the earth and let 
things be. Heidegger would reply to such an objection that, regardless of Nietzsche's 
intentions in putting forward through Zarathustra the doctrine of the eternal return, he has 
developed the "Inner logic" of nihilism at work in Nietzsche's thought". Heidegger 
contends that, as a countermovement to metaphysics, Nietzsche's project of a revaluation 
of all moral values does not escapes from the clutches of metaphysics. For him, in order 
to overcome metaphysics, it is not enough to overturn the suprasensory and metaphysical 
principles of revaluation of all moral values, as Nietzsche does, and posit the new principle 
in the sensory and naturalistic will to power. In fact, to think in terms of value-positing is 
intrinsically metaphysical because metaphysics always necessarily thinks of Being as a 
value. Therefore, inasmuch as Nietzsche understands nihilism as the inner law of the 
history of the devaluing of the highest values up to now and explains that devaluing as a 
revaluing of all values, he remains in the province of nihilism where the process of 
decadence of values is endlessly perpetuated. 
Nietzsche's theories of the will to power and eternal return represent, for Heidegger, 
the most advanced expression of what it means to fl-link in terms of values. In the theory 
of the will to power, values are first seen as objects to be brought before the judgemental 
faculties of the subject for valuation. Once established as values by virtue of their life- 
enhancing qualities, they are held to be true, thus securing subjectivity in the certainty of 
itself The doctrine of the eternal return of the same gives instead an insight into the way 
in which the will to power, unsatisfied with what it has already obtained, returns 
incessantly to itself to re-initiate the self-referring movement of expansion of life. 
Cf. M. Heidegger, "The Word of Nietzsche. God Is Dead", cit.; plus M. E. Zinunerman, Heidegger's 
Confrontation with Modernity, cit., p. 187. 
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Heidegger applies to Nietzsche himself Nietzsche's own distinctions between 
"incomplete nihilism" and "completed nihilism", and regards him as having propounded 
a doctrine that defers the enactment of the conditions necessary to overcome nihilism. 
Nietzsche uses the expression 11 nihilism" in two different sense: one sense refers to the 
history of the devaluing of the highest values through the gradual realization that the 'ideal 
world is not and is never to be realized within the real world. ' The other sense alludes 
instead to the act of revaluation of values through which nihilism completes and 
consummates itself. 
Now, Nietzsche claims that, between the definitive collapse of the prior system and 
the establishment of the new one, a transitional situation comes to prevail in which, on the 
one hand, it becomes evident that the highest values up to now have lost their guiding force 
and appear valueless, while, on the other hand, the act of revaluation of all values fails to 
be performed. The situation corresponding to the positing of new values that follows the 
act of revaluation is named by Nietzsche "completed nihilism"; the in-between condition 
in which the world stands valueless is instead what Nietzsche designates by the expression 
"incomplete nihilism". 
Nietzsche holds that, in the void widened by the collapse of the highest values up to 
now, new ideals settle. Among them, he enumerates the doctrine of progress, with its 
promise of earthly happiness for the greatest number, socialism and the Wagnerian music. 
These are however futile attempts, he argues, to escape nihilism without revaluing the 
former values, and have therefore the effect of delaying the completion of the history of 
nihilism. The act of revaluation of all values requires instead not only the replacement of 
the former values with new ones, but also the displacement of the place of God as the 
metaphysical principle of revaluation. 
Since all the ideals in vogue in the phase of incomplete nihilism fail to do away with 
the transcendent realm as the place of value, Nietzsche asserts that they consequently fail 
to overcome nihilism. Heidegger contends, in turn, that Nietzsche's Overman fails to 
overcome nihilism, too. At the climax of his comment on Nietzsche, he claims that, insofar 
as the Overman pretends to have surpassed the man up to now because he has experienced 
and accepted the will to power as the Being of all beings, the only aim that he succeeds to 
accomplish is to disguise himself under the illusion that 'he does think Being in the most 
exalted manner. ' The mere fact of transforming Being into a value binds the Overman 
indissolubly to the history of metaphysics which is essentially nihilistic. Nietzsche 
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obliterates the access to an authentic experience of Being, according to Heidegger, by 
stamping Being with the mark of a value. In his teaching of the Overman, Being as such 
becomes something superfluous and its truth remains therefore unthought. 
In this perspective, the Overman is nothing but one of those ideals pullulating in the 
state of incomplete nihilism to fill in the spiritual void widened by the loss of God. Yet, 
there is another., completely different side of Heidegger's reading of the Ovennan. This is 
hidden in the folds of his oracular discourse about the mystery of Being. At the conclusion 
of his essay The Word of Nietzsche: God Is Dead, he claims that 'in the age of the 
completion and consurnmation of nihilism which is beginning Nietzsche experienced some 
characteristics of nihilism but never recognized the essence of it. '64Then he goes on to 
affirm that., in Western history, Being has remained unthought not because of an error or 
a neglect of the question concerning Being, but because Being withdraws. As a 
consequence, obliviousness to Being is not the fault of man, but of Being itself. The 
inference that one isjustified in drawing from this seemingly innocuous reflection in which 
the Overman and the withdrawal of Being are linked together, is that the Ovennan, rather 
than representing one more futile ideal set up by the man up to now in the face of the 
dissolving of the supreme values, is actually the destiny sent out by Being to enable man 
to pass over into another history no longer marked by metaphysics. In other terms, the 
Overman turns out to be the man who appears at the culmination of the history of 
metaphysics with the mandate to push forward to its extreme logical consequences the 
teclinological world, so as to prepare the conditions necessary for a new advent of Being 
which could determine a turning in the history of humanity. Zimmerman helps to capture 
this unspoken side of Heidegger's thought: 
For Heidegger, the Overman is demanded by the final stage of the history of metaphysics. 
If humanity did not allow itself to be stamped by modem technology, that history could not 
be brought to a completion and a new beginning would not be possible. In light of 
Heidegger's claimthat the "saving power" arises only within the "growing danger", we might I týt: ý t_ý 
say that the emergence of the Nietzschean-Juengerian Overman is in and of itself a 
harbinger 
t) t: ý 
of the longed-for new world, despite the fact that the Overman is simultaneously 
the 
culmination of the nihilism which constitutes the "inner logic" of 
Western history. " 
Zimmerman emphasizes the ambiguity intrinsic in the figure of the 
Overman. He claims 
Cf. M. Heidegger, "The World of Nietzsche: God is Dead", in The Question 
Concerning 
Technology, cit., p. 109. 
65 Cf. M. E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, cit., p. 
188. 
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that the Overman, as the technological man, is Janus-faced: he could become the harbinger 
of the new era, but he could also perpetuate endlessly the nihilistic forgetfulness of Being. 
This dialectical interpretation of the figure of the Overman, however, is further reinforced 
by Gadamer's Hegelian reading of Heidegger's philosophy of history. Gadamer's writing 
is extremely dense and it is worth therefore quoting one passage of his confrontation 
between Hegel and Heidegger in full: 
Of course Heidegger never speaks of an historical necessity anything like the one which 
Hegel claims as the basis of his construing of world history as reason in history. For 
Heidegger history is not a past which has been suffered through to a point where the present 
itself is encountered in the totality of what it has been. In his later works Heidegger quite 
intentionally avoids the expressions, history and historicity, which since Hegel have 
dominated reflection upon the "end of metaphysics" and which we associate with the problem 
of historical relativism. Instead, he speaks of "fate" and "our being fated" as if to underscore 
the fact that here it is not a matter of possibilities of human existence which we ourselves 
seize upon - not a matter of historical consciousness and self-consciousness. Rather, it is a 
matter of what it is allotted to man and by which he is so very much detem-lined that all self- 
determination and self-consciousness remains subordinate. Heidegger does not claim that in 
his philosophical thinking about history he grasps the necessity in the course which history 
takes. Nevertheless, in conceiving of metaphysical thought as a history unified by the 
forgetfulness of Being which pervades it and in seeing the radicalization of this forgetfulness 
behind the age of technology, he is attributing a kind of inner consequentiality to history. To 
go even further, if metaphysics is understood as forgetfulness of Being or obliviousness to 
it and the history of metaphysics up to the point of its dissolution, as growing forgetfulness 
of Being, then of necessity, it is the lot of the thinking which thinks this, that what has been 
forgotten comes to mind again. And, in fact, it is made evident by certain of Heidegger's 
phrases, e. g., "presumably, all of a sudden", that there is even a connection between 
increasing forgetfulness of Being and the expectation of this coming or epiphany of Being - 
a connection quite sirrular to that of a dialectical reversal. 
In the exposure to the indeterminacy of the future which arrests all human self- 
projection, Heidegger finds traces of a kind of historical self-justification: the radical 
deepening of forgetfulness of Being in the age of technology justifies the eschatological 
expectation in thought of a turnabout which will make visible that which actually is, behind 
all that produces and reproduces. 
One must allow that such an historical self-consciousness as this is no less all- 
inclusive than Hegel's philosophy of the Absolute. 66 
Gadamer contends that Heidegger's return to the question of Being is not itself a 
beginning, but is made possible by an end. So, the arising of metaphysics, its deepening 
across the centuries and its final exhaustion are historical steps which mediate the step 
Heidegger takes when he turns his attention to meditative fl-iinking in the vicinity of Being. 
In this perspective, the "step back" which he urges us to effect is not a logical leap 'in the 
sense of a vaulting out of the medium and context of metaphysical thought', but is 
Cf. H. G. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, Yale University Press, 1976, pp. 
109-110. 
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originated by the working out of all possibilities in the history of metaphysics. Since there 
can-not be history without continuity, Gadamer argues, the historical justification for the 
turning into the post-metaphysical era must be contained in the metaphysical one. This way 
of proceeding in which a position is pushed to the point of self-contradiction so as to make 
possible the transition to a higher truth is precisely what Hegel meant by dialectics. Can 
Heidegger's thinking be inscribed within a pattern of dialectical thought where truth 
emerges as the result of the process that led to it? Is it possible to associate a philosophy 
based upon the temporality and finitude of human existence to a form of movement which, 
by contrast, postulates totality and self-referentiality? 
Gadamer argues that Heidegger proceeds in a Hegelian fashion, despite his 
innumerable attempts to demarcate his own thought from Hegel's. He maintains that his 
history of metaphysics is articulated in the form of a series of "sendings" of a destiny that 
determines both the present and the future. Gadamer also believes that an inner necessity 
can be discerned in the history of metaphysics as the history of obliviousness to Being in 
which the progression of one misconception of Being after another moves head-on toward 
its most radical consequences. Finally, Gadamer points out how, according to Heidegger, 
the primordial revelation of Being to the early Greeks continues to influence even the 
present technological world, so as a link is established between origins and end which 
makes it possible to see them within a single process, as antipodes of a unique whole. 
It could be added to these analogies, in order to support the parallelism between 
Hegel's and Heidegger's accounts of Western history, the fact that Heidegger conceives 
of the mutual involvement of man and Being as a kind of movement marked by difference 
and negativity. Man is deemed by Heidegger as the receptive abode for the appearance of 
Being, but Being, in giving itself out into the open space, simultaneously withdraws into 
the dark and the shadow. Yet, although Gadamer's reading of Heidegger's account of the 
history of metaphysics is substantially correct, it needs to be qualified. In entering Hegel's 
territory, one is immediately caught within a system of thought spelling the philosophical 
vocabulary of self-closure, self-transparency and self-presence. Well, it must be said that 
the dialectical tensions arising within the historical epochs described by Heidegger as 
stamped with the mark of metaphysics do not lead to full self-understanding. For 
Heidegger, we cannot see what the overcoming of technology and universal imposition, 
assuming that it will one day occur, will bring about. The end of modernity fulfils the long 
history of metaphysics, but that history is only one turn in the directionless play of Being. 
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Heidegger believes that a radical finitude and deep obscurity underlie the human situation 
in the historical world and no rationality, not even Hegel's interplay of the dialectical 
oppositions in wl-fich both form and content are involved, can account for its mystery. 
However, the dialectical necessity that Gadamer discerns in Heidegger's version of 
Western history concerns merely the succession of epochs within it. Taken as a whole, 
Gadamer would probably recognize that the occurrence of Western history as well as its 
connection with other possible new beginnings is a matter of pure chance which has to do 
with the errant wanderings of Being. Yet, this fundamental contingency taking place on 
the grounding level of the arising of traditions does not rule out the possibility that each 
tradition, specifically the Western tradition, contains in its beginning tensions and 
contradictions that lead to later developments and changes. Indeed, Heidegger believes that 
from within the possibilities we are granted by the disclosure of Being, we can retrieve and 
renew what has been left unthought. Those critics, like Kolb, who deny dialectical 
movement in Heidegger's account of Western history assume erroneously that Heidegger 
gives no explanation of the arising of differences of content between the epochs. Kolb 
claims that the particular quality of each different epoch, for example, the medieval as 
distinct from the modem) remains unaccounted in Heidegger and must be accepted as a 
destiny. As a consequence, we have to take what is granted to us as something immediate 
and unified, 'not something that can be caught in a dialectic that exploits inner tensions and 
multiplicity'. To sustain his argument, Kolb points out how all the historical epochs that 
emerge from Heidegger's account of Western history are, in a certain sense, levelled out 
because their differences disappear into the Greek beginning which stands so dominant 
over what comes later that there is no further space for inner mirroring and mediation. 
This analysis is not correct, though. Although there is in Heidegger no systematic 
account of the process of Western history as a whole in the shape of Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit, his writings are disseminated with disparate and nearly 
comprehensive explanations. If we consider, for instance, his account of the movement 
within modernity, from the earlier stage characterized by Descartes's affirmation of 
subjectivity to the later one dominated by technology and universal imposition, we can 
discern a gradual process in which inner contradictions arise and demand to be overcome. 
The transition from Descartes's ego cogito to Nietzsche's will to power, Heidegger 
explains, is mediated by Leibnitz, Kant and the German idealists. When Descartes's ego 
cogito turns out to be too formal and abstract, Leibnitz is called to 
introduce in it, with his 
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doctrine of the individual monads, appetite, desire and will". Kant subsequently finds 
himself in- the necessity of having to determine transcendental laws in order to regulate the 
activities of understanding and will. He attempts, at least to a certain extent, to contain the 
latter within the domain of the former, but Nietzsche, who comes to bring to a conclusion 
the whole process, shows how the will, once liberated from its transcendent chains, does 
not admit any limits, even those which are self-imposed. 68 
This brief story, though abrupt, should be sufficient to claim the untenability of 
Kolb's position and maintain Gadamer's dialectical hypothesis which accounts for the role 
that Heidegger invokes the Overman to play in order to take man out of modernity. Now 
it is time I confronted the question which I raised at the beginning of this section, namely 
the question of the sense in which the alternative conception of humanity that Heidegger 
develops should be regarded as superior to the existing humanity reared within the 
humanistic tradition. 
I have already pointed out that the long decline Heidegger denounces humanity has 
undergone in the course of Western history is not of biological but metaphysical character. 
He emphasizes how humanity has been shaped across the centuries according to a system 
of moral, spiritual and cultural values deeply rooted in a metaphysical and naturalistic 
conception of human nature which has significantly distorted its true essence. The 
humanistic tradition, Heidegger maintains, rests firmly upon an interpretation of the 
essence of man as animale rationale. In that tradition, man is taken fundamentally as an 
aggregate of animal organs, instincts and drives upon which a structure of rational 
attributes is predicated. Heidegger contends that this conception of man is substantially 
metaphysical, and hence nil-iilistic, because it fails to take into account the fact that man 
exists in the world as a temporalizing being standing in the lighting of Being. Man is much 
more than mere animalitas, he claims, and is also essentially other than an animal organism 
to which a soul has been attached from outside to infuse life into it. For Heidegger, the 
essence of man lies in his ek-sistence, that is in an "ecstatic" inherence in the truth of Being 
I am aware that this "deconstructive evaluation of Descartes's thought is partly inappropriate, 
but it 
seems to be Heidegger's belief that Descartes's notion of subjectivity lacks of the content of will. 
Or, 
more likely, Heidegger knows the articulation of Descartes position, but 
he simplifies it consciously, 
a fault which is inevitable in any sort of deconstructive thinking. 
68 Cf. M. Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. IV, cit. tn 
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in which he continuously makes the present by projecting himself toward the future out of 
what has been handed to him from the past". 
Heidegger, however, rejects the accusation of promoting the "inhuman" as a 
consequence of rejecting humanisrif'. Rather, he counterattacks by claiming that it is in 
truth the naturalistic conception of the essence of man in humanism that does not recognize 
man') s authentic dignity: 
Humanism does not set the humanitas of man high enough... The essential worth of man does 
not consist in his being the substance of beings, as the Subject among them, so that as the 
tyrant of Being he may deign to release the beingness of beings into an all too loudly bruited 
"objectivity". Man is rather "thrown" from Being itself into the truth of Being, so that ek- 
sisting in this fashion he might guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might appear 
in the light of Being as the beings they are. Man does not decide whether and how beings 
appear, whether and how God and the gods or history and nature come forward into the 
lighting of Being, come to presence and depart. The advent of beings lies in the destiny of 
Being. But for man it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in his essence which 
corresponds to such destiny; for in accord with this destiny man as ek-sisting has to guard the 
truth of Being. Man is the shepherd of Being. 71 
Humanism, by retaining man in a state of forgetfulness of Being, stifles his transcendent 
nature and relegates him to the dispersion of the everyday affairs in the world of beings. 
There man, deprived of what is most his own, the care of Being, is condemned homeless 
to stumble aimlessly about. Thus, he sets out to wage a relentless struggle for power, while 
his logical instruments of calculation give him the illusion of being in control of the entire 
planet. Culture, science, art, religion, all that which man estimates worth cherishing 
become mere objects of value that gain the highest ontological status in the order of beings 
only by virtue of a subjective assessment. Therefore, subjected to the vagaries of man's 
judging and doing, they are not let be what they truly are, vanishing inexorably into the 
anonymity of mere, though valid, things. 
With his denunciation of humanism, Heidegger aims to restore the humanity of what 
he calls homo humanus. He believes that a new, "higher" type of man, that 
is homo 
humanus, would anse if the present man abandoned the region of 
homo animalis and set 
off on a new path of thinking closer to the abode of Being. 
However, were man actually 
make the decision of embracing the realm of thinking and 
dwelling in the proximity of 
6' For a full understanding of Heidegger7s notion of 
"temporal ecstasies", cf. M. Heidegger, Being and 
Time, Division Two, Harper and Row Publishers, New York, pp. 370-38 
1. 
70 Cf. M. Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", cit., p. 210. 
71 Cf. M. Heidegger, ibid. 
174 
Being, no theoretical or practical consequences would, for Heidegger, result out of it. Nor 
would such a decision be susceptible of ethical judgement, either. In Heidegger's view, 
thinking and dwelling in the truth of Being simply fulfil the essence of man. We should 
bear in mind, however, that to scatter ourselves in the realm of beings or to devote our 
intellectual capacities to scientific knowledge and pl-tilo sophy are perfectly legitimate forms 
of fulfilling our human essence too, though in the mode of inauthenticity. From an 
ontological viewpoint, there is nothing wrong with that. Yet, Heidegger thinks that more 
essential than fabricating rules and laws for a rational conduct is for man to find his way 
to his abode in the nearness of Being, because there he can eventually experience 
something he can hold on to, in his jargon, 'a protective heed that offers hold for all 
conduct. ' 72 
In spite of the eschatological hopes that Heidegger attaches to it, the path of 
thinking he traces appears to be arduous to follow. It involves a confrontation with 
nothingness, with anxiety and with the thought of death. It demands man to repudiate the 
present, prosperous and secure life he enjoys in the context of a progressive society and to 
adventure into a spiritual territory from which all promises of material well-being have 
been banned. In brief, it asks man to peer through the optimistic veil covering the 
inevitability of technology and human progress and grasp its fundamental purposelessness 
and necessitylessness. This glimpse into the ungrounded grounds of technology will not 
open up a horizon of absolute freedom where everything is pennitted, though. A new kind 
of necessity will emerge in which man comes to recognize that his own death is inevitable 
and that its inevitability determines the limits of what can be done. 
Given Heidegger's remark that the recognition of human finitude implies a step 
back from the unlimited striving of the humanistic subjectivity, the question arises again 
of whether the transition from the inauthentic,, humanistic mode of revelation of man's 
essence to the authentic, post-humanistic one is necessary or depends upon the 
unpredictable play of Being. Does homo humanus emerge as a logical result of the 
development of the clever animal or is the ontological gap between these two types a 
priori not reducible to a matter of historical necessity? 
Taking into account Heidegger's assumption that history is a manifestation of the 
play of Being, it would seem plausible to regard the question of the destiny of man as an 
72 Cf. M. Heideggger, ibid., p. 239. 
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exclusive prerogative of the mystery of Being. Yet, Being is for Heidegger a historical 
necessity. It necessitates by defining the horizon within which man is thrown. The thesis 
I have propounded in this chapter is that the necessity to which the Heideggerean history 
of Western man is subjected is articulated in dialectical terms. This means that the 
completion of the stages of forgetfulness of Being that constitute the history of 
productionist metaphysics makes at the same time possible the arising of the new post- 
metaphysical era. In this perspective, I believe homo humanus represents the teleological 
fulfilment of the historical process initiated by the Greeks, a belief that amounts to the 
claim that the historical occurrence of homo humanus was already contemplated at the very 
beginning. 
What characterizes Heidegger's position, however, is a peculiar eschatological 
import which it carries with it. Homo humanus does not emerge at the conclusion of a 
positive progression, as the mature actualization of possibilities that are gradually brought 
to completion, but appears at the end of a process of negative fulfilment out of a Hegelian 
operation of dialectical reversal. The manner in which the Heideggerean man makes his 
way through history is strikingly similar to the Christian narrative of the accomplishment 
of spiritual perfection through painful and lacrimatory descent into the obscurity of fleshly 
sin". For Heidegger, homo humanus appears at the dawn of a new beginning after having 
undergone a long decline of homelessness and alienation away from his abode in the 
nearness of Being. His task is to redeem man from his fall into the blindness of the clever 
animal whose humanistic training has denied him the accomplishment of his authentic 
possibility: to disclose things and to shelter their Being. This task involves three 
interrelated moments: first, a destruction of all values and standards of metaphysics 
through a hermeneutical. digging out of the unthought sediments of the human possibilities 
which are deposited underneath the crystallised shapes - Middle Ages, Renaissance, 
Modernity, for example - constituting the history of productionist metaphysics. At the end 
of this reinterpretative enquiry, metaphysics transpires as the history of nihilism which 
leads, via dialectical reversal, to the disclosing as well as self- withdrawing event of Being. 
Secondly, it implies man's dwelling in the proximity of Being, waiting for a new revelation 
" The enormous influence of the Scholastic on Heidegger's manner of questioning and posing 
philosophical problems is indicated by Heidegger himself in a letter to Karl Loewith dated 1921. There 
he writes: 'Do not measure me by the standards of any creative philosopher... I am a Christian 
theologian. ' This quotation is reported by G. Steiner, Heidegger, London, 1992, XVI. 
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to arise. Such a state of attendance is made necessary by the fact that the turning away from 
the. purposelessness of the technological world does not generate by itself the new post- 
technological world, but simply prepares the conditions for it to be established. In this 
transitional stage, all our logical categories and moral conceptions are suspended and we 
come to recognize the finitude of our existence and set limits on the range of possibilities 
which are open to us. Finally, it demands us to attune ourselves to the happening of Being 
in order to discern. the signs that indicate the direction we must follow. 
However a dangerous exit lurks behind Heidegger's outline of man's path to 
purification. Its cathartic significance seems to exempt those who undertake it from raising 
questions about the ethical implications descending from his overall project. Homo 
humanus is not merely superior to animale rationale. He is rather beyond good and evil. 
He fulfils teleologically the essence of man at the culmination of a long process made of 
falls, deviations and n-dsconceptions. The Via Crucis of these historical digressions he is 
forced into is however not of moral but ontological nature. There is no suggestion in 
Heidegger that clear and distinct knowledge of what is good, i. e. dwelling in the vicinity 
of Being, springs out of deep descent into evil, i. e. inhabiting the world in a state of 
obliviousness to Being. Were it the case, it would be possible to attach a moral value to the 
whole process. Instead, why man must go astray from the path of Being to retrieve it later 
is something we do not know. The reason lies in the mystery of Being. From this 
viewpoint, the history of Being Heidegger sketches is more reminiscent of the Greek 
tragedy than the Christian allegory of salvation. At bottom, the true player of the whole is 
the inscrutable destiny. Here is how Zimmerman explains this point in a highly 
illuminating way: 
Heidegger's account of the history of Being, and of humanity relation to it, reads in places 
like a Greek tragedy, in which the protagonist - Western man - acts as if he were gifted with 
self-understanding and self-mastery, but in fact possesses neither. The hero turns out to be 
a victim of hubris, having wrongly assumed that he knew who he was and that his own 
intentions were the origins of his acts. Western man's blindness, however, is not self-inflicted 
but fated: the Being of entities conceals itself to such an extent that Western man can no 
longer understand who he is or what other entities are. Happening "behind the backs" of 
historical humanity, the self-concealment of Being tends to turn humanity into players in an 
ontological game. In tracing out the history of Being, Heidegger sought to discover the 4t, In 
character of this play. Such dis covering was an act of anainnesis, i. e. the remembering of 
what had been concealed and thus forgotten. 74 Z! 
74 Cf. M. E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, cit., p. 167. 
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While the Christian metaphor of the trajectory of salvation from an original state of 
innocence to final. redemption via Fall into sin helps to render the digressions of the 
Heideggerean man in history, it must be said, though, that it is misleading insofar as it 
conveys on them a moral significance. In this respect, the narrative structure of Greek 
tragedy helps in a greater measure to capture the exclusively ontological relevance of the 
historical development of the Western man Heidegger intends to account for. Yet, despite 
all the conceptual expedients we set out to devise to qualify Heidegger's thought, it is 
rather difficult for him to avoid the question of the moral implications descending from his 
overall project. He dismisses the accusation of advocating the "inhuman" by speaking 
against humanism or of appealing to irrationalism and the arbitrariness of drives and 
feelings by speaking against logiO, but he does not provide persuasive reasons to ensure 
that the breakdown of logic and rationality following man's dwelling in the vicinity of 
Being will not end up in an unrestrained eruption of destructive nonsense. As Gillespie 
points out, 'having abandoned the categorical reason of metaphysics for something 
approaching a pure intuitionism... man is liable to fall prey to the most subterranean forces 
in his soul or at least is in danger of mistaking the subrational for the superrational. ' 
Besides, he continues, man's openness to the truth of Being not only 'finds it difficult to 
distinguish between that which rises above and that which falls below reason, but is also 
unable to distinguish between good and evil and indeed tacitly admits that both are present 
in every revelation of Being. "' 
Yet, what I have argued for in this chapter suggests that Heidegger's failure to 
account for the moral implications of his thinking reflects a more fundamental failure 
which is of logical nature. As I explained above, Heidegger employs dialectical 
instruments in order to provide a historical justification for the necessity of overcoming 
modernity. He believes that Western history is a history of decline, but the account he 
offers of it leads, via dialectical reversal, to a final redemption. He claims that the modem 
technological age dominated by universal imposition is a prelude to a post-technological 
one in which man ends his long journey of digressions and deviations from the path of 
Being and returns home, an abode in the proximity of Being. Nevertheless, the exhaustion 
of the logical possibilities of technology in which culminates the entire history of 
75 Cf. M. Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", cit., p. 225. 
76 Cf. M. A. Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger and the Ground of History, cit., p. 174. 
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metaphysics since Platofalls short of a full establishment of the new era. Heidegger urges 
man to take a step back from the technological world in the belief that disclosure of the 
necessity lessness and purposelessness on which it rests would follow, thus revealing the 
more fundamental necessitylessness of Being. But, having taken the step back and attuned 
his thinking to the happening of Being, man must wait for the new revelation to be 
unveiled. Thinking, Heidegger claims, can make man become aware of the 
purposelessness of technology and prepare him to be prepared for the arrival or absence 
of God, but no more can be asked of it. 
Tracing Heidegger's line of thought, one draws the conclusion that he has penetrated 
deep into the mind of God and seen what He is storing for man, but he himself is not God 
and thus cannot make things happen. Therefore, the logical gap between the potentialities 
liberated by the exhaustion of Western history and their effective actualization is filled by 
mysticism. This conceptual chasm raises the question of the consistency of Heidegger's 
philosophy. The question is not whether the technological era is the last word in the history 
of the West or a prelude to a post-technological era, but whether Heidegger's account of 
the history of Western humanity is plausible or arbitrary. The fact that he resorts to a semi- 
mystical form of a-logical thinking after having made large use of the most sophisticated 
expedients of dialectical methodology suggests that there must be something wrong with 
his account of Western civilization as well as, by hermeneutical implication, according to 
Heidegger's own standards of hermeneutical interpretation, with his ends. Given that 
Heidegger seems to have gone far enough into the depths of Being and become privy to 
a great deal of its secrets, the inference that one is led to derive from the mystical clouds 
surrounding the advent of the post-metaphysical era is that he does not provide sufficient 
historical justification for its actualization. In other terms, the new era Heidegger envisages 
is not a possibility contemplated in our tradition. Arrived at the culmination of the 
technological world, a logical leap in the fon-n of a step back or suspension of the rational 
categories of thought is required not because our tradition has worked out all its 
possibilities, but because the possibilities that Heidegger has allegedly rediscovered 
from 
what has been left unthought in Western history are utterly arbitrary and 
do not belong to 
its actual development. There is no evidence, for instance, to justify inscribing the classical 
and medieval worlds in the history of the forgetfulness of Being and not 
in that of the 
forgetfulness of subjectivity. Why should Descartes's subjectivistic turn be seen as a 
hubristic form of self- affirmation and not as man's finally coming home after a 
long 
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journey across alien (and authoritarian) worlds? Is it not the old positivist story, echoed by 
Blumenberg, more plausible that important discoveries in science in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries prompted man to break free from the divine order of the universe and 
reconsider his role in it than a sacerdotal narration of epiphanies which describes the 
emergence of modernity and subjectivity as the coming into light of something that was 
already there but in a different form? Is not modem subjectivity, as Hegel explained, a 
tormented and suffered achievement in the history of humanity which brought about 
freedom, liberation and emancipation rather than the further deepening of an original 
mistake? Insofar as these questions remain unanswered, Heidegger's dialectical account 
of Western history appears to be, in Hegel's terms, more a dialectic of the abstract than a 
dialectic of the concrete. 
VI. Conclusion 
At the conclusion of the last chapter, I raised the question of whether Heidegger, in spite 
of his devastating critique of the ideology of progress, shares with Nietzsche the deeper 
dialectical structure lying at the core of that concept. The answer offered in this chapter is 
positive, but with an important amendment. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger too detects a 
continuity in the history of the West from the earlier stages of the forgetfulness of Being 
in the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle to the later development in nihilism. Yet, nihilism 
is for him the end of modernity and we do not know the way out, provided that there is 
any. At this point history is complete and a new beginning is needed. By contrast, 
Nietzsche's standpoint is not fatalistic. He envisages an exit from the age of nihilism to be 
carried out by synthetisizing in a new, more advanced human type the achievements that 
man has attained during his historical past. 
However, the great importance of Heidegger is to have shifted the debate on 
progress towards the question of technology. His major philosophical accomplishment 
consists in having shown that the growth of man's potentiality to control natural processes 
is not in itself progress. Rather, the transformations that the age of technology 
has 
generated are such that they undermine at its very roots the potential of 
humanization of 
our world upon wl-iich the heirs of the Enlightenment relied. 
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The philosophers of Critical Marxism, with whom I will deal in the last two 
chapters, have not exorcised Nietzsche and Heidegger but have incorporated the potential 
of their thought within their own reflection. Yet, there is one thing which even a critic of 
progress like Adorno cannot put into question: that is, the idea that the development of 
human capacity of domination of nature, while not being by itself true progress, is however 
the fundamental condition of its possibility. Allegiance to this idea sets apart the two 
critiques of progress - the 'nihilistic' and the 'utoUpian' - and marks the suspicion of 
Critical Theory towards those expressions of a romantic call for a return to nature which 
resonate in certain passages of Zarathustra or in the most conspicuosly mystical 
declinations of Heidegger's writings. 
Critical Theory's reception of the Enlightenment tradition wasAmediated by Max 
Weber. Before examining in depth the philosophical reflection of Adorno, Horkheimer, 
and Marcuse on the themes relevant for this thesis, I turn briefly my attention in the next 
chapter to the great German sociologist and to his interpretation of modernity as a process 
of progressive rationalization of the world. 
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THE CURCKMATE. 0, F RE. ASO N. " 
Max Weber's Account of the Western Path of Rationalization 
1. Introduction 
In a fashion which strongly reverberates with Nietzsche's study of the genealogy of morals, 
Max Weber draws a picture of the modem world in which its distinctive features of 
scientific and technological development as well as bureaucratic organization of society 
are understood to be the result of a historical process of rationalization and 
intellectualization. He devises a developmental framework, bordering on the lines of a 
philosophy of history, within which the secular modem world appears to emerge out of the 
successive stages of magic and religion. In his view, magic characterizes the earliest forms 
of behaviour in the history of humanity. He holds that in primitive societies, by virtue of 
a process of abstraction, spirits are believed to conceal behind natural objects, artifacts, 
animals or the person of the magician and endow them with special power. This power is 
used to manipulate worldly forces in order to achieve practical ends: 
Since it is assumed that behind real things and events there is something else, distinctive and 
spiritual, of which real events are only the symptoms or indeed the symbols, an effort must 
be done to influence, not the concrete things, but the spiritual powers that express themselves 
through concrete things. This is done through actions that address themselves to a spirit or 
soul, hence done by instrumentalities that "mean" something, i. e., symbols. Thereafter, 
naturalism may be swept away by a flood of symbolic actions. ' 
The displacement of naturalism, Max Weber emphasizes, depends upon the success with 
which the magicians use their charismatic power to fabricate in the followers the belief in 
a causal connection between magical forces and economic and social life. As long as the 
manipulation of these extraordinary forces generates a following which believes in their 
effectiveness to provide the social cornmunity with material welfare and protection from 
evil spirits, the dominion of magical symbolism is legitimated. 
' Cf. Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, Methuen, London, 1965, p. 7. 
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The transition from the age of belief in spirits and demons to the age of 
monotheism and world-religions occurs through a process-of rationalization which favours 
the primacy of universal gods. ' In India, Iran and Babylon, Max Weber argues, a 
relationship is increasingly established between 'the rational regularity of the stars in their 
heavenly courses' and the earthly domain. As both dimensions, the terrestrial and the 
celestial, are conceived of as being regulated by a common divine order, norms and 
practices of the social community are progressively made to conform the systematized 
sacred demands of a class of priests. 
But it is especially in Israel that for Max Weber there evolves an approach to 
universalistic monotheism of world-historical significance. There, a covenant is forged 
between Yahweh, a god of independent existence who governs both the natural and 
historical events, and the Israelites by which the Israelites promise loyalty to Yahweh in 
return for Yahweh's promise to grant them dominion over Canaan after the liberation of 
Israel from Egyptian bondage. Of course, in constituting the covenant, the Israelites accept 
to conform their actions to Yahweh's commandments and be sanctioned in case of 
violation. However, Weber contends that, as historical reality contradicts the divine 
promises, Yahweh tends to lose the characteristics of a warrior lord who presides over the 
destiny of a local community and takes on the universal traits of a transcendent and 
inscrutable God of world redemption and world history. As a result, the conception of God 
is spiritualised and religious behaviour is increasingly rationalized. 
The growing recognition of a transcendent God who cannot be reached by means 
of magical devices undermines the original calculating rationalism which instrumentally 
resorts to religious behaviour for the purely external advantages of everyday economic 
success. ' Pursuit of the sacred becomes more and more 'irrationalised' while the other- 
worldly goal of salvation takes over the practical concern for happiness and welfare in this 
world. According to Max Weber, this process of adjustment of metaphysical views, along 
with the systematization of a religious ethics carried out by a professionally trained class 
of priests, develops up to the modem age when the magical and religious understandings 
of the world are displaced by the growth of scientific and objective knowledge. 
Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 22. 
Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 27. 
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Science, with its all-encompassing explanations about the origin of the world and 
the causes of its events, relegates belief-systems to a marginal role, thus bringing about a 
condition of disenchantment of the world. As irrational forces are banished from the sphere 
of intellectual life and replaced by the assumption that reality is ultimately known by 
means of mathematical calculation, transcendent values are eliminated from the domain 
of political and economic life while individual conduct is re-oriented towards the pursuit 
of immediate everyday needs. The world comes therefore to be de-sacralized and the 
vacuum opened up by the retreat of other-worldly meanings into the realm of private 
conviction is filled with the creation of 'the technique of establishing the most efficient 
way to achieve a given end. 74 This makes up what Max Weber labels the world of formal 
and instrumental rationality, a world in which the procedures of means-ends calculability 
pervade all forms of social life and confer upon it the hallmark of a systematic and 
organized whole. 
This chapter is designed to be introductory to the following chapters on Adorno, 
Horkheirner, and Marcuse. Therefore, I will not deal in depth with the themes which arise 
in it. 
11. The Path of Rationalization: Max Weber on Ancient Judaism 
Weber ascribes to the establishment in ancient Israel of an ethical monotheism free of all 
magic the value of a process of universal historical significance. In particular, he identifies 
in Deuteronomy, the free prophets from Amos to Jeremiah, and the Book of Job the 
inaugural texts of Western rationalism. The essential features that these sources reveal as 
breaking points of the age of magic can be summed up in 1) a new conception of God, 2) 
the affirmation of a rational and systematic religious ethic, and 3) the institutionalization 
of the sacred in a hieratic structure. ' 
In truth, the departure from magical beliefs in ancient Israel did not occur at once, 
but resulted from the transition from the pre-state and pre-prophetic times, when the 
religiosity of the peasants was still predominant, to the prophetic and pre-exilic period, 
dominated by urban culture. ' 
Cf. R. Schroeder, Max Weber and the Sociology of Culture, Sage, London, 1992, p. 13. 
Cf. W. Schluchter, Rationalism, Religion, and Doinination, University of California Press, 
1989, pp. 167-68. 
On Weber's periodization of the history of ancient Judaism, cf. W. Schluchter, ibid., p. 169. 
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It was the constant sense of threat which the Israelites felt in the face of the 
merciless conquerors surrounding them and the traumatic collective experiences of the 
Egyptian bondage and of the Babylonian-Persian exile that for Weber set them on the path 
of searching meaning and salvation in religious behaviour. This feeling of uncertainty and 
instability reflected on their conception of God, too. Yahweh emerged first as a creator of 
suprahuman power, driven in his actions by arbitrariness, passion and wrath rather than 
wisdom and goodness. From his residence atop the mountains, he established a covenant 
with the Israelites whereby he conu-nitted himself to guarantee protection to the political 
confederacy of the Israelite tribes in return for the loyalty of his chosen people. But later, 
the ancient Israelites's voluntary submission to an alien and supramundane being named 
Yahweh shifted the idea of God from a celestial and physical sense to an immaterial and 
metaphysical one. In the face of the perfection of the divine order, the world as it was 
began to appear to the Israelites meaningless and worthy of rejection. World-oriented 
behaviour was therefore increasingly replaced by a world-denying attitude which identified 
in God the provider of the meaning of the course of history. As a consequence, a demand 
advanced that., in order for the world to become a meaningful totality, it had to be shaped 
according to the designs of its creator. In other terms, since the world was believed to have 
a systematic and coherent meaning provided by God, the conviction spread that the 
conduct of mankind should be oriented according to this meaning, for only in relation to 
it life could obtain a unified and significant pattern. 7 
This process of systematization of all manifestations of life was carried out in the 
pre-exilic times by teaching prophets and teaching priests. Weber sees in Deuteronomy an 
expression of this breakthrough towards standardization of human conduct. Deuteronomy 
is a document containing ethical commandments as well as ritual and socio-political 
prescriptions. Given the characteristics of its content, Weber infers that it must have been 
written by religiously motivated intellectual elites. It betrays in fact an intellectualistic 
conception of God. Yahweh is no longer seen as the lord of a local confederacy who acts 
arbitrarily, but his actions are now described to be rational and to conform to a plan. 
Behind this conceptual transformation of the notion of God lies a shift in the centre 
of gravity of the social and political life from the countryside, inhabited by masses of 
peasants and shepherds, to the city, populated by the nobles and the plebs. However, the 
' Cf., Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, cit., p. 59. 
185 
urban plebeian strata were not appealed by the Levitic Torah teachers, but by the prophets 
of doom. According to Weber, from 900 to 600 BC, that is from the division of the 
Kingdom to the Persian- Baby Ionian exile, a religious conflict went on between teaching 
priests and prophets. These clashes turned out to be extremely fruitful to the intellectual 
culture of Palestine, since they brought the demand to make sense of growing political 
threats to a higher level of interpretation. The pre-exilic prophets of doom were in fact 
capable of transcending the primarily legal ethic of the Torah in the direction of an ethic 
of conviction. ' By reinterpreting the old covenant as reflecting an 'original state of purity, 
they blamed the failure of the believers to meet the demands of God for the present 
miserable condition. Only by finding the way back to the conduct of life to which the 
people of Israel had committed themselves when they formed the covenant, the pre-exilic 
prophets taught, could a future kingdom of salvation be gained. In this way, they succeeded 
both to restore faith in the covenant and to go beyond the Torah doctrine which descended 
from it. 
Unlike Deuteronomy, written in edifying and charitable spirit, the books of the 
prophets are scattered with prognostications of an imminent and apocalyptic revolution. 
They do not simply prescribe conunandments, but relate them to a divine will operating 
within a plan of doom and salvation. As a result, the process of systematization of the 
religious doctrine is steered away from a purely legalistic exit into an ethics of conviction. 
From now on, fulfilment of Torah's obligations is notjust a ritual duty, but takes the form 
of a rational task to be performed as part of a messianic eschatology. Religious behaviour 
begins to point to a theodicy which holds that sooner or later there will arise 'some 
tremendous hero or god" who will dispense concrete retribution of justices and injustices 
on the basis of an overall judgement of the conduct of the believer in this world. 
In this perspective, God becomes a historicized figure who intervenes in the course 
of history and is responsive to the ethical achievements of his subjects. According to 
Schluchter's reading of AncientJudaism, Weber considers the turn in world-view achieved 
by pre-exilic Israelite prophets towards an ethics of conviction as having far reaching 
consequences: 
8 Cf. W. Scluchter, Rationalism, Religion, and Domination, cit., p. 194. 
' Cf. Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, cit., p. 139. 
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The development of ancient Israelite religion is seen to have been promoted by pre-exilic Levitic Torah teachers, lay intellectuals, and pre-exilic Torah prophets until it reached a level from which "world-historical consequences" could result., The teaching priests produced anti- 
magical puritanical Yahwism. The teaching prophets provided it with the quality of an ethic 
of conviction. As a result, the direction of subsequent ethical development seemed to have been set. A universal religious ethic of conviction of this-worldly activity free of all magic 
existed within the realm of possibility. This would have marked the transition from sacred law to sacred conviction, from the norm to the principle. For a religious ethic of conviction implies that the value of individual achievements and activities is replaced by "the value of 
the total personality pattern". It implies further the overstepping of "Individual norms in order 
to bring about a meaningful total relationship of the pattern of life to the goal of religious tl salvation". " 
Although ancient Judaism created the conditions for a religious ethic of conviction to set 
off, Weber discovers that this development did not occur, fundamentally because Judaism 
lacked of the idea of a direct relationship between God, the deliverer of salvation, and 
individual consciousness, that is the locus where the conviction of salvation necessary to 
nurture practical conduct grows. It was necessary, he argues, to wait until the emergence 
of Protestantism to see the value of the total personality pattern being affirmed. 
This erratic course of Weber's developmental history makes his rationalization 
thesis appear fragmented. As Ginther Roth points out, 'Weber modifies the tradition of 
unilinear progress by viewing socio-cultural evolution as rationalization along various 
dimensions and directions. At the same time he also rejects the scientific developmental 
history of his day with its application of historical laws. "' For Weber, distinctive factors 
operate in history within a multi-dimensional structure and come together not as a result 
of a pre-determined or teleological concatenation, but of an overlapping of alternative 
paths. The model that he employs in analysing developmental history involves "a dialectics 
between restrictive conditions and revolutionary breakthroughs". In this sense, ancient 
Judaism represented a special phenomenon within restrictive conditions. Yet., 'forces 
developing from this starting point succeeded in overcoming these limits and thus triggered 
revolutionary breakthroughs'. Thus, although the main features of ancient Judaism did not 
imply continuity or linearity, 'they did point to revolutionary breakthroughs upon which 
subsequent conditions of development were based, some of which had "world-historical 
significance". "' 
'0 Cf. W. Schluchter, Rationalism, Religion, and Domination, cit., pp. 194-95. 
Cf., G. Roth, "Rationalization in Max Weber's Developmental History", in S. Lash and 
S. Whimster, Max Weber, Rationality, and Modernity, Allen & Unwin, London, 1987. 
" Cf. W. Schluchter, Rationalism, Religion, and Domination, cit., p. 190. 
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In order to explain Weber's apparently irreversible course of rationalization, Weiss 
draws a parallelism between Weber and Kant. As Kant-claims that the future course of 
history can be predicted only to the extent that men, as rational actors, contribute to its 
shaping, Weiss asserts that Weber accounts for the dynamic of rationalization by drawing 
upon 'acting human beings conscious of their freedom of action' who 'confirm their 
position and their capacity to act within the process of rationalization. "' This, Weiss 
clarifies, is not intended to deny that 'a good part of the rationalization occurs 'behind the 
back' of social actors and wholly independent of their conscious motivation and 
decision. "' Nevertheless, he claims, such an unconscious element is not decisive and, 
since men intentionally do not wish a reversal of the process of rationalization on the 
grounds of. their ideas and interests, the course of development flows in an unalterable 
fashion. 
Schluchter argues that Weber identifies in pre-exilic ancient Israelite ethics four 
developmental alternatives ensuing from several biblical sources. Among these, the Book 
of Job contains embryonically elements of ascetic Protestantism pointing both towards a 
conception of God as an absolute, incomprehensible sovereign and towards a doctrine of 
predestination. However, the Book of Job remained almost completely misunderstood and 
a new world-view based upon the promise of a future reward in this world for the chosen 
people prevailed. At the same time, the prophetic and revolutionary spirit faded away and 
the social structure came to be theocratized. A class of priests took control over the masses 
and promoted a religious ethics which, though rational and free of magic, was excessively 
focussed upon the calculative assessment of individual actions according to the 
prescriptions of the biblical law. 
Given the legal turn that Judaism took in post-exilic times, Weber holds that it 
could not go beyond a rationalism of worldly accommodation. It inevitably failed, he 
claims, to see the economic realm as a place where the believer could prove his religious 
stance. Thus, instead of promoting a process of rationalization of this-worldly activity, 
Judaic religion ended up adjusting itself to the existing social relations. 
" Cf. J. Weiss, "On the Irreversibility of Western Rationalization and Max Weber's Alleged 
Fatalism", in S. Lash and S. Whimster, Max Weber, Rationality, and Modernity, cit., pp. 154- 
163, p. 160. 
" Cf. J Weiss, ibid., p. 160. 
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Ill. Up and Down on the Path of Rationalization: Max Weber on Medieval 
Christianity and the Protestant Ethic 
This incapacity of Judaism to impose a systematic mastery over the world had the effect 
for Weber of emphasizing the specific character of resentment by which it, as a religion 
of suffering of a pariah community, had always been marked: 
The factor of resentment thus achieved importance in the Jewish ethical salvation religion, 
although it had been completely lacking in all magical and caste religions. Resentment is a 
concomitant of that particular religious ethic of the dispriviliged which, in the sense 
expounded by Nietzsche in direct inversion of the ancient belief, teaches that the unequal 
distribution of mundane goods is caused by the sinfulness and the illegality of the privileged, 
and that sooner or later God's wrath will overtake them. In this theodicy of the dispriviliged, 
the moralistic quest serves as a device for compensating a conscious or unconscious desire 
for vengeance. This is connected in its origin with the faith in compensation, since once a 
religious conception of compensation has arisen, suffering may take on the quality of the 
religiously meritorious, in view of the belief that it brings in its wake great hopes of future 
compensation. " 
This theodicy of misfortune developed into early Christianity and beyond. In continuity 
with Judaism, early Christian belief carried forward the conception of an eschatological 
future of redemption for the imperfect and sinful humanity. Yet, it related the possibility 
of fulfilment of the messianic expectations to unconditional faith in Jesus, an incarnate 
saviour embodying magical powers within his person. Hence, by making of salvation a 
matter of inward devotion to the saviour, it gave up the task of reorienting human conduct 
through obedience to the absolute commands of a transcendent God. Rekindling of the 
spirit and emotional experience were given priority as opposed to the intellectualistic 
approach to God predominant among the virtuosi of legalistic scholarship. 
Seen from the vantage point of the growth in modernity of Western rationalism, 
early Christianity seems to represent for Weber a form of regression. In order to obtain 
salvation, Jesus simply demanded from his followers unlimited submission to the divine 
power. Worldly affairs and sensuous pleasure remained outside the scope of his concern. 
Similarly, no ethical condemnation seemed to be attached to the activities of those who 
engaged themselves in the practice of accumulating wealth or securing luxury. This attitude 
of ethical indifference to the world slowed down the process of rationalization of the 
pattern of life. The Christian doctrine did not prescribe a coherent set of ethical 
commandments whose fulfilment could lead to the establishment of a rigorous and 
" Cf. Max Weber, The Sociology of Religion, cit., pp. I 10- 111. 
189 
methodical conduct. Its instructions pointed only towards brotherly love and charity, two 
forms of behaviour which sprung more from a feeling of empathy with the other fellow- 
men within the religious community than from a reflective and deliberative choice. 
Later development of Christianity into an organized Church with a clerical 
hierarchy came to institutionalize the fundamentally magical character of its teaching. 
Christ's incarnate spirit was renewed through the creation of a corpus of priests and 
bishops who embodied in their own functional role the miraculous powers of their 
predecessor. Salvation for the believers came thereby to be deemed to originate not from 
a consistent and systematic conduct emanating from an inward ethics, but from the 
performance of a set of sacraments and rites which were assumed to bear, by inexplicable 
magic, the spirit of the divine. As a consequence, the institution of the Church became the 
only provider of divine grace while external and formal devotion to its doctrinal authorities 
ratified the plea for salvation. 
As Christianity reinforced throughout the Middle Ages the institutionalization of 
the religious practice and systematized the doctrine of God in a body of dogmas, it 
detached itself further and further from the ethical teaching of Judaism. Yet, Weber 
stresses that in the periphery of the Church's official hierarchy, an ethics of asceticism 
emerged. New virtuosi of faith appeared who claimed to be the true disciples of Jesus and 
the real carriers of his ideals. They led a monastic life away from the temptations of the 
world, judged liable to distracting the pious from a pure dialogue with God. Although they 
never posed a real threat to the monopoly of the Church on religious authority, they 
succeeded in promoting a form of life of methodical discipline and constant self-control 
which later became an important model for the vocational ethics of Puritanism. 
Considered as a whole, however, early and medieval Christianity had a regressive 
impact on the course of Western rationalism. It failed to reorient human conduct according 
to the demands of a transcendent authority and encouraged an attitude of accommodation 
to external norms. 
The dynamic of rationalization was given instead a new impulse by the emergence 
in the XVI century of the Protestant world-view. The new idea that the Reformation put 
forward and changed the whole trajectory of Western history is captured by Weber under 
the expression 'calling'. Calling was conceived of by Luther as a divine ordinance, a task 
set by God to be performed in the station of life. What is relevant for Weber with regard 
to the idea of calling is the fact that it established an evaluation of the moral standard of 
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the individual according to his capacity of fulfilling the obligations imposed upon him by 
his position in the world. " 
Luther rejected the traditional Ch-ristian devaluation of worldly activity as a thing 
of the flesh and rediscovered the value of labour in a calling as the outward expression of 
brotherly love. Weber argues that Luther offered a moral justification of worldly affairs 
by reinterpreting the relationship of man and God along the lines defined by the notion of 
calling. Luther invested the fulfilment of the duties that the divine will had imposed upon 
the individual of a supreme moral significance. Monastic life was denounced in his 
teaching as devoid of value since it led the individual to withdraw from his temporal 
obligations. In contrast, work in the world came to be appreciated by him insofar as it 
contributed to alleviating the suffering of the most indigent people and to ameliorating the 
general conditions of the community. 
Yet, Luther's conception of calling remained traditionalistic. He did not accept the 
pursuit of material gain beyond the personal needs. In his perspective, worldly activities 
were to be confined within the limits of the order of things established by the divine will. 
In this respect, Weber claims that more far-reaching cultural and historical consequences 
for the renewal of religious life had to come from Calvinism. 
The point of departure of Calvin's theological doctrine is marked by the dogma of 
predestination. This is derived more from the logical necessity of his thought than from 
religious experience. 17 He moves in fact from the assumption that God does not exist for 
men, but men for the sake of God. The only meaning of all creation consists therefore in 
magnifying the glory of God. An unbridgeable gap separates men from God so that men 
deserve from him only eternal death unless he has decreed otherwise. Only a small 
proportion of men, Calvin professes, are elected for salvation, the others are damned. As 
a result, men) s action in the world can play no part in determining their destiny, since it 
would amount to thinking that men can affect God's absolute and unconditioned decrees. 
According to Weber, Calvin's doctrine of predestination had the effect of leaving 
the single individual in a terrifying state of loneliness. This could no longer turn to the 
traditional inten-nediaries and vehicles of the divine - sacraments and rites - in order to 
attain grace. Thereby, anxiety for his fate and terror of God settled in his soul. 
Cf. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, London, 1930, p. 80. 
Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 102. 
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Nevertheless, by way of a characteristic dialectical reversal, the Calvinist believer 
transformed his feeling of self-humiliation before God into a restless and systematic 
strug, gle with life. " Given that he existed as an instrument of God's will designed to serve 
his glory, he realized that he could better fulfil God's demands by engaging himself in 
organizing social life according to God's commandments. 
As a result, the Lutheran value of brotherly love came to be seen as a practice of 
involvement in 'the daily tasks given by the "lex naturae". "' And later, Weber argues, it 
assumed 'a peculiarly objective and impersonal character, that of service in the interest of 
the rational organization of our social environment. For the wonderfully purposeful 
organization and arrangement of this cosmos is, according both to the revelation of the 
Bible and to natural intuition, evidently designed by God to serve the utility of the human 
race. This makes labour in the service of impersonal social usefulness appear to promote 
the glory of God and hence to be willed by Him. "' 
Weber explains that worldly activity came to be considered among the Calvinists 
as the only suitable means capable of counteracting the feelings of religious anxiety. When 
the believer posed the question of how he could be certain of his own election, the answer 
he accorded to himself was that intense involvement in the affairs of the world could 
disperse his religious doubts and give him confidence about his state of grace. He saw 
himself as a mere tool of the divine will and felt thereby prompted to prove his faith by 
increasing the glory of God through real good works. Indeed, he was aware that the 
objective results he achieved in his working could not affect God's final judgement, but 
he assumed that they could be interpreted as a sign of election. Furthermore, although good 
works were useless as a means of obtaining salvation, he reasoned that they could play an 
important role in releasing him from his fear of damnation, thus helping him to obtain a 
condition of systematic self-control. 
This pattern of explanation provides Weber with the conceptual tools to claim that 
the Protestant ethics, especially in its Calvinist version, by changing the believer from 
within and reshaping the structure of his consciousness, brought the process of 
" Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 108. 
'9 Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 109. 
" Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 109. 
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rationalization of the world which had been initiated by the Judaic prophets to its logical 
conclusion: 
The God of Calvinism demanded of his believers not single good works, but a life of good 
works combined into a unified system. There was no place for the very human Catholic cycle 
of sin, repentance, atonement, release, followed by renewed sin. Nor was there any balance 
of merit for a life as a whole which could be adjusted by temporal punishments or the 
Church's means of grace. The moral conduct of the average man was thus deprived of its 
planless and unsystematic character and subjected to a consistent method for conduct as a 
whole. " 
Whereas the Protestant ethic began with a widening of the gap between God and the world 
and a postulation of a divine calling urging man to perform the duties established for him 
from eternity by the divine will, it ended up legislating a secular imperative towards the 
rationalization of the world and, reflexively, of all spheres of human activity. Hence, the 
idea of fulfilling God's will by carrying out worldly deeds metamorphosed into the secular 
task of pursuing an efficient and rational organization of the world through impersonal 
institutions which could facilitate the achievement of the original religious end. 
Consequently, the believer increasingly lost sight of the transcendent aims of his 
orientation and loosened the ties with his religious community. The quest for salvation, 
which originally motivated his involvement in worldly affairs, gave way to the purely 
utilitarian calculus of economic success, thus bringing to completion the process of 
secularization of belief. 
IV. The Iron Cage of Modern Rationalism 
Max Weber having described the process of rationalization as a progressive, though not 
one-dimensional and unilinear, development from magic and myth into knowledge and 
science, one would expect him to celebrate in triumphal tones the conquests of modernity. 
On the contrary, he holds a highly pessimistic view of the conditions of humanity in the 
disenchanted modem world. At the conclusion of The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of 
Capitalism, he compares the modem economic order which today appears to be closely 
bound up with the technical predicament of machine production and bureaucratic 
organization of society to an iron cage. He portrays this cage as an inescapable condition 
" Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 117. 
193 
of our historical situation. But, at the same time, he does not seem to be able to face up to 
the reality of modem social- life. Goethe's Faust's disillusioned outlook, for whom the 
realization of intellectualization and rationalization 'meant a renunciation, a departure from 
an age of full and beautiful humanity, which can no more be repeated in the course of our 
cultural development than can the flower of the Athenian culture of antiquity', " appears 
to his mind extremely difficult to embrace. The intellectual constructions of science are 
depicted as a realm of artificial abstraction from which no real life pulsates. The last pages 
of The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, for instance, are scattered with bleak 
pronouncements about the fate of the modem world like this: 
No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this 
tremendous development entirely new prophets will anse, or there will be a great rebirth of 
old ideas and ideals, or, if neither, mechanized petrification, embellished with a sort of 
convulsive self-importance. For of the last stage of this cultural development, it might well 
be truly said: "Specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that 
it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved. " 
Thus., does Western civilization represent for Weber true progress? If it does not, should 
it be condemned as a whole? Or should our negative judgement be passed only upon 
limited segments of its course? And, if the latter is the case, which stages of Western 
development diverged from the path of progress? Just the latest one? And what is wrong 
with it? 
Weber believes that, under conditions of modernity, science marks the pace and 
direction of development. He emphasizes also that the origins and role of science in 
modem life are not accidental, but tightly linked to the pattern of rationalism and 
disenchantment. He argues that modem natural science emerged out of the Platonic idea 
of eternal truth and the Renaissance's technique of rational experiment. The Platonic 
notion of a permanent and unchangeable truth gave impulse to the search for universally 
valid laws beyond the mutability of everyday opinions, while the technique of rational 
experiment provided the truths reached at through abstraction with an empirical basis of 
validation and confirmation. 
This methodology of reliably controlling experience informs science of its main 
features. According to Weber, science is a system of techniques and calculations whereby 
Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 18 1. 
Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 182. 
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man masters nature and the world. It has no other meaning but giving answers to 
theoretical and practical questions about the causes of certain phenomena. However, Weber 
underlines, every scientific answer raises new questions; 'it asks to be surpassed and 
outdated. "' As a result, science has no meaning beyond the purely technical and practical - 
In Weber's view, after Nietzsche's devastating criticism of the last man, no one can 
believe any longer in the naive optimism with which science surrounds its techniques of 
mastering life as a way to happiness. " Quoting Leo Tolstoy, he dismisses the 
meaninglessness of scientific progress in these terms: 
All his [Leo Tolstoy] broodings increasingly revolved around the problem of whether or not 
death is a meaningful phenomenon. And his answer was: For civilized man death has no 
meaning. It has none because the individual life of civilized man placed into an infinite 
'progress', according to its own imminent meaning should never come to an end; for there 
is always a further step ahead of one who stands in the march of progress. And no man who 
comes to die stands upon the peak which lies in infinity. Abraham, or some peasant of the 
past, died "old and satiated with life", because he stood in the organic cycle of life; because 
his life, in terms of its meaning on the eve of its days, had given to him what life had to offer; 
because for him there remained no puzzles he might wish to solve; and therefore he could 
have had "enough of life". Whereas civilized man, placed in the midst of the continuous 
enrichment of culture by ideas, knowledge, and problems, may become "tired of life" but not 
"satiated with life". He catches only the most minute part of what the life of spirit brings 
forth ever anew, and what he seizes is always something provisional and not definitive, and 
therefore death for him is a meaningless occurrence. And because death is meaningless, 
civilized life as such is meaningless; by its very "progressiveness" it gives death the imprint 
of meaninglessness. " 
Science cannot reveal the meaning of the world. It is an illusion to believe that science 
constitutes the way to 'true being' or to 'true nature'. All scientific work is based upon the 
presupposition of its logic and method as well as of its own existence. Accordingly, the 
question of whether it is worth having scientific knowledge of the world at all cannot be 
answered by scientific means. 
For Weber, the origins of science are part of the overall process of disenchantment 
of the world. Scientific techniques and mathematical calculations are, in a certain sense, 
modem substitutes for magic and spirits. Whereas in ancient times people used to make 
recourse to mysterious incalculable forces in order to implore the spirits governing the 
world to satisfy their needs, today all things in the world can be mastered by pure 
Cf. Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation", in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, 
Routledge, London, 1948, p. 138. 
" Cf. Max Weber, ibid. p. 143. 
26 Cf. Max Weber, ibid., pp. 139-140. 
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calculation. However, Weber emphasizes, 'the increasing intellectualization and 
rationalization do not indicate an increased and general knowledge of the conditions under 
which one lives. "' 
Rather, scientific rationalism has extended its influence upon other spheres of social life. 
Systematic organization of the labour processes and objective assessment of what are the 
most efficient means to achieve a given end have become the hallmark of the economic, 
political, and institutional orders. All the ethical considerations imbuing the religious 
world-views have vanished. But the abandonment of these demands has opened up a 
vacuum which has not been filled by the scientific outlook. Science is in principle 
refractory to any idea of the world as a meaningful totality. Its own attempts aim at 
devising formal frameworks which reproduce objectively the structure of certain aspects 
of reality. But science does not purport to answer to the ultimate questions of human life, 
questions about the sense of death or the meaning of our being in the world; questions of 
the sort: "What shall we do and how shall we live? ". " The fact that in the disenchanted 
world of scientific domination these questions are deemed to be an anachronistic residuum 
of a distant Wstorical past dominated by magic, illusion, and self-deception does not 
eliminate 'the human need for a coherent and meaningful world-view. "' 
Given the narrowness of the causal mechanisms of explanation into which science 
has forced all systems of belief, Weber seems to deny that the growth of scientific 
knowledge amounts to real progress. This assertion, however, is not based upon scientific 
and objective criteria, but stems from the realm of values. Underlying the dominion of 
science is for Weber an obscure world of 'ultimately possible attitudes towards life' which 
are endlessly claslidng with each other and whose struggle can never be brought to a final 
reconciliation. To decide which attitude should be predominant is a matter of 
interpretation, not of scientific knowledge. This fundamental aporia about the ultimate 
values invests the value of the modem world dominated by science, too. There can be no 
definitive answer to the question of whether the same products of scientific knowledge are 
worth being known: 
27 Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 139. 
28 Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 143. 
29 Cf. R. Schroeder, Max Weber and The Sociology of Culture, cit., p. 125. 
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Science presupposes that what Is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it 
is "worth being known". In this, obviously, are contained all our problems. For this 
presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means. It can only be interpreted with 
reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must reject or accept according to our ultimate 
position towards life. " 
Weber imagines that in the age of modernity, by way of a sort of dialectical reversal, we 
have been thrown back to the pre-religious world of magic in which a plurality of 
contending gods and demons competed to impose their predominance. He thinks that we, 
disenchanted and grown-up people of the age of science, are facing a conflict in our 
consciousness as to which of these gods should prevail and guide our life: 
We live as did the ancients when their world was not yet disenchanted of its gods and 
demons, only we live in a different sense. As Hellenic man at times sacrificed to Aphrodite 
and at other times to Apollo, and, above all, as everybody sacrificed to the gods of his city, 
so do we still nowadays, only the bearing of man has been disenchanted and denuded of its 
mystical but inwardly genuine plasticity. Fate, and certainly not "science", holds sway over 
the gods and their struggles. " 
This polytheism was dethroned by religious prophecy which promoted a rational and 
methodical conduct of life. But, Weber continues: 
Today the routines of everyday life challenge religion. Many old gods ascend from their 
graves; they are disenchanted and hence take the form of impersonal forces. They strive to 
gain power over our lives and again they resume their eternal struggle with one another. 
... Our civilization destines us to realize more clearly these struggles again, after our eyes have been blinded for a thousand years - blinded by the allegedly or presumably exclusive 
orientation towards the grandiose moral fervour of Christian ethics. 32 
It is this fundamental uncertainty about the ultimate values that makes it impossible for 
Weber to pass a final judgement over the value of modem civilization. Or, to put it 
differently, our dilemma in assessing the value of modernity is for Weber a reflection of 
the Kantian yet unresolved dichotomy between the realm of nature, governed by the 
necessity of the causal explanations of science, and the realm of spirit or religion, whose 
unbridled revelations generate explanations in terms of the meaning of life. To make our 
assessment still more problematic is the evidence that the inner logic of religion, at least 
in its Western Jewish-Christian variation, is a logic of secularization which underniines all 
forms of religious explanation and forces the ground of the meaning of moral values to 
" Cf. Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, cit., p. 143. 
" Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 148. 
32 Cf. Max Weber, ibid., p. 149. 
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retreat into obscurity. The loss of this ground has, of course, implications for the direction 
of scientific activity. As. science is no longer legitimated by the religious and-ethical 
imperative of glorifying God, it becomes meaningless and is increasingly determined by 
mere material interests. Its norms cease 'to possess a purposive ground and assume an 
entirely instrumental character. "' 
The fact that Weber abstains from evaluating the fate of modernity may be taken 
as an indication that he considers the process of disenchantment of the world as irreversible 
in the foreseeable future. Whether it is so because instrumental rationality is the telos of 
history now fully unfolded or because it corresponds to our intellectual aspirations and 
requirements is left undetermined. To tip the balance towards the teleological hypothesis 
involves the realization that, once the process of disenchantment of the world has been 
brought to completion, the enchanted polytheism of the ancient times can be restored only 
by magic. In other terms, as Nietzsche came to understand throughout the spiritual and 
existential itinerary of Zarathustra, the overcoming of nihilism - that is, the demise of the 
old systems of values - and the creation of a new one can be achieved only by irrationally 
lending our support to a forthcoming prophet capable of rekindling our enthusiasm for new 
and far-reaching ideals. But how can our historical consciousness relinquish the 
accomplishment of its own enlightenment and give itself over to the demands of new gods 
without denying itself? 
At this point, it seems that between the Scylla of the iron cage of instrumental 
rationality and the Charybdis of a rope dance performed by new prophets who invite 
humanity to physically destroy itself and its memory of the past - an outcome which some 
commentators believe Nietzsche advocated through Zarathustra -a different alternative is 
to be sought in order to prevent modem rationality from declining irretrievably into 
instrumental rationality tout court and to revive its original 'religious' and 'ethical' pathos 
for human emancipation and liberation. 
33 Cf. D. Owen, Maturity and Modernity, cit., pp. 115-116. 
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7 
" THE AN"Tt-60-EMONN OF MA-LECTIC. 
Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse on Progress and Human Civilization 
1. Introduction 
A striking convergence between Weber's thesis of rationalization and the critique of 
instrumental reason propounded by the tradition of Critical Theory was noted by Habermas 
in his Theory of Communicative Action. ' Like Weber, Habermas argues, Adorno and 
Horkheimer maintain that the development of formal and instrumental rationality results 
from the process of disenchantment of the world whose advent, in turn, Weber traces back 
to the rationalized worldviews of religion and metaphysics. Ironically, Habermas remarks, 
both Weber, on the one hand, and Adorno and Horkheimer, on the other, identify the 
outcome of the stage of disenchantment in a return to a polytheism of idols in which 
sub . ective beliefs and convictions come into conflict with each other and surrender the 9 
resolution of their struggle to the irrational force of power. Unlike Weber, however, 
Adorno and Horkheimer hold that the predominance of instrumental reason in the service 
of self-preservation drives subjective reason to madness, 'for the thought of anything that 
goes beyond the subjectivity of self-interest is robbed of all rationality. " According to their 
analysis, in the iron cage of the bureaucratic and adrninistered world the purposive rational 
actions of the individuals are increasingly detached from the ethically grounded motives 
underlying the religious methodical conduct of life and rendered mere functional responses 
to the needs of the socio-economic system. 
However, Habermas contends that Adorno and Horkheirner have transformed 
Weber's rationalization thesis by expanding 'instrumental reason into a category of the 
world-historical process of civilization as a whole. " On their account, the reification of the 
world, to use Lukacs's expression, that is the assimilation of social relationships to mere 
things in the world liable of being manipulated by the subject at his own will, are not 
Cf. Juergen Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, Beacon Press, Boston, 1984, vol. 1, p. 345. 
2 Cf. Juergen Habermas, ibid., p. 349. 
3 Cf. Juergen Habermas, ibid., p. 366. 
199 
modem phenomena, but can be tracked down to the very beginnings of human 
enlightenment when reason was still blurred with myth. Accordingly, they show that the 
process of rationalization of the world is not limited to the formalization of certain aspects 
of social life, but has penetrated deep into consciousness. Thought is put in the service of 
a logic of domination over nature and human beings, while the ego, which presides over 
the entire process of subjugation of nature and development of the productive forces, learns 
to convey these same methods of mastery and repression to his own inner nature. 
Haben-nas argues that from this dialectic of rationalization descends a philosophy of 
history entangled in an irresoluble paradox. On the one hand, in fact, Adorno and 
Horkheimer launch their attack against instrumental reason from the viewpoint of a 
substantive concept of reason which unfolds itself in the form of a universal reconciliation 
between spirit and nature. On the other hand, however, 'they can only suggest' this more 
emphatic concept of reason, given that they reject the Hegelian philosophy of totality 
which rests on the assumption of a unity of the identity and non-identity. ' Paraphrasing 
Horkheimer, Habermas claims that 'the dialectic of enlightenment is an ironic affair: It 
shows the self-critique of reason the way to truth, and at the same time contests the 
possibility "that at this stage of complete alienation the idea of truth is still accessible". " 
Adorno does not want to get out of this philosophical dilemma. He invites us to 
learn to get along with it and engage in a practice of negative dialectic in which reflective 
thought exhibits the aporetic nature of the 'concept of the non-identical" without falling 
in the temptation of closing the series of contradictions into a final identifying 
reconciliation. However, as long as one wants to catch sight of the harmony of the 
primordial reason in which spirit and nature were merged together, Adorno suggests that 
one should resort to the mimetic achievements of the work of art where that unity is given 
not discursively, but intuitively. 
In this chapter, I examine the concept of progress as it is analyzed in the writings of 
Adorno, Horkheirner, and Marcuse. I will deal with the philosophical puzzles into which 
they cast this notion following their critical reception of Max Weber's understandanding 
of modernity in terms of the affirmation of instrumental rationality. In order to outline the 
context in which these philosophers locate their theories of human civilization, I begin with 
a study of one of Horkheimer's middle works, Eclipse of Reason. Then, I move on to 
4 Cf. Juergen Habermas, ibid., p. 382. 
5 Cf. Juergen Habermas, ibid., p. 383. 
' Cf. Juergen Haben-nas, ibid., p. 385. 
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present Adorno's dialectical theory of progress. To be sure, he never articulated one in a 
systematic way. Nonetheless, I will rely upon a lecture he gave in 1962 devoted entirely 
to the idea of progress and on other fragmentary remarks on this topic scattered across his 
writings to sketch a comprehensive framework of his theory. In the following section, I 
respond to the objections raised by Habermas against Adomo's and Horkheimer's 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. I will argue that they fall short of seriously unden-nining 
Adorno's and Horkheimer's theory of human civilization provided that this is rescued from 
regressing into the realm of aesthetics and taken back to the domain of philosophical 
discourse. In this respect, in the last section I criticize Marcuse's utopian vision of man's 
liberation as it is exposed in Eros and Civilization on the ground that it is based upon a 
merely biological account of human nature. However, my critique of Marcuse is only 
provisional. In the following and final chapter, I will present a different view of his theory 
and embrace his dialectical account of the potential of transformation harboured in 
technology. 
11. Objective versus Subjective Reason: Horkheimer's Reception of Weber's Idea of 
Instrumental Reason 
A paradigmatic account of the philosophical project of Critical Theory can be found in a 
middle work of Horkheimer entitled Eclipse of Reason. This is a revealing text not least 
because it offers a Weberian diagnosis of the process of rationalization of Western society 
and juxtaposes to instrumental reason a more emphatic and utopian one. Its starting point 
is the enunciation of the existence of two forms of reason, both historically developed. 
Horkheimer names them subjective and objective reason. Subjective reason is concerned 
with devising the most efficient procedures for the achievement of a given end. Whether 
this end is valuable in itself or not, though, is a matter that transcends its scope. Simply, 
the value of the end is assumed by the subject to be self-explanatory and taken for granted. 
This means that, insofar as a goal is rendered the purposive object of human action, it is 
presumed to serve the interests of the subject in relation to self-preservation, and therefore 
is thought to be reasonable. Horkheimer argues that in this process reason is narrowed to 
the ambit of instrumental reason, that is of a faculty of mechanic calculation emptied of 
empirical content. 
However, he underlines that the concept of reason has not always in the history of 
Western thought been associated with the utilitarian meaning of a technical instrument 
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devoted to immediate subjective gains. In Plato and Aristotle as well as in the 
comprehensive philosophical -systems of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel, speculative 
reflection aimed at conforming man's life to the objective structure of the universal order. 
The world as a whole was conceived of as a harmonious totality within which the place of 
each being was determined according to rational criteria objectively incorporated in the 
world itself. As a part of a more comprehensive totality, subjective reason, with its 
demands for self-interest and self-preservation, was regarded 'as only a partial limited 
expression of a universal rationality 17 unfolding in the multiple manifestations of the 
objective world. Relations between man and nature as well as between men themselves, 
social and political institutions, and all the instances of the Hegelian objective spirit were 
thought of inseparably from the idea of the highest good. The task of philosophy was 
therefore to gain an insight into the nature of the ultimate goals and then to reconcile 
subjective reason with the prescriptions descending from them. Thus, understood from the 
perspective of classical and modem philosophy, reason does not refer to the function of 
coordination of means and ends, but to a form of thinking of what is good in itself and how 
a happy life can be lived in accordance with the enlightened order of objective reason. 
In Horkheimer's view, the subjectivist trend of present day philosophy reflects an 
incapacity of thought to conceive of objectivity independently of the creative faculties of 
the subject. But, he admonishes, if man's ultimate decisions are removed from the sphere 
of rational consideration and relegated to the irrational domain of unaccountable instinctual 
or intentional forces, reason becomes a functional agency of correlation. The world is 
increasingly devoid not just of the presence of objective reason, but of any objective 
content all together: 
In the end, no particular reality can seem reasonable 'per se'; all the basic concepts, emptied 
of their content, come to be only formal shells. As reason is subjectivized, it also becomes 
formalized. ' 
As mentioned above, Horkheirner argues that originally, in the philosophies of Socrates 
and Plato, reason was regarded as a universal insight into the true nature of things. It was 
conceived of as the eye of mind that could penetrate into the ideas and perceive the eternal 
order of the world. Reason accounted for what it came to see through a form of dialectical 
thought which, on the basis of a reflective understanding of ends, could determine beliefs 
and regulate relations between men. 
7 Cf. Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, The Seabury Press, New York, 1974, p. 4. 
' Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 7. 
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The notion of objective reason rested upon the conviction that reason was essentially 
contained in reality and that from it derived a specific set of practical obligations. Tl-ýs was 
an emphatic conception of reason which allowed philosophy to become a suitable 
substitute for religion and mythology. In fact, as faith in God faded away, methodical and 
speculative thought emerged as the highest intellectual instrument for bestowing moral 
meaning upon individual life and rationally organizing political institutions. Therefore, 
Horkheimer contends, although rationalist philosophy as detached from theology initiated 
the process of formalization of reason, during the periods of Renaissance and the 
Enlightenment it still seemed to be able to fulfil the task of providing man with a 
comprehensive doctrine of theoretical knowledge and moral life without the support of any 
external spiritual authority. 
It is precisely this objective content of reason along with the secularized idea of 
reason as a medium for penetrating into the true nature of reality that, Horkheimer argues, 
empiricisrahas neutralized. Under the devastating criticisms of Hume and Berkeley, reason 
has been deprived of the ethical function of determining guiding principles for human life 
while its objective basis has been reduced to 'a chaos of uncoordinated data' to be 
classified and organized by science. ' Reason has therefore lost autonomy and become a 
mere instrument of the productive and social process. It has relinquished the foundational 
role of furnishing objective content to the ideas of justice, equality, and happiness, and 
surrendered to heteronomous meanings. As a consequence, these ideas, while preserving 
their status of ends and purposes, have come to be deprived of a rational relation to an 
objective reality. Their truth-validity is no longer sanctioned by reason. Reason, by now 
subjectivized and formalized, limits its range of intervention to the mechanical operations 
of classifying data and calculating probabilities. The appraisal of the content of its logical 
operations is instead considered to be beyond its possibilities and thus dismissed as 
metaphysical. 
Horkheimer points out how the process of functionalization of reason strips man of 
the most fundamental aspect of his intellectual and moral experience: 
Everything and everybody is classified and labeled. The quality of the human that precludes 
identifying the individual with a class is 'metaphysical' and has no place in empiricist 
epistemology. The pigeon-hole into which a man is shoved circumscribes 
his fate. As soon 
as a thought or a word becomes a tool, one can dispense with actually 
'thinking' it, that is, 
with going through the logical acts involved in verbal formulation of it. ... 
7be advantage of 
mathematics ... 
lies in just this 'intellectual economy'. Complicated logical operations are 
'Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 12. 
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carried out without actual performance of all the intellectual acts upon which the 
mathematical and logical symbols are based. Such mechanization is indeed essential to the 
expansion of industry; but if it becomes the characteristic feature of minds, if reason itself 
is instrumentalized, it takes on a kind of materiality and blindness, becomes a fetish, a magic 
entity that is accepted rather than intellectually experienced. " 
When the ideals of rationalist metaphysics are divorced from their human content and 
become empty variables of purely symbolic and operational sentences, a process of 
dehumanization of thinking creeps in and shakes the foundations of our civilization. 
Justice, equality, and happiness are not thought of as ends intrinsically worth or reasonable 
per se, but are transformed into functions of blind econom ic forces. Sub ected to the 
operations of formalized reason, they come to depend upon contingent likes and dislikes. 
The dissociation of these expressions of human aspirations from the idea of objective 
truth deprives them of their rational foundation so that they assume 'a completely irrational 
aspect. "' The Enlightenment, enveloped in the instrumental mechanisms of subjective 
reason, reverts into its opposite and becomes a new mythology. The promises of human 
advancement and emancipation it purported to achieve take on the illusory vestiges of 
technical progress which denies in its own unfolding the philosophical assumptions on the 
basis of which those promises were made. 
The process of subjectivization and formalization of reason reifies our highest 
concepts and ideas. Severed from any meaningful order and totality, Horkheimer argues, 
our concepts of justice, equality, and happiness are converted into schemes or plans of 
actions, that is, into the theoretical equivalents of commodities in the industrial society. As 
their validity is determined by the practical success or failure of the course of actions by 
which they are fulfilled, no living relation to our real intentions and aspirations is 
preserved. Accordingly, the analysis of their content comes to fall into the domain of the 
logic of probability, while the philosophical examination of their historical development 
is made obsolete. 
In denouncing the instrumental character of reason, Horkheimer dissociates himself 
from the traditional, conservative critics of civilization. The latter, in his view, fail to 
recognize the stultification implicit in modem man caused by the social division of labor. 
Instead of rehabilitating the speculative capacity of reason banned by science, they 
condemn simultaneously science, subjective reason, and intellectual life as one and the 
same thing, thus extolling acritically an idealized concept of culture and individuality 
which has always thwarted human striving for emancipation. By way of this indiscriminate 
10 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 23. 
" Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 3 1. 
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denunciation of enlightenment as such regardless of its contingent historical development 
as a functional instrument of the processes of economic production, social organization, 
and administrative planning, reactionary conservatives like Aldous Huxely end up 
mythologizing a cultured man refractory to civilization, contemptuous of democracy and 
the masses, and above all eager to relish blind instinctual forces. 
Horkheimer rejects both the philosophy of positivism which, in his understanding, 
regards science as the carrier of progress and for its sake purports to subject humanity to 
the methods of scientific reasoning, and contemporary revivals of the philosophy of the 
absolute. He believes that the latter, to which he refers by the collective expression neo- 
Thon-iLism, by attacking science's reliance on experiment and revaluating intuition and 
revelation, renovate old methods of domination as well as authoritarian systems of 
thought. " They represent nothing but an artificial attempt to fill the void opened up by the 
dissolution of the philosophical basis of our beliefs. Rather than criticizing society as it is, 
these revived systems of objectivist philosophy reproduce the same patterns of domination 
as scientific theories. Their doctrines are formalized and modeled after the hierarchical 
order of their thought. They are shaped into a scientific mould in order to satisfy the social 
necessity of accornodating religious dogmas to the predominant structure of reality and 
render them pliable to mass manipulation. 
On the other hand, Horkheimer contends that positivism reiterates the same sort of 
absolutism and dogmatism for which it attacks neo-Thoniism. By identifying science with au 
truth without offering a philosophical justification of its procedures, positivism ends up 
into ideology. As the official philosophy of science, it is guilty of a petitio principh: for, 
in order to legitimate the ultimate principles of scientific conduct, it appeals to verifiable 
experimental observation, that is to the same sort of method that needs to be legitimized. " 
Horkheimer does not deny the importance of science in the process of civilization. 
What he objects to is the disregard of positivism for a philosophical justification of the 
logical and conceptual apparatus of scientific theories: 
If science is to be the authority that stands fin-n against obscurantism and in demanding this 
the positivists continue the great tradition of humanism and the Enlightenment - philosophers 
must set up a criterion for the true nature of science. Philosophy must formulate the concept 
of science in a way that expresses human resistance to the threatening relapse into mythology 
and madness, rather than further such a relapse by formalizing science and conforming it to 
the requirements of existing practice. To be the absolute authority science must be justified 
as an intellectual principle, not merely deduced from empirical procedures and then made 
12 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 61. 
11 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 76. 
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absolute as truth on the basis of dogmatic criteria of scientific success. " 
Both neo-Thomism and positivism, according to Horkheimer, elude the intellectual 
examination of their dogmas and principles because their underlying purpose is to master 
reality and reconcile individual thinking with prevailing structures of domination. They 
reify natural and spiritual data into facts, but fail to connect the world so reified to the 
social process. Thus, dialectical reflection on the web of relations between facts and social 
processes should be for Horkheimer the task of philosophy as critical thinking: 
The task of critical reflection is not merely to understand the various facts in their historical 
connection ... but also to see through the notion of fact itself, in its development and 
therefore in its relativity. The so-called facts ascertained by quantitative methods, which the 
positivists are inclined to regard as the only scientific ones, are often surface phenomena that 
obscure rather than disclose the underlying reality. A concept cannot be accepted as the 
measure of truth if the ideal of truth that it serves in itself presupposes social processes that 
thinking cannot accept as ultimates. The mechanical cleavage between origin and thing is 
one of the blind spots of dogmatic thinking, and to remedy it is one of the most important 
tasks of a philosophy that does not mistake the congealed form of reality for a law of truth. " 
Neo-Thomism's and positivism's lack of self-reflection has led them to encourage a pattern 
of behaviour acquiscent to pragmatic aims. They hypostatize in their own respective 
systems of thought a set of principles which exclude negation. The only measure of 
validity they acknowledge is the success or failure of the actions that those principles enact. 
By doing so, Horkheimer charges, neo-Thomism and positivism seek 'to adapt humanity 
') 16 
to common sense or to what theory recognizes as reality , thus a priori preventing 
philosophical reflection from confronting existing and accepted reality to a standard of 
utopian ideas which could deny its legitimacy. The result is the establishment of 'a state 
of irrational rationality' in which autonomous reason is replaced by 'the automatism of 
streamlined mythology' or by 'the authority of a dogma'. " 
There is a profound discrepancy in the world between the rationality of our cognitive 
practices designed to regulate the processes of change and the irrationality of the purposes 
which those practices serve. By the expression 'state of rationality', Horkheii[ner refers to 
the realm of means into which science has metamorphosed the sphere of being. The 
process of subjectivization of reason has reduced nature to the status of a mere object 
in 
relation to human subjects. " Under the sway of the latter, the world has become a tool 
for 
14 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 77. 
15 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 82. 
" Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 90. 
17 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., pp. 90-91. 
" Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 93. 
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human exploitation. Yet, Horkheimer argues, domination of nature does not serve authentic 
human purposes. The goals of happiness of the individual or wealth and health which are 
usually taken up in order to justify mastery of nature are functional to the needs of 
industrialist society. They simply fulfil the task of creating 'favourable conditions for 
intellectual and material production. '19 So much so that man himself becomes object of 
domination. This occurs because in order for domination of nature to be effective, man is 
impelled to subjugate not only external nature, human and non-human, but also nature 
within himself Domination is internalized, ) as it were, applied to instincts and inner drives. 
Seen from the perspective of man's sacrifice and self-renunciation, subjugation of 
nature turns out to be irrational. It has no meaningful purpose for human existence but 
subordination of it to the goals of industrial-technological civilization. Yet, given over to 
the power of the subject, 'nature is not really transcended or reconciled but merely 
repressed. "' Civilization enacts a mechanism of domination for the sake of domination. 
In the social Darwinian struggle for survival, the individual is called upon to adjust himself 
to 'the requirements of the system' in order to secure his own preservation. Self- 
preservation and preservation of the systematic social totality are strictly linked: To 
survive, the individual is required to summon all his intellectual and psychological 
resources and put them in the service of a pattern of rational action consonant with the 
rationalized and planned arrangements of the system. 
Submitted to the deliberations of a planning minority of experts, the autonomous 
individual relinquishes his power of judgement and relegates himself to the repressive 
activity of adapting his inner inclinations to the overpowering existing reality. Hence, as 
the Enlightenment principle of liberum arbitrium reverses into 'a principle of domination 
by which man makes himself a tool of that same nature which he subj ugates', " the paradox 
of civilization comes to the fore. On the one hand, civilization liberates consciousness from 
subordination to any heteronomous standards of conduct and recognizes the free individual 
as the only source of morality; on the other hand, the gained independence of the 
individual from mythology and religion fails to express itself in the context of an 
authentically intellectual competition of ends and ideas. Under the constraint of economic 
and social forces, the autonomy of the individual turns into passivity. Before the pressure 
of external circumstances, he learns 'to react automatically, according to general patterns 
11 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 94. 
20 Cf. Max Horkheirner, ibid. 
21 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 94. 
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of adaptation. 522 Thus, this withdraw of the self to the level of an abstract ego for whom 
everything in the world is at his own disposal. as a means for his own preservation parallels 
the debasement of reason to the status of a faculty making useful calculations for the sake 
of man's adjustment to reality. 
Horkheimer does not underestimate the advantages for humanity that the increase of 
material goods has brought about in the course of civilization. His query is rather directed 
towards the qualitative changes in the nature of the freedom that modem men enjoy 
nowday s. He acknowledges that in the present high-productivity industrial society ordinary 
consumers are offered in their luxurious expenditures a range of choices unknown to any 
previous age. A modem automobile, for instance, makes available to us a number of 
benefits in ten-ris of efficiency and comforts an old horseman could only dream about. Yet, 
this increase of potentialities has set upon us such a strain of coercive pressure that we are 
forced to give up our individuality. The freedom we have gained by supplying ourselves 
with a car in order to bring within our temporal reach distant spaces is only apparent. As 
a matter of fact, Horkheimer argues, freedom is constrained by so many restrictions that 
its quality is fundamentally altered: 
It is as if the innumerable laws, regulations, and directions with which we must comply were 
driving the car, not we. There are speed limits, warnings to drive slowly, to stop, to stay 
within certain lanes, and even diagrams showing the shape of the curve ahead. We must keep 
our eyes on the road and be ready at each instant to react with the right motion. Our 
spontaneity has been replaced by a frame of mind which compels us to discard every emotion 
or idea that might impair our alertness to the impersonal demands assailing us. 23 
This is the reality with which man is confronted and to which he is compelled to adapt 
himself Whereas in the past the world as it is was constantly opposed for negation to an 
ideal world existing in the realm of possibilities, in the present industrial society dominated 
by formalized reason the actual world has been elevated to the status of a normative ideal 
to which all human possibilities must conform. Philosophical and speculative thought 
pointed toward an understanding of nature in itself has been liquidated and replaced by 
pragmatic intelligence focused upon immediate goals. To preside over this process of 
instrumentalization of reason has been what Horkheimer names 'the ego', that is, the 
principle of domination. The ego is the inner voice of consciousness, an internalized and 
sublimated leader who by issuing commands imposes discipline, coherence, and logical 
order upon the flux of experiences of the subject. In order to shape the life of the individual 
22 Cf. Max Horkheinier, ibid., p. 97. 
23 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 98. 
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according to a regular pattern, the ego discharges his donUneering power against the sphere 
of passions, that is, that element in the subject conducive to unbridled nature. The 
repression of nature within the subject enacts an irreconcilable dualism between the 
transcendental domain of the ego and the realm of desires whose results have far-reaching 
consequences. Oppressed, nature rebels against the ego. Behind the seemingly submissive 
behaviour of the individual, natural impulses refractory to the demands of civilization 
come to 'lead a devious undercover life. "I They never settle to live in harmony with 
reason. 
Horkheirner claims that the primary condition of the process of civilization resides 
in the transvaluation of man's native mimetic impulses into rational attitudes. Progress 
demands that men learn to direct their instincts of imitation towards a definite goal. These 
efforts to curb the most primitive urges in man's inner life in order to bring him to a state 
of responsibility succeed only if they are accompanied by the messianic promise of a future 
world of happiness and beatitude resulting from the establishment of the dominion of 
reason. However, as long as the expectations of a better world are not fulfilled, 'the 
mimetic impulses lie in wait, ready to break out as a destructive force. 1125 
National Socialism, for example, is for Horkheimer the archetype of the revolt of nature 
taking on a regressive and distorted form. Although Nazi rebellion against civilization 
culminated in furthering the tyranny of formalized reason and imposing additional 
restraints on nature, Horkheimer believes that the launch of the movement was made 
possible by the exploitation among the discontented German masses of repressed natural 
drives. Indeed, modem fascism epitomizes the capacity of rationality 'to incorporate in its 
own system the rebellious potentialities of nature'; " it instrumentally manipulates 
suppressed desires for reactionary purposes. But, according to Horkheimer, there is no 
overcoming of the crisis brought about by the enlightenment and technological progress 
by regressing to more primitive stages of human development. The creation of new myths 
proclaiming a return to nature and a delimitation of the domain of spirit 'lead from 
historically reasonable to utterly barbaric forms of social domination. "' 
Unfortunately, the revival of old doctrines which exalt nature as a supreme principle 
is encouraged by the affirmation of the Darwinian theory in the realm of ethics. The 
Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 113. 
Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 116. 
26 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 12 1. 
21 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 127. 
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application of the principle of organic evolution to the realm of values introduces into 
moral life an element of blindness and indeterminacy which reduces reason to the condition 
of a functional organ in the service of natural selection: 
In popular Darwinism, reason is purely an organ; spirit or mind, a thing of nature. According 
to a current interpretation of Darwin, the struggle for life must necessarily, step by step, 
through natural selection, produce the reasonable out of the unreasonable. In other words, 
reason, while serving the function of dominating nature, is whittled down to being a part of 
nature; it is not an independent faculty but something organic, like tentacles or hands, 
developed through adaptation to natural conditions and surviving because it proves to be an 
adequate means of mastering them, especially in relation to acquiring food and averting 
danger. As a part of nature, reason is at the same time set against nature - the competitor and 
enemy of all life that is not its own. 28 
As reason becomes an epiphenomenon of bluntly natural processes, philosophy abdicates 
the foundational task of discovering the truth implicit in the concept of nature. Its 
commitment to analyze the value of what is given as natural is withdrawn in favour of an 
empirical undertaking aimed at mastering those forces standing in the way of self 
preservation. Horkheirner warns, though, that to identify the good with the well-adapted 
while leaving unquestioned the value of that to which the organism adapts itself 
(culminates in a confusing of philosophical truth with self-preservation and war': 
The equating of reason and nature, by which reason is debased and raw nature exalted, is a 
typical fallacy of the era of rationalization. Instrumentalized subjective reason either 
eulogizes nature as pure vitality or disparages it as brute force, instead of treating it as a text 
to be interpreted by philosophy that, if rightly read, will unfold a tell of infinite suffering. 
Without committing the fallacy of equating nature and reason, mankind must try to reconcile 
the two. " 
Horkheimer 's project for critical theory seems to resume, as it were, the reflective and 
speculative activity of theological and metaphysical thought in order to come to assist 
nature without either overriding it abruptly or regressing to its primitive urges. The full 
explication of how reason and nature come to be dialectically mingled is the task of 
Adorno's philosophical enterprise. 
Ill. Adorno's Theory of Progress 
A myriad of common elements ranging from the understanding of the activity of 
philosophy in ten-ns of dialectical reflection to the ambition of accounting for the nature 
of the actual world by recollecting the past history of human civilization run through 
both 
28 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 125. 
29 Cf. Max Horkheimer, ibid., p. 125-26. 
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Adomo's thought and Hegel's philosophy of history. Yet, Adorno's perception of his own 
relation to Hegel was always one of uneasiness if not obsession at all. So much so that one 
could dare to read Adomo's philosophical effort as constantly guided by the determination 
to avoid the Hegelian tendency to absolutize the categories of the system with almost no 
fear of incurring into the fallacy of interpretive reductionism. 
One way in w1fich Adomo sought to escape from the rigidity of Hegel's system was 
by presenting his own thought in fragments-'O Adorno never conceived of organizing his 
work into a coherent and organic whole. Relish of aporia is a trademark of his writings. To 
a reader who sets out to follow the peripeties of his tortuous reasoning, he comes across 
as, to use Benhabib's characterization, 'an ethnologist of advanced civilization. "' He 
understands as his critical task 'to illuminate those cracks in the totality, those fissures in 
the social net, those moments of disharmony and discrepancy, through which the untruth 
of the whole is revealed and glimmers of another life become visible. "' 
To this adversity to systematic thought belong also his fragmentary meditations on 
the idea of progress. Indeed, apart from a lecture given in 1962, Adomo never offered a 
detailed analysis of progress. Nevertheless, scattered across his various texts, one can find 
innumerable insightful remarks on the issue. But, above all, his entire work, insofar as it 
is reduceable to a unity, can be seen as a critique of 'the progressivist illusion. "I 
Maintaining his hostility to definitions, in his 1962 lecture Adorno describes progress 
as an undefinable concept. Any attempt at specifying and determining its content, he states, 
destroys the unity af the concept into a plurality of mere contiguous moments. To be sure, 
in this remark the echo of the Hegelian jargon strongly resonates, yet we should not allow 
ourselves to be deceived by it. In fact, it is precisely against Hegel and what is named 'the 
logic of disintegration' that Adorno abstains from giving definitions, as a passage from 
Negative Dialectics clarifies: 
Any definition that appears noncontradictory turns out to be as contradictory as the 
ontological models of "Being" and "Existenz". From philosophy we can obtain nothing 
positive that would be identical with its construction. In the process of demythologization, 
positivity must be denied all the way down to the reason that is the instrument of 
demythologization. The idea of reconcilment forbids the positive positing of reconcilment 
as a concept. " 
Cf. G. Rose, The Melancholy Science, The MacnUllian Press LTD, London, 1978, p. 52. 
Cf. S. Benhabib, Critique, Nonn, and Utopia, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p. 182. 
12 Cf. S. Benhabib, ibid., p. 18 1. 
Cf. M. Loewy and E. Vankas, "The World Spirit on the Fins of a Rocket: Adomo's Critique of 
Progress", in Radical Philosophy, 70, March/April 1995, pp. 9-16, p. 9. 
34 Cf., T. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, Routledge, London, 1973, p., 145. 
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According to Adorno, definitions must not be given because they reproduce in themselves, 
as their immanent contradiction, the antithesis of thought to what is heterogeneous to it. 
The task of philosophical thinking is not 'to cling to the idea of something beyond 
contradiction', " but to display the tension between the concept and the reality it covers so 
as to see, on the one hand, whether the reality fulfils the concept, and, on the other hand, 
whether the concept is not abstractly removed from reality. 
Thus, it is in the essence of the concept of progress to refuse univocity. Yet, 
although progress as a philosophical term is equivocal, Adorno claims that it can be 
employed roughly with no risk of misunderstanding, since everyone knows more or less 
accurately what is meant by it. So, without defying his resistance to totalization and 
abstract conceptualization, he sets out to articulate the web of antionornies and 
contradictions into which the concept of progress is entangled. To a first scrutiny, it 
appears to him that progress is strictly linked to the idea of humanity. In Kant, he 
emphasizes, the doctrine of progress entails a notion of universal history. Kant assumes 
that 'the highest purpose of nature' lies in the development of all mankind's capacities. But 
such a development can be accomplished only in a society 'with the greatest freedom'. And 
since the completion of this goal involves the constitution of a perfectly just civic society, 
'progress has its place in a concept of history that for Kant is emphatically universal or 
cosmopolitan, not a history of particular spheres of life. "' 
There is for Adorno no idea of progress without an idea of humanity. Quoting 
Benjamin, he underlines however that progress of skill and knowledge should not be 
confused with human progress. Benj arnin, he continues, points out that the idea of progress 
carries with it a redemptive moment. In his view, we cannot speak of progress without 
including in its notion the idea of happiness of future generations. Given that humanity 
faces total destruction, 'no progress should be supposed in such a way as to imply there 
already is such a thing as humanity which therefore simply could progress'. On the 
contrary, it is a condition of having progress that 'progress would produce humanity 
itself. "I 
To be sure., in the Theses on the Philosophy of History, which Adomo refers to, 
Benjamin is more concerned with propounding a pronouncement of incompleteness of the 
'5 Cf. T. Adomo, ibid., p. 146. 
36 Cf. T. Adomo, "Progress", in The Philosophical Forum, vol. XV, Fall-Winter 1983-84, pp. 55-70, 
p. 56. 
37 Cf. T. Adomo, ibid., p. 57. 
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work of the past within a historical materialist framework than with the preservation of 
future generations, though the two things to a certain extent go together. Here is a passage 
showing his standing: 
Our image of happiness is indissolubly bound with the image of redemption. The same applies to 
our view of the past, which is the concern of history. The past carries with it a temporal index by 
which it is referred to redemption. There is a secret agreement between past generations and the 
present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have 
been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That claim 
cannot be settled cheaply. Historical materialists are aware of that. " 
Benjamin rejects Hegel's philosophy of history which hypostazises a necessary dialectical 
link between the historical events and whose unfolding leads to a final redemption. He 
describes history as 'one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage. "' 
This pile of debris can be stopped from 'reaching up to the sky' only by the proletariat with 
the support of its science, namely historical materialism, both called upon to bring the 
movement of history to a standstill. The flow of history comes to a halt, according to 
Benjamin, when it 'crystallizes into a monad, that is when its configuration is constructed 
as something immediately present and the historical materialist recognizes in this structure 
the sign of a messianic cessation of happening. "' 
By the expression "crystallization of history into a monad" Benjamin means the 
revolutionary outcome advocated by Marx, but, contrary to the latter, he covers his 
secularized idea of liberation with theological vestiges. After reading the historical events 
in Russia and Germany in the late 1930's as evidence of a departure of the Marxian theory 
from praxis, he calls for historical materialism to abandon philosophy and take on the 
service of theology if it wants to have a chance of 'winning the match' of the class 
struggle. " In this respect, he expresses the wish that historical materialism will be able to 
awaken the dead. We must not leave the dead to bury their dead, he observes, as though 
our task were that of ratifying that what has been lost has been lost and no alternative 
praxis is available. Were we to relinquish the wish of redeen-fing our dead, they would die 
a second time. 
Benjaminrejects the teleological view of history as progressive development. History 
38 Cf. W Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History", in Illuminations, Fontana, Glasgow, 1973, 
Thes. 11, p. 256. 
39 Cf. W. Benjamin, ibid., Thes. IX, p. 259. 
40 Cf. W. Benjamin, ibid., Thes. XVII, pp. 264-265. 
41 On this point see R. Tiedemann, "Historical Materialism or Political Messianism: An Interpretation 
of the Theses 'On the Concept of History"', in Philosophical Forum, 15, Fall-Winter 
1984, pp. 71- 
104. 
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for him proceeds by both continuity and discontinuity. Accordingly, in order to realize a 
new beginning, he assigns to the historical materialist the task of constructing history not 
by repeating in thought those epic moments of the past which represent a rapture in the 
continuum of history, but by recreating them in discontinuity with the past. As Tiedemann 
clarifies, Benjamin's project is an eschatological one: 
Benjamin has attempted to establish "the discontinuity of historical time" and its political and 
practical complement, "the destructive power of the working class", "at the foundations of the materialistic view of history". This attempt terminates in the concept of history as "one 
single catastrophe" which dominates the image in the ninth thesis. "Catastrophe as the 
continuum of history" means an absolute, not a specific, negation of progress. "Catastrophe 
is progress, progress is catastrophe" - thus history becomes a mythical nunc stans which 
extends itself into the present. "The concept of progress should be based on the idea of 
catastrophe. That things just 'keep on going' is the catastrophe. It isn't that which always lies 
ahead, but that which always is given". The proposition that at some point it would not go 
on can therefore not be included in a teleology of history in a Hegelian sense. Nor can it be 
sought in the historical labor of humanity, which - in the Marxist sense - seizes upon the inherent contradictions of the present and propels them to a higher social formation. If "the 
state of emergency in which we live is not the exception but the rule" [ ... ] "then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency". This "real state of 
emergency" which the revolution is to produce appears as the Other of history. It is not 
merely the end of the class struggle, but the end of history itself: this was not how Marx 
imagined the conclusion of the prehistory of human society. And the revolution which would 
bring about this state of emergency would also be far from the proletarian revolution Marx 
hoped for: it would be an apocalyptic destruction, an eschatological finish. The historical 
materialist who disguises himself as "the angel of history" may not be one after all. " 
This eschatological import is alien to Adorno's philosophy. He, too, claims that history is 
the unity of continuity and discontinuity, but he does not follow Benjamin in jettisoning 
the possibility and, indeed, the necessity of a universal philosophy of history. He 
acknowledges that Hegel's philosophy of history is overloaded with a set of metaphysical 
assumptions under whose weight the concept of reality evaporates, yet he maintains that 
Hegel's insight that 'the particular is unthinkable without the universal' is one which 
philosophy cannot do without. 
Adorno argues that Hegel's idea of a philosophy of history rests upon the conceptual 
dualism between phenomenality and totality. In Hegel'sj argon, he expands, the expression 
'totality' refers to the world spirit, that is the total movement of history in which all 
individual facts are synthesized. To experience the world spirit as a whole means, for 
Adomo, to experience its negativity. This means, in turn: Since reconciliation with the 
totality of the world spirit transcends individual achievements, the latter are experienced 
by consciousness as finite and only, after being denied, are integrated into the totality - that 
is, the total concatenation of humanity - to which they are internally linked. So understood, 
42 Cf. R Tiedemann, ibid., pp. 94-95. 
214 
world spirit is not a metaphysical hypostatization but denotes a concrete meaning 
teleologically inherent in the concept of society. 
It is one of the most recurrent themes of Hegel's philosophy to show individual 
consciousness experiencing the order of the world as alien and hostile because it can-not 
recognize itself in it. Yet, Hegel contends also that, in order to survive, people often adapt 
therneselves to the universal even though their consciousness experiences it as opposed to 
themselves. Adorno, dismisses this solution of the antagonism between consciousness and 
the world as a mere 'appearance of reconciliation 5.43 
In this respect, he emphasizes that, to the extent that Hegel does not question the irrational 
fon-ns - which include either the need for self-preservation or the state of dominion abused 
by the stronger - by which the individuals have been integrated into unity in the course of 
history, he ignores the antagonistic dialectic occurring between totality and individuality. 
Consequently, the identity that Hegel's absolute self-consciousness achieves is 
contradictory. 'It perpetuates non-identity in suppressed and damaged form', " he claims. 
In this identity, in which nothing particular is tolerated, the universal is imposed upon the 
particular in such a way that the resulting unity turns out to be conflictual in itself. 
However, Adorno qualifies, these incursions into the unity of Hegel's spirit with the 
intent of breaking the continuity of the historical process should not go so far as to 
undermine the concept of universal history. Discontinuity and universal history must be 
conceived together: 
Universal history must be construed and denied. After the catastrophes that have happened, 
and in view of the catastrophes to come, it would be cynical to say that a plan for a better 
world is manifested in history and unites it. Not to be denied for that reason, however, is the 
unity that cements the discontinuous, chaotically splintered moments and phases of history - 
the unity of the control of nature, progressing to rule over men, and finally to that over men's 
inner nature. No universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one 
leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb. It ends in the total menace which organized 
mankind poses to organized men, in the epitome of discontinuity. It is the horror that verifies 
Hegel and stands him on his head. If he transfigured the totality of historic suffering into the 
positivity of the self-realizing absolute, the One and All that keeps rolling on to this day - 45 
with occasional breathing spells - would teleologically be the absolute of suffering. 
By preserving the notion of universal history, Adorno goes beyond Benjamin's reversal of 
progress into total catastrophe and his historical-materialist imperative of a sudden, radical 
rapture of the continuum of history. Although the passage quoted above may be taken as 
evidence to the contrary, Adorno does not believe that the pile of debris accumulated in the 
43 Cf. T. Adomo, Negative Dialectics, cit., p. 312. 
44Cf. T. Adomo, ibid., p. 318. 
45 Cf. T. Adomo, ibid., p. 320. 
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course of history can be redeemed at once and turned into absolute positivity. According 
to him, there is an immanent teleology implicit in the idea of progress which derives from 
Augustine's conception of history as salvation history. Augustine imagined humanity 
4moving in the continuum of time toward the heavenly realm. "' But later the 
Enlightenment, by shifting humanity's redemption from the civitas dei to the civitas 
terrena, thus 'making concrete the idea of progress so as to be able to be realized', " has 
levelled it out onto what merely is. Progress has ended up celebrating the existing and 
surrounding what is with an aura of redemption. At this point, philosophical reflection on 
progress faces a dilemma: 'if progress is equated with redemption, as simple transcendent 
intervention, it surrenders any comprehensible meaning with the dimension of time, and 
evaporates into ahistorical theology'; " if, instead, it is lowered down to the movement of 
history, then this mediation 'threatens to make it an idol, and with it the absurdity, both in 
reflection on the concept and in reality, that what inhibits progress is what counts as 
progress. "' 
Adorno refuses to resolve this dilemma. The concept of progress is for him 
irreduceable to either facticity or the pure idea, and this contradiction must be accepted as 
such. Indeed, progress unfolds historically along the lines of an antagonism between, in 
Augustine's jargon, what is of heaven and what is of the earth. In other words, redemption, 
which constitutes the transcendent telos of history, exists only in tension with history. It 
cannot 'break out of the immanent process of enlightenment' because enlightenment in its 
historical labor presupposes 'the concept of humanity which alone raises itself above the 
immanence of the world. "' 
In this dialectical understanding of progress is condensed, as it were, Adorno's 
departure from Hegel's notion of reconciliation as the final closure of the system. Where 
Hegel postulates the speculative identity of concept and object so as to show that the reality 
of appearance is the actualization of its latent possibilities, Adomo understands as the task 
of immanent critique - which he transforms into negative dialectics - unendingly to 
destructure both the object and the concept of the object so as to show, on the one hand, 
that the object is not what it seeks to be, that is its concept, and, on the other hand, that the 
46 Cf. T. Adorno, "Progress", cit., p. 58. 
" Cf. T. Adomo, ibid. 
4' Cf. T. Adorno, ibid. 
iew, in spite 49 Cf. T. Adorno, ibid. This dilemma applies also to Benjamin's eschatological vi of the fact that 
he does not conceive of the redeemer as a Messiah coming from outside, but sees him as embodied in the 
making of historical materialism in alliance with theology. 
50 Cf. T. Adorno, ibid., p. 59. 
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concept a Is to be what in fact is, that is its object, for it is always brought from outside. 
By doing so, Adomo 'dissolves the rigidity of the temporally and spatially fixed object into 
a field of tension of the possible and the real. "' The object is constantly shown to be false 
and therefore is negated. In its facticity - that is, necessity - it never reachs an end point of 
reconciliation with its truth - that is, possibility - for its truth resides in an illusory totality 
in which all moments of individuality are absorbed into the whole. Let us see how these 
methodological principles apply to the issue of progress and enlightenment. 
According to Adomo, the reconciliation of spirit and nature upon which the modem 
model of enlightenment rests betrays a spellbound allegiance of thinking to the Hegelian 
'demon of identity'. Under the logic of identity, nature becomes a product of spirit, that 
is a mere function of the dynamic of reason. Disenchantment of the world and control of 
inner and outer nature are inescapable moments of the idea of reconciliation underlying the 
project of the Enlightenment. This unfolds in a ruthless practice of intellectualization and 
rationalization of mythical modes of apprehension aimed at extirpating animism from the 
world and establishing in its place the sovereignty of human knowledge. By unmasking the 
mythological deities as anthropomorphic projections onto nature of the subjective, " the 
Enlightenment releases man from fear in the power of fanciful entities like spirits and 
demons allegedly hidden behind material things and natural phenomena. Accordingly, as 
supernatural entities are dissolved into superstitious constructions and mirror images of 
frightened men, the Enlightenment recognizes as being and occurrence only what is 
reduceable to measurable quantities within a system of calculability. 
This process of abstraction whereby qualitative differences are reduced to 
quantitative equivalences enables, for Adomo, the subordination of empirical phenomena 
to natural laws, thus reproducing the mythological illusion that events in reality follow a 
repeated pattern which allows humanity to escape from the power of the unpredictable. 
Seen in this light, the systematic conceptualization of the world achieved by modem 
science is nothing but the expansion of mythological symbolism to a more advanced stage. 
Scientific explanations are therefore shown to be sublimated magic practices performed 
for the sake of preservation, while propositions attained via deductive method, 
far from 
communicating authentic discoveries, turn out to exhibit a content which was already 
known from the start. 
51 Cf. T. Adorrio, "Sociology and Empirical Research", in The Positivist Dispute in Gertnan Sociology, 
Heineman, London, 1969, p. 69; plus S. Benhabib, Nonn, Critique, and Utopia, c1t., pp. 17 1- 
174. 
Cf. T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Verso, 
London, p. 6. 
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The affirmation of the rationality of self-preservation implies, in Adorno's view, also 
domination -of man's inner nature: 
Man's domination over himself, which grounds his selfhood, is almost always the destruction 
of the subject in whose service it is undertaken; for the substance which is dominated, 
suppressed, and dissolved by virtue of self-preservation is none other than that very life as functions of which the achievements of self-preservation find their sole definition and determination: it is in fact what is to be preserved... The history of civilization is the history 
of the introversion of sacrifice. In other words: the history of renunciation. Everyone who 
practices renunciation gives away more of his life than is given back to him: and more than 
the life that he vindicates. " 
These considerations suggest for Adorno that the identity established by spirit in the 
enlightenment model is an antagonistic one. In his struggle for reconciliation, spirit 
incorporates the otherness of nature only in the self-identity of the empty and tautological 
formula of the "1=1". What spirit really wants is identity with itself via suppression of the 
other. Nature remains the other of spirit to be subjugated and dominated. As a 
consequence, power criteria creep in the categories of scientific thought. These do not 
correspond to a real content in the world but are expressions of social domination. The 
deductive structures of scientific theories speak of the hierarchy and coercion of the social 
order. Thought forms reflect the unity of the whole in which the individual is subjected to 
the universal, whereas the necessity springing from their inner relations displays the 
apparent solidity of the social compact with its repressive structures. 
Logical necessity apparently governs the evolution of industrial society today and 
takes on the characteristic of the ancient Fate. The masses regard the accomodation of their 
lives to the needs of the administered system as an objective necessity 'against which they 
believe there is nothing they can do. "' Yet, the necessity that transpires from the rational 
organization of society is for Adorno illusory. The reality is that man has left natural 
necessity behind to fetter himself to institutions and practices of domination which 
reproduce socially the domination of nature. If today the prospect of man's future freedom 
is not visible, it is because enlightenment has restricted the function of thinking to the 
reified domains of 'mathematics, machine, and organization', thus 'relinquishing its own 
realization. "I Nevertheless, the concept of progress lives on historically only by constantly 
renewing the promise of removal of necessity. 
53 Cf. T. Adomo and M. Horkhelmer, ibid., pp. 54-55. 
54 Cf. T. Adomo and M. Horkheimer, cit., p. 38. 
55 Cf. T. Adomo and M. Horkheimer, ibid. p. 41. 
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According to Adorno, a revival of the utopian vision of human liberation requires 
that domination be recognized as unreconciled nature and a form of dialectical thought 
capable of rescuing the concept of freedom from the tautological hypostatizations of spirit 
prevail. In setting out to achieve this program, he purports to single out a point of view on 
progress fluctuating between the critique of its historical implementation and the 
preservation of its emancipatory intent without postulating a totalizing concept of it. This 
point of view corresponds, as it were, to an 'ethical position whose criterion is neither the 
degree to which human understanding advances, nor the emancipatory potential of that 
advance, but rather the degree to which this promise of emancipation has been realized. "' 
Dismissed as a conclusive category, progress becomes therefore a negative concept, 
that is a philosophical rod whereby it becomes possible to denounce the dangers of 
regression that fetishism of progress as pure dominion of technique originates. The fact that 
Adorno's critical standpoint is limited to negativity does not cancel, though, the positive 
moment implicit in the dialectic of progress. Resistance to the triumph of evil is a positive 
act which is undertaken in the hope that things will get better and one day good will 
prevail. The peculiarity of Adorno's position resides precisely in his determination not to 
swing the philosophical pendulum toward one or the other side of the dialectical duality. 
He rejects both the positive and the negative philosophies of history: the former, because 
they rest upon a notion of teleology, in the Hegelian version, or linear temporality, in the 
Marxist productivist paradigm, which the failure of the march of history to release 
humanity from suffering and realize the promise of freedom has made untenable; " the 
latter, because they hypostatize unfreedom as an ontological category, that is a category 
56 Cf. M Loewy and E. Vankas, "The World Spirit on the Fins of a Rocket: Adorno's Critique of 
Progress", cit., p. 12. 
57 Martin Jay, Juergen Habermas, and Seyla Benhabib are credited with an interpretation of Adomo 
which sees him as moving away from Marx's philosophy of history and projecting humanity's 
prospects of reconciliation into a utopian horizon. Yet, against what he labels "the hegemonic 
interpretation of Adomo", K. J. Heller attributes to Adomo both a positive philosophical 
anthropology, analogous to Marx's, according to which 'need for freedom is inherent to human 
nature', and a Marxist productivist paradigm, according to which, since repression is caused by 
material scarcity, 'the development of mankind's productive forces is a necessary condition 
for the 
eradication of repression'. However, although Heller's argument is based upon some textual 
evidence, it succeeds more to re-balance than to thoroughly subvert the current state of interpretation 
of Adomo among his scholars. To make the picture even more complicated, it must 
be added that 
the attribution to Marx of an acritically positive philosophy of history is highly controversial. 
As 
Adorno himself points out, Marx admitted the possibility of relapse into barbarism. Cf. K. J. Heller, 
"Adorno Against the Grain: Re-reading Theodor Adomo's Philosophy of History", in Praxis 
Intemational, 11 (3), 1991, pp. 354-376. 
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inherent to the essence of human nature, and 'end up supporting the repressive status quo 
they purport to oppose. "" 
Rejection of the negative philosophies of history is part of Adorno's refusal to 
advocate romantic calls for a return to nature. He holds that civilization results from 
humanity's need to confront and transform nature" so as to overcome the primordial 
condition of material scarcity. To break the bondage of nature is therefore a necessary 
condition of human freedom. Counter-Enlightenment naturalists who posit freedom in the 
depths of the soul and reify it as an inner voice speaking from a transcendent source 
disregard the struggle that man in the course of history had to wage against nature in order 
to survive. They do not see that freedom develops in a dialectic between subject and object, 
through resistance to the blind necessity of nature. In this respect, Adorno admonishes that, 
as long as reconciliation with nature is meant as restoration of an idyllic primordial unity 
with it, man risks being given over to irrational forces beyond his control. Hence, instead 
of postulating a dubious orginal state of harmony as a historical datum, he employs the 
memory of it as a dialectical expedient designed to counteract excessive and deformed 
subjugation of nature. In his view, recollection of a past happiness, whether real or 
mythical it may be, can operate as a lever to break through the continuity of history and 
end its eternally recurrent spectacle of domination. 
IV. Habermas on Dialectic of Enlightenment 
According to Haben-nas, Adorno's and Horkheimer's Dialectic ofEnlightenment holds out 
a negative philosophy of history that accounts for the process whereby reason relinquishes 
its original demands for liberation and justice and reverts into its opposite. He argues that 
the two authors of the Frankfurt School, by claiming the existence of a secret complicity 
between myth and enlightenment, intend to dispute the conventional understanding of the 
latter in terms of a counterforce to the authoritarian nonnativity of tradition. From their 
analysis, enlightenment emerges as a process constantly suspended between distantiation 
from the mythic origins and relapse into mythology. If enlightenment has described itself 
as a movement of thought vindicating the superiority of rational argument over the 
ungrounded propositions of religion and metaphysics, Habermas contends that Horkheimer 
58 See Adorno's comments on Spengler and Huxely in Prisins, Neville Spearman, London, 1961, pp. 
53-72 and 95-117; plus The Jargon of Authenticity, Routledge, London, 1973. 
59 Cf. T. Adorno, Prisins, cit., p. 67. 
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and Adorno put forward a thesis asserting that moments of rationalization are embedded 
with the same patterns of self-deception which constitute ancient mythological 
symbolism. " 
In Habermas's interpretation, the Janus-face nature of what he labels as the world- 
historical process of enlightenment is revealed by the adventures of Odysseus in his search 
for the homeland, a symbolical site where Adomo and Horkheimer locate the genealogical 
origin of modem consciousness. The experiences of the Homeric hero tell a story of 
dramatic struggle of the ego to gain identity by learning to repress nature within itself. 
Renunciation and introversion of sacrifice are the price that it pays for acquisition of self- 
knowledge. Dark, mythic forces of nature pose countless obstacles in Odysseus' way so 
that he is forced to draw on the most remote resources of his intelligence in order to 
overcome them. In this perspective, his final landing on Ithaca marks the triumph of human 
skill and intelligence over an archaic nature still inhabited by mythical dreadful powers. 
Yet, Adomo and Horkheimer detect in Odysseus's success the ambivalent nature of 
reason. The rationality that he exhibits during his j ourney is an instrumental one, a kind of 
rationality made up of a set of expediences and cunning devices whose only goal is self- 
preservation. According to them, Odysseus is the prototype of the modem bourgeois 
individual whose existence is at the centre of an unreconciled dialectic between desire for 
self-consciousness and temptation to turn back to undifferiantiated chaos. 
In the narrative of Odysseus's encounter with the Syrens all the features of bourgeois 
life - that is, risk taking, renunciation, and sublimation of instincts into art - are 
contemplated. Odysseus takes the risk of listening to the song of the Syrens even though 
he knows that, were he to yield to the promise of primordial deadly pleasure that they 
evoke, his chances of getting home - that is, his chances of emancipation from the 
primordial forces of nature - would vanish. However, his risk is a calculated one. Before 
setting out to sail through the waters visited by the Syrens, he makes sure that his body is 
fettered to the mast so that his urge to abandon himself to their seduction remains thwarted. 
Of course, the suffering caused by the renunciation to regress to prerational pleasure is 
compensated by artistic sublimation. While the ropes fetter him more and more tightly to 
the mast as he listens to the song of the Syrens, he learns to appreciate the beauty that the 
song conveys so that it is made liable to become object of aesthetic contemplation. 
60 Cf. J. Habermas, "The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
Adorno", in The Philosophical Discourse ofModemity, The MIT Press, Cambndge, Massachusetts, p. 
107. 
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Haben-nas suggests that the adventures of Odysseus as they are explained by Adorno 
and Horkheimer seem to evoke the vicissitudes of Hegel's Spirit through its incarnations 
in the experiences of consciousness. Yet, acting as a force motivated merely by a drive to 
self-preservation, he claims that the "spirit" at work in the process of enlightenment 
emerging from the Dialectic appears to enact a paralyzing movement that mutilates reason. 
Thus, in this respect, if one considers the revenge that the forces of inner nature take upon 
the emancipated self, one realizes that Nietzsche's diagnosis of nihilism would probably 
offer a better paradygm. to elucidate what Adorno and Horkheimer intend to show in the 
Dialectic. They certainly share Nietzsche's belief that, with the dernise of religious and 
metaphysical claims to truth, all normative standards of our morality are no longer 
tenable. " This holds true despite a substantial philosophical difference obtaining between 
Nietzsche and the two authors of the Dialectic. For Nietzsche, the death of God unveils all 
our theoretical and moral judgements as manifestations of the will to power; Adomo and 
Horkheimer, instead, refrain from asserting that sheer will to power is the exclusive 
motivational force underlying knowledge and morality but maintain that, especially under 
the authority of modem science, the moments of reason have regressed to instrumental 
rationality in the service of self-preservation. 
Habermas argues that Adomo's and Horkheimer's critique of enlightenment is 
oversimplified, incomplete, and onesided. He points out that it fails to do justice to 'the 
rational content of cultural modernity that was captured in bourgeois ideals (and also 
instrumentalized along with them)'. He emphasizes 'the specific theoretical dynamic that 
continually pushes the sciences, and even the self-reflection of the sciences, beyond merely 
engendering technically useful knoweledge. "I Coherently, he sets out to disclose the 
motives prompting Adorno and Horkheimer to undertake the task of critique of 
enlightenment. In doing so, he associates the Dialectic to the Marxist stream of ideology 
critique which attempts to explain all theoretical validity claims in terms of relationships 
of power. The outcome is that, when the truth of enlightenment itself comes under 
suspicion and is revealed to be tainted with myth, the presupposition of purity and 
autonomy of reason is seriously unden-nined. 
Habermas identifies the gist of Adomo's and Horkheimer's Dialectic precisely in the 
claim that a demythologized understanding of the world is an illusion. 
In his view, the 
Dialectic reflects a radicalization of ideology critique which 
is now applied to 
Cf. Juergen Habermas, ibid., p. I 11. 
Cf. J. Habennas, ibid., p. 113. 
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enlightenment itself in order to exposes its own foundations. However, he claims that, in 
turning against reason, Adorno and Horkheimer fall into contradiction. In fact, - since they 
conduct the critique of reason with the intent of enlightening, they must assume the 
universal validity of critique, thus coming to face an irreconcilable paradox. On the one 
hand, their critical investigation into the foundations of the process of enlightenment aims 
at exposing critical self-reflection as suspicious; on the other hand, in the same act of 
conducting their critical analysis they cannot do without totalized critique. As a result, 
Habermas dismisses this description of the self-destruction of the critical capacity as 
paradoxical 'because in the moment of description it still has to make use of the critique 
that has been declared dead. It denounces the Enlightenment) s becoming totalitarian with 
its own tools. "' 
In the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche, too, Habermas contends, took the step of 
unmasking the binding of power and validity by totalizing critique. But his move was 
philosophically justified by his theory of the will to power as the creative source of values. 
After having reduced all validity claims to value judgements and disclosed the notions of 
true and false as mere expressions of preferences of taste, Nietzsche turned totalized 
ideology critique into genealogy critique. ' Derivation and descent, nearness to the origin, 
to what is earlier and more primordial became the new criteria of rank by which 'to 
discriminate between a power that deserves to be esteemed and one that deserves to be 
devalued. "' Therefore, by elevating genealogical localizations of power to the level of a 
critical and normative principle, Nietzsche endowed himself with the conceptual means 
necessary to carry out the exercise of critique against 'the sovereignty of the ideals of 
science and universalistic moralityll. 
Unfortunately, according to Habermas, this tool is not available for Adorno and 
Horkheimer as long as they are motivated in their critical practice by the intent of 
enlightening. While disclosing that reason is entwined with myth, they refuse in fact to 
abandon the world to an irreconcilable struggle between powers, 'as if it were the mythic 
world. "' Consequently, in a Hegelian fashion, they opt to retain in the course of their 
meditations the rational criterion of determinate negation. Yet, unlike Hegel, they do not 
pursue a final closure for the chain of contradictions and overcomings, but keep open the 
paradox of ideology critique as applied to reason, thus leaving critique to 
float on a 
63 Cf. J. Habermas, ibid., p. 119. 
64Cf. J. Habermas, ibid., p. 125. 
65 Cf. J. Habermas, ibid. 
66 Cf. J. Habermas, ibid. p. 127. 
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groundless ground with no ultimate guarantee of its undisputed validity. 
In answer to Habermas's argument, Christopher Rocco suggests that the conceptual 
contradiction in which the Dialectic is caught - between denunciation of theoretical totality 
and use of the same totality for a comprehensive cntique of reason - can be removed by 
pointing out that it operates at two different levels: a) a level of philosophical content at 
which Western rationalism is criticized for its penchant to include everything within the 
unity of the system and tolerate nothing outside of it; b) a level of formal structure which 
refers to the armature of the book as a synopsis of excursuses, appendixes, drafts, and 
aphorisms. Thus, he contends that 
the formal structure of the Dialectic... enacts the very process of disintegration it describes, 
simultaneously reflecting and criticizing the reality it seeks to comprehend: reflectinc, 
because of its fragmentation, criticizing because the fragmentary character of the book is 
mediated by a thematic coherence (each chapter is a variation on the theme that myth is 
already enlightenment and enlightenment reverts to mytholog ) that makes the book a whole 0 
and so allows it to achieve that plurality within unity that eludes enlightenment itself. At is 
precisely the structure of the book, its disintegration into fragments, that questions its own 
and enlightenment's epistemological claims and opposes the impulse toward totality in both 
system and critique. " 
This solution of the Dialectic's aporia appears to be overcontrived. To say that the 
philosophical content of the critique denies the formal structure of the text which 
encompasses that same content amounts to reproducing the logical fallacy of dropping the 
ladder away once it has been used to climb up the tree. As I argued in the former section, 
Adomo's and Horkheimer's dilemma of attempting to dismantle the systematic and 
totalizing structures of modernity by employing at the same time the tool of total theory 
must be left in its unresolved openness. As Benhabib suggests, 'it must not be abandoned 
but continually practised and revived through negative dialectics. "' The substantive vision 
of a systemic closure in which men finally come to live in harmony with nature and with 
themselves serves as a critical rod whereby it becomes possible to mount the attack against 
the failure of modernity to realize its emancipatory potential. It is to be recalled, however, 
that this vision makes no claim to total actualization. From the utopian dimension onto 
which it has been projected, it plays the regulative function of guiding the direction of the 
critique. Yet, while reviving the illusion of a final reconciliation of social antagonism, the 
critique must simultaneously demystify it so as not to give in to the temptation implicit in 
67 Cf. C. Rocco, "Between Modernity and Postmodemity- Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment against L- t7 
the Grain", in Political Theory, vol. 22, No 1,1994, pp. 71-97, p. 85-86. 
Cf. S. Benhabib, Critique, Nonn, and Utopia, cit., p. 18 1. 
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'conceptual thinking' of using actuality as a mere vessel into which empting the 
unmediated contents of thought. 19 
By presenting myth as disposition of rationalization and certain aspects of modem 
progress as regression to archaic barbarism, Adomo and Horkheimer conjure up a 
dialectical mechanism for demythologizing the present and exposing our unreflective belief 
in the myth of history as progress to critical assessment. Under the scrutiny of their 
dialectical analysis, the structures of civilized modernity no longer emerge in their reified 
form as naturally given, while simultaneously all nostalgic claims for a return to a falsely 
idealized past are made to appear untenable. In this respect, the Dialectic ofEnlightenment 
is not an attempt to deny the emancipatory achievements of enlightened reason and 
advocate a negative philosophy of history. On the contrary, it vindicates most of the 
conquests of civilization as progressive as well as acknowledges the material benefits that 
enlightenment has brought about in relation to the capacity of the modem world to satisfy 
the fundamental needs of society. 
Yet, Adomo and Horkheimer cannot refrain themselves from denouncing the failure 
of modernity to deliver the promises ofjustice, freedom, equality, and individual autonomy 
that accompanied its advent. They emphasize that, while neglecting these goals, 
enlightened reason has taken the path of instrumental reason and narrowed its ambit of 
application to the domains of scientific enterprise, technological development, and 
bureaucratic organization of society. Enlightenment has gone so far in the direction of 
formalistic reason that modem barbarism can be seen as a crystallized mirror image of the 
self-destructive logic underlying its ratio. The Holocaust, for example, with its 'deadly 
combination of myth (anti-Semitism) and enlightenment (beaurocratically and rationally 
organized mass murder)' represents the most prominent logical outcome of the extension 
of the structures of formal reason to all spheres of life. " 
If the Enlightenment promised to emancipate man from tradition and establish reason 
as the only court of judgement to assess the validity of our moral and cognitive claims, 
Adorno and Horkheimer warn us against the self-deceitful and self-destructive forces 
operating within human reason and intellect. They point out that enlightenment, while 
promising to release man from natural necessity, simultaneously locks him in the iron cage 
of a second nature made up of inescapable machanisms of domination, discipline, and 
control. Enlightenment, they admonish, provides the individual with rational instruments 
69 Cf. S. Benhabib, ibid. 
70 Cf. C. Rocco, "Between Modernity and Postmodernity: Reading Dialectic of Enlightenmelit Against 
the Grain", cit., p. 79. 
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to shape the world and give fon-n to their own existence, and yet it hands them over to an 
impersonal apparatus of institutions, norms, and abstract -constraints which neutralize any 
possible space for the fulfilment of individual autonomy. 
Adomo's and Horkheimer's critique highlights the mutual implication in Western 
history of reason and myth, liberation and slavery, self-determination and heteronomous 
dependence. It would be misleading, however, to draw from this exposition of the 
paradoxical nature of enlightenment the conclusion that they relinquish in the Dialectic 
faith in human progress and in the power of reason. Their dialectical reconstruction of the 
history of civilization does not account for a reversal of Western rationalism into 
irrationality, but limits itself to denouncing the betrayal of enlightenment's original 
comn-titment to justice, freedom, and equality. The problem with enlightenment is not that 
it has exhausted its driving force to pursuing human liberation, but that its emancipatory 
potential has been left to a great extent unrealized and therefore needs to be redeemed. 
V. Between Archaism and Utopia: Marcuse's Vision of Human Liberation 
I claimed in section III that Adorno assigns the task of reconciliation to an act of 
recollection of the primordial unity between man and nature. This redemptive effort, 
however, risks being seriously unden-nined in present industrial-technological civilization, 
for the dynamic of cultural change unfolds in a way which tends to deny the past. In the 
one-dimensional society in which all areas of life have been colonized by the criteria of 
instrumental action and rational decision, culture ceases to be a repository of collective 
memory. History is forgotten and with it all those hopes and unfulfilled promises of the 
past whose memory could be reactivated and projected onto the present as a living 
historical possibility. As a consequence, the prospects of human redemption are removed 
from the continuum of history and cast into a point outside time. To reabsorb them into the 
historical process becomes a desperate enterprise. 
Marcuse seeks to resolve the dilenu-na of how to overcome the all-pervasive 
structures of rationalization in a world from which the autonomous individual has been 
extirpated and the memories of past aspirations banished, by identifying in the sensuous 
realm a subversive potential for redemption. However, as I will show throughout an 
analysis of Eros and Civilization, this endeavour turns out to be incapable of offering a real 
prospect of future transformation, thus remaining confined to a retrospective standpoint 
wl-&h, while inspecting the entire process of civilization, is suspended between mythology 
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and utopia. 
Marcuse's Eros and Civilization is an attempt to question Freud's assertion that 
civilization goes hand in hand with repression. Freud's theory of civilization can be 
summed up in Marcuse's view in the two following propositions: 1) that civilization is 
based upon the subjugation of human instincts. According to Freud, the principle 
governing the process of Western emancipation from natural necessity demands that the 
satisfaction of immediate urges be delayed and the resulting repressed impulses be 
sublimated into socially useful or cultural activities; 2) that repression belongs to the 
essence of civilization as such, thus ruling out any possible alternative to the condition of 
unfreedom and domination of man by man pervading the present industrial- technological 
world. 
While accepting 1), Marcuse rejects 2). He acknowledges that progress as it has 
unfolded itself so far in the manifestations of mastery of nature, mechanization and 
standardization of life, and intellectual impoverishment leads to man's self-destruction. 
Yet, he contests the claim that the dialectic of progress and domination constitutes a 
permanent feature of civilization and traces its causes back to 'a specific historical 
organization of human existence. "' He also identifies in the web of Freud's theory itself 
the interstices disclosing the possibility of a non-repressive civilization. This enables him 
to theoretically envisage the creation of a truly free world and at the same time maintain 
the validity of the most fundamental assertions of Freud's theory. 
According to Marcuse's reading of Civilization and Its Discontent, the main claim 
of Freud is that constraint of the instinctual structure of human beings is a precondition of 
progress. Unrestrained pursuit of the most immediate urges is incompatible with the 
condition of civilization, for the latter demands deflection from gratification as an end in 
itself and capacity of rechannelling the repressed biological impulses towards the goals of 
self-preservation and security. Freud describes the transition from the animal man -a being 
living under the sway of instincts - to the human being -a new creature capable of 
controlling his instinctual nature - in terms of the transformation of the pleasure principle 
into the reality principle. These two principles are related to two different dimensions of 
man ýs mental life: the pleasure principle refers to the unconscious apparatus of instinctual 
drives seeking immediate gratification, whereas the reality principle denotes the multiple 
sources of resistance to the principle of pleasure stemming from the natural and human 
Cf. H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, ARK Paperbacks, 
London, 1987, p. 5. 
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environment. Freud claims, in Marcuse's interpretation, that the individual, confronted in 
the course of his development with natural necessity, comes to realize that he cannot attain 
'full and painless gratification of his desires by himself. ' Hence, he 'leams to give up 
momentary, uncertain, and destructive pleasure for delayed, restrained, but "assured" 
pleasure. "' 
The predominant reality principle does not deny the pleasure principle, but modifies 
and readjusts it in a manner that serves to contain the destructive import of immediate 
gratification and make it compatible with 'the established societal norms and relations. "' 
Yet, Marcuse contends that its advent changes not just the form and timing but the very 
essence of pleasure, to the extent that pleasure itself is transubstantiated: 
With the establishment of the reality principle, the human being which, under the pleasure 
principle, has been hardly more than a bundle of animal drives has become an organized ego. 
It strives for "what is useful" and what can be obtained without damage to itself and to its 
vital environment. Under the reality principle, the human being develops the function of 
reason: it learns to "test" the reality, to distinguish between good and bad, true and false, 
useful and harmful. Man acquires the faculty of attention, memory, and judgement. He 
becomes a conscious thinking subject, geared to a rationality which is imposed upon him 
from outside. 74 
In Freud's psychoanalytic interpretation, the replacement of the pleasure principle by the 
reality principle is a genetic-historical as well as structural process. It involves both social 
evolution of the species man, on the phylogenetic level, and the development of the 
individual, on the ontogenetic one: 
Phylogenetically, it occurs first in the primal horde, when the primal father monopolizes 
power and pleasure and enforces renunciation on the part of the sons. Ontogenetically, it 
occurs during the period of early childhood, and submission to the reality principle is 
enforced by the parents and other educators. But, both on the generic and individual level, 
subrnission is continuously reproduced. The rule of the primal father is followed, after the 
first rebellion, by the rule of the sons, and the brother clan develops into institutionalized 
social and political domination. The reality principle materializes in a system of institutions. 
And the individual, growing up within such a system, learns the requirements of the reality 
75 
principle as those of law and order, and transnUts them to the next generation. 
The establishment of the reality principle is never definitive but needs to be constantly 
reasserted. This is because the claims of the pleasure principle, assuaged or repressed 
during the process of civilization, survive in the subterranean and unconscious repository 
of mental life and from there affect the shaping of the social institutions substantiating the 
Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 13. 
Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid. 
Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 14. 
Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 15. 
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reality principle. Therefore, in order for the dominion of the instinctual apparatus not to 
be restored, the external mechanisms of repression are repeated in the inner human nature 
throughout the introjection on the part of the civilized individual of the commands of his 
masters. 
Furthermore, Freud argues that the transition from the pleasure principle to the 
reality principle represents an adaptive response to the basic survival needs. The individual, 
under the pressure of economic scarcity, is spurned to deflect his energies away from 
sexual gratification toward the working activities necessary to provide him with enough 
means of subsistence. In this respect, Marcuse suggests that Freud's metapsychological 
theory seems to reproduce the attitude of those ideologies of culture intent in seeking 
rational reasons for the justification of repression. Nevertheless, he believes that Freud's 
theory contains also elements which logically point in the direction of the possibility of a 
non-repressive civilization. Whereas cultural progress works relentlessly its way across 
history by constraining the biological urges for immediate gratification, the claims for 
happiness and freedom are taken up by the unconscious and brought onto the surface of 
conscious life in form of a memory of a lost paradise in which full satisfaction of needs is 
guaranteed: 
Whatever liberty exists in the realm of the developed consciousness, and in the world it has 
created, is only derivative, compromised freedom, gained at the expense of the full 
satisfaction of needs. And insofar as the full satisfaction of needs is happiness, freedom in 
civilization is essentially antagonistic to happiness: it involves the repressive modification 
(sublimation) of happiness. Conversely the unconscious, the deepest and oldest layer of the 
mental personality, is the drive for integral gratification, which is absence of want and 
repression. As such, it is the immediate identity of necessity and freedom. According to 
Freud, the equation of freedom and happiness tabooed by the conscious is upheld by the 
unconscious. Its truth, although repelled by consciousness, continues to haunt the mind: it 
preserves the memory of past stages of individual development at which integral gratification 
is obtained. And the past continues to claim the future: it generates the wish that the paradise 
be re-created on the basis of the achievements of civilization. 76 
As long as from the repository of the unconscious comes the call for reviving the promises 
of freedom and happiness, Marcuse claims that the regressive aspects of civilization can 
be turned into a progressive function. He believes that this hope is kept alive by Freud's 
theory itself, despite its stating that a non-repressive civilization is impossible. After all, 
he remarks, Freud was not a romantic or utopian who turned nostalgically to "the past" - 
the past stages of individual development and human evolution - in order to seek 
compensation for the misery of the present, but used the inner connection of civilization 
" Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 18. 
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and barbarism both to denounce the suffering implicit in the implementation of progress 
and to reorient it toward the goal of a future liberation. 
Following Freud, Marcuse acknowledges that repression is a condition of 
civilization. Moreover, he describes as privilege and distinction of man the historical 
circumstance that, with the transition from the human animal to the animal sapiens, the 
containment of instinctual drives has intensified gratification. He points out that man, by 
breaking the compulsion of nature, has transformed 'the blind necessity of the fulfilment 
of want into desired gratification', 77 thus making available for himself refined and mature 
pleasure. Against Freud, however, Marcuse contends that it is because of specific interests 
of domination and not because of material scarcity that the process of civilization has taken 
on in the course of history certain institutional forms of control whose implementation 
demands additional repression to that enforced by objective scarcity of means. According 
to Marcuse, in modem industrial society domination has developed to such a level of 
distortion that sublimated desire for cultural emancipation and spiritual growth has been 
perverted into an ossified activity of coordination of the individual with the whole. If not 
arrested, this downward dynamic of alienation will lead the process of civilization to 
inevitable self-destruction. To be sure, he concedes that Freud anticipated the fatality of 
this dynamic. Freud explained the historical transformation of humanity in terms of an 
antagonism between two primary instincts, the life instinct, or eros, and the death instinct, 
or thanatos. Eros presides over the instinctual tendency of the organism to secure its 
preservation and prevent its premature return to inorganic existence; thanatos, instead, 
impels the organism to retrieve the lost state of peace and harmony which was 
characteristic of life in the womb and was broken with its coming into existence. 
Originally, Eros and Thanatos were fused together in the Nirvana-like condition of 
life within the womb. This "oceanic unity" was broken, on the phylogenetic level, when 
the first human group - the primal horde - was established under the rule of the 
father. 
Since then, a relentless war was waged against him by his It sons" in order to recapture the 
desired woman - that is, the wife of the father - and restore the previous state of 
integral 
peace and absence of need, pain, and desire. The father, with his despotic rule, was 
eventually defeated by the rebellious sons. Yet, the latter, haunted by a feeling of guilt for 
the killing, did not resume the longed-for harmony of the womb-like existence but 
reinforced the process of civilization by substituting for the tyrannical authoritarianism of 
the father an apparatus of legal restrictions, administrative regulations, and moral codes. 
" Cf. H Marcuse, ibid., p. 38. 
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As a result of this self- inhibition, they began to feel doubly guilty: guilty for killing the 
father and guilty for betraying the cause of the revolt against domination. 
According to Freud, the aggressive impulse to repeat the crime against the new forms 
of domination has never been totally subdued. However, as he clarifies, civilization has 
warded off all threats arising from the destructive tendencies of this impulse by diverting 
the death instinct towards mastery of nature and technological betterment. Seen in this 
light, the entire process of civilization has been rendered possible by the sublimation of the 
destructive instincts into meaningful work. Indeed, the "irrationality" of the repression of 
the instinctual constellation of man is for Freud at the very basis of the supreme rationality 
of civilization, and, as long as domination is the only effective means for preventing the 
death trends from sweeping away the cultural work of eros, he believes that its rational 
justification is granted. The problem for him is rather that the sublimated diversions of the 
aggressive impulses induce in the individual excessive pain which, with the further 
progression of civilization, could increase to such a degree to become unbearable. In a 
certain sense, Freud assumes that both the life and the death instinct contain in themselves 
a regressive dynamic. Both aim at restoring the condition of pleasure and integral 
fulfilment of an archaic time. The only difference between them is that, whereas the latter 
longs for immediate gratification, thus putting constantly the life of the organism into risk, 
the former defers the death of the organism by developing a form of rational behaviour 
which allows it to be secured a lasting satisfaction of its needs. This means that, contrary 
to its appearance, the journey of life across its sublimated constructions is 'really one long 
detour to death. 578 
At first glance, Marcuse seems to reject the gloomy picture of the process of 
civilization that Freud depicts. He notices that the sublimated diversions of exploitation of 
nature and technological rationality appear to have subdued the aggressive impulses and 
furthered the work of Eros. Yet, he cannot help but emphasizing that destruction, though 
diverted from the ego to nature and to the external world of other human beings, remains 
destruction, thus aiming at unrestrained fulfilment: 
While the destructive impulses are thus being satisfied [in the modified and sublimated 
diversions of civilization], such satisfaction cannot stabilize their energy 
in the service of 
Eros. Their destructive force must drive thembeyond this servitude and sublimation, for their 
aim is, not matter, not nature, not any object, but life itself. 
If they are the derivatives of the 
death instinct, then they cannot accept as final any "substitutes". Then, through constructive b 
78 This quotation from Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle appears in 
H. Marcuse, Eros and 
Civilization, cit., p. 26. 
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technological destruction, through the constructive violation of nature, the instincts would 
still operate toward the annihilation of life. The radical hypothesis of Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle would stand: the instincts of self-preservation, self assertion, and mastery, insofar 
as they have absorbed this destructiveness, would have the function of assuring the 
organism's "own path to death. " Freud retracted this hypothesis as soon as he had advanced 
it, but its formulations in Civilization and Its Discontents seem to restore its essential content. 
And the fact that the destruction of life (human and animal) has progressed with the progress 
of civilization, that cruelty and hatred and the scientific extern-unation of men have increased 
in relation to the real possibility of elimination of oppression - this feature of late industrial 
civilization would have instinctual roots which perpetuate destructiveness beyond all 
rationality. The growing mastery of nature then would, with the growing productivity of 
labor, develop and fulfil the human needs only as a by-product: increasing cultural wealth 
and knowledge provide the material for progressive destruction and the need for increasing 
instinctual repression. '9 
Marcuse acknowledges that the dialectic of civilization results in the triumph of the death 
instinct but insists that this self-destructive dynamic has been impressed upon the work of 
culture by the historical accomodation of the institutional structures to the interests of 
domination. In line with Freud's metapsychology, he maintains also that the instinctual 
source of civilization resides in the erotic impulse 'to preserve and enrich life by mastering 
nature in accordance with the developing vital needs. "' Striving for pleasure, not for 
security, he observes, is originally the aim of human existence. Although civilization 
demands repression of sexuality as the very life force, this repressive utilization of 
instinctual energy is still directed towards the enhancement of life. The problem with 
civilization is instead that, throughout its development, the erotic basis of the achievements 
of culture has been transformed. The logic of domination, whose rationale originally lay 
in the instrumental value of serving the needs of life, has become an end in itself. 
Rationalization and mechanization of labor, rather than being used to minimize the tiiine 
necessary for the procurement of the goods necessary for survivaland to encourage a 
qualitative change in the present costellation of man's needs so as to enable him to develop 
a higher spectrum of interests beyond the realm of necessity, have been turned into sources 
of further alienation. The more the progress of civilization has disclosed 'the real 
possibility of liberating the individual from the constraints once justified by scarcity and 
immaturity",, " the more the individual has been forced into an impersonal system of 
functions and relations which obey exclusevely to the purpose of fostering domination 
in 
society. 
The present configuration of instincts is for Marcuse a historical 
development only 
partially determined by the struggle for existence. The repressive control of the 
libido 
Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., pp. 86-87. 
Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p, 125. 
Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 93. 
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through institutionalization and internalization has been enforced mainly in order to 
preserve the oppressive organization of society. Consequently, there is no destructive or 
asocial force inherent in the very essence of instincts that necessitates repressive constraint. 
The nature of instincts is historically acquired and lends itself to modifications and 
transformations in accordance with the transformations of the conditions of civilization. 
The intent of Marcuse's project is precisely theoretically to examine the hypothesis of a 
non-repressive civilization based upon a non-repressive development of the libido and to 
contemplate the possibility of consciousness to be released from the limitations of the 
reality principle and taken closer to the fulfilments of the pleasure principle. However, this 
reconciliation between the pleasure principle and the reality principle is not meant to be 
oriented retrospectively towards a subhistorical and subhuman past sunk into the depths 
of an ideal state of nature, but refers to a future, utopian state of humanity envisaged to 
emerge 'with the progress of conscious rationality' at the point of 'the highest maturity of 
civilization. "' Marcuse imagines that technological progress will bring about a general 
automatization of labor which will make possible 'reduction of labor time to a minimum' 
and 'exchangeability of functions. "' Overcoming of scarcity and rational distribution of 
resources will enable men to satisfy their basic needs without the fatigue of work. Of 
course, the necessity of labor cannot be totally eliminated as long as material and 
intellectual production are a prerequisite for gratification. Nevertheless, the reorientation 
of industrial civilization in the direction of loosening the imperative of productivity would 
unleash for Marcuse a different instinctual dynamic bound to disclose an unexplored realm 
of freedom: 
The utopian claims of imagination have become saturated with historical reality. If the 
achievements of the performance principle [that is, the historically determined perversion of 
the reality principle by surplus-repression and alienated labor] surpass its institutions, they 
also militate against the direction of its productivity - against the subjugation of man to his 
labor. Freed from this enslavement, productivity loses its repressive power and impels the 
free development of individual needs. Such a change in the direction of progress goes beyond 
the fundamental reorganization of social labor which it presupposes. No matter how justly 
and rationally the material production may be organized, it never can be a realm of freedom 
and gratification; but it can release time and energy for the free play of human faculties 
outside the realm of alienated labor. The more complete the alienation of labor, the greater 
the potential of freedom: total automation would be the optimum. It is the sphere outside 
labor which defines freedom and fulfilment, and it is the definition of the human existence 
in terms of this sphere which constitutes the negation of the performance principle. This 
negation cancels the rationality of domination and consciously "de-realizes" the world shaped 
by this rationality - redefining it by the rationality of gratification. While such a 
historical 
turn in the direction of progress is rendered possible only on the basis of the achievements 
Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 150. 
Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 152. 
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of the performance principle and of its potentialities, it transforms the human existence in its 
entirety, including the work world and the struggle with nature. Progress beyond the 
performance principle is not promoted through improving or supplementing the present 
existence by more contemplation, more leisure, through advertising and practising the "higher values", through elevating oneself and one's life. Such ideas belong to the cultural household of the performance principle itself. The lamentation about the degrading effect of "total work", the exhortation to appreciate the good and beautiful things in this world and in 
the world hereafter, is itself repressive insofar as it reconciles man with the work world 
which it leaves untouched on the side and below. Moreover, it sustains repression by 
diverting the effort from the very sphere in which repression is rooted and perpetuated. " 
Marcuse offers also quite a detailed description of what the new world beyond want and 
external compulsion would look like. However, contrary to his announced utopian program 
orientated towards the future, he draws upon the archetypes of Orpheus and Narcissus - 
two mythological images symbolizing an order in which man and nature live in harmony - 
to characterize a realm of freedom in which the mechanical structures of bureaucracy and 
the alienated conditions of labor crippling the realm of necessity are replaced respectively 
by ordered forms of beauty and "free play" with reality. The combination of these two 
elements of beauty and imaginative play compounded with the conquest of time - another 
mythical residuum symbolized by Orpheus and Narcissus whose images represent also 
man) s rebellion against the passage of time as well as the desire for lasting gratification - 
make up what appears to be a form of aesthetic liberation. Man, split by the progress of 
civilization between an order of consciousness and an order of reason perennially in 
conflict with each other, should, Marcuse claims, reconstitute the unity of his being by 
giving free rein to a basic impulse underlying the faculty of imagination, namely the play 
impulse, and by endowing it with the aesthetic function of reconciling feelings and 
affections with the ideas of reason. " 
In the process of bringing together reason and sensuousness, these two mental 
processes do not remain the same. The free activity of the play impulse not only 
emancipates the individual from the values of productivity and performance, but also 
effects an operation of desublimation of reason whereby the highest and most sublime 
values preached by civilization are depreciated in favour of a maturation and promotion 
to culture of the manifestations of the lower faculties. This debasement of the elevated 
products of reason does not bring about, though, a relapse into barbarism since it is 
designed to occur at the culmination of civilization under conditions of abundance and 
superfluity. Given that all products of reason are epiphenomena of the realm of necessity, 
Marcuse assumes that they carry with them the repressive traits of their origin. Therefore, 
Cf. H Marcuse, ibid., pp. 156-57. 
Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 182. 
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freedom is possible only outside the structures of reason and of the world it conceptualizes. 
No matter how rationally it may be organized, 'the realm of-labor is one of unfreedom 
because the human existence in this realm is determined by objectives and functions that 
are not its own and that do not allow the free play of human faculties and desires. "' Hence, 
once removed from their aloofness in a platonic realm of perfection, the ideals of reason 
can be taken back 'into the organic structure of human existence from which they were 
separated', " thus allowing the potentialities of man to freely develop in harmony with 
nature. 
This realm of aesthetic imagination into which Marcuse retreats constitutes the 
extreme refuge for the critical and dialectical reason that modem technological society 
suppresses. However, although he grounds his project of human liberation upon an 
immanent critique of the present material conditions and envisages a technological 
rationality capable of reviving the Greek concept of techne as the art of living well in view 
of individual and societal happiness, his biological account of the possibility of an "orphic 
and narcissistic life" seems to be untenable. In fact, given the manipulative use to which 
in advanced capitalist society consciousness is subjected, when it comes to detem-lining its 
own desires the instinctual sphere of human nature cannot provide an ultimate criterion to 
distinguish true from false needs - that is, needs superimposed upon the individual by 
particular social interests. The rationale to which consciousness is urged to appeal in 
Marcuse's critical approach does not go beyond subjective feelings attesting to 
potentialities of pleasure and gratification. These, however, are highly suspect and defy 
objective standards of evaluation. " To be sure, Marcuse maintains that the sublimated 
products of culture and art unfold an emancipatory dynamic, for they articulate a life of 
harmony and fulfilment which extends the principle of pleasure 'beyond the narrow 
compass of genital sexuality'. " In this respect, the path of human liberation he contrives 
evokes the itinerary of the Hegelian consciousness which begins, too, with a desire for self- 
recognition via negation of the other to culminate in a transparent unity with it. 
Nevertheless, Marcuse deviates from Hegel in conceiving the attainment of freedom not 
as a spiritual event which ultimately resides in the idea but as an act of subversion which 
remains bound to the level of organic and instinctual satisfaction. Hegel, as Marcuse 
himself shows, 'replaces the idea of progress by that of a cyclical development which 
86 Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 195. 
87 Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 196. 
11 Cf. D. Ingram, Critical Theory and Philosophy, Paragon House, New York, 1990, p. 103. 
'9 Cf. H. Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, cit., p. 82. 
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moves, self-sufficient, in the reproduction and consummation of what is. "' When 
consciousness ceases its activities of conquest, it comes to rest by fulfilling its being in the 
conprehension of its history and recollection of the past. Its end, therefore, is not mere 
gratification but absolute knowledge. On the contrary, Marcuse conceives of a pattern of 
striving for pleasure which projects humanity from the realm of necessity onto the realm 
of freedom, but he describes this trajectory of enrichment of life as the transfon-nation of 
a purely redundant erotic instinct. Unfortunately, this adherence to a modem version of 
essentialism makes his whole project appear as the call for a return to an archaic beginning 
where life is lived in peace and harmony with nature. Thus, renouncement of linear time 
comes once again to coincide with the myth of the eternal return of the same. 
VI. Conclusion 
To the dilemmas facing Critical Theory before the expansion of the process of 
rationalization to all spheres of life, there are two answers: one pertains to Adomo and 
claims that the ultimate norms for human liberation are to be searched for in art and 
philosophy, or, more correctly, in those crevices of these two activities which remained 
refractory to mass-manipulation. The other belongs to the Marcuse of Eros and Civilization 
and sees in the instinctual configuration of human subjectivity the lever for overturning the 
structures of domination of society. I have argued that Marcuse's appeal to a permanent 
feature of organic life reproduces a form of essentialism w1lich is vulnerable to Adorno's 
suspicion of onesided validity claims transcending the critical scrutiny of negative 
dialectic. Truth outside a contextual particularity is for Adorno an ideological 
hypostatazation whose false and mythical elements must be unmasked by philosophy. 
According to him, an object, in order to be meaningful, must be related to the totality in 
which it is inserted. Nevertheless, the mediation between the universal and the particular 
is never definitive. Adorno' s negative dialectic requires that the non-identical be 
constantly redefined. 
But the account of Adomo's theory given in this chapter has come to discern in the 
method of negative dialectic a not entirely satisfying device for dealing with the question 
of progress. If one wants to elude the aporias impinging upon both the linear and the 
circular views of historical time - that is, the positive and negative philosophies of history - 
" Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 117. 
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I have shown that Adorno's "technique" of determinate negation offers a paradoxical and, 
in some respects, not ineffective solution. It abstains from postulating a definition of what 
progress ought to be like but, at the same time, does not abdicate the critical stance of 
reflecting upon the actual historical unfolding of it. At this point, the problem confronting 
Adorno's dialectical approach to the question of progress is: from where does reflection 
about the nature of our civilization draw the principles of its critique? Adomo's 
radicalization of instrumental reason prompts him to hypostatize a realm of aesthetic 
reconciliation from whose vantage point the attack against the contradictions of the world 
is mounted. This retreat into the truth of art seems however to have no legitimation. 
Indeed, it cannot have one unless philosophy provides it with an ultimate meaning. 
Otherwise, how could art conduct the activity of determinate negation without making use 
of a mode of discursive knowledge? " 
To be sure, Adorno himself recognizes the necessity of mediating art with conceptual 
thought when he claims that 'aesthetic experience must pass over into philosophy or else 
it will not be genuine"'. But a transition from the reahn of aesthetic-intuitive 
reconciliation to that of discoursive philosophical engagement is also demanded by the 
very nature of the question of progress. Progress is in fact not an abstract concept but a 
historical and anthropological phenomenon situated in the totality of human relations. 
Whoever sets out to come to terms with it cannot avoid the confrontation with the dilemma 
of how to bind its historical evolution to a system of rationally grounded norms. 
To philosophy and the inescapable dilemmas of its discourse I turn in the next and 
final chapter. There, I will draw a different picture of Marcuse from the one offered so far 
and suggest a materialist-dialectical version of 'essentialism' accounting for the theory of 
technological progress. 
" Cf. L. Zuldervaart, Adorno's Aesthetic 77ieory: Die Redemption of an Illusion, MIT Press, 199 1, p. 
188. 
" Cf. T. Adomo, Aesthetic Theory, Routledge, London, p. 190. 
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Beyond Habermas towards Marcuse: 
A Critical Framework for Technological Progress 
1. Introduction 
If Heidegger is right in his reading of Western civilization, we live in an epoch dominated 
by technology. This claim is not innocuous. It does not merely say that technology is an 
aspect, even the prevailing one, of the contemporary world. Rather, it implies that in the 
technological phenomenon an entire history, namely, the history of metaphysics and of the 
forgetfulness of Being, comes to its logical conclusion. In other terms, it says that in the 
technological world of late modernity culminates a historical totality and, as a result, the 
whole culture is penetrated by technical modes of thought. 
There are two lines of argument running against this Heideggerean substantive 
conception of the universality of technology: one asserts that technology is neutral and that 
machines are mere tools that we can use for different purposes; the other recognizes instead 
the fundamental bias of technology towards domination of man and nature, but asserts also 
that it is possible to transcend its repressive clutches into a higher, humanized technological 
universe. 
The first line of argument is held, among others, by Habermas who believes that 
there is nothing wrong with technology as such. According to hii[n, the problem with 
technological modernization resides in the spread of instrumental and purposive rationality 
-a category into which he lumps technical practices - to all spheres of life. He warns that, 
as long as the imperatives of technical reason encroach upon the lifeworld, they tend to 
delegitirnize genuine practical or political questions and take over the specific forms of 
rationality regulating our everyday communicative practices. 
The second line of argument is held instead by Marcuse. He directs his critical attack 
not just against technology, but against scientific and technical reason. He claims that 
machines are in their very structure penetrated by the dominant values of industrial society. 
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This bias, in his view, is not a contingent accident of a repressive application of 
fundamentally neutral raw materials, but is inscribed in the nature of formal thinking. 
The consequences of this thesis are devastating. On the one hand, it implies the 
assertion that the world has become one-dimensional and that there is no place for critical 
consciousness. On the other hand, it suggests that, insofar as there is room for critique, the 
present technological reality can be transcended only by abandoning science. 
In this paper, I confront the implications of these two lines of argument. In section 
11,1 begin with a presentation of Habermas's theory of modernity as the emergence of the 
conflicting spheres of instrumental and communicative rationality. Then, in section 111,1 
test his theory to the issue of technological progress. By using a recent book of Simpson 
which devises a theory of technology within a quasi-Habermasian framework, I argue that, 
as long as this framework confines technology to the domain of instrumental and purposive 
rationality, it is untenable. 
My thesis is that technology is value-laden. In advanced industrial society it is biased 
towards domination, but in a free society it can be bent to serve different, alternative 
purposes. In order to support my claim in favour of the liberating and emancipatory 
potential of technology, I rely in section IV upon Marcuse's analysis of technological 
rationality. By drawing upon Feenberg's interpretation of Marcuse, I argue that his 
dialectical conception of reality offers a valid framework to edify a new technological 
society based upon the values of freedom, justice, equality, happiness and beauty. The 
accomplishment of this utopian project does not require us to relinquish science and 
reason. The story of the transformation of technology is different from the story of the 
transformation of science, and these two domains can and must be maintained distinct. 
II. Communicative Reason versus Instrumental Reason: Habermas's Theory of 
Progress 
One of the cornerstones of Habermas's philosophical reflection on Critical Theory can be 
identified in the claim that Adorno's and Horkheimer's dialectic of Enlightenment stands 
impotent before the regressive and nihilistic tendencies of modernity. He contends that the 
tool of negative dialectic, though apparently effective as a critical yardstick 
by which to 
evaluate the historical process of rationalization, fails to ground 
itself on a normative 
foundation, thus resulting in self-contradiction. Habermas also points out that the 
239 
methodological process of determinate negation refers to a conceptual framework of the 
philosophy of history which is based upon dubious assumptions about the future outcome 
of history. Even supposing, as the Hegelian-Marxist model does, that the normative 
standards against which the present conditions of society are measured are immanent in the 
historical process, their validity can be claimed only under the hypothetical proviso that 
the meaning of history is successfully realized in the future. 
Against the theoretical illusions associated with the philosophy of history, Habennas 
offers a critical paradigm of understanding social meaning which combines hermeneutic 
interpretation with the empiric- analytical procedures of the natural sciences. Besides, he 
traces these two modes of research back to a reflective power of human rationality to 
produce uncoerced consensus in a process of domination-free discussion. According to 
Habermas, the human species is oriented in the course of its evolution towards the 
acquisition of a reflective capacity to overcome disagreement through a process of 
intersubjective dialogue. The thesis of Habermas is that the legacy of the Enlightenment 
is not exhausted by the affirmation of instrumental and purposive rationality but includes 
also a dimension of communicative rationality in which issues of practical life are 
intersub . ectively debated. He argues that, in the modem world dominated by technological 
progress and maximization of efficiency, questions concerning the nature of the good life 
are increasingly taken away from the context of communicative disputation and brought 
under the management of an apparatus of experts where they become technical questions 
concerning the most efficient means for the achievement of an end. Given these premises, 
the challenge facing the legacy of the Enlightenment consists for Habermas in finding ways 
to preserve a space for intersubjective dialogue against the encroachment of instrumental 
imperatives. 
To be sure, Habermas is not opposed to conceptualizing certain aspects of society in 
system-theoretic terms - that is, in terms of a whole articulated into a plurality of elements 
whose functional relations guarantee the stability of the whole - but maintains that the 
intersub, ective dimension of the lifeworld cannot be totally objectified into an alienated j 
system. In fact, were the process of system integration succeeding in absorbing the realm 
of intersubjective communication, the latter would be reduced to a structure of practices 
operating as self-regulating mechanisms independent from any subjective determination. 
Accordingly, Habermas is encouraged to believe that, insofar as the primary level of the 
lifeworld is preserved as a source of meaning from the assault of system theory, it provides 
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a model of rationality alternative to the dominant instrumental one. 
To this purpose, Habermas redefines the concept of progress in tenryis which, though 
avoiding the unilinear and necessary implications of the Hegelian philosophy of history, 
retain the principle of evolutive linearity. He argues that there are different levels of 
historical change and that it is mistaken to see instrumental rationality as a totalizing 
category of the historical process. In fact, whereas on the systemic level instrumental and 
formal rationality tends to expand and colonize increasing spheres of social life, on the 
level of communicative interaction counterforces operate to imprint upon history 
alternative developmental tendencies. However, Habermas rejects the historical materialist 
model of species history which assumes the existence of a macro subject - that is, the 
species subject - undergoing evolution and identifies in societies the bearers of evolution. 
He points out that social evolution occurs in world history as a process of replacing certain 
social structures by more comprehensive ones 'in accord with a pattern that is to be 
rationally reconstructed. 'I This denial of a macro subject in history, though, does not 
prevent him from extending to the phylogenetic level of the species the process of 
individual cognitive maturation occurring at the ontogenetic level. Rather, Habermas 
argues that the species as such learns at both the instrumental and moral level, and that the 
historical process in which this formative advance takes place follows a developmental 
logic. This logic of instrumental and moral development does not unfold along the 
trajectory of a necessary pattern. Habermas denies the possibility for historical knowledge 
to anticipate the totality of future events. History, he claims, is a narrative reconstruction 
of events occurred in the past and does not lend itself to prognostic speculation. Its task is 
limited to explaining factual processes as actualizations of structurally open possibilities. 
These possibilities, in turn, may be progressive or regressive. There is no guarantee that 
the species will follow the progressive pattern of action. Yet, once at a given stage of the 
evolutionary process a certain path is taken, the structural sequences arising from that 
course are irreversible. 
In a challenge to the nihilism of Max Weber, Habermas argues that modernity is an 
uncompleted project whose prospects of fulfilment are still open. In his view, 
modernization is more than the process of increasing expansion of instrumental rationality. 
Cf. M. Jay, "Jurgen Habermas and the Reconstruction of Marxist Holism", in Marxism and Totality, 
Polity Press, Cambridge, 1984, p. 488; plus J. Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of 
Society, Heinemann, London, p. 140. 
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He contends that an emancipatory progression can be discerned in the development of the 
modem world which proceeds from 'the ritual practices of sacred cults to the symmetrical 
social interaction' of communicative rationality. ' The worldviews of the earliest 
communities were based upon a form of 'totalistic mythic thinking" whose normative 
foundations eluded reflective legitimation. As universal consensus on the ethical standards 
was guaranteed by the authority of a unified collective consciousness, social practices 
remained unexamined. However, the disenchantment of this sacredly grounded moral and 
cognitive order has unleashed a kaleidoscope of alternative worldviews for whose decision- 
making processes rational procedures of communicative interaction are required. 
Consequently, as the attainment of normative agreement becomes increasingly necessary, 
practices of communicative rationality widen so as to enact a collective learning process 
to which the species submits itself. 
This evolution from the pre-rational religious worldviews to the differentiation of the 
sphere of the communicatively mediated lifeworld is for Habermas a legitimate 
achievement of modernity. If it is true that, from within this type of rationality oriented 
towards normative agreement a more instrumental rationality has developed which 
threatens to colonize the lifeworld itself, Habermas underlines the capacity of resistance 
of the rationalized lifeworld against its systemic integration. The struggle over which type 
of rationality should prevail is not yet over and Habermas undertakes the task of rescuing 
'the critical potential for completing the project of modernization'. ' Indeed, he does not 
envisage a sweeping triumph of communicative upon instrumental rationality, but argues 
for a mediated relation between them. Although he is aware that their antagonism will 
never be overcome into a 'harmonious normative totality', ' he believes that functional 
procedures of rationalization can be effectively used to increase the emancipatory potential 
of the discursive dimension of the lifeworld. Seen in this light, the mediation between the 
system and social integration does not resume, as Martin Jay points out, the Hegelian 
concept of totality: 
Habermas's attempt to reconstruct the Western Marxist concept of totality was... 
linUted. The 
Cf. M. Jay, Marxism and Totality, cit., p. 503. 
Cf. M. Jay, ibid., p. 505. 
Cf. M. Jay, ibid. p. 507. 
Cf. M. Jay, ibid., p. 506. 
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latitudinal alternative he posited [that is, the alternative between system and social integration] was based on a decentred rather than expressive holism. System and social integration, functional and communicative rationalization were related, but not reducible to 
a higher type of integrative unity. The differentiation produced by modernization could not be undone and indeed, in important ways, ought not to be. Longitudinal totality meant a 
reconstructed evolutionary process of learning skills in several areas, but one that could be 
validated only through a highly uncertain discursive process of will formation. Normative 
totality meant the achievement (or near achievement) of an ideal speech situation grounded 
in the institutional framework of a new public sphere where generalizable interests would be 
discursively articulated. But there would always be a residual antagonism between man and 
nature that would defy full totalization in discursive terms. 6 
To summarize: Habermas identifies in the subjection of increasing domains of 
communicative interaction to formal regulations and systemic imperatives the danger that 
modem societies face. He asserts that the one-sided rationalization of economic and 
administrative systems encroaches upon the lifeworld so as to undermine the processes of 
social integration, cultural reproduction, and socialization through which the lifeworld 
reproduces itself. When the abstract mechanisms of functional rationality creep into the 
lifeworld, the processes of mutual understanding and coordination of action orientations 
whereby consensus is generated are bypassed, thus enabling an elite of 'functionaries and 
experts trained to obey 'I to take the place of social actors. 
The lifeworld is the domain of values and norms. If consensus upon them breaks 
down, it provides from within itself discursive procedures to reestablish agreement. The 
argumentative renegotiation of the norms and values upon which new modes of social 
organization are forged occurs through a process of reinterpretation of needs and interests. 
These, for Habermas, are not givens, something imprinted upon human nature from the 
very beginning and therefore immutable. Rather, they can be discussed in a process of 
dialogic exchange so as to be redeemed from the sheer particularity of their original shape 
and become generalizable. Habermas's notion of rationalization of the lifeworld as 
opposed to systemic rationalization refers precisely to the differentiation of practices of 
consensus oriented communication within the dimension of social life. Technical solutions 
to problems arising in this sphere short-circuit the very practical character of those 
problems. They are imposed from outside and do not take into account the developmental 
nature of human life in the domain of praxis. From their systemic perspective, 
functional 
orientations elude the interpretive process through which social practices unfold and 
6 Cf. M. Jay, ibid., p. 507. 
7 Cf. S. Benhabib, Critique, Norin, and Utopia, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986, p. 229. 
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from technical mediation ends up reproducing the same instrumental paradigm against 
which it purports to intervene: 
If we choose to leave something untouched by technology, is that not a subtler kind of 
technical determination? Have I not domesticated a wild tree or bush if I plant around it in 
such a way as to bring, out its beauty? (This is a standard technique of Japanese gardening). 
If I suddenly need meaning in my overly technologized life and obtain it by returning to my 
family's religious traditions, am I not using tradition as a kind of supertechnology? If so, how 
can I believe in it? How can I ever leave the technical sphere if the very act of bounding a 
reservation instrumental izes It? 28 
In order to support my claim in favour of the existence of a liberating potential in 
technology, I will draw upon Marcuse's critical theory of post-industrial civilization. At 
first sight, it might appear as a bizarre choice for my advocacy of the capacity of 
technology to bring about qualitative changes in society to make recourse to a thinker who 
is known to be the bearer of strong critical claims against technological civilization. In 
One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse launches a fierce attack not just against the use to which 
technology is put today, but against technology and technological reason as such. He 
rejects the notion of the neutrality of technology - that is, the idea that technology is 
indifferent to the variety of purposes it is bent to serve - and states that in the advanced 
industrial society technology has become an ideology. From his line of argument, it 
emerges that the technological universe represents the moment of synthesis of the historical 
project of subjugation of man and nature. Hence, as a part of a system of domination, 
technological rationalization takes on political connotations which, according to him, are 
inscribed deep down 'in the concept and construction of techniques. "' 
Yet, from this radical critique of technology, Marcuse, like Adorno and Horkheimer 
before him, is not led to call for a romantic and irrationalist return to a pre-technological 
form of life. He maintains that technology, despite its ideological character, is still the most 
effective means available for man to be released from toil and misery, satisfy his needs, 
and develop his intellectual faculties. As a result, he argues that the technological reality 
of domination of nature, exploitation of human resources, and social authoritarianism can 
be transcended only by completing the technological project: 
If the completion of the technological project Involves a break with the prevailing 
" Cf. A. Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology, ibid., p. 10. 
29 Cf. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, Routledge, London, 1964, Introduction, p. XVI. 
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technological rationality, the break in turn depends on the continued existence of the 
technical base itself. For it is this base which has rendered possible the satisfaction of needs 
and the reduction of toll - it remains the very base of all forms of human freedom. The 
qualitative change rather lies in the reconstruction of this base - that is, in its development 
with a view of different ends. " 
Now, on the basis of this claim, how is it possible to reconcile the view that technological 
rationality is in its own logic politically and ideologically biased towards domination with 
the utopian idea of transcending the technological reality of domination into a higher, 
humanized technological world? Whether Marcuse succeeds in resolving this dilemma is 
still an open question in the philosophical literature. " Nevertheless, no one can deny 
Marcuse's intent to articulate the promise of a disalienated technological civilization by 
moving from the Heideggerean position that technological rationality is a priori biased 
towards domination. Since I take this attempt seriously, I want to follow Marcuse's line 
of reasoning up to its ultimate consequences so as to assess its viability for my purposes 
of human liberation. 
From the passage quoted above, it seems that Marcuse envisages the possibility of 
reconstructing existing technology and make it serve new ends in the context of a radical 
transformation of society. For such a possibility to be actualized, however, a conception 
of the neutrality of technology must be maintained at some level. In fact, the technical 
resources can unleash their liberating potential only if there is in their structure an 
essentially neutral core which can be abstracted from the substantive values they 
incorporate in their concrete historical applications. However, were such a core to be 
found, the contradiction between the affirmation that technology is a priori value-laden and 
the faith in the possibility of conferring anew direction upon technological progress would 
simply be shifted onto a different ground. Marcuse would in fact be facing the dilemma 
of holding two incompatible positions: the position that technology is biased towards 
" Cf. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, ibid., p. 23 1. This passage is also quoted by Andrew Feenberg 
to whom I am totally indebted for my interpretation of Marcuse. See 
A. Feenberg, "The Blas of 
Technology", in R. Pippin, A. Feenberg, and C. P. Webel (eds. ), Marcuse: Critical 
Theory and the Promise 
of Utopia, London, 1988, pp. 225-256, p. 227. 
" On Marcuse's one-dimensionality thesis an opposite interpretation to that given 
by Feenberg is offered, 
among others, by Claus Offe in "Technology and One-Dimensionality: 
A Version of the Technocracy 
Thesis? ", in R. Pippin, A. Feenberg, and C. P. Webel (eds. ), Marcuse: Critical 
Theory and the Promise of 
Utopia, cit., pp. 215-225. 
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don-iination and the position that it is neutral and value-free. Now, Feenberg clam-is that 
'neutrality and bias can and do in fact coexist and that Marcuse's theory rests on the 
possibility of their coexistence. 132 He distinguishes between two kinds of bias: substantive 
and formal bias. Substantive bias occurs when different standards are applied to individuals 
who ought to be treated equally. Formal bias arises instead when individuals are judged by 
the same standards but in a context in which some benefit from the apparent fairness of the 
procedural arrangements and others are disadvantaged. 
Feenberg argues that Marcuse's critique of technological rationality implies the 
assumption that technology is formally biased. In his view, Marcuse recognizes the 
fundamental neutrality, if not of technology, of the technological elements out of which 
technologies are built up. These elements such as the hammer, the lever, or the electric 
circuit are in themselves indifferent to the ends they are contingently made to serve in 
particular social and cultural settings. 'They are', Feenberg says, 'like the vocabulary of 
a language: they can be strung together to form a variety of "sentences" with different 
meanings and intentions'. " The bias arises precisely when these elements are combined 
and arranged in a concrete form. Therefore, if we define technologies as 'developed 
ensembles of technical elements', Feenberg continues, it can be stated that 'they are greater 
than the sum of their parts. They meet social criteria of purposes in the very selection and 
arrangement of the intrinsically neutral elements from which they are built. These social 
purposes can be understood as "embodied" in the technology and not simply as an extrinsic 
use to which a neutral tool might be put. "' 
Following the interpretation of Feenberg, it is possible to draw the conclusion that, 
according to Marcuse, the neutrality of technology can be preserved to the extent that 
contextual considerations are not taken into account. In a decontextualized, abstract 
analysis the illusion arises that technology is value-free. But, in fact, this analysis 
confounds the neutral status of the technical elements with the value-laden substance of the 
technological combinations. The strategy of Marcuse is therefore to bring into 
consideration the larger, concrete social context within which the formally neutral technical 
materials are arranged and imagine new ways of combining them according to a different 
'2Cf. A. Feenberg, "The Bias of Technology", cit., p. 230. 
" Cf. A. Feenberg, "The Bias of Technology", ibid., p. 233. 
34 Cf. A. Feenberg, "The Bias of Technology", ibid., p. 233. 
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system of values. 
Yet, there is a more radical thesis that Marcuse puts forward in One-Dimensional 
Man. It asserts that even the formally neutral elements from which technologies are built 
up are intrinsically biased because they are penetrated by the values embodying scientific- 
technical knowledge. The consequences of this thesis are devastating for his purposes of 
transcending the actual technological reality into a humanized one, for it shifts the object 
of critique from technology to technical reason. The implication is that scientific-technical 
reason emerges to be biased towards domination. In other terms, Marcuse comes as far as 
to claim that there is something intrinsic to fon-nallY neutral systems that bends them in the 
direction of distorted, repressive applications. 
Marcuse's demonstration of the formal bias of technical reason and, more generally, 
of abstract thinking is based upon his dialectical ontology as well as a Hegelian 
understanding of the categories of "abstract" and 11 concrete", "universal" and "particular", 
"concept" and "idea". He points out that formal thinking tends artificially to isolate the 
object from the whole to which it properly belongs, thus suppressing the practical and 
dialectical mediation through which the potentialities of the object are uncovered. In so 
doing, formal thinking loses the essential connection of the object to its context and 
realizes a truth which refers exclusively to an abstract universe of fixed and frozen 
concepts 'available for manipulation from without. "' But as soon as these conceptual 
constructions are reintegrated to the concrete, historical totality, the formal bias emerges. 
In factl as a result of the suppression of the possibilities of a higher, progressive 
development immanently present in the object, the latter is adapted to what merely is. 
Hence, the theoretical propositions stenuning from the abstractive process, though neutral 
in that 'they do not prescribe the ends of the object they construct conceptually', are not 
neutral 'with respect to the alternative of actual and potential in [their] objects'. Given that 
they have done away with the dialectical concept of potentiality, they are 'clearly biased 
towards the actual. ý36 
There is no such a thing, for Marcuse, as the object of immediate experience 
abstracted from the conceptual process through which it is grasped. Rather, the truth of the 
object lies in its concept whereby it is put in relation with the historical totality and made 
35 Cf. A. Feenberg, "The Bias of Technology", ibid., p. 247. 
Cf. A. Feenberg, "The Bias of Technology", ibid., p. 246-247. 
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recognizable as that which it really is. What the object really is not exhausted by what it 
actually is, but includes the. potentialities to which it points by virtue of an inner tension. 
As a matter of fact, then, the object tends to deny what it immediately is and transcend 
itself 'towards its reality'. " 
Insofar as formal thinking ignores the dynamic and dialectical content of our 
conceptual experience, its operational procedures assume a political function. " To 
emphasize this point, Marcuse brings up the case of a study into labour relations in an 
American company in the 1950s conducted by social researchers. This case is illuminating 
of the discriminatory social outcome that empiricist methodology generates when applied 
to social theory. Here is Marcuse's account of the results of the study: 
In investigating the workers' complaints about working conditions and wages, the researchers 
hit upon the fact that most of the complaints were formulated in statements which contained 
"vague, indefinite ten-ris", lacked the "objective reference" to "standards which are generally 
accepted", and had characteristics "essentially different from the properties generally 
associated with common facts". In other words, the complaints were formulated in such 
general statements as "the washrooms are unsanitary", "the job is dangerous", "rates are too 
low". 
Guided by the principle of operational thinking, the researchers set out to translate or 
reformulate those statements in such a manner that their vague generality could be reduced 
to particular referents, terms designating the particular situation in which the complaints 
originated and thus picturing "accurately the conditions in the company". ... For example, the statement "the washrooms are unsanitary" was translated into "on 
such and such occasion I went into this washroom, and the washbowl had some dirt in it. " 
Inquiries then ascertained that this was "largely due to the carelessness of some employees", 
a campaign against throwing papers, spitting on the floor, and similar practices was 
instituted, and an attendant was assigned to constant duty in the washrooms. It was in this 
way that many of the complaints were re-interpreted and used to effect improvements. 39 
What is wrong with this study? The reply of Marcuse is that, insofar as this kind of 
operational thinking contributes to alleviating human suffering, it fulfils a progressive 
function in the material and intellectual advance of society. Yet, he underlines, it 'also 
testifies to the ambivalent rationality of progress. "' The aim of the study is, after all, to 
assuage the discontent of the workers by making it something tractable in functional and 
operational terms. But, as a result of the manipulative act of translation carried out by the 
researchers, the meaning and content of the original universal propositions of the workers 
37 Cf. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, cit., pp. 105-106. 
31 Cf. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, ibid., p. 107. 
31 Cf. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, ibid., p. 109. 
" Cf. H Marcuse, One-dimensional Man, ibid., p. 114. 
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are significantly transfon-ned. Whereas the untranslated statements express a universal state 
of affairs by relating the particular conditions of the workers to the larger social and 
political context outside the workplace, in the translation the link between the particular 
and the whole is cut off. As a consequence, the discontent of the workers appears as a 
matter of personal, contingent distress to be treated through the functional measures 
devised by sociology and psychology while the general mood of unhappiness pervading 
the whole of society goes lost. 
In this light, which set of propositions captures and recognizes better the reality of 
the workers for what it truly is? The "vague, indefinite, universal" propositions of the 
workers or their operational translations? Paradoxically, what appears to be a concrete, 
detailed, and meticulous description of thefacts, Marcuse observes, 'is the result of a series 
of abstractions from [their] real concreteness, which is in the universal character of the 
case. 1141 
From this ontological critique of the instrumental nature of scientific and technical 
reason, Marcuse derives some speculative and utopian consequences. However, as long as 
his attack against the process of formal abstraction with its bias towards domination 
implies a radical reform of both science and technique, his positive suggestions must be 
rejected. Towards the end of One-Dimensional Man, he suggests that science and 
technology should constitute themselves as 'political enterprise', " thus propounding a 
political intervention into the evolution of scientific-technological rationality. This 
suggestion, however, fails to recognize that science is intrinsically impermeable to external 
interference. Certainly, no one can rule out the possibility that scientific rationality develop 
a new methodology shrinking from abstract formalism, but, were such a development to 
occur, it would proceed from within science itself. What the political power can do instead 
is to radically transform the social environment so that new questions arise which may 
induce scientists to alter their categories of understanding of the world and, possibly, 
devise new theories. 43 
Nevertheless, the theoretical impossibility of prefiguring an alternative science does 
not preclude the possibility hic et nunc to develop a new technology. In this respect, 
Marcuse's suggestions can be far more fruitful. Taking for granted his critique of formal 
Cf. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, ibid., p. 110. 
Cf. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, ibid., p. 233. 
Cf. A. Feenberg, "The Bias of Technology", cit., pp. 250-25 1. 
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rationality, the erection of an alternative technology incorporating human values in its very 
structure requires the recovery of a dialectical conception of reality. To the extent that 
current technical practices fulfil the task of serving the most vital human needs, a new 
technology that wants to be liberating and emancipatory must assign to itself the additional 
task of serving other, higher human needs, namely, the need for freedom, justice, equality, 
happiness, and beauty. There is nothing deceivingly utopian in this requirement. As 
Feenberg explains, 'Marcuse's theory contains the means to construct a solution which 
avoids the excesses of both utopian technophobia and uncritical acceptance of given 
technology as a fate. Recall that the essential flaw in scientific-technical rationality, by 
which it is bound to biased application, lies in its reified decontextualization of the objects 
it constructs. Thus it should be possible to at least advance toward a new technology by 
multiplying the contexts and technical systems that interact in any given application to take 
into account more and more of the essential features of the object. The initial steps in this 
direction are obvious and concern the integration of ecological, medical, aesthetic, and 
work-democratic considerations into the existing technologies to begin the movement 
toward a better society. Thus just as technical practice now incorporates the requirements 
of domination in its basic structure, in a free society it would instead incorporate the 
requirements of peace and freedom. "' 
The incorporation of a plurality of contexts of human needs into the structure and 
design of technical machines opens the way to what Feenberg calls in a Hegelian fashion 
the "concretization of technology". Through the realization of its integrative potential, 
technology is made to interact with a wide range of interests and action systems. To 
recognize this dialectical dimension of technology does not require a commitment to some 
kind of Aristotelian teleology or a special access to the notion of true human needs and 
potentialities. Technology, as a social and human enterprise, is inextricably linked to a 
variety of milieux. Marcuse shows that the way out of present technological reality is not 
to put boundaries on technical practices, but to recontextualize them into the "lifeworld". 
This means to install into the very structure of machines a new technical code informed 
with human and natural potentialities. How the transition from the present reified 
technological world to a future reintegrated technology is to be achieved is a practical and 
political question. The intent of this paper was to remove some conceptual and 
'" Cf. A. Feenberg, "The Bias of Technology", cit., p. 253. 
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philosophical obstacles which seemed to be in the way of a critical theory of technology, 
and I think that Marcuse's and Feenberg's contributions demonstrate that this can be done 
without dumping reason, and scientific reason, into the dustbin of history. 
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9 
Us 10 N. - 
The philosophical itinerary of my investigation into the idea of progress has moved 
from a genealogical analysis of this idea to arrive at the definition of a dialectical 
framework for technological progress. In undertaking an examination of the 
confrontation between Loewith and Blumenberg, I claimed that the idea of progress 
contains within its own semantic baggage a redeeming element which is not covered by 
Blumenberg's account of modernity in ten-ns of human self-assertion. While 
considering as plausible Blurnenberg's thesis that modernity represents a second 
overcoming of Gnosticism - that is, that modernity unfolds in terms of a historical 
process in which the destiny of the world is taken away from the inscrutable designs of 
God and placed within the reach of the human project of self- affirmation -I argued that 
Blumenberg's narrative can be justified only within a framework of philosophy of 
history. As a consequence, the semantic content implicit in the idea of progress is not 
exhausted by the circumstances of its emergence in the enterprises of physics and 
astronomy at the onset of the modem age, but implies a goal transcending the actual 
historical context of modernity. Loewith's claim that the idea of progress represents a 
secularization of the theological idea of salvation captures precisely the excess of 
meaning which goes missing in Blumenberg's analysis. 
This eschatological element occupies a primary role even in the negative 
philosophies of history developed by Nietzsche and Heidegger. Nietzsche's ideal of the 
overman as a synthesis of the master and slave types and Heidegger's envision of a 
postmodern age emerging from the overman's act of pushing forward to its most radical 
logical conclusions the world of technology reflect a dialectical tension operating at the 
core of the concept of progress. Yet) with Heidegger the phenomenon of technology as 
the essential characteristic of modem society becomes prominent. Technology, 
Heidegger explains, is not a tool in the hands of man to serve his purposes but a 
destiny, a way of life whose inner logic has taken over man's power of choice. 
This substantive theory of technology seems to reproduce, at the culmination of 
modernity, that condition of hiddeness and imperscrutability of God articulated by the 
Gnostic doctrine which, according to Blumenberg, was overcome during the transition 
from the Middle Ages to modernity through the revaluation of the world. Thus, at this 
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stage, if Heidegger's apocalyptic vision of attributing quasi-dIvine powers to 
technology is correct, a kind of "third overcoming of Gnosticism" is needed. 
However, while rejecting the neutrality of technology and partially embracing 
Heidegger's substantialism, Feenberg argues in his interpretation of Marcuse that the 
vast machinery which characterizes the modern world is not a mechanistic and 
deterministic order but contains internal tensions and contradictions wl-&h can be 
exploited by social forces to open a range of possible futures based upon a politics of 
technological transformation. Technology is neither neutral nor a destiny: it is not 
neutral because it is embedded with the values and interests of the dominant classes; it 
is not a destiny because it is a cultural product liable to a plurality of developments and 
civilizational. alternatives. A fundamental ambivalence is inscribed in the technical 
codes according to which machines are designed and built up and this allows other 
possible rationalizations to be explored through a reconfiguration of human and 
technical resources. 
In order to counter the danger of falling back into a condition of Gnostic fatalism, 
I argued that Marcuse's dialectical framework for technological progress accounts for 
the possibility of reorganizing modem industrial society by making its development 
conform to the demands of a wider range of values. A technical politics capable of 
keeping together political and technical considerations and of providing new criteria of 
innovation for technical development could seize upon the tensions in the industrial 
system 'to actualize ambivalent potentialities' so far suppresed by the dominant 
paradigm of rationality. 
This utopian project of civilizational. change does not involve a reform of science 
but requires a radical transformation of the relation between scientific enterprise, 
technological design, and social and political structure. Technology is not exclusive 
domain of a technically educated apparatus of managers and bureaucrats. In the current 
organization of society, it tends to clash with the dimension of communicative 
rationality because technical functions are undemocratically performed in disregard of 
common needs and interests. But a technical politics aimed at reconceptualizing the 
spheres of influence of all domains of life can subvert the operational autonomy of the 
specialized elites and subject their claims to power to democratic control. 
Adorno's theory of negative dialectic and Habermas's theory of communicative 
action presuppose the unchallenged imperialism of formal and 
instrumental rationality 
and therefore relegate the task of philosophy to the spectatonal role of either criticizing 
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abstractly actual instances of progress or placing boundaries to technological 
imperatives. Neither of them, however, engages in the more positive enterprise of 
inventing a politics of technological transformation. I have argued instead that 
Marcuse's materialist-dialectical framework offers a feasible instrument for integrating 
the larger context of human needs and potentialities within the very structure of the 
rules and procedures of technological development. Now, whether the direction of 
progress should take a path in which human and technical elements are combined into a 
dialectical totality or should remain anchored to the level of instrumental rationality is a 
political choice. The practical implications involved in this choice have not been dealt 
with in the course of the thesis. Here, I have focused my attention on the more 
fundamental philosophical question of the possibility of progress through a 
confrontation of positive and negative philosophies of history. The question whether 
history displays progress is not an empirical but a normative one. It cannot be 
disconnected from the question of whether there should or should not be progress. 
Although this statement may evoke a Kantian echo, it should be empasized that I 
have not pursued the search for transcendental grounds in order to legitimize the idea of 
progress. On the contrary, this study has been conducted in the Hegelian fashion of 
treating history according to the dialectical method. Since progress implies, as Marcuse 
claims, that the given state of affairs is negated and not continued, the philosophical 
categories of actuality and potentiality which Hegel employed for understanding history 
have imposed themselves without the chrism of arbitrariness. 
In embracing Marcuse's dialectical framework to account for a technological 
transformation of the structures of society, I appeal to his concept of essence as a 
historical category. By 'essence', Marcuse refers to 'the totality of the social process as 
it is organized in a particular epoch'. ' Essence is something which has become, the 
result of a process in which actual facts are transcended towards their own 
potentialities. The possibilities inherent in a particular historical situation are 
determined by the measure of control of nature, the degree of development of the 
productive forces, and the level of emancipation of human needs - 'the "free" needs 
for 
gratification and happiness, for the "good and beautiful"' - from the elementary stage of 
the reproduction of life. ' 
' Cf. H. Marcuse, "The Concept of Essence", in Negations, cit., p. 70. 
2 Cf. H. Marcuse, ibid., p. 72. 
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However, in order to grasp the historical tendencies operating within a particular 
mode of social organization, Marcuse appeals to an account of the course of history as a 
whole. In his view, the projection of a historical goal embodying a more advanced form 
of social life must be made through a process of recollection of the past, that is by 
analyzing all aspects of the present form of life in their interconnected unity and by 
showing them as resulting from an entire sequence of historical appearences. This 
anchoring of the essential potentialities of a given historical situation to the concrete 
conditions of life preserves the dialectical method from the abstractness of utopian 
idealism. 
The main claim of this thesis is that there is no theory of progress without a 
philosophy of history, that is without an overall account of the whole course of history. 
I have argued that Nietzsche, contrary to the most widespread interpretations of his 
thought, discerns a progressive directionality in the history of Western civilization 
leading from the decline of the master type to the affirmation of the overman, and that 
this development can be explained in dialectical terms. Heidegger, too, I have 
contended, speaks of a dialectical necessity implicit in the history of the forgetfulness 
of Being, in spite of his assumption that all historical epochs are mere manifestations of 
the play of chance of Being. What distinguishes, then, 'negative' from 'positive' 
philosophies of history - or, in other terms, critics and advocates of progress - does not 
lie in their different conceptions of time and history. Nietzsche, a presumed critic of 
progress, seems not to have rejected the idea of linear time, whereas Marcuse - at least 
the Marcuse of Eros and Civilization, an apologist of progress - embraces Hegel's 
dialectical model with his view of the culmination of the historical process as a return 
to the beginning. 
In the ultimate analysis, it seems to me that the difference separating the two 
philosophies of history - the nihilistic and the utopian or, better, materialist-dialectical 
ones - resides in the different value judgements they attach to the course of 
history. 
There is nothing vaguely abstract in Nietzsche's narrative of the transition from the 
master type to the overman via the slave type. His philosophy of history is as much 
'concrete' as Marcuse's. If he gives his preference to an individualist view of human 
emancipation, this is because of his fundamentally tragic conception of human 
existence. Of a different mould, instead, is Heidegger's narrative of modernity. There 
appears to be in his argument a theoretical flaw descending from his fatalistic 
conception of Being and I have described his account of the emergence of modernity as 
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utterly arbitrary. By contrast, Marcuse bestows a totally different etl&al import upon 
the experience of -dornination of man upon man. For li-im, 'humanitarian and moral 
arguments are not merely deceitful ideology. Rather, they can and must become central 
social forces. " 
Marcuse's philosopl-fical reflection shows that purely explanatory patterns 
accounting for the mechanisms which preside over historical change are not sufficient 
to legitimize the idea of progress. At bottom, insights into a better way of life 
transcending 'the bad current state of humanity' can find their truth only in historical 
action and in the struggle of humanity to overcome suffering. Habermas, in reporting a 
conversation he had with Marcuse a few days before his death on the normative basis of 
Critical Theory, remembers Marcuse as having told him: 'look, I know wherein our 
most basic value judgements are rooted - in compassion, in our sense for the suffering 
of the others. " 
No better place than human misery speaks of the necessity of a real fulfilment of 
human desires and potentialities. 
Cf. J. Habermas, "Psychic Thermidor and the Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity" in 
R. J. Bernstein 
(ed. ), Habermas and Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 66-77, p. 
76. 
Cf. J. Haberrnas, ibid., p. 77. 
267 
Adorno, T., and Horkheimer, M., Dialectic of Enlightenment, Verso, London, 1979. 
Adorno, T., Negative Dialectics, Routledge, London, 1973. 
Aesthetic Theory, Routledge, London 1984. 
The Jargon of Authenticity, Routledge, London, 1973. 
Prisms, Neville Spearman, London, 1961. 
"Progress", in The Philosophical Forum, vol. XV, Fall-Winter 1983-84, pp. 55-70. 
"Sociology and Empirical ResearcIf ', in Adorno, T., The Positivist Dispute in Gennan 
Sociology, Heineman, London, 1969. 
Ansell-Pearson, K., Nietzsche contra Rousseau, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1991. 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, The University of Michigan Press, 1960. 
Barnes, J., Aristotle, Oxford University Press, 1982. 
Benhabib, S., Critique, Norm, and Utopia, Columbia University Press, New York, 1986. 
Benjamin, W., "Theses on the Philosophy of History", in Benjamin, W., Illuminations, 
Fontana, Glasgow, 1973. 
Birault, H., "Beatitude in Nietzsche", in Allison, D. B., (ed. ), The New Nietzsche, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985. 
Blumenberg, H., The Legitimacy of the Modem Age, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1995. 
Bultmann, D. R., History and Eschatology, The Edinburgh University Press, 1957. 
Cassirer, E., The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Beacon Press, Boston, 1961. 
The Questions of J. J Rousseau, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1963. 
Conway, D. W., "Genealogy and Critical Method", in Schacht, R., (ed. ), Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, Morality, University of California Press, 1994. 
Davey, N., "Hermeneutics and Nietzsche" s Early Thought", in Ansell-Pearson, K., (ed. ), 
Nietzsche and Modem German Thought, Routledge, London, 199 1, pp. 88-118. 
Feenberg, A., Critical Theory of Technology, Oxford University Press, 199 1. 
"The Bias of Technology", in Pippin, R., Feenberg, A., and Webel, C. P., (eds. ), 
Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise of Utopia, London, 1988. 
Gadamer, H. G., Truth and Method, Sheed and Ward, London, 1975. 
268 
Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, Yale University Press, 1976. 
GiBespie, M. A., Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground o History, The University of Chicago !f 
Press, Chicago, 984. 
Jay, M., "Juergen Habennas and the Reconstruction of Marxist HolisnY', in Jay, M., 
Marxism and Totality, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1984. 
Haar, M., "Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language", in Allison, D. B., (ed. ), The New 
Nietzsche, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985. 
Habermas, J., "The Entry into Postmodernity: Nietzsche as a Turning Point", in Habermas, 
J., The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1991, pp. 83-105. 
'The Entwinement of Myth and Enlightenment: Max Horkheirner and Theodor 
Adorno"', in The Philosophical Discourse ofModemity, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 199 1. 
"Modernity's Consciousness of Time and Its Need for Self-Reassurance", in Habennas, 
J., The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, The MIT Press, Carnbridge, 
Massachusetts, 199 1. 
"Psychic Them-fidor and the Rebirth of Rebellious Subjectivity", in Bernstein, R. J., 
(ed. ), Habermas and Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985. 
Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, Beacon Press, Boston, 1984. 
Communication and the Evolution of Society, Heinemann, London, 1979. 
Heidegger, M., "The Word of Nietzsche: 'God is Dead' ", in Heidegger, M., The Question 
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 
1977. "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra", in Allison, D. B., (ed. ), The New 
Nietzsche, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985. 
Nietzsche, vol. IV, Harper & Row Publishers, San Francisco, 1982. 
"Letter on Humanism", in Heidegger, M., (ed. ), Basic Writings, Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, London and Henley, 1978. 
"The Age of the World Picture", in Heidegger, M., (ed. ), The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1977. 
"The Origin of the Work of Art", in Heidegger, M., (ed. ), The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1977. 
"Only A God Can Save Us: An Interview with Martin Heidegger", in Graduate Faculty 
Philosophy Journal, vol. IV, No. 1,1977. 
269 
Being and Time, Harper & Row Publishers, New York, 1962. 
Heller, K. J.; "Adomo Against the Grain: Re-reading Theodor Adomo's Philosophy of 
History", in Praxis International, 11 (3), 199 1, pp. 354-376. 
Horkheimer, M., Eclipse of Reason, The Seabury Press, New York, 1974. 
Horowitz, A., Rousseau, Nature, and History, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 19 87. 
Hoy, D. C., "Nietzsche, Hume, and the Genealogical Method-, in Yovel, Y., Nietzsche as 
Affirmative Thinker, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986. 
Ingram, D., Critical Theory and Philosophy, Paragon House, New York, 1990. 
Kolb, D., The Critique of Pure Modernity, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1986. 
Lampert, L., Nietzsche's Teaching, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1986. 
Loewith, K., Meaning in History, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949. 
Loewy, M., and Varikas, E., "The World Spirit on the Fins of a Rocket: Adorno's Critique 
of Progress", in Radical Philosophy, 70, March/April 1995, pp. 9-16. 
Magnus, B., "Nietzsche's Eternalistic Counter-Mytlf', in Review of Metaphysics 26: 4, 
(1973), pp. 604-616. 
"Perfectibility and Attitude in Nietzsche's Uebermensch", in Review of Metaphysics, 
36, (March 1983), pp. 633-659. 
Marcuse, H., "The Concept of Essence", in Marcuse, H., Negations, Allen Lane The 
Penguin Press, London, 1968, pp. 43-87. 
Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, ARK Paperbacks, London, 
1987. 
One-Dimensional Man, Routledge, London, 1964. 
Marx, W., Heidegger and the Tradition, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 197 1. 
Melzer, A. M., The Natural Goodness of Man, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
and London, 1990. 
Nehemas, A., "The Genealogy of Genealogy", in Schacht, R., (ed. ), Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
Morality, University of California Press, 1994, pp. 269-283. 
Nietzsche, F., The Will to Power, Random Horse, New York, 1967. 
Untimely Meditations, Cambridge UniversitY Press, Cambridge, 1983. 
The Anti-Christ, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1990. 
On the Genealogy of Morals, Vintage Books, New York, 1962. 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1961. 
Offe, C., "Technology and One-Dimensionality: A Version of the Technocracy 
Thesis? ", in 
270 
Pippin, R., Feenberg, A., and Webel, C. P., (eds. ), Marcuse: Critical Theory and the 
Promise of Utopia, London, 1988. 
Owen, D., Maturity and Modernity, Routledge, London, 1994. 
Pippin, R. B., "Blumenberg and the Modernity Problerrf', in Pippin R. B., Idealism as 
Modernism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997, pp. 265-285. 
"Irony and Affirmation in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in Gillespie, M. A., and 
Strong, T. B., (ed. ), Nietzsche's New Seas, The University of Chicago Press, CMcago, 
19 8 8, pp. 45 -7 1. 
"Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the Metaphysics of Modemity", in Ansell-Pearson, K., 
(ed. ), Nietzsche and Modem German Thought, Routledge, London, 199 1. 
Richardson, J., Nietzsche's System, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996. 
Rocco, C., "Between Modernity and Postmodernity: Reading Dialectic of Enlightenment 
against the Grain", in Political Theory, vol. 22, No. 1,1994, pp. 71-97. 
Rose, G., The Melancholy Science, The Macmilhan Press LTD, London, 1978. 
Roth, G., "Rationalization in Max Weber's Developmental History"', in Lash, S., and 
Whimster, S., Max Weber, Rationality, and Modernity, AHen & Unwin, London, 
1987. 
Rousseau, J. J. , "Discourse on the 
Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men' ', in 
The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 3, University Press of New England, 
Hanover and London, 1992. 
Reveries of a Solitary Walker, Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1979. 
Schacht, R., "Of Morals and Menschen, in Schacht, R., (ed. ), Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
Morality, University of California Press, 1994, pp. 427-448. 
Schluchter, W., Rationalism, Religion, and Domination, University of California Press, 
1989. 
Schopenauer, A., The World as Will and Representation, Dover Pubhcations, New York, 
1966. 
Schroeder, R., Max Weber and the Sociology of Culture, Sage, London, 1992. 
SinTson, L., Technology, Time, and the Conversations of Modernity, Routledge, New 
York, 1995. 
SmaH, R., 'Eternal Recurrence", in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 13: 
4, (December 
1983), pp. 585-605. 
Steiner, G., Heidegger, The Harvester Press, London, 1992. 
271 
Strauss, L., "Three Waves of Modernity", in Political Philosophy: Six Essays by Leo 
Strauss, Pegasus, New York, 1975, pp. 81-98. 
"The Crisis of Modem Right", in Natural right and History, University of Chicago 
Press, CWcago, 1953. 
Tiedemann, R., "Historical Materialism or Political Messianism: An Interpretation of the 
Theses 'On the Concept of History' ", in Philosophical Forum, 15, Fall-Winter 1984, 
pp. 71-104. 
Vattirno, G., "Nietzsche and Contemporary Henneneutics"), in Yovel, Y., Nietzsche as 
Affinnative Thinker, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, pp. 58-68. 
Wallace, R. M., "Progress, Secularization, and Modernity: The Loewith-Blumenberg 
Debate", in New German Critique, 1989, n. 22, pp. 63-79. 
Weber, M., The Sociology of Religion, Methuen, London, 1965. 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London, 1930. 
"Science as a VocatioW', in From Max Weber., Essays in Sociology, Routledge, 
London, 1948. 
Weiss, J., "On the Irreversibility of Western Rationalization and Max Weber's Alleged 
Fatalisid', in Lash, S., and V41ftuster, S., Max Weber, Rationality, and Modernity, 
Allen & Unwin, London, 1987. 
VAiitlock, G., Retuming to Sils-Maria, Peter Lang, New York, 1990. 
Windharn, M. E., "Nietzsche's Philosopher of the Future as an Ethicist: Experimentalism 
in EtMcs", ) in International 
Studies in Philosophy, XXIV/2,1992, pp. 115-124. 
Yovel, Y. . "Nietzsche and 
Spinoza: amorfati and amor dei", in Yovel, Y., (ed. ), Nietzsche 
as Affirmative Thinker, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986, pp. 183-203. 
Zimmerman, M. E., Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity, Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis, 1990. 
Zuidervaart, L., Adorno's Aesthetic Theory: The Redemption of an Illusion, The MIT 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 199 1. 
272 
